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authorKevin Cernekee <cernekee@chromium.org>2017-12-05 15:42:41 -0800
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2018-01-31 12:55:52 +0100
commit898eeca02a55e354c42a7aa5cdfebf16c3742f44 (patch)
tree1d6bb1fb72a99da4d300ed278d563cb5031d3dbd /net
parent2c3184ea80322347287bc7e57f782d77f478e73c (diff)
netfilter: xt_osf: Add missing permission checks
commit 916a27901de01446bcf57ecca4783f6cff493309 upstream. The capability check in nfnetlink_rcv() verifies that the caller has CAP_NET_ADMIN in the namespace that "owns" the netlink socket. However, xt_osf_fingers is shared by all net namespaces on the system. An unprivileged user can create user and net namespaces in which he holds CAP_NET_ADMIN to bypass the netlink_net_capable() check: vpnns -- nfnl_osf -f /tmp/pf.os vpnns -- nfnl_osf -f /tmp/pf.os -d These non-root operations successfully modify the systemwide OS fingerprint list. Add new capable() checks so that they can't. Signed-off-by: Kevin Cernekee <cernekee@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
-rw-r--r--net/netfilter/xt_osf.c7
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_osf.c b/net/netfilter/xt_osf.c
index 2455b69b5810..b589a62e68a2 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_osf.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_osf.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/if.h>
#include <linux/inetdevice.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
@@ -69,6 +70,9 @@ static int xt_osf_add_callback(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl,
struct xt_osf_finger *kf = NULL, *sf;
int err = 0;
+ if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (!osf_attrs[OSF_ATTR_FINGER])
return -EINVAL;
@@ -113,6 +117,9 @@ static int xt_osf_remove_callback(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl,
struct xt_osf_finger *sf;
int err = -ENOENT;
+ if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (!osf_attrs[OSF_ATTR_FINGER])
return -EINVAL;