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| author | Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> | 2015-08-19 20:40:41 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> | 2015-08-26 20:34:24 +0100 |
| commit | a5e090acbf545c0a3b04080f8a488b17ec41fe02 (patch) | |
| tree | ae603e2e67bcac0564b2eba0a7771f8c5cebf352 /arch/arm/Kconfig | |
| parent | 2190fed67ba6f3e8129513929f2395843645e928 (diff) | |
ARM: software-based priviledged-no-access support
Provide a software-based implementation of the priviledged no access
support found in ARMv8.1.
Userspace pages are mapped using a different domain number from the
kernel and IO mappings. If we switch the user domain to "no access"
when we enter the kernel, we can prevent the kernel from touching
userspace.
However, the kernel needs to be able to access userspace via the
various user accessor functions. With the wrapping in the previous
patch, we can temporarily enable access when the kernel needs user
access, and re-disable it afterwards.
This allows us to trap non-intended accesses to userspace, eg, caused
by an inadvertent dereference of the LIST_POISON* values, which, with
appropriate user mappings setup, can be made to succeed. This in turn
can allow use-after-free bugs to be further exploited than would
otherwise be possible.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm/Kconfig')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/arm/Kconfig | 15 |
1 files changed, 15 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig index a750c1425c3a..e15d5ed4d5f1 100644 --- a/arch/arm/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig @@ -1694,6 +1694,21 @@ config HIGHPTE bool "Allocate 2nd-level pagetables from highmem" depends on HIGHMEM +config CPU_SW_DOMAIN_PAN + bool "Enable use of CPU domains to implement privileged no-access" + depends on MMU && !ARM_LPAE + default y + help + Increase kernel security by ensuring that normal kernel accesses + are unable to access userspace addresses. This can help prevent + use-after-free bugs becoming an exploitable privilege escalation + by ensuring that magic values (such as LIST_POISON) will always + fault when dereferenced. + + CPUs with low-vector mappings use a best-efforts implementation. + Their lower 1MB needs to remain accessible for the vectors, but + the remainder of userspace will become appropriately inaccessible. + config HW_PERF_EVENTS bool "Enable hardware performance counter support for perf events" depends on PERF_EVENTS |