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commit d796e77f1dd541fe34481af2eee6454688d13982 upstream.
As a writable mount, it is not expected for overlayfs to return
EINVAL/EROFS for fsync, even if dir/file is not changed.
This commit fixes the case of fsync of directory, which is easier to
address, because overlayfs already implements fsync file operation for
directories.
The problem reported by Raphael is that new PostgreSQL 10.0 with a
database in overlayfs where lower layer in squashfs fails to start.
The failure is due to fsync error, when PostgreSQL does fsync on all
existing db directories on startup and a specific directory exists
lower layer with no changes.
Reported-by: Raphael Hertzog <raphael@ouaza.com>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Raphaël Hertzog <hertzog@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f3038ee3a3f1017a1cbe9907e31fa12d366c5dcb upstream.
This function was introduced by 247e743cbe6e ("Btrfs: Use async helpers
to deal with pages that have been improperly dirtied") and it didn't do
any error handling then. This function might very well fail in ENOMEM
situation, yet it's not handled, this could lead to inconsistent state.
So let's handle the failure by setting the mapping error bit.
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9903a91c763ecdae333a04a9d89d79d2b8966503 upstream.
With pipe-user-pages-hard set to 'N', users were actually only allowed up
to 'N - 1' buffers; and likewise for pipe-user-pages-soft.
Fix this to allow up to 'N' buffers, as would be expected.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180111052902.14409-5-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Fixes: b0b91d18e2e9 ("pipe: fix limit checking in pipe_set_size()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 85c2dd5473b2718b4b63e74bfeb1ca876868e11f upstream.
pipe-user-pages-hard and pipe-user-pages-soft are only supposed to apply
to unprivileged users, as documented in both Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
and the pipe(7) man page.
However, the capabilities are actually only checked when increasing a
pipe's size using F_SETPIPE_SZ, not when creating a new pipe. Therefore,
if pipe-user-pages-hard has been set, the root user can run into it and be
unable to create pipes. Similarly, if pipe-user-pages-soft has been set,
the root user can run into it and have their pipes limited to 1 page each.
Fix this by allowing the privileged override in both cases.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180111052902.14409-4-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Fixes: 759c01142a5d ("pipe: limit the per-user amount of pages allocated in pipes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d0290bc20d4739b7a900ae37eb5d4cc3be2b393f upstream.
Commit df04abfd181a ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext
data") added a bounce buffer to avoid hardened usercopy checks. Copying
to the bounce buffer was implemented with a simple memcpy() assuming
that it is always valid to read from kernel memory iff the
kern_addr_valid() check passed.
A simple, but pointless, test case like "dd if=/proc/kcore of=/dev/null"
now can easily crash the kernel, since the former execption handling on
invalid kernel addresses now doesn't work anymore.
Also adding a kern_addr_valid() implementation wouldn't help here. Most
architectures simply return 1 here, while a couple implemented a page
table walk to figure out if something is mapped at the address in
question.
With DEBUG_PAGEALLOC active mappings are established and removed all the
time, so that relying on the result of kern_addr_valid() before
executing the memcpy() also doesn't work.
Therefore simply use probe_kernel_read() to copy to the bounce buffer.
This also allows to simplify read_kcore().
At least on s390 this fixes the observed crashes and doesn't introduce
warnings that were removed with df04abfd181a ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add
bounce buffer for ktext data"), even though the generic
probe_kernel_read() implementation uses uaccess functions.
While looking into this I'm also wondering if kern_addr_valid() could be
completely removed...(?)
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171202132739.99971-1-heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com
Fixes: df04abfd181a ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data")
Fixes: f5509cc18daa ("mm: Hardened usercopy")
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 073c516ff73557a8f7315066856c04b50383ac34 upstream.
Andrey reported a use-after-free in __ns_get_path():
spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline]
lockref_get_not_dead+0x19/0x80 lib/lockref.c:179
__ns_get_path+0x197/0x860 fs/nsfs.c:66
open_related_ns+0xda/0x200 fs/nsfs.c:143
sock_ioctl+0x39d/0x440 net/socket.c:1001
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:45 [inline]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x1bf/0x1780 fs/ioctl.c:685
SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:700 [inline]
SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:691
We are under rcu read lock protection at that point:
rcu_read_lock();
d = atomic_long_read(&ns->stashed);
if (!d)
goto slow;
dentry = (struct dentry *)d;
if (!lockref_get_not_dead(&dentry->d_lockref))
goto slow;
rcu_read_unlock();
but don't use a proper RCU API on the free path, therefore a parallel
__d_free() could free it at the same time. We need to mark the stashed
dentry with DCACHE_RCUACCESS so that __d_free() will be called after all
readers leave RCU.
Fixes: e149ed2b805f ("take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs")
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ba87977a49913129962af8ac35b0e13e0fa4382d upstream.
Commit b7ce40cff0b9 ("kernfs: cache atomic_write_len in
kernfs_open_file") changes type of local variable 'len' from ssize_t
to size_t. This change caused that the *ppos value is updated also
when the previous write callback failed.
Mentioned snippet:
...
len = ops->write(...); <- return value can be negative
...
if (len > 0) <- true here in this case
*ppos += len;
...
Fixes: b7ce40cff0b9 ("kernfs: cache atomic_write_len in kernfs_open_file")
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ivan Vecera <ivecera@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e231c6879cfd44e4fffd384bb6dd7d313249a523 upstream.
When locking the file in order to do O_DIRECT on it, we must unmap
any mmapped ranges on the pagecache so that we can flush out the
dirty data.
Fixes: a5864c999de67 ("NFS: Do not serialise O_DIRECT reads and writes")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 49686cbbb3ebafe42e63868222f269d8053ead00 upstream.
nfs_idmap_legacy_upcall() is supposed to be called with 'aux' pointing
to a 'struct idmap', via the call to request_key_with_auxdata() in
nfs_idmap_request_key().
However it can also be reached via the request_key() system call in
which case 'aux' will be NULL, causing a NULL pointer dereference in
nfs_idmap_prepare_pipe_upcall(), assuming that the key description is
valid enough to get that far.
Fix this by making nfs_idmap_legacy_upcall() negate the key if no
auxdata is provided.
As usual, this bug was found by syzkaller. A simple reproducer using
the command-line keyctl program is:
keyctl request2 id_legacy uid:0 '' @s
Fixes: 57e62324e469 ("NFS: Store the legacy idmapper result in the keyring")
Reported-by: syzbot+5dfdbcf7b3eb5912abbb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1b8d97b0a837beaf48a8449955b52c650a7114b4 upstream.
If some of the WRITE calls making up an O_DIRECT write syscall fail,
we neglect to commit, even if some of the WRITEs succeed.
We also depend on the commit code to free the reference count on the
nfs_page taken in the "if (request_commit)" case at the end of
nfs_direct_write_completion(). The problem was originally noticed
because ENOSPC's encountered partway through a write would result in a
closed file being sillyrenamed when it should have been unlinked.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7f1bda447c9bd48b415acedba6b830f61591601f upstream.
The commit list can get very large, and so we need a cond_resched()
in nfs_commit_release_pages() in order to ensure we don't hog the CPU
for excessive periods of time.
Reported-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ba4a76f703ab7eb72941fdaac848502073d6e9ee upstream.
Currently when falling back to doing I/O through the MDS (via
pnfs_{read|write}_through_mds), the client frees the nfs_pgio_header
without releasing the reference taken on the dreq
via pnfs_generic_pg_{read|write}pages -> nfs_pgheader_init ->
nfs_direct_pgio_init. It then takes another reference on the dreq via
nfs_generic_pg_pgios -> nfs_pgheader_init -> nfs_direct_pgio_init and
as a result the requester will become stuck in inode_dio_wait. Once
that happens, other processes accessing the inode will become stuck as
well.
Ensure that pnfs_read_through_mds() and pnfs_write_through_mds() clean
up correctly by calling hdr->completion_ops->completion() instead of
calling hdr->release() directly.
This can be reproduced (sometimes) by performing "storage failover
takeover" commands on NetApp filer while doing direct I/O from a client.
This can also be reproduced using SystemTap to simulate a failure while
doing direct I/O from a client (from Dave Wysochanski
<dwysocha@redhat.com>):
stap -v -g -e 'probe module("nfs_layout_nfsv41_files").function("nfs4_fl_prepare_ds").return { $return=NULL; exit(); }'
Suggested-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Fixes: 1ca018d28d ("pNFS: Fix a memory leak when attempted pnfs fails")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d8db5b1ca9d4c57e49893d0f78e6d5ce81450cc8 upstream.
The inode is not locked in init_xattrs when creating a new inode.
Without this patch, there will occurs assert when booting or creating
a new file, if the kernel config CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK is enabled.
Log likes:
UBIFS assert failed in ubifs_xattr_set at 298 (pid 1156)
CPU: 1 PID: 1156 Comm: ldconfig Tainted: G S 4.12.0-rc1-207440-g1e70b02 #2
Hardware name: MediaTek MT2712 evaluation board (DT)
Call trace:
[<ffff000008088538>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x238
[<ffff000008088834>] show_stack+0x14/0x20
[<ffff0000083d98d4>] dump_stack+0x9c/0xc0
[<ffff00000835d524>] ubifs_xattr_set+0x374/0x5e0
[<ffff00000835d7ec>] init_xattrs+0x5c/0xb8
[<ffff000008385788>] security_inode_init_security+0x110/0x190
[<ffff00000835e058>] ubifs_init_security+0x30/0x68
[<ffff00000833ada0>] ubifs_mkdir+0x100/0x200
[<ffff00000820669c>] vfs_mkdir+0x11c/0x1b8
[<ffff00000820b73c>] SyS_mkdirat+0x74/0xd0
[<ffff000008082f8c>] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
Signed-off-by: Xiaolei Li <xiaolei.li@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
(julia: massaged to apply to 4.9.y, which doesn't contain fscrypto support)
Signed-off-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 97f4b7276b829a8927ac903a119bef2f963ccc58 upstream.
also replaces memset()+kfree() by kzfree().
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9aca7e454415f7878b28524e76bebe1170911a88 upstream.
Autonegotiation gives a security settings mismatch error if the SMB
server selects an SMBv3 dialect that isn't SMB3.02. The exact error is
"protocol revalidation - security settings mismatch".
This can be tested using Samba v4.2 or by setting the global Samba
setting max protocol = SMB3_00.
The check that fails in smb3_validate_negotiate is the dialect
verification of the negotiate info response. This is because it tries
to verify against the protocol_id in the global smbdefault_values. The
protocol_id in smbdefault_values is SMB3.02.
In SMB2_negotiate the protocol_id in smbdefault_values isn't updated,
it is global so it probably shouldn't be, but server->dialect is.
This patch changes the check in smb3_validate_negotiate to use
server->dialect instead of server->vals->protocol_id. The patch works
with autonegotiate and when using a specific version in the vers mount
option.
Signed-off-by: Daniel N Pettersson <danielnp@axis.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f04a703c3d613845ae3141bfaf223489de8ab3eb upstream.
If cifs_zap_mapping() returned an error, we would return without putting
the xid that we got earlier. Restructure cifs_file_strict_mmap() and
cifs_file_mmap() to be more similar to each other and have a single
point of return that always puts the xid.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 373b0589dc8d58bc09c9a28d03611ae4fb216057 ]
Once the inode item writeback errors is already fixed, it's time to fix the same
problem in dquot code.
Although there were no reports of users hitting this bug in dquot code (at least
none I've seen), the bug is there and I was already planning to fix it when the
correct approach to fix the inodes part was decided.
This patch aims to fix the same problem in dquot code, regarding failed buffers
being unable to be resubmitted once they are flush locked.
Tested with the recently test-case sent to fstests list by Hou Tao.
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 22a6c83777ac7c17d6c63891beeeac24cf5da450 ]
Fix some complaints from the UBSAN about signed integer addition overflows.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 88bc0ede8d35edc969350852894dc864a2dc1859 ]
register_shrinker() might return -ENOMEM error since Linux 3.12.
Call panic() as with other failure checks in this function if
register_shrinker() failed.
Fixes: 1d3d4437eae1 ("vmscan: per-node deferred work")
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d210a9874b8f6166579408131cb74495caff1958 ]
percpu_counter_init failure path doesn't clean up &btp->bt_lru list.
Call list_lru_destroy in that error path. Similarly register_shrinker
error path is not handled.
While it is unlikely to trigger these error path, it is not impossible
especially the later might fail with large NUMAs. Let's handle the
failure to make the code more robust.
Noticed-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 81833de1a46edce9ca20cfe079872ac1c20ef359 ]
restart_grace() uses hardcoded init_net.
It can cause to "list_add double add" in following scenario:
1) nfsd and lockd was started in several net namespaces
2) nfsd in init_net was stopped (lockd was not stopped because
it have users from another net namespaces)
3) lockd got signal, called restart_grace() -> set_grace_period()
and enabled lock_manager in hardcoded init_net.
4) nfsd in init_net is started again,
its lockd_up() calls set_grace_period() and tries to add
lock_manager into init_net 2nd time.
Jeff Layton suggest:
"Make it safe to call locks_start_grace multiple times on the same
lock_manager. If it's already on the global grace_list, then don't try
to add it again. (But we don't intentionally add twice, so for now we
WARN about that case.)
With this change, we also need to ensure that the nfsd4 lock manager
initializes the list before we call locks_start_grace. While we're at
it, move the rest of the nfsd_net initialization into
nfs4_state_create_net. I see no reason to have it spread over two
functions like it is today."
Suggested patch was updated to generate warning in described situation.
Suggested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ae254dac721d44c0bfebe2795df87459e2e88219 ]
Prevent the use of the closed (invalid) special stateid by clients.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Elble <aweits@rit.edu>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit b872285751c1af010e12d02bce7069e2061a58ca ]
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9271d7e509c1bfc0b9a418caec29ec8d1ac38270 ]
After taking the stateid st_mutex, we want to know that the stateid
still represents valid state before performing any non-idempotent
actions.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit fb500a7cfee7f2f447d2bbf30cb59629feab6ac1 ]
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 98c4f78dcdd8cec112d1cbc5e9a792ee6e5ab7a6 ]
In xfs_ifree, we reset the data/attr forks to extents format without
bothering to free any inline data buffer that might still be around
after all the blocks have been truncated off the file. Prior to commit
43518812d2 ("xfs: remove support for inlining data/extents into the
inode fork") nobody noticed because the leftover inline data after
truncation was small enough to fit inside the inline buffer inside the
fork itself.
However, now that we've removed the inline buffer, we /always/ have to
free the inline data buffer or else we leak them like crazy. This test
was found by turning on kmemleak for generic/001 or generic/388.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9f97df50c52c2887432debb6238f4e43567386a5 ]
The i_version field in reiserfs is not initialized and is only ever
updated here. Nothing ever views it, so just remove it.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit b77000ed558daa3bef0899d29bf171b8c9b5e6a8 ]
If we fail to prepare our pages for whatever reason (out of memory in
our case) we need to make sure to drop the block_group->data_rwsem,
otherwise hilarity ensues.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ add label and use existing unlocking code ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1995266727fa8143897e89b55f5d3c79aa828420 upstream.
Commit bdcf0a423ea1 ("kernel: make groups_sort calling a responsibility
group_info allocators") appears to break nfsd rootsquash in a pretty
major way.
It adds a call to groups_sort() inside the loop that copies/squashes
gids, which means the valid gids are sorted along with the following
garbage. The net result is that the highest numbered valid gids are
replaced with any lower-valued garbage gids, possibly including 0.
We should sort only once, after filling in all the gids.
Fixes: bdcf0a423ea1 ("kernel: make groups_sort calling a responsibility ...")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Acked-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Wolfgang Walter <linux@stwm.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6793f1c450b1533a5e9c2493490de771d38b24f9 upstream.
After do_readv_writev, the inode cache is invalidated anyway, so i_size
will never be read. It will be fetched from the server which will also
know about updates from other machines.
Fixes deadlock on 32-bit SMP.
See https://marc.info/?l=linux-fsdevel&m=151268557427760&w=2
Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <martin@omnibond.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fc3dc67471461c0efcb1ed22fb7595121d65fad9 upstream.
fcntl(0, F_SETOWN, 0x80000000) triggers:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in fs/fcntl.c:118:7
negation of -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int':
CPU: 1 PID: 18261 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.1-0-syzkaller #1
...
Call Trace:
...
[<ffffffffad8f0868>] ? f_setown+0x1d8/0x200
[<ffffffffad8f19a9>] ? SyS_fcntl+0x999/0xf30
[<ffffffffaed1fb00>] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc1
Fix that by checking the arg parameter properly (against INT_MAX) before
"who = -who". And return immediatelly with -EINVAL in case it is wrong.
Note that according to POSIX we can return EINVAL:
http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/fcntl.html
[EINVAL]
The cmd argument is F_SETOWN and the value of the argument
is not valid as a process or process group identifier.
[v2] returns an error, v1 used to fail silently
[v3] implement proper check for the bad value INT_MIN
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 54930dfeb46e978b447af0fb8ab4e181c1bf9d7a upstream.
Most extended attributes will fit in a single block. More importantly,
we drop the reference to the inode while holding the transaction open
so the preallocated blocks aren't released. As a result, the inode
may be evicted before it's removed from the transaction's prealloc list
which can cause memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 08db141b5313ac2f64b844fb5725b8d81744b417 upstream.
The main loop in __discard_prealloc is protected by the reiserfs write lock
which is dropped across schedules like the BKL it replaced. The problem is
that it checks the value, calls a routine that schedules, and then adjusts
the state. As a result, two threads that are calling
reiserfs_prealloc_discard at the same time can race when one calls
reiserfs_free_prealloc_block, the lock is dropped, and the other calls
reiserfs_free_prealloc_block with the same block number. In the right
circumstances, it can cause the prealloc count to go negative.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a0ec1ded22e6a6bc41981fae22406835b006a66e upstream.
In orangefs_devreq_read, there is a loop which picks an op off the list
of pending ops. If the loop fails to find an op, there is nothing to
read, and it returns EAGAIN. If the op has been given up on, the loop
is restarted via a goto. The bug is that the variable which the found
op is written to is not reinitialized, so if there are no more eligible
ops on the list, the code runs again on the already handled op.
This is triggered by interrupting a process while the op is being copied
to the client-core. It's a fairly small window, but it's there.
Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <martin@omnibond.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0afc0decf247f65b7aba666a76a0a68adf4bc435 upstream.
set_op_state_purged can delete the op.
Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <martin@omnibond.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8bb2ee192e482c5d500df9f2b1b26a560bd3026f upstream.
do_task_stat() accesses IP and SP of a task without bumping reference
count of a stack (which became an entity with independent lifetime at
some point).
Steps to reproduce:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
int main(void)
{
setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &(struct rlimit){});
while (1) {
char buf[64];
char buf2[4096];
pid_t pid;
int fd;
pid = fork();
if (pid == 0) {
*(volatile int *)0 = 0;
}
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "/proc/%u/stat", pid);
fd = open(buf, O_RDONLY);
read(fd, buf2, sizeof(buf2));
close(fd);
waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
}
return 0;
}
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0000000000003fd8
IP: do_task_stat+0x8b4/0xaf0
PGD 800000003d73e067 P4D 800000003d73e067 PUD 3d558067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 1417 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.15.0-rc8-dirty #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1.fc27 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:do_task_stat+0x8b4/0xaf0
Call Trace:
proc_single_show+0x43/0x70
seq_read+0xe6/0x3b0
__vfs_read+0x1e/0x120
vfs_read+0x84/0x110
SyS_read+0x3d/0xa0
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x6c
RIP: 0033:0x7f4d7928cba0
RSP: 002b:00007ffddb245158 EFLAGS: 00000246
Code: 03 b7 a0 01 00 00 4c 8b 4c 24 70 4c 8b 44 24 78 4c 89 74 24 18 e9 91 f9 ff ff f6 45 4d 02 0f 84 fd f7 ff ff 48 8b 45 40 48 89 ef <48> 8b 80 d8 3f 00 00 48 89 44 24 20 e8 9b 97 eb ff 48 89 44 24
RIP: do_task_stat+0x8b4/0xaf0 RSP: ffffc90000607cc8
CR2: 0000000000003fd8
John Ogness said: for my tests I added an else case to verify that the
race is hit and correctly mitigated.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180116175054.GA11513@avx2
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Reported-by: "Kohli, Gaurav" <gkohli@codeaurora.org>
Tested-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d3f14c485867cfb2e0c48aa88c41d0ef4bf5209c upstream.
round_pipe_size() contains a right-bit-shift expression which may
overflow, which would cause undefined results in a subsequent
roundup_pow_of_two() call.
static inline unsigned int round_pipe_size(unsigned int size)
{
unsigned long nr_pages;
nr_pages = (size + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
return roundup_pow_of_two(nr_pages) << PAGE_SHIFT;
}
PAGE_SIZE is defined as (1UL << PAGE_SHIFT), so:
- 4 bytes wide on 32-bit (0 to 0xffffffff)
- 8 bytes wide on 64-bit (0 to 0xffffffffffffffff)
That means that 32-bit round_pipe_size(), nr_pages may overflow to 0:
size=0x00000000 nr_pages=0x0
size=0x00000001 nr_pages=0x1
size=0xfffff000 nr_pages=0xfffff
size=0xfffff001 nr_pages=0x0 << !
size=0xffffffff nr_pages=0x0 << !
This is bad because roundup_pow_of_two(n) is undefined when n == 0!
64-bit is not a problem as the unsigned int size is 4 bytes wide
(similar to 32-bit) and the larger, 8 byte wide unsigned long, is
sufficient to handle the largest value of the bit shift expression:
size=0xffffffff nr_pages=100000
Modify round_pipe_size() to return 0 if n == 0 and updates its callers to
handle accordingly.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507658689-11669-3-git-send-email-joe.lawrence@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dong Jinguang <dongjinguang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bdcf0a423ea1c40bbb40e7ee483b50fc8aa3d758 upstream.
In testing, we found that nfsd threads may call set_groups in parallel
for the same entry cached in auth.unix.gid, racing in the call of
groups_sort, corrupting the groups for that entry and leading to
permission denials for the client.
This patch:
- Make groups_sort globally visible.
- Move the call to groups_sort to the modifiers of group_info
- Remove the call to groups_sort from set_groups
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171211151420.18655-1-thiago.becker@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Thiago Rafael Becker <thiago.becker@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Acked-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 457ae7268b29c33dee1c0feb143a15f6029d177b ]
This isn't super serious because you need CAP_ADMIN to run this code.
I added this integer overflow check last year but apparently I am
rubbish at writing integer overflow checks... There are two issues.
First, access_ok() works on unsigned long type and not u64 so on 32 bit
systems the access_ok() could be checking a truncated size. The other
issue is that we should be using a stricter limit so we don't overflow
the kzalloc() setting ctx->clone_roots later in the function after the
access_ok():
alloc_size = sizeof(struct clone_root) * (arg->clone_sources_count + 1);
sctx->clone_roots = kzalloc(alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
Fixes: f5ecec3ce21f ("btrfs: send: silence an integer overflow warning")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ added comment ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit abdc0eb06964fe1d2fea6dd1391b734d0590365d ]
When session starts beyond offset 2^31 the arithmetics in
udf_check_vsd() would overflow. Make sure the computation is done in
large enough type.
Reported-by: Cezary Sliwa <sliwa@ifpan.edu.pl>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c79dde629d2027ca80329c62854a7635e623d527 ]
After rmmod 8250.ko
tty_kref_put starts kwork (release_one_tty) to release proc interface
oops when accessing driver->driver_name in proc_tty_unregister_driver
Use jprobe, found driver->driver_name point to 8250.ko
static static struct uart_driver serial8250_reg
.driver_name= serial,
Use name in proc_dir_entry instead of driver->driver_name to fix oops
test on linux 4.1.12:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffa01979de
IP: [<ffffffff81310f40>] strchr+0x0/0x30
PGD 1a0d067 PUD 1a0e063 PMD 851c1f067 PTE 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in: ... ... [last unloaded: 8250]
CPU: 7 PID: 116 Comm: kworker/7:1 Tainted: G O 4.1.12 #1
Hardware name: Insyde RiverForest/Type2 - Board Product Name1, BIOS NE5KV904 12/21/2015
Workqueue: events release_one_tty
task: ffff88085b684960 ti: ffff880852884000 task.ti: ffff880852884000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81310f40>] [<ffffffff81310f40>] strchr+0x0/0x30
RSP: 0018:ffff880852887c90 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: ffffffff81a5eca0 RBX: ffffffffa01979de RCX: 0000000000000004
RDX: ffff880852887d10 RSI: 000000000000002f RDI: ffffffffa01979de
RBP: ffff880852887cd8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88085f5d94d0
R10: 0000000000000195 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffffa01979de
R13: ffff880852887d00 R14: ffffffffa01979de R15: ffff88085f02e840
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88085f5c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffa01979de CR3: 0000000001a0c000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
Stack:
ffffffff812349b1 ffff880852887cb8 ffff880852887d10 ffff88085f5cd6c2
ffff880852800a80 ffffffffa01979de ffff880852800a84 0000000000000010
ffff88085bb28bd8 ffff880852887d38 ffffffff812354f0 ffff880852887d08
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff812349b1>] ? __xlate_proc_name+0x71/0xd0
[<ffffffff812354f0>] remove_proc_entry+0x40/0x180
[<ffffffff815f6811>] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x41/0x60
[<ffffffff813be520>] ? destruct_tty_driver+0x60/0xe0
[<ffffffff81237c68>] proc_tty_unregister_driver+0x28/0x40
[<ffffffff813be548>] destruct_tty_driver+0x88/0xe0
[<ffffffff813be5bd>] tty_driver_kref_put+0x1d/0x20
[<ffffffff813becca>] release_one_tty+0x5a/0xd0
[<ffffffff81074159>] process_one_work+0x139/0x420
[<ffffffff810745a1>] worker_thread+0x121/0x450
[<ffffffff81074480>] ? process_scheduled_works+0x40/0x40
[<ffffffff8107a16c>] kthread+0xec/0x110
[<ffffffff81080000>] ? tg_rt_schedulable+0x210/0x220
[<ffffffff8107a080>] ? kthread_freezable_should_stop+0x80/0x80
[<ffffffff815f7292>] ret_from_fork+0x42/0x70
[<ffffffff8107a080>] ? kthread_freezable_should_stop+0x80/0x80
Signed-off-by: nixiaoming <nixiaoming@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5e422f5e4fd71d18bc6b851eeb3864477b3d842e ]
There was one spot in xfs_bmap_add_extent_unwritten_real that didn't use the
passed in new extent state but always converted to normal, leading to wrong
behavior when converting from normal to unwritten.
Only found by code inspection, it seems like this code path to move partial
extent from written to unwritten while merging it with the next extent is
rarely exercised.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9f2a4505800607e537e9dd9dea4f55c4b0c30c7a ]
It is possible for mkfs to format very small filesystems with too
small of an internal log with respect to the various minimum size
and block count requirements. If this occurs when the log happens to
be smaller than the scan window used for cycle verification and the
scan wraps the end of the log, the start_blk calculation in
xlog_find_head() underflows and leads to an attempt to scan an
invalid range of log blocks. This results in log recovery failure
and a failed mount.
Since there may be filesystems out in the wild with this kind of
geometry, we cannot simply refuse to mount. Instead, cap the scan
window for cycle verification to the size of the physical log. This
ensures that the cycle verification proceeds as expected when the
scan wraps the end of the log.
Reported-by: Zorro Lang <zlang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9ca2e97fa3c3216200afe35a3b111ec51cc796d2 ]
If 'btrfs_alloc_path()' fails, we must free the resources already
allocated, as done in the other error handling paths in this function.
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo.btrfs@gmx.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit cc555b09d8c3817aeebda43a14ab67049a5653f7 ]
This patch fixes a deadlock caused when the jdata flag is set for
inodes that are already on the ordered write list. Since it is
on the ordered write list, log_flush calls gfs2_ordered_write which
calls filemap_fdatawrite. But since the inode had the jdata flag
set, that calls gfs2_jdata_writepages, which tries to start a new
transaction. A new transaction cannot be started because it tries
to acquire the log_flush rwsem which is already locked by the log
flush operation.
The bottom line is: We cannot switch an inode from ordered to jdata
until we eliminate any ordered data pages (via log flush) or any
log_flush operation afterward will create the circular dependency
above. So we need to flush the log before setting the diskflags to
switch the file mode, then we need to remove the inode from the
ordered writes list.
Before this patch, the log flush was done for jdata->ordered, but
that's wrong. If we're going from jdata to ordered, we don't need
to call gfs2_log_flush because the call to filemap_fdatawrite will
do it for us:
filemap_fdatawrite() -> __filemap_fdatawrite_range()
__filemap_fdatawrite_range() -> do_writepages()
do_writepages() -> gfs2_jdata_writepages()
gfs2_jdata_writepages() -> gfs2_log_flush()
This patch modifies function do_gfs2_set_flags so that if a file
has its jdata flag set, and it's already on the ordered write list,
the log will be flushed and it will be removed from the list
before setting the flag.
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Abhijith Das <adas@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 350976ae21873b0d36584ea005076356431b8f79 ]
On truncate down, if new size is not block size aligned, we zero the
rest of block to avoid exposing stale data to user, and
iomap_truncate_page() skips zeroing if the range is already in
unwritten state or a hole. Then we writeback from on-disk i_size to
the new size if this range hasn't been written to disk yet, and
truncate page cache beyond new EOF and set in-core i_size.
The problem is that we could write data between di_size and newsize
before removing the page cache beyond newsize, as the extents may
still be in unwritten state right after a buffer write. As such, the
page of data that newsize lies in has not been zeroed by page cache
invalidation before it is written, and xfs_do_writepage() hasn't
triggered it's "zero data beyond EOF" case because we haven't
updated in-core i_size yet. Then a subsequent mmap read could see
non-zeros past EOF.
I occasionally see this in fsx runs in fstests generic/112, a
simplified fsx operation sequence is like (assuming 4k block size
xfs):
fallocate 0x0 0x1000 0x0 keep_size
write 0x0 0x1000 0x0
truncate 0x0 0x800 0x1000
punch_hole 0x0 0x800 0x800
mapread 0x0 0x800 0x800
where fallocate allocates unwritten extent but doesn't update
i_size, buffer write populates the page cache and extent is still
unwritten, truncate skips zeroing page past new EOF and writes the
page to disk, punch_hole invalidates the page cache, at last mapread
reads the block back and sees non-zero beyond EOF.
Fix it by moving truncate_setsize() to before writeback so the page
cache invalidation zeros the partial page at the new EOF. This also
triggers "zero data beyond EOF" in xfs_do_writepage() at writeback
time, because newsize has been set and page straddles the newsize.
Also fixed the wrong 'end' param of filemap_write_and_wait_range()
call while we're at it, the 'end' is inclusive and should be
'newsize - 1'.
Suggested-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <eguan@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e1699d2d7bf6e6cce3e1baff19f9dd4595a58664 ]
This is a story about 4 distinct (and very old) btrfs bugs.
Commit c8b978188c ("Btrfs: Add zlib compression support") added
three data corruption bugs for inline extents (bugs #1-3).
Commit 93c82d5750 ("Btrfs: zero page past end of inline file items")
fixed bug #1: uncompressed inline extents followed by a hole and more
extents could get non-zero data in the hole as they were read. The fix
was to add a memset in btrfs_get_extent to zero out the hole.
Commit 166ae5a418 ("btrfs: fix inline compressed read err corruption")
fixed bug #2: compressed inline extents which contained non-zero bytes
might be replaced with zero bytes in some cases. This patch removed an
unhelpful memset from uncompress_inline, but the case where memset is
required was missed.
There is also a memset in the decompression code, but this only covers
decompressed data that is shorter than the ram_bytes from the extent
ref record. This memset doesn't cover the region between the end of the
decompressed data and the end of the page. It has also moved around a
few times over the years, so there's no single patch to refer to.
This patch fixes bug #3: compressed inline extents followed by a hole
and more extents could get non-zero data in the hole as they were read
(i.e. bug #3 is the same as bug #1, but s/uncompressed/compressed/).
The fix is the same: zero out the hole in the compressed case too,
by putting a memset back in uncompress_inline, but this time with
correct parameters.
The last and oldest bug, bug #0, is the cause of the offending inline
extent/hole/extent pattern. Bug #0 is a subtle and mostly-harmless quirk
of behavior somewhere in the btrfs write code. In a few special cases,
an inline extent and hole are allowed to persist where they normally
would be combined with later extents in the file.
A fast reproducer for bug #0 is presented below. A few offending extents
are also created in the wild during large rsync transfers with the -S
flag. A Linux kernel build (git checkout; make allyesconfig; make -j8)
will produce a handful of offending files as well. Once an offending
file is created, it can present different content to userspace each
time it is read.
Bug #0 is at least 4 and possibly 8 years old. I verified every vX.Y
kernel back to v3.5 has this behavior. There are fossil records of this
bug's effects in commits all the way back to v2.6.32. I have no reason
to believe bug #0 wasn't present at the beginning of btrfs compression
support in v2.6.29, but I can't easily test kernels that old to be sure.
It is not clear whether bug #0 is worth fixing. A fix would likely
require injecting extra reads into currently write-only paths, and most
of the exceptional cases caused by bug #0 are already handled now.
Whether we like them or not, bug #0's inline extents followed by holes
are part of the btrfs de-facto disk format now, and we need to be able
to read them without data corruption or an infoleak. So enough about
bug #0, let's get back to bug #3 (this patch).
An example of on-disk structure leading to data corruption found in
the wild:
item 61 key (606890 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 9662 itemsize 160
inode generation 50 transid 50 size 47424 nbytes 49141
block group 0 mode 100644 links 1 uid 0 gid 0
rdev 0 flags 0x0(none)
item 62 key (606890 INODE_REF 603050) itemoff 9642 itemsize 20
inode ref index 3 namelen 10 name: DB_File.so
item 63 key (606890 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 8280 itemsize 1362
inline extent data size 1341 ram 4085 compress(zlib)
item 64 key (606890 EXTENT_DATA 4096) itemoff 8227 itemsize 53
extent data disk byte 5367308288 nr 20480
extent data offset 0 nr 45056 ram 45056
extent compression(zlib)
Different data appears in userspace during each read of the 11 bytes
between 4085 and 4096. The extent in item 63 is not long enough to
fill the first page of the file, so a memset is required to fill the
space between item 63 (ending at 4085) and item 64 (beginning at 4096)
with zero.
Here is a reproducer from Liu Bo, which demonstrates another method
of creating the same inline extent and hole pattern:
Using 'page_poison=on' kernel command line (or enable
CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING) run the following:
# touch foo
# chattr +c foo
# xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -W 0 1000" foo
# xfs_io -f -c "falloc 4 8188" foo
# od -x foo
# echo 3 >/proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
# od -x foo
This produce the following on my box:
Correct output: file contains 1000 data bytes followed
by zeros:
0000000 cdcd cdcd cdcd cdcd cdcd cdcd cdcd cdcd
*
0001740 cdcd cdcd cdcd cdcd 0000 0000 0000 0000
0001760 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
*
0020000
Actual output: the data after the first 1000 bytes
will be different each run:
0000000 cdcd cdcd cdcd cdcd cdcd cdcd cdcd cdcd
*
0001740 cdcd cdcd cdcd cdcd 6c63 7400 635f 006d
0001760 5f74 6f43 7400 435f 0053 5f74 7363 7400
0002000 435f 0056 5f74 6164 7400 645f 0062 5f74
(...)
Signed-off-by: Zygo Blaxell <ce3g8jdj@umail.furryterror.org>
Reviewed-by: Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 033853325fe3bdc70819a8b97915bd3bca41d3af ]
Currently client doesn't respect max sizes server returns in CREATE_SESSION.
nfs4_session_set_rwsize() gets called and server->rsize, server->wsize are 0
so they never get set to the sizes returned by the server.
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 954cd6dc02a65065aecb7150962c0870c5b0e322 ]
Fix the way in which a call that's in progress and being waited for is
aborted in the case that EINTR is detected. We should be sending
RX_USER_ABORT rather than RX_CALL_DEAD as the abort code.
Note that since the only two ways out of the loop are if the call completes
or if a signal happens, the kill-the-call clause after the loop has
finished can only happen in the case of EINTR. This means that we only
have one abort case to deal with, not two, and the "KWC" case can never
happen and so can be deleted.
Note further that simply aborting the call isn't necessarily the best thing
here since at this point: the request has been entirely sent and it's
likely the server will do the operation anyway - whether we abort it or
not. In future, we should punt the handling of the remainder of the call
off to a background thread.
Reported-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@auristor.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7286a35e893176169b09715096a4aca557e2ccd2 ]
Fix afs_kill_pages() in two ways:
(1) If a writeback has been partially flushed, then if we try and kill the
pages it contains, some of them may no longer be undergoing writeback
and end_page_writeback() will assert.
Fix this by checking to see whether the page in question is actually
undergoing writeback before ending that writeback.
(2) The loop that scans for pages to kill doesn't increase the first page
index, and so the loop may not terminate, but it will try to process
the same pages over and over again.
Fix this by increasing the first page index to one after the last page
we processed.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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