diff options
| author | Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> | 2014-11-24 12:16:01 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> | 2014-12-13 15:16:16 +0100 |
| commit | 4e5bfd776f9f8f9add60e9eb1a9d7042a48ae2b5 (patch) | |
| tree | 8c22a1c5db88abaca9ec20140b39d868ae28b30b /net | |
| parent | 0973cb310090b529264d92fd4f201de1e316c933 (diff) | |
net: sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in af->from_addr_param on malformed packet
commit a6e1af6f5e9e75095ae1b004f6f00082e5fc4d2d upstream
An SCTP server doing ASCONF will panic on malformed INIT ping-of-death
in the form of:
------------ INIT[PARAM: SET_PRIMARY_IP] ------------>
While the INIT chunk parameter verification dissects through many things
in order to detect malformed input, it misses to actually check parameters
inside of parameters. E.g. RFC5061, section 4.2.4 proposes a 'set primary
IP address' parameter in ASCONF, which has as a subparameter an address
parameter.
So an attacker may send a parameter type other than SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS
or SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS, param_type2af() will subsequently return 0
and thus sctp_get_af_specific() returns NULL, too, which we then happily
dereference unconditionally through af->from_addr_param().
The trace for the log:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000078
IP: [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[...]
Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-504.el6.x86_64 #1 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01e9c62>] [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01f2add>] ? sctp_bind_addr_copy+0x5d/0xe0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e1fcb>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x21b/0x340 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e5c09>] ? sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc+0xc9/0xf0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e61f6>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x116/0x230 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[...]
A minimal way to address this is to check for NULL as we do on all
other such occasions where we know sctp_get_af_specific() could
possibly return with NULL.
Fixes: d6de3097592b ("[SCTP]: Add the handling of "Set Primary IP Address" parameter to INIT")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit e40607cbe270a9e8360907cb1e62ddf0736e4864)
CVE-2014-7841
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1392820
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c index 5f2dc3f6cf92..9de3592d0a56 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c @@ -2544,6 +2544,9 @@ do_addr_param: addr_param = param.v + sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t); af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(param.p->type)); + if (af == NULL) + break; + af->from_addr_param(&addr, addr_param, htons(asoc->peer.port), 0); |