diff options
| author | Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> | 2006-11-05 09:04:23 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> | 2006-11-05 09:04:23 +0100 |
| commit | 0ddfcc96928145d6a6425fdd26dad6abfe7f891d (patch) | |
| tree | 9fe3f2eb76d7d690fcde2fe000fa0557cda88de7 /net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | |
| parent | 6ac62be885810e1f8390f0c3b9d3ee451d3d3f19 (diff) | |
[NETFILTER]: Fix ip6_tables extension header bypass bug (CVE-2006-4572)
As reported by Mark Dowd <Mark_Dowd@McAfee.com>, ip6_tables is susceptible
to a fragmentation attack causing false negatives on extension header
matches.
When extension headers occur in the non-first fragment after the fragment
header (possibly with an incorrect nexthdr value in the fragment header)
a rule looking for this extension header will never match.
Drop fragments that are at offset 0 and don't contain the final protocol
header regardless of the ruleset, since this should not happen normally.
Since all extension headers are before the protocol header this makes sure
an extension header is either not present or in the first fragment, where
we can properly parse it.
With help from Yasuyuki KOZAKAI <yasuyuki.kozakai@toshiba.co.jp>.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 11 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c index a3e3da11b1c1..e2bb9acd241c 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c @@ -1447,6 +1447,9 @@ static void __exit fini(void) * If target header is found, its offset is set in *offset and return protocol * number. Otherwise, return -1. * + * If the first fragment doesn't contain the final protocol header or + * NEXTHDR_NONE it is considered invalid. + * * Note that non-1st fragment is special case that "the protocol number * of last header" is "next header" field in Fragment header. In this case, * *offset is meaningless and fragment offset is stored in *fragoff if fragoff @@ -1470,12 +1473,12 @@ int ipv6_find_hdr(const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int *offset, if ((!ipv6_ext_hdr(nexthdr)) || nexthdr == NEXTHDR_NONE) { if (target < 0) break; - return -1; + return -ENOENT; } hp = skb_header_pointer(skb, start, sizeof(_hdr), &_hdr); if (hp == NULL) - return -1; + return -EBADMSG; if (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT) { unsigned short _frag_off, *fp; fp = skb_header_pointer(skb, @@ -1484,7 +1487,7 @@ int ipv6_find_hdr(const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int *offset, sizeof(_frag_off), &_frag_off); if (fp == NULL) - return -1; + return -EBADMSG; _frag_off = ntohs(*fp) & ~0x7; if (_frag_off) { @@ -1495,7 +1498,7 @@ int ipv6_find_hdr(const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int *offset, *fragoff = _frag_off; return hp->nexthdr; } - return -1; + return -ENOENT; } hdrlen = 8; } else if (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_AUTH) |