diff options
| author | Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> | 2018-02-07 13:46:25 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2018-03-18 11:18:53 +0100 |
| commit | f506da51bdf6602ec942f25d682a4de9b59760da (patch) | |
| tree | eedd627a968c3db0d144facbba5beeb5e9934f94 /net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | |
| parent | b323768e610b3108bd8ad48329f420d91e7b336b (diff) | |
netfilter: add back stackpointer size checks
commit 57ebd808a97d7c5b1e1afb937c2db22beba3c1f8 upstream.
The rationale for removing the check is only correct for rulesets
generated by ip(6)tables.
In iptables, a jump can only occur to a user-defined chain, i.e.
because we size the stack based on number of user-defined chains we
cannot exceed stack size.
However, the underlying binary format has no such restriction,
and the validation step only ensures that the jump target is a
valid rule start point.
IOW, its possible to build a rule blob that has no user-defined
chains but does contain a jump.
If this happens, no jump stack gets allocated and crash occurs
because no jumpstack was allocated.
Fixes: 7814b6ec6d0d6 ("netfilter: xtables: don't save/restore jumpstack offset")
Reported-by: syzbot+e783f671527912cd9403@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c index 55aacea24396..3d95b070cdad 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c @@ -376,6 +376,10 @@ ip6t_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb, } if (table_base + v != ip6t_next_entry(e) && !(e->ipv6.flags & IP6T_F_GOTO)) { + if (unlikely(stackidx >= private->stacksize)) { + verdict = NF_DROP; + break; + } jumpstack[stackidx++] = e; } |