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authorEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>2014-12-05 17:51:47 -0600
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2015-01-08 10:00:50 -0800
commit096b0c8d7033ef56d4c0eb13a29865a021eedea5 (patch)
tree7440d166d574eb606a6fbd5d39115ec908a64915 /kernel
parent00fcd1ceab6c42f7facfa0168b207fe70ee198c2 (diff)
userns: Document what the invariant required for safe unprivileged mappings.
commit 0542f17bf2c1f2430d368f44c8fcf2f82ec9e53e upstream. The rule is simple. Don't allow anything that wouldn't be allowed without unprivileged mappings. It was previously overlooked that establishing gid mappings would allow dropping groups and potentially gaining permission to files and directories that had lesser permissions for a specific group than for all other users. This is the rule needed to fix CVE-2014-8989 and prevent any other security issues with new_idmap_permitted. The reason for this rule is that the unix permission model is old and there are programs out there somewhere that take advantage of every little corner of it. So allowing a uid or gid mapping to be established without privielge that would allow anything that would not be allowed without that mapping will result in expectations from some code somewhere being violated. Violated expectations about the behavior of the OS is a long way to say a security issue. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r--kernel/user_namespace.c4
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
index 80a57afd8647..e382fcdc57d6 100644
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -804,7 +804,9 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid,
struct uid_gid_map *new_map)
{
- /* Allow mapping to your own filesystem ids */
+ /* Don't allow mappings that would allow anything that wouldn't
+ * be allowed without the establishment of unprivileged mappings.
+ */
if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1)) {
u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first;
if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) {