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authorDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>2023-08-29 08:07:25 -0700
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2023-09-23 10:59:52 +0200
commitac78921ec2467b7364636d7efd6bbdd8030ca7d8 (patch)
treea47a381220d30fc30bcef5b597bacb36332aa5dd /arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
parentdf7ca43fe090e1a56c216c8ebc106ef5fd49afc6 (diff)
x86/speculation: Mark all Skylake CPUs as vulnerable to GDS
[ Upstream commit c9f4c45c8ec3f07f4f083f9750032a1ec3eab6b2 ] The Gather Data Sampling (GDS) vulnerability is common to all Skylake processors. However, the "client" Skylakes* are now in this list: https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/support/articles/000022396/processors.html which means they are no longer included for new vulnerabilities here: https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/topic-technology/software-security-guidance/processors-affected-consolidated-product-cpu-model.html or in other GDS documentation. Thus, they were not included in the original GDS mitigation patches. Mark SKYLAKE and SKYLAKE_L as vulnerable to GDS to match all the other Skylake CPUs (which include Kaby Lake). Also group the CPUs so that the ones that share the exact same vulnerabilities are next to each other. Last, move SRBDS to the end of each line. This makes it clear at a glance that SKYLAKE_X is unique. Of the five Skylakes, it is the only "server" CPU and has a different implementation from the clients of the "special register" hardware, making it immune to SRBDS. This makes the diff much harder to read, but the resulting table is worth it. I very much appreciate the report from Michael Zhivich about this issue. Despite what level of support a hardware vendor is providing, the kernel very much needs an accurate and up-to-date list of vulnerable CPUs. More reports like this are very welcome. * Client Skylakes are CPUID 406E3/506E3 which is family 6, models 0x4E and 0x5E, aka INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE and INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_L. Reported-by: Michael Zhivich <mzhivich@akamai.com> Fixes: 8974eb588283 ("x86/speculation: Add Gather Data Sampling mitigation") Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c8
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 0c0c2cb038ad..1592f309c3c1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1147,11 +1147,11 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(CANNONLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | GDS),