xen: Revert commits da72ff5bfcb0 and 72a9b186292d

commit 84d582d236dc1f9085e741affc72e9ba061a67c2 upstream.

Recent discussion (http://marc.info/?l=xen-devel&m=149192184523741)
established that commit 72a9b186292d ("xen: Remove event channel
notification through Xen PCI platform device") (and thus commit
da72ff5bfcb0 ("partially revert "xen: Remove event channel
notification through Xen PCI platform device"")) are unnecessary and,
in fact, prevent HVM guests from booting on Xen releases prior to 4.0

Therefore we revert both of those commits.

The summary of that discussion is below:

  Here is the brief summary of the current situation:

  Before the offending commit (72a9b186292):

  1) INTx does not work because of the reset_watches path.
  2) The reset_watches path is only taken if you have Xen > 4.0
  3) The Linux Kernel by default will use vector inject if the hypervisor
     support. So even INTx does not work no body running the kernel with
     Xen > 4.0 would notice. Unless he explicitly disabled this feature
     either in the kernel or in Xen (and this can only be disabled by
     modifying the code, not user-supported way to do it).

  After the offending commit (+ partial revert):

  1) INTx is no longer support for HVM (only for PV guests).
  2) Any HVM guest The kernel will not boot on Xen < 4.0 which does
     not have vector injection support. Since the only other mode
     supported is INTx which.

  So based on this summary, I think before commit (72a9b186292) we were
  in much better position from a user point of view.

Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@amazon.com>
Cc: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

5 files changed, 34 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/events.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/events.h
index 608a79d5a466..e6911caf5bbf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/events.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/events.h
@@ -20,4 +20,15 @@ static inline int xen_irqs_disabled(struct pt_regs *regs)
 /* No need for a barrier -- XCHG is a barrier on x86. */
 #define xchg_xen_ulong(ptr, val) xchg((ptr), (val))
 
+extern int xen_have_vector_callback;
+
+/*
+ * Events delivered via platform PCI interrupts are always
+ * routed to vcpu 0 and hence cannot be rebound.
+ */
+static inline bool xen_support_evtchn_rebind(void)
+{
+	return (!xen_hvm_domain() || xen_have_vector_callback);
+}
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_XEN_EVENTS_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/pci/xen.c b/arch/x86/pci/xen.c
index a00a6c07bb6f..4ea9f290c19f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/pci/xen.c
+++ b/arch/x86/pci/xen.c
@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ void __init xen_msi_init(void)
 
 int __init pci_xen_hvm_init(void)
 {
-	if (!xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_pirqs))
+	if (!xen_have_vector_callback || !xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_pirqs))
 		return 0;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
index bdd855685403..8f1f7efa848c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
@@ -137,6 +137,8 @@ struct shared_info xen_dummy_shared_info;
 void *xen_initial_gdt;
 
 RESERVE_BRK(shared_info_page_brk, PAGE_SIZE);
+__read_mostly int xen_have_vector_callback;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xen_have_vector_callback);
 
 static int xen_cpu_up_prepare(unsigned int cpu);
 static int xen_cpu_up_online(unsigned int cpu);
@@ -1521,7 +1523,10 @@ static void __init xen_pvh_early_guest_init(void)
 	if (!xen_feature(XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap))
 		return;
 
-	BUG_ON(!xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_callback_vector));
+	if (!xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_callback_vector))
+		return;
+
+	xen_have_vector_callback = 1;
 
 	xen_pvh_early_cpu_init(0, false);
 	xen_pvh_set_cr_flags(0);
@@ -1860,7 +1865,9 @@ static int xen_cpu_up_prepare(unsigned int cpu)
 		xen_vcpu_setup(cpu);
 	}
 
-	if (xen_pv_domain() || xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_safe_pvclock))
+	if (xen_pv_domain() ||
+	    (xen_have_vector_callback &&
+	     xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_safe_pvclock)))
 		xen_setup_timer(cpu);
 
 	rc = xen_smp_intr_init(cpu);
@@ -1876,7 +1883,9 @@ static int xen_cpu_dead(unsigned int cpu)
 {
 	xen_smp_intr_free(cpu);
 
-	if (xen_pv_domain() || xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_safe_pvclock))
+	if (xen_pv_domain() ||
+	    (xen_have_vector_callback &&
+	     xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_safe_pvclock)))
 		xen_teardown_timer(cpu);
 
 	return 0;
@@ -1915,8 +1924,8 @@ static void __init xen_hvm_guest_init(void)
 
 	xen_panic_handler_init();
 
-	BUG_ON(!xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_callback_vector));
-
+	if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_callback_vector))
+		xen_have_vector_callback = 1;
 	xen_hvm_smp_init();
 	WARN_ON(xen_cpuhp_setup());
 	xen_unplug_emulated_devices();
@@ -1954,7 +1963,7 @@ bool xen_hvm_need_lapic(void)
 		return false;
 	if (!xen_hvm_domain())
 		return false;
-	if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_pirqs))
+	if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_pirqs) && xen_have_vector_callback)
 		return false;
 	return true;
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/smp.c b/arch/x86/xen/smp.c
index 311acad7dad2..137afbbd0590 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/smp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/smp.c
@@ -765,6 +765,8 @@ static void __init xen_hvm_smp_prepare_cpus(unsigned int max_cpus)
 
 void __init xen_hvm_smp_init(void)
 {
+	if (!xen_have_vector_callback)
+		return;
 	smp_ops.smp_prepare_cpus = xen_hvm_smp_prepare_cpus;
 	smp_ops.smp_send_reschedule = xen_smp_send_reschedule;
 	smp_ops.cpu_die = xen_cpu_die;
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/time.c b/arch/x86/xen/time.c
index 33d8f6a7829d..67356d29d74d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/time.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/time.c
@@ -432,6 +432,11 @@ static void xen_hvm_setup_cpu_clockevents(void)
 
 void __init xen_hvm_init_time_ops(void)
 {
+	/* vector callback is needed otherwise we cannot receive interrupts
+	 * on cpu > 0 and at this point we don't know how many cpus are
+	 * available */
+	if (!xen_have_vector_callback)
+		return;
 	if (!xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_safe_pvclock)) {
 		printk(KERN_INFO "Xen doesn't support pvclock on HVM,"
 				"disable pv timer\n");