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authorJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>2014-07-11 15:32:23 +0300
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2014-09-17 09:22:14 -0700
commitc8383cb6fd5d8f66fc50319e2d6f8363cecb022b (patch)
treea926ab1735e4e13775fd6f8ec539a84f93511ee0 /net
parent41466215bd7e371a70ece9f4a721f03ccb5cd613 (diff)
Bluetooth: Fix tracking local SSP authentication requirement
commit 6c53823ae0e10e723131055e1e65dd6a328a228e upstream. When we need to make the decision whether to perform just-works or real user confirmation we need to know the exact local authentication requirement that was passed to the controller. So far conn->auth_type (the local requirement) wasn't in one case updated appropriately in fear of the user confirmation being rejected later. The real problem however was not really that conn->auth_type couldn't represent the true value but that we were checking the local MITM requirement in an incorrect way. It's perfectly fine to let auth_type follow what we tell the controller since we're still tracking the target security level with conn->pending_sec_level. This patch updates the check for local MITM requirement in the hci_user_confirm_request_evt function to use the locally requested security level and ensures that auth_type always represents what we tell the controller. All other code in hci_user_confirm_request_evt still uses the auth_type instead of pending_sec_level for determining whether to do just-works or not, since that's the only value that's in sync with what the remote device knows. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com> Tested-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/hci_event.c17
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
index 6c8e405f5ca4..4dac1d2ffefb 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
@@ -3538,18 +3538,14 @@ static void hci_io_capa_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
/* If we are initiators, there is no remote information yet */
if (conn->remote_auth == 0xff) {
- cp.authentication = conn->auth_type;
-
/* Request MITM protection if our IO caps allow it
* except for the no-bonding case.
- * conn->auth_type is not updated here since
- * that might cause the user confirmation to be
- * rejected in case the remote doesn't have the
- * IO capabilities for MITM.
*/
if (conn->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT &&
cp.authentication != HCI_AT_NO_BONDING)
- cp.authentication |= 0x01;
+ conn->auth_type |= 0x01;
+
+ cp.authentication = conn->auth_type;
} else {
conn->auth_type = hci_get_auth_req(conn);
cp.authentication = conn->auth_type;
@@ -3621,9 +3617,12 @@ static void hci_user_confirm_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev,
rem_mitm = (conn->remote_auth & 0x01);
/* If we require MITM but the remote device can't provide that
- * (it has NoInputNoOutput) then reject the confirmation request
+ * (it has NoInputNoOutput) then reject the confirmation
+ * request. We check the security level here since it doesn't
+ * necessarily match conn->auth_type.
*/
- if (loc_mitm && conn->remote_cap == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT) {
+ if (conn->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM &&
+ conn->remote_cap == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT) {
BT_DBG("Rejecting request: remote device can't provide MITM");
hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY,
sizeof(ev->bdaddr), &ev->bdaddr);