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authorDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>2016-04-06 16:14:26 +0100
committerDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>2016-04-11 22:43:43 +0100
commita511e1af8b12f44c6e55786c463c9f093c214fb6 (patch)
tree68451cc38ab74ac81f11825a407008c01918147b /crypto/asymmetric_keys
parent99716b7cae8263e1c7e7c1987e95d8f67071ab3e (diff)
KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link()
Move the point at which a key is determined to be trustworthy to __key_link() so that we use the contents of the keyring being linked in to to determine whether the key being linked in is trusted or not. What is 'trusted' then becomes a matter of what's in the keyring. Currently, the test is done when the key is parsed, but given that at that point we can only sensibly refer to the contents of the system trusted keyring, we can only use that as the basis for working out the trustworthiness of a new key. With this change, a trusted keyring is a set of keys that once the trusted-only flag is set cannot be added to except by verification through one of the contained keys. Further, adding a key into a trusted keyring, whilst it might grant trustworthiness in the context of that keyring, does not automatically grant trustworthiness in the context of a second keyring to which it could be secondarily linked. To accomplish this, the authentication data associated with the key source must now be retained. For an X.509 cert, this means the contents of the AuthorityKeyIdentifier and the signature data. If system keyrings are disabled then restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted() resolves to restrict_link_reject(). The integrity digital signature code still works correctly with this as it was previously using KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, which doesn't permit anything to be added if there is no system keyring against which trust can be determined. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/asymmetric_keys')
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c62
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h6
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c21
3 files changed, 33 insertions, 56 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
index b4c10f2f5034..ac4bddf669de 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* Instantiate a public key crypto key from an X.509 Certificate
*
- * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2012, 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
@@ -9,20 +9,12 @@
* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
*/
-#define pr_fmt(fmt) "X.509: "fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "ASYM: "fmt
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
-#include <linux/mpi.h>
-#include <linux/asn1_decoder.h>
-#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
-#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>
-#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
-#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include "asymmetric_keys.h"
-#include "x509_parser.h"
static bool use_builtin_keys;
static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid;
@@ -62,45 +54,55 @@ static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
__setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup);
#endif
-/*
+/**
+ * restrict_link_by_signature - Restrict additions to a ring of public keys
+ * @trust_keyring: A ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert.
+ * @type: The type of key being added.
+ * @payload: The payload of the new key.
+ *
* Check the new certificate against the ones in the trust keyring. If one of
* those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark the
* new certificate as being trusted.
*
- * Return 0 if the new certificate was successfully validated, 1 if we couldn't
- * find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list and an error if there
- * is a matching certificate but the signature check fails.
+ * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we couldn't find a
+ * matching parent certificate in the trusted list, -EKEYREJECTED if the
+ * signature check fails or the key is blacklisted and some other error if
+ * there is a matching certificate but the signature check cannot be performed.
*/
-int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
- struct key *trust_keyring)
+int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *trust_keyring,
+ const struct key_type *type,
+ const union key_payload *payload)
{
- struct public_key_signature *sig = cert->sig;
+ const struct public_key_signature *sig;
struct key *key;
- int ret = 1;
+ int ret;
- if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1])
- return 1;
+ pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
if (!trust_keyring)
+ return -ENOKEY;
+
+ if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ sig = payload->data[asym_auth];
+ if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1])
+ return 0;
+
if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(sig->auth_ids[1], ca_keyid))
return -EPERM;
- if (cert->unsupported_sig)
- return -ENOPKG;
+ /* See if we have a key that signed this one. */
key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
sig->auth_ids[0], sig->auth_ids[1],
false);
if (IS_ERR(key))
- return PTR_ERR(key);
+ return -ENOKEY;
- if (!use_builtin_keys ||
- test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags)) {
- ret = verify_signature(key, cert->sig);
- if (ret == -ENOPKG)
- cert->unsupported_sig = true;
- }
+ if (use_builtin_keys && !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags))
+ ret = -ENOKEY;
+ else
+ ret = verify_signature(key, sig);
key_put(key);
return ret;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_validate_trust);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
index 7a802b09a509..05eef1c68881 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
@@ -58,9 +58,3 @@ extern int x509_decode_time(time64_t *_t, size_t hdrlen,
*/
extern int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert);
extern int x509_check_for_self_signed(struct x509_certificate *cert);
-
-/*
- * public_key_trust.c
- */
-extern int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
- struct key *trust_keyring);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 6d7f42f0de9a..fb732296cd36 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -178,31 +178,12 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
cert->pub->id_type = "X509";
- /* See if we can derive the trustability of this certificate.
- *
- * When it comes to self-signed certificates, we cannot evaluate
- * trustedness except by the fact that we obtained it from a trusted
- * location. So we just rely on x509_validate_trust() failing in this
- * case.
- *
- * Note that there's a possibility of a self-signed cert matching a
- * cert that we have (most likely a duplicate that we already trust) -
- * in which case it will be marked trusted.
- */
- if (cert->unsupported_sig || cert->self_signed) {
+ if (cert->unsupported_sig) {
public_key_signature_free(cert->sig);
cert->sig = NULL;
} else {
pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n",
cert->sig->pkey_algo, cert->sig->hash_algo);
-
- ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, get_system_trusted_keyring());
- if (ret)
- ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, get_ima_mok_keyring());
- if (ret == -EKEYREJECTED)
- goto error_free_cert;
- if (!ret)
- prep->trusted = true;
}
/* Propose a description */