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authorKohei Kaigai <Kohei.Kaigai@emea.nec.com>2011-05-26 14:59:25 -0400
committerEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>2011-05-26 17:20:53 -0400
commit0f7e4c33eb2c40b1e9cc24d2eab6de5921bc619c (patch)
tree793c5f834751215dfc93b05540fa9ed46c64ee07 /security
parentea77f7a2e8561012cf100c530170f12351c3b53e (diff)
selinux: fix case of names with whitespace/multibytes on /selinux/create
I submit the patch again, according to patch submission convension. This patch enables to accept percent-encoded object names as forth argument of /selinux/create interface to avoid possible bugs when we give an object name including whitespace or multibutes. E.g) if and when a userspace object manager tries to create a new object named as "resolve.conf but fake", it shall give this name as the forth argument of the /selinux/create. But sscanf() logic in kernel space fetches only the part earlier than the first whitespace. In this case, selinux may unexpectedly answer a default security context configured to "resolve.conf", but it is bug. Although I could not test this patch on named TYPE_TRANSITION rules actually, But debug printk() message seems to me the logic works correctly. I assume the libselinux provides an interface to apply this logic transparently, so nothing shall not be changed from the viewpoint of application. Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kohei.kaigai@emea.nec.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c37
1 files changed, 36 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index fde4e9d64bfd..19489042fdf7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/kobject.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
/* selinuxfs pseudo filesystem for exporting the security policy API.
Based on the proc code and the fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c code. */
@@ -751,6 +752,14 @@ out:
return length;
}
+static inline int hexcode_to_int(int code) {
+ if (code == '\0' || !isxdigit(code))
+ return -1;
+ if (isdigit(code))
+ return code - '0';
+ return tolower(code) - 'a' + 10;
+}
+
static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
{
char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
@@ -785,8 +794,34 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
nargs = sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu %s", scon, tcon, &tclass, namebuf);
if (nargs < 3 || nargs > 4)
goto out;
- if (nargs == 4)
+ if (nargs == 4) {
+ /*
+ * If and when the name of new object to be queried contains
+ * either whitespace or multibyte characters, they shall be
+ * encoded based on the percentage-encoding rule.
+ * If not encoded, the sscanf logic picks up only left-half
+ * of the supplied name; splitted by a whitespace unexpectedly.
+ */
+ char *r, *w;
+ int c1, c2;
+
+ r = w = namebuf;
+ do {
+ c1 = *r++;
+ if (c1 == '+')
+ c1 = ' ';
+ else if (c1 == '%') {
+ if ((c1 = hexcode_to_int(*r++)) < 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((c2 = hexcode_to_int(*r++)) < 0)
+ goto out;
+ c1 = (c1 << 4) | c2;
+ }
+ *w++ = c1;
+ } while (c1 != '\0');
+
objname = namebuf;
+ }
length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
if (length)