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[ Upstream commit ea956d8be91edc702a98b7fe1f9463e7ca8c42ab ]
Empty executable arguments were being skipped when printing out the list
of arguments in an EXECVE record, making it appear they were somehow
lost. Include empty arguments as an itemized empty string.
Reproducer:
autrace /bin/ls "" "/etc"
ausearch --start recent -m execve -i | grep EXECVE
type=EXECVE msg=audit(10/03/2018 13:04:03.208:1391) : argc=3 a0=/bin/ls a2=/etc
With fix:
type=EXECVE msg=audit(10/03/2018 21:51:38.290:194) : argc=3 a0=/bin/ls a1= a2=/etc
type=EXECVE msg=audit(1538617898.290:194): argc=3 a0="/bin/ls" a1="" a2="/etc"
Passes audit-testsuite. GH issue tracker at
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/99
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: cleaned up the commit metadata]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3f130a37c442d5c4d66531b240ebe9abfef426b5 ]
When load_balance() fails to move some load because of task affinity,
we end up increasing sd->balance_interval to delay the next periodic
balance in the hopes that next time we look, that annoying pinned
task(s) will be gone.
However, idle_balance() pays no attention to sd->balance_interval, yet
it will still lead to an increase in balance_interval in case of
pinned tasks.
If we're going through several newidle balances (e.g. we have a
periodic task), this can lead to a huge increase of the
balance_interval in a very small amount of time.
To prevent that, don't increase the balance interval when going
through a newidle balance.
This is a similar approach to what is done in commit 58b26c4c0257
("sched: Increment cache_nice_tries only on periodic lb"), where we
disregard newidle balance and rely on periodic balance for more stable
results.
Signed-off-by: Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Dietmar.Eggemann@arm.com
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: patrick.bellasi@arm.com
Cc: vincent.guittot@linaro.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1537974727-30788-2-git-send-email-valentin.schneider@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 993f0b0510dad98b4e6e39506834dab0d13fd539 ]
With the addition of the NUMA identity level, we increased @level by
one and will run off the end of the array in the distance sort loop.
Fixed: 051f3ca02e46 ("sched/topology: Introduce NUMA identity node sched domain")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f592f804831f1cf9d1f9966f58c80f150e6829b5 ]
The dev_map_notification() removes interface in devmap if
unregistering interface's ifindex is same.
But only checking ifindex is not enough because other netns can have
same ifindex. so that wrong interface selection could occurred.
Hence netdev pointer comparison code is added.
v2: compare netdev pointer instead of using net_eq() (Daniel Borkmann)
v1: Initial patch
Fixes: 2ddf71e23cc2 ("net: add notifier hooks for devmap bpf map")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit d2130e82e9454304e9b91ba9da551b5989af8c27 ]
The way we calculate logbuf free space percentage overflows signed
integer:
int free;
free = __LOG_BUF_LEN - log_next_idx;
pr_info("early log buf free: %u(%u%%)\n",
free, (free * 100) / __LOG_BUF_LEN);
We support LOG_BUF_LEN of up to 1<<25 bytes. Since setup_log_buf() is
called during early init, logbuf is mostly empty, so
__LOG_BUF_LEN - log_next_idx
is close to 1<<25. Thus when we multiply it by 100, we overflow signed
integer value range: 100 is 2^6 + 2^5 + 2^2.
Example, booting with LOG_BUF_LEN 1<<25 and log_buf_len=2G
boot param:
[ 0.075317] log_buf_len: -2147483648 bytes
[ 0.075319] early log buf free: 33549896(-28%)
Make "free" unsigned integer and use appropriate printk() specifier.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181010113308.9337-1-sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com
To: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e6fe3e5b7d16e8f146a4ae7fe481bc6e97acde1e ]
The current printk() is ready to handle log buffer size up to 2G.
Give an explicit error for users who want to use larger log buffer.
Also fix printk formatting to show the 2G as a positive number.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181008135916.gg4kkmoki5bgtco5@pathway.suse.cz
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: He Zhe <zhe.he@windriver.com>
Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
[pmladek: Fixed to the really safe limit 2GB.]
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9cf38d5559e813cccdba8b44c82cc46ba48d0896 ]
When SME is enabled in the first kernel, it needs to allocate decrypted
pages for kdump because when the kdump kernel boots, these pages need to
be accessed decrypted in the initial boot stage, before SME is enabled.
[ bp: clean up text. ]
Signed-off-by: Lianbo Jiang <lijiang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de
Cc: mingo@redhat.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com
Cc: bhelgaas@google.com
Cc: baiyaowei@cmss.chinamobile.com
Cc: tiwai@suse.de
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com
Cc: dyoung@redhat.com
Cc: bhe@redhat.com
Cc: jroedel@suse.de
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180930031033.22110-3-lijiang@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit d0e7d14455d41163126afecd0fcce935463cc512 ]
When booting with "nosmt=force" a message is issued into dmesg to
confirm that SMT has been force-disabled but such a message is not
issued when only "nosmt" is on the kernel command line.
Fix that.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181004172227.10094-1-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit cbdd96f5586151e48317d90a403941ec23f12660 ]
Instead of calling BUG_ON(), if we find a kprobe in use on free kprobe
list, just remove it from the list and keep it on kprobe hash list
as same as other in-use kprobes.
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: David S . Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Naveen N . Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/153666126882.21306.10738207224288507996.stgit@devbox
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 55a3235fc71bf34303e34a95eeee235b2d2a35dd ]
For userspace to tell the difference between a random signal and an
exception, the exception must include siginfo information.
Using SEND_SIG_FORCED for SIGILL is thus wrong, and it will result
in userspace seeing si_code == SI_USER (like a random signal) instead
of si_code == SI_KERNEL or a more specific si_code as all exceptions
deliver.
Therefore replace force_sig_info(SIGILL, SEND_SIG_FORCE, current)
with force_sig(SIG_ILL, current) which gets this right and is
shorter and easier to type.
Fixes: 014940bad8e4 ("uprobes/x86: Send SIGILL if arch_uprobe_post_xol() fails")
Fixes: 0b5256c7f173 ("uprobes: Send SIGILL if handle_trampoline() fails")
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 86989c41b5ea08776c450cb759592532314a4ed6 ]
If the first process started (aka /sbin/init) receives a SIGKILL it
will panic the system if it is delivered. Making the system unusable
and undebugable. It isn't much better if the first process started
receives SIGSTOP.
So always ignore SIGSTOP and SIGKILL sent to init.
This is done in a separate clause in sig_task_ignored as force_sig_info
can clear SIG_UNKILLABLE and this protection should work even then.
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 731dc9df975a5da21237a18c3384f811a7a41cc6 upstream.
A kernel module may need to check the value of the "mitigations=" kernel
command line parameter as part of its setup when the module needs
to perform software mitigations for a CPU flaw.
Uninline and export the helper functions surrounding the cpu_mitigations
enum to allow for their usage from a module.
Lastly, privatize the enum and cpu_mitigations variable since the value of
cpu_mitigations can be checked with the exported helper functions.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 763a9ec06c409dcde2a761aac4bb83ff3938e0b3 upstream.
Commit:
de53fd7aedb1 ("sched/fair: Fix low cpu usage with high throttling by removing expiration of cpu-local slices")
introduced a few compilation warnings:
kernel/sched/fair.c: In function '__refill_cfs_bandwidth_runtime':
kernel/sched/fair.c:4365:6: warning: variable 'now' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
kernel/sched/fair.c: In function 'start_cfs_bandwidth':
kernel/sched/fair.c:4992:6: warning: variable 'overrun' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
Also, __refill_cfs_bandwidth_runtime() does no longer update the
expiration time, so fix the comments accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chiluk <chiluk+linux@indeed.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: pauld@redhat.com
Fixes: de53fd7aedb1 ("sched/fair: Fix low cpu usage with high throttling by removing expiration of cpu-local slices")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1566326455-8038-1-git-send-email-cai@lca.pw
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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cpu-local slices
commit de53fd7aedb100f03e5d2231cfce0e4993282425 upstream.
It has been observed, that highly-threaded, non-cpu-bound applications
running under cpu.cfs_quota_us constraints can hit a high percentage of
periods throttled while simultaneously not consuming the allocated
amount of quota. This use case is typical of user-interactive non-cpu
bound applications, such as those running in kubernetes or mesos when
run on multiple cpu cores.
This has been root caused to cpu-local run queue being allocated per cpu
bandwidth slices, and then not fully using that slice within the period.
At which point the slice and quota expires. This expiration of unused
slice results in applications not being able to utilize the quota for
which they are allocated.
The non-expiration of per-cpu slices was recently fixed by
'commit 512ac999d275 ("sched/fair: Fix bandwidth timer clock drift
condition")'. Prior to that it appears that this had been broken since
at least 'commit 51f2176d74ac ("sched/fair: Fix unlocked reads of some
cfs_b->quota/period")' which was introduced in v3.16-rc1 in 2014. That
added the following conditional which resulted in slices never being
expired.
if (cfs_rq->runtime_expires != cfs_b->runtime_expires) {
/* extend local deadline, drift is bounded above by 2 ticks */
cfs_rq->runtime_expires += TICK_NSEC;
Because this was broken for nearly 5 years, and has recently been fixed
and is now being noticed by many users running kubernetes
(https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/67577) it is my opinion
that the mechanisms around expiring runtime should be removed
altogether.
This allows quota already allocated to per-cpu run-queues to live longer
than the period boundary. This allows threads on runqueues that do not
use much CPU to continue to use their remaining slice over a longer
period of time than cpu.cfs_period_us. However, this helps prevent the
above condition of hitting throttling while also not fully utilizing
your cpu quota.
This theoretically allows a machine to use slightly more than its
allotted quota in some periods. This overflow would be bounded by the
remaining quota left on each per-cpu runqueueu. This is typically no
more than min_cfs_rq_runtime=1ms per cpu. For CPU bound tasks this will
change nothing, as they should theoretically fully utilize all of their
quota in each period. For user-interactive tasks as described above this
provides a much better user/application experience as their cpu
utilization will more closely match the amount they requested when they
hit throttling. This means that cpu limits no longer strictly apply per
period for non-cpu bound applications, but that they are still accurate
over longer timeframes.
This greatly improves performance of high-thread-count, non-cpu bound
applications with low cfs_quota_us allocation on high-core-count
machines. In the case of an artificial testcase (10ms/100ms of quota on
80 CPU machine), this commit resulted in almost 30x performance
improvement, while still maintaining correct cpu quota restrictions.
That testcase is available at https://github.com/indeedeng/fibtest.
Fixes: 512ac999d275 ("sched/fair: Fix bandwidth timer clock drift condition")
Signed-off-by: Dave Chiluk <chiluk+linux@indeed.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: John Hammond <jhammond@indeed.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Kyle Anderson <kwa@yelp.com>
Cc: Gabriel Munos <gmunoz@netflix.com>
Cc: Peter Oskolkov <posk@posk.io>
Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Brendan Gregg <bgregg@netflix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1563900266-19734-2-git-send-email-chiluk+linux@indeed.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4c4e3731564c8945ac5ac90fc2a1e1f21cb79c92 upstream.
Notable cmpxchg() does not provide ordering when it fails, however
wake_q_add() requires ordering in this specific case too. Without this
it would be possible for the concurrent wakeup to not observe our
prior state.
Andrea Parri provided:
C wake_up_q-wake_q_add
{
int next = 0;
int y = 0;
}
P0(int *next, int *y)
{
int r0;
/* in wake_up_q() */
WRITE_ONCE(*next, 1); /* node->next = NULL */
smp_mb(); /* implied by wake_up_process() */
r0 = READ_ONCE(*y);
}
P1(int *next, int *y)
{
int r1;
/* in wake_q_add() */
WRITE_ONCE(*y, 1); /* wake_cond = true */
smp_mb__before_atomic();
r1 = cmpxchg_relaxed(next, 1, 2);
}
exists (0:r0=0 /\ 1:r1=0)
This "exists" clause cannot be satisfied according to the LKMM:
Test wake_up_q-wake_q_add Allowed
States 3
0:r0=0; 1:r1=1;
0:r0=1; 1:r1=0;
0:r0=1; 1:r1=1;
No
Witnesses
Positive: 0 Negative: 3
Condition exists (0:r0=0 /\ 1:r1=0)
Observation wake_up_q-wake_q_add Never 0 3
Reported-by: Yongji Xie <elohimes@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jisheng Zhang <Jisheng.Zhang@synaptics.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d303de1fcf344ff7c15ed64c3f48a991c9958775 ]
A customer reported the following softlockup:
[899688.160002] NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 22s! [test.sh:16464]
[899688.160002] CPU: 0 PID: 16464 Comm: test.sh Not tainted 4.12.14-6.23-azure #1 SLE12-SP4
[899688.160002] RIP: 0010:up_write+0x1a/0x30
[899688.160002] Kernel panic - not syncing: softlockup: hung tasks
[899688.160002] RIP: 0010:up_write+0x1a/0x30
[899688.160002] RSP: 0018:ffffa86784d4fde8 EFLAGS: 00000257 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff12
[899688.160002] RAX: ffffffff970fea00 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
[899688.160002] RDX: ffffffff00000001 RSI: 0000000000000080 RDI: ffffffff970fea00
[899688.160002] RBP: ffffffffffffffff R08: ffffffffffffffff R09: 0000000000000000
[899688.160002] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8b59014720d8
[899688.160002] R13: ffff8b59014720c0 R14: ffff8b5901471090 R15: ffff8b5901470000
[899688.160002] tracing_read_pipe+0x336/0x3c0
[899688.160002] __vfs_read+0x26/0x140
[899688.160002] vfs_read+0x87/0x130
[899688.160002] SyS_read+0x42/0x90
[899688.160002] do_syscall_64+0x74/0x160
It caught the process in the middle of trace_access_unlock(). There is
no loop. So, it must be looping in the caller tracing_read_pipe()
via the "waitagain" label.
Crashdump analyze uncovered that iter->seq was completely zeroed
at this point, including iter->seq.seq.size. It means that
print_trace_line() was never able to print anything and
there was no forward progress.
The culprit seems to be in the code:
/* reset all but tr, trace, and overruns */
memset(&iter->seq, 0,
sizeof(struct trace_iterator) -
offsetof(struct trace_iterator, seq));
It was added by the commit 53d0aa773053ab182877 ("ftrace:
add logic to record overruns"). It was v2.6.27-rc1.
It was the time when iter->seq looked like:
struct trace_seq {
unsigned char buffer[PAGE_SIZE];
unsigned int len;
};
There was no "size" variable and zeroing was perfectly fine.
The solution is to reinitialize the structure after or without
zeroing.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191011142134.11997-1-pmladek@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 68e7a4d66b0ce04bf18ff2ffded5596ab3618585 ]
vtime_account_system() assumes that the target task to account cputime
to is always the current task. This is most often true indeed except on
task switch where we call:
vtime_common_task_switch(prev)
vtime_account_system(prev)
Here prev is the scheduling-out task where we account the cputime to. It
doesn't match current that is already the scheduling-in task at this
stage of the context switch.
So we end up checking the wrong task flags to determine if we are
accounting guest or system time to the previous task.
As a result the wrong task is used to check if the target is running in
guest mode. We may then spuriously account or leak either system or
guest time on task switch.
Fix this assumption and also turn vtime_guest_enter/exit() to use the
task passed in parameter as well to avoid future similar issues.
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Fixes: 2a42eb9594a1 ("sched/cputime: Accumulate vtime on top of nsec clocksource")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190925214242.21873-1-frederic@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 194c2c74f5532e62c218adeb8e2b683119503907 upstream.
As instances may have different tracers available, we need to look at the
trace_array descriptor that shows the list of the available tracers for the
instance. But there's a race between opening the file and an admin
deleting the instance. The trace_array_get() needs to be called before
accessing the trace_array.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 607e2ea167e56 ("tracing: Set up infrastructure to allow tracers for instances")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9ef16693aff8137faa21d16ffe65bb9832d24d71 upstream.
The ftrace set_ftrace_filter and set_ftrace_notrace files are specific for
an instance now. They need to take a reference to the instance otherwise
there could be a race between accessing the files and deleting the instance.
It wasn't until the :mod: caching where these file operations started
referencing the trace_array directly.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 673feb9d76ab3 ("ftrace: Add :mod: caching infrastructure to trace_array")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fc64e4ad80d4b72efce116f87b3174f0b7196f8e upstream.
max_latency is intended to record the maximum ever observed hardware
latency, which may occur in either part of the loop (inner/outer). So
we need to also consider the outer-loop sample when updating
max_latency.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/157073345463.17189.18124025522664682811.stgit@srivatsa-ubuntu
Fixes: e7c15cd8a113 ("tracing: Added hardware latency tracer")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat (VMware) <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit 98dc19c11470ee6048aba723d77079ad2cda8a52 upstream.
nmi_total_ts is supposed to record the total time spent in *all* NMIs
that occur on the given CPU during the (active portion of the)
sampling window. However, the code seems to be overwriting this
variable for each NMI, thereby only recording the time spent in the
most recent NMI. Fix it by accumulating the duration instead.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/157073343544.17189.13911783866738671133.stgit@srivatsa-ubuntu
Fixes: 7b2c86250122 ("tracing: Add NMI tracing in hwlat detector")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat (VMware) <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit b0f53dbc4bc4c371f38b14c391095a3bb8a0bb40 upstream.
Partially revert 16db3d3f1170 ("kernel/sysctl.c: threads-max observe
limits") because the patch is causing a regression to any workload which
needs to override the auto-tuning of the limit provided by kernel.
set_max_threads is implementing a boot time guesstimate to provide a
sensible limit of the concurrently running threads so that runaways will
not deplete all the memory. This is a good thing in general but there
are workloads which might need to increase this limit for an application
to run (reportedly WebSpher MQ is affected) and that is simply not
possible after the mentioned change. It is also very dubious to
override an admin decision by an estimation that doesn't have any direct
relation to correctness of the kernel operation.
Fix this by dropping set_max_threads from sysctl_max_threads so any
value is accepted as long as it fits into MAX_THREADS which is important
to check because allowing more threads could break internal robust futex
restriction. While at it, do not use MIN_THREADS as the lower boundary
because it is also only a heuristic for automatic estimation and admin
might have a good reason to stop new threads to be created even when
below this limit.
This became more severe when we switched x86 from 4k to 8k kernel
stacks. Starting since 6538b8ea886e ("x86_64: expand kernel stack to
16K") (3.16) we use THREAD_SIZE_ORDER = 2 and that halved the auto-tuned
value.
In the particular case
3.12
kernel.threads-max = 515561
4.4
kernel.threads-max = 200000
Neither of the two values is really insane on 32GB machine.
I am not sure we want/need to tune the max_thread value further. If
anything the tuning should be removed altogether if proven not useful in
general. But we definitely need a way to override this auto-tuning.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190922065801.GB18814@dhcp22.suse.cz
Fixes: 16db3d3f1170 ("kernel/sysctl.c: threads-max observe limits")
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 20bb759a66be52cf4a9ddd17fddaf509e11490cd upstream.
Calling 'panic()' on a kernel with CONFIG_PREEMPT=y can leave the
calling CPU in an infinite loop, but with interrupts and preemption
enabled. From this state, userspace can continue to be scheduled,
despite the system being "dead" as far as the kernel is concerned.
This is easily reproducible on arm64 when booting with "nosmp" on the
command line; a couple of shell scripts print out a periodic "Ping"
message whilst another triggers a crash by writing to
/proc/sysrq-trigger:
| sysrq: Trigger a crash
| Kernel panic - not syncing: sysrq triggered crash
| CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 5.2.15 #1
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| Call trace:
| dump_backtrace+0x0/0x148
| show_stack+0x14/0x20
| dump_stack+0xa0/0xc4
| panic+0x140/0x32c
| sysrq_handle_reboot+0x0/0x20
| __handle_sysrq+0x124/0x190
| write_sysrq_trigger+0x64/0x88
| proc_reg_write+0x60/0xa8
| __vfs_write+0x18/0x40
| vfs_write+0xa4/0x1b8
| ksys_write+0x64/0xf0
| __arm64_sys_write+0x14/0x20
| el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xb0/0x168
| el0_svc_handler+0x28/0x78
| el0_svc+0x8/0xc
| Kernel Offset: disabled
| CPU features: 0x0002,24002004
| Memory Limit: none
| ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: sysrq triggered crash ]---
| Ping 2!
| Ping 1!
| Ping 1!
| Ping 2!
The issue can also be triggered on x86 kernels if CONFIG_SMP=n,
otherwise local interrupts are disabled in 'smp_send_stop()'.
Disable preemption in 'panic()' before re-enabling interrupts.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191002123538.22609-1-will@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/BX1W47JXPMR8.58IYW53H6M5N@dragonstone
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Xogium <contact@xogium.me>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit b9023b91dd020ad7e093baa5122b6968c48cc9e0 ]
When a cpu requests broadcasting, before starting the tick broadcast
hrtimer, bc_set_next() checks if the timer callback (bc_handler) is active
using hrtimer_try_to_cancel(). But hrtimer_try_to_cancel() does not provide
the required synchronization when the callback is active on other core.
The callback could have already executed tick_handle_oneshot_broadcast()
and could have also returned. But still there is a small time window where
the hrtimer_try_to_cancel() returns -1. In that case bc_set_next() returns
without doing anything, but the next_event of the tick broadcast clock
device is already set to a timeout value.
In the race condition diagram below, CPU #1 is running the timer callback
and CPU #2 is entering idle state and so calls bc_set_next().
In the worst case, the next_event will contain an expiry time, but the
hrtimer will not be started which happens when the racing callback returns
HRTIMER_NORESTART. The hrtimer might never recover if all further requests
from the CPUs to subscribe to tick broadcast have timeout greater than the
next_event of tick broadcast clock device. This leads to cascading of
failures and finally noticed as rcu stall warnings
Here is a depiction of the race condition
CPU #1 (Running timer callback) CPU #2 (Enter idle
and subscribe to
tick broadcast)
--------------------- ---------------------
__run_hrtimer() tick_broadcast_enter()
bc_handler() __tick_broadcast_oneshot_control()
tick_handle_oneshot_broadcast()
raw_spin_lock(&tick_broadcast_lock);
dev->next_event = KTIME_MAX; //wait for tick_broadcast_lock
//next_event for tick broadcast clock
set to KTIME_MAX since no other cores
subscribed to tick broadcasting
raw_spin_unlock(&tick_broadcast_lock);
if (dev->next_event == KTIME_MAX)
return HRTIMER_NORESTART
// callback function exits without
restarting the hrtimer //tick_broadcast_lock acquired
raw_spin_lock(&tick_broadcast_lock);
tick_broadcast_set_event()
clockevents_program_event()
dev->next_event = expires;
bc_set_next()
hrtimer_try_to_cancel()
//returns -1 since the timer
callback is active. Exits without
restarting the timer
cpu_base->running = NULL;
The comment that hrtimer cannot be armed from within the callback is
wrong. It is fine to start the hrtimer from within the callback. Also it is
safe to start the hrtimer from the enter/exit idle code while the broadcast
handler is active. The enter/exit idle code and the broadcast handler are
synchronized using tick_broadcast_lock. So there is no need for the
existing try to cancel logic. All this can be removed which will eliminate
the race condition as well.
Fixes: 5d1638acb9f6 ("tick: Introduce hrtimer based broadcast")
Originally-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Balasubramani Vivekanandan <balasubramani_vivekanandan@mentor.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190926135101.12102-2-balasubramani_vivekanandan@mentor.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0f74914071ab7e7b78731ed62bf350e3a344e0a5 ]
When building with W=1, gcc properly complains that there's no prototypes:
CC kernel/elfcore.o
kernel/elfcore.c:7:17: warning: no previous prototype for 'elf_core_extra_phdrs' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
7 | Elf_Half __weak elf_core_extra_phdrs(void)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/elfcore.c:12:12: warning: no previous prototype for 'elf_core_write_extra_phdrs' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
12 | int __weak elf_core_write_extra_phdrs(struct coredump_params *cprm, loff_t offset)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/elfcore.c:17:12: warning: no previous prototype for 'elf_core_write_extra_data' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
17 | int __weak elf_core_write_extra_data(struct coredump_params *cprm)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/elfcore.c:22:15: warning: no previous prototype for 'elf_core_extra_data_size' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
22 | size_t __weak elf_core_extra_data_size(void)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Provide the include file so gcc is happy, and we don't have potential code drift
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/29875.1565224705@turing-police
Signed-off-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 714e501e16cd473538b609b3e351b2cc9f7f09ed ]
An oops can be triggered in the scheduler when running qemu on arm64:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff000008effe40
Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
Process migration/0 (pid: 12, stack limit = 0x00000000084e3736)
pstate: 20000085 (nzCv daIf -PAN -UAO)
pc : __ll_sc___cmpxchg_case_acq_4+0x4/0x20
lr : move_queued_task.isra.21+0x124/0x298
...
Call trace:
__ll_sc___cmpxchg_case_acq_4+0x4/0x20
__migrate_task+0xc8/0xe0
migration_cpu_stop+0x170/0x180
cpu_stopper_thread+0xec/0x178
smpboot_thread_fn+0x1ac/0x1e8
kthread+0x134/0x138
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
__set_cpus_allowed_ptr() will choose an active dest_cpu in affinity mask to
migrage the process if process is not currently running on any one of the
CPUs specified in affinity mask. __set_cpus_allowed_ptr() will choose an
invalid dest_cpu (dest_cpu >= nr_cpu_ids, 1024 in my virtual machine) if
CPUS in an affinity mask are deactived by cpu_down after cpumask_intersects
check. cpumask_test_cpu() of dest_cpu afterwards is overflown and may pass if
corresponding bit is coincidentally set. As a consequence, kernel will
access an invalid rq address associate with the invalid CPU in
migration_cpu_stop->__migrate_task->move_queued_task and the Oops occurs.
The reproduce the crash:
1) A process repeatedly binds itself to cpu0 and cpu1 in turn by calling
sched_setaffinity.
2) A shell script repeatedly does "echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online"
and "echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online" in turn.
3) Oops appears if the invalid CPU is set in memory after tested cpumask.
Signed-off-by: KeMeng Shi <shikemeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@arm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1568616808-16808-1-git-send-email-shikemeng@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 89340d0935c9296c7b8222b6eab30e67cb57ab82 upstream.
This patch reverts commit 75437bb304b20 (locking/pvqspinlock: Don't
wait if vCPU is preempted). A large performance regression was caused
by this commit. on over-subscription scenarios.
The test was run on a Xeon Skylake box, 2 sockets, 40 cores, 80 threads,
with three VMs of 80 vCPUs each. The score of ebizzy -M is reduced from
13000-14000 records/s to 1700-1800 records/s:
Host Guest score
vanilla w/o kvm optimizations upstream 1700-1800 records/s
vanilla w/o kvm optimizations revert 13000-14000 records/s
vanilla w/ kvm optimizations upstream 4500-5000 records/s
vanilla w/ kvm optimizations revert 14000-15500 records/s
Exit from aggressive wait-early mechanism can result in premature yield
and extra scheduling latency.
Actually, only 6% of wait_early events are caused by vcpu_is_preempted()
being true. However, when one vCPU voluntarily releases its vCPU, all
the subsequently waiters in the queue will do the same and the cascading
effect leads to bad performance.
kvm optimizations:
[1] commit d73eb57b80b (KVM: Boost vCPUs that are delivering interrupts)
[2] commit 266e85a5ec9 (KVM: X86: Boost queue head vCPU to mitigate lock waiter preemption)
Tested-by: loobinliu@tencent.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: loobinliu@tencent.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 75437bb304b20 (locking/pvqspinlock: Don't wait if vCPU is preempted)
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e430d802d6a3aaf61bd3ed03d9404888a29b9bf9 upstream.
The timer delayed for more than 3 seconds warning was triggered during
testing.
Workqueue: events_unbound sched_tick_remote
RIP: 0010:sched_tick_remote+0xee/0x100
...
Call Trace:
process_one_work+0x18c/0x3a0
worker_thread+0x30/0x380
kthread+0x113/0x130
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x40
The reason is that the code in collect_expired_timers() uses jiffies
unprotected:
if (next_event > jiffies)
base->clk = jiffies;
As the compiler is allowed to reload the value base->clk can advance
between the check and the store and in the worst case advance farther than
next event. That causes the timer expiry to be delayed until the wheel
pointer wraps around.
Convert the code to use READ_ONCE()
Fixes: 236968383cf5 ("timers: Optimize collect_expired_timers() for NOHZ")
Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com>
Signed-off-by: Liang ZhiCheng <liangzhicheng@baidu.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1568894687-14499-1-git-send-email-lirongqing@baidu.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7c3a6aedcd6aae0a32a527e68669f7dd667492d1 upstream.
syzbot found that a thread can stall for minutes inside kexec_load() after
that thread was killed by SIGKILL [1]. It turned out that the reproducer
was trying to allocate 2408MB of memory using kimage_alloc_page() from
kimage_load_normal_segment(). Let's check for SIGKILL before doing memory
allocation.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a0e3436829698d5824231251fad9d8e998f94f5e
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/993c9185-d324-2640-d061-bed2dd18b1f7@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+8ab2d0f39fb79fe6ca40@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c751798aa224fadc5124b49eeb38fb468c0fa039 upstream.
syzkaller managed to trigger the warning in bpf_jit_free() which checks via
bpf_prog_kallsyms_verify_off() for potentially unlinked JITed BPF progs
in kallsyms, and subsequently trips over GPF when walking kallsyms entries:
[...]
8021q: adding VLAN 0 to HW filter on device batadv0
8021q: adding VLAN 0 to HW filter on device batadv0
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9869 at kernel/bpf/core.c:810 bpf_jit_free+0x1e8/0x2a0
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 0 PID: 9869 Comm: kworker/0:7 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc8+ #1
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events bpf_prog_free_deferred
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x113/0x167 lib/dump_stack.c:113
panic+0x212/0x40b kernel/panic.c:214
__warn.cold.8+0x1b/0x38 kernel/panic.c:571
report_bug+0x1a4/0x200 lib/bug.c:186
fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:178 [inline]
do_error_trap+0x11b/0x200 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:271
do_invalid_op+0x36/0x40 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:290
invalid_op+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:973
RIP: 0010:bpf_jit_free+0x1e8/0x2a0
Code: 02 4c 89 e2 83 e2 07 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 86 00 00 00 48 ba 00 02 00 00 00 00 ad de 0f b6 43 02 49 39 d6 0f 84 5f fe ff ff <0f> 0b e9 58 fe ff ff 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 e2 48 c1
RSP: 0018:ffff888092f67cd8 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000007 RBX: ffffc90001947000 RCX: ffffffff816e9d88
RDX: dead000000000200 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88808769f7f0
RBP: ffff888092f67d00 R08: fffffbfff1394059 R09: fffffbfff1394058
R10: fffffbfff1394058 R11: ffffffff89ca02c7 R12: ffffc90001947002
R13: ffffc90001947020 R14: ffffffff881eca80 R15: ffff88808769f7e8
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffbfff400d000
#PF error: [normal kernel read fault]
PGD 21ffee067 P4D 21ffee067 PUD 21ffed067 PMD 9f942067 PTE 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 9869 Comm: kworker/0:7 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc8+ #1
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events bpf_prog_free_deferred
RIP: 0010:bpf_get_prog_addr_region kernel/bpf/core.c:495 [inline]
RIP: 0010:bpf_tree_comp kernel/bpf/core.c:558 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__lt_find include/linux/rbtree_latch.h:115 [inline]
RIP: 0010:latch_tree_find include/linux/rbtree_latch.h:208 [inline]
RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_kallsyms_find+0x107/0x2e0 kernel/bpf/core.c:632
Code: 00 f0 ff ff 44 38 c8 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 fa 00 00 00 41 f6 45 02 01 75 02 0f 0b 48 39 da 0f 82 92 00 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 30 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 45 01 00 00 8b 03 48 c1 e0
[...]
Upon further debugging, it turns out that whenever we trigger this
issue, the kallsyms removal in bpf_prog_ksym_node_del() was /skipped/
but yet bpf_jit_free() reported that the entry is /in use/.
Problem is that symbol exposure via bpf_prog_kallsyms_add() but also
perf_event_bpf_event() were done /after/ bpf_prog_new_fd(). Once the
fd is exposed to the public, a parallel close request came in right
before we attempted to do the bpf_prog_kallsyms_add().
Given at this time the prog reference count is one, we start to rip
everything underneath us via bpf_prog_release() -> bpf_prog_put().
The memory is eventually released via deferred free, so we're seeing
that bpf_jit_free() has a kallsym entry because we added it from
bpf_prog_load() but /after/ bpf_prog_put() from the remote CPU.
Therefore, move both notifications /before/ we install the fd. The
issue was never seen between bpf_prog_alloc_id() and bpf_prog_new_fd()
because upon bpf_prog_get_fd_by_id() we'll take another reference to
the BPF prog, so we're still holding the original reference from the
bpf_prog_load().
Fixes: 6ee52e2a3fe4 ("perf, bpf: Introduce PERF_RECORD_BPF_EVENT")
Fixes: 74451e66d516 ("bpf: make jited programs visible in traces")
Reported-by: syzbot+bd3bba6ff3fcea7a6ec6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Zubin Mithra <zsm@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
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[ Upstream commit 4ff96fb52c6964ad42e0a878be8f86a2e8052ddd ]
klp_module_coming() is called for every module appearing in the system.
It sets obj->mod to a patched module for klp_object obj. Unfortunately
it leaves it set even if an error happens later in the function and the
patched module is not allowed to be loaded.
klp_is_object_loaded() uses obj->mod variable and could currently give a
wrong return value. The bug is probably harmless as of now.
Signed-off-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
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commit f18ddc13af981ce3c7b7f26925f099e7c6929aba upstream.
ENOTSUPP is not supposed to be returned to userspace. This was found on an
OpenPower machine, where the RTC does not support set_alarm.
On that system, a clock_nanosleep(CLOCK_REALTIME_ALARM, ...) results in
"524 Unknown error 524"
Replace it with EOPNOTSUPP which results in the expected "95 Operation not
supported" error.
Fixes: 1c6b39ad3f01 (alarmtimers: Return -ENOTSUPP if no RTC device is present)
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190903171802.28314-1-cascardo@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c9dccacfccc72c32692eedff4a27a4b0833a2afd upstream.
kmsg_dump_get_buffer() is supposed to select all the youngest log
messages which fit into the provided buffer. It determines the correct
start index by using msg_print_text() with a NULL buffer to calculate
the size of each entry. However, when performing the actual writes,
msg_print_text() only writes the entry to the buffer if the written len
is lesser than the size of the buffer. So if the lengths of the
selected youngest log messages happen to precisely fill up the provided
buffer, the last log message is not included.
We don't want to modify msg_print_text() to fill up the buffer and start
returning a length which is equal to the size of the buffer, since
callers of its other users, such as kmsg_dump_get_line(), depend upon
the current behaviour.
Instead, fix kmsg_dump_get_buffer() to compensate for this.
For example, with the following two final prints:
[ 6.427502] AAAAAAAAAAAAA
[ 6.427769] BBBBBBBB12345
A dump of a 64-byte buffer filled by kmsg_dump_get_buffer(), before this
patch:
00000000: 3c 30 3e 5b 20 20 20 20 36 2e 35 32 32 31 39 37 <0>[ 6.522197
00000010: 5d 20 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 0a ] AAAAAAAAAAAAA.
00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
After this patch:
00000000: 3c 30 3e 5b 20 20 20 20 36 2e 34 35 36 36 37 38 <0>[ 6.456678
00000010: 5d 20 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 31 32 33 34 35 0a ] BBBBBBBB12345.
00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190711142937.4083-1-vincent.whitchurch@axis.com
Fixes: e2ae715d66bf4bec ("kmsg - kmsg_dump() use iterator to receive log buffer content")
To: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.5+
Signed-off-by: Vincent Whitchurch <vincent.whitchurch@axis.com>
Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e336b4027775cb458dc713745e526fa1a1996b2a ]
Since BUG() and WARN() may use a trap (e.g. UD2 on x86) to
get the address where the BUG() has occurred, kprobes can not
do single-step out-of-line that instruction. So prohibit
probing on such address.
Without this fix, if someone put a kprobe on WARN(), the
kernel will crash with invalid opcode error instead of
outputing warning message, because kernel can not find
correct bug address.
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Acked-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: David S . Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Naveen N . Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/156750890133.19112.3393666300746167111.stgit@devnote2
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a46d14eca7b75fffe35603aa8b81df654353d80f ]
Enabling WARN_DOUBLE_CLOCK in /sys/kernel/debug/sched_features causes
warning to fire in update_rq_clock. This seems to be caused by onlining
a new fair sched group not using the rq lock wrappers.
[] rq->clock_update_flags & RQCF_UPDATED
[] WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 54385 at kernel/sched/core.c:210 update_rq_clock+0xec/0x150
[] Call Trace:
[] online_fair_sched_group+0x53/0x100
[] cpu_cgroup_css_online+0x16/0x20
[] online_css+0x1c/0x60
[] cgroup_apply_control_enable+0x231/0x3b0
[] cgroup_mkdir+0x41b/0x530
[] kernfs_iop_mkdir+0x61/0xa0
[] vfs_mkdir+0x108/0x1a0
[] do_mkdirat+0x77/0xe0
[] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x1d0
[] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Using the wrappers in online_fair_sched_group instead of the raw locking
removes this warning.
[ tglx: Use rq_*lock_irq() ]
Signed-off-by: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190801133749.11033-1-pauld@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a07db5c0865799ebed1f88be0df50c581fb65029 ]
On !CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED configurations it is currently not possible to
move RT tasks between cgroups to which CPU controller has been attached;
but it is oddly possible to first move tasks around and then make them
RT (setschedule to FIFO/RR).
E.g.:
# mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct/group1
# chrt -fp 10 $$
# echo $$ > /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct/group1/tasks
bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
# chrt -op 0 $$
# echo $$ > /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct/group1/tasks
# chrt -fp 10 $$
# cat /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct/group1/tasks
2345
2598
# chrt -p 2345
pid 2345's current scheduling policy: SCHED_FIFO
pid 2345's current scheduling priority: 10
Also, as Michal noted, it is currently not possible to enable CPU
controller on unified hierarchy with !CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED (if there
are any kernel RT threads in root cgroup, they can't be migrated to the
newly created CPU controller's root in cgroup_update_dfl_csses()).
Existing code comes with a comment saying the "we don't support RT-tasks
being in separate groups". Such comment is however stale and belongs to
pre-RT_GROUP_SCHED times. Also, it doesn't make much sense for
!RT_GROUP_ SCHED configurations, since checks related to RT bandwidth
are not performed at all in these cases.
Make moving RT tasks between CPU controller groups viable by removing
special case check for RT (and DEADLINE) tasks.
Signed-off-by: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: lizefan@huawei.com
Cc: longman@redhat.com
Cc: luca.abeni@santannapisa.it
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190719063455.27328-1-juri.lelli@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f6cad8df6b30a5d2bbbd2e698f74b4cafb9fb82b ]
The load_balance() has a dedicated mecanism to detect when an imbalance
is due to CPU affinity and must be handled at parent level. In this case,
the imbalance field of the parent's sched_group is set.
The description of sg_imbalanced() gives a typical example of two groups
of 4 CPUs each and 4 tasks each with a cpumask covering 1 CPU of the first
group and 3 CPUs of the second group. Something like:
{ 0 1 2 3 } { 4 5 6 7 }
* * * *
But the load_balance fails to fix this UC on my octo cores system
made of 2 clusters of quad cores.
Whereas the load_balance is able to detect that the imbalanced is due to
CPU affinity, it fails to fix it because the imbalance field is cleared
before letting parent level a chance to run. In fact, when the imbalance is
detected, the load_balance reruns without the CPU with pinned tasks. But
there is no other running tasks in the situation described above and
everything looks balanced this time so the imbalance field is immediately
cleared.
The imbalance field should not be cleared if there is no other task to move
when the imbalance is detected.
Signed-off-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1561996022-28829-1-git-send-email-vincent.guittot@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 71492580571467fb7177aade19c18ce7486267f5 ]
Tetsuo Handa had reported he saw an incorrect "downgrading a read lock"
warning right after a previous lockdep warning. It is likely that the
previous warning turned off lock debugging causing the lockdep to have
inconsistency states leading to the lock downgrade warning.
Fix that by add a check for debug_locks at the beginning of
__lock_downgrade().
Debugged-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Reported-by: syzbot+53383ae265fb161ef488@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1547093005-26085-1-git-send-email-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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first symbol
[ Upstream commit 2a1a3fa0f29270583f0e6e3100d609e09697add1 ]
An arm64 kernel configured with
CONFIG_KPROBES=y
CONFIG_KALLSYMS=y
# CONFIG_KALLSYMS_ALL is not set
CONFIG_KALLSYMS_BASE_RELATIVE=y
reports the following kprobe failure:
[ 0.032677] kprobes: failed to populate blacklist: -22
[ 0.033376] Please take care of using kprobes.
It appears that kprobe fails to retrieve the symbol at address
0xffff000010081000, despite this symbol being in System.map:
ffff000010081000 T __exception_text_start
This symbol is part of the first group of aliases in the
kallsyms_offsets array (symbol names generated using ugly hacks in
scripts/kallsyms.c):
kallsyms_offsets:
.long 0x1000 // do_undefinstr
.long 0x1000 // efi_header_end
.long 0x1000 // _stext
.long 0x1000 // __exception_text_start
.long 0x12b0 // do_cp15instr
Looking at the implementation of get_symbol_pos(), it returns the
lowest index for aliasing symbols. In this case, it return 0.
But kallsyms_lookup_size_offset() considers 0 as a failure, which
is obviously wrong (there is definitely a valid symbol living there).
In turn, the kprobe blacklisting stops abruptly, hence the original
error.
A CONFIG_KALLSYMS_ALL kernel wouldn't fail as there is always
some random symbols at the beginning of this array, which are never
looked up via kallsyms_lookup_size_offset.
Fix it by considering that get_symbol_pos() is always successful
(which is consistent with the other uses of this function).
Fixes: ffc5089196446 ("[PATCH] Create kallsyms_lookup_size_offset()")
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit eddf3e9c7c7e4d0707c68d1bb22cc6ec8aef7d4a upstream.
The following crash was observed:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158
Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
pc : resend_irqs+0x68/0xb0
lr : resend_irqs+0x64/0xb0
...
Call trace:
resend_irqs+0x68/0xb0
tasklet_action_common.isra.6+0x84/0x138
tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
__do_softirq+0x120/0x324
run_ksoftirqd+0x44/0x60
smpboot_thread_fn+0x1ac/0x1e8
kthread+0x134/0x138
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
The reason for this is that the interrupt resend mechanism happens in soft
interrupt context, which is a asynchronous mechanism versus other
operations on interrupts. free_irq() does not take resend handling into
account. Thus, the irq descriptor might be already freed before the resend
tasklet is executed. resend_irqs() does not check the return value of the
interrupt descriptor lookup and derefences the return value
unconditionally.
1):
__setup_irq
irq_startup
check_irq_resend // activate softirq to handle resend irq
2):
irq_domain_free_irqs
irq_free_descs
free_desc
call_rcu(&desc->rcu, delayed_free_desc)
3):
__do_softirq
tasklet_action
resend_irqs
desc = irq_to_desc(irq)
desc->handle_irq(desc) // desc is NULL --> Ooops
Fix this by adding a NULL pointer check in resend_irqs() before derefencing
the irq descriptor.
Fixes: a4633adcdbc1 ("[PATCH] genirq: add genirq sw IRQ-retrigger")
Signed-off-by: Yunfeng Ye <yeyunfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Zhiqiang Liu <liuzhiqiang26@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1630ae13-5c8e-901e-de09-e740b6a426a7@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit bc6f2a757d525e001268c3658bd88822e768f8db ]
In module_add_modinfo_attrs if sysfs_create_file
fails, we forget to free allocated modinfo_attrs
and roll back the sysfs files.
Fixes: 03e88ae1b13d ("[PATCH] fix module sysfs files reference counting")
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 5e2d2cc2588bd3307ce3937acbc2ed03c830a861 upstream.
do_sched_cfs_period_timer() will refill cfs_b runtime and call
distribute_cfs_runtime to unthrottle cfs_rq, sometimes cfs_b->runtime
will allocate all quota to one cfs_rq incorrectly, then other cfs_rqs
attached to this cfs_b can't get runtime and will be throttled.
We find that one throttled cfs_rq has non-negative
cfs_rq->runtime_remaining and cause an unexpetced cast from s64 to u64
in snippet:
distribute_cfs_runtime() {
runtime = -cfs_rq->runtime_remaining + 1;
}
The runtime here will change to a large number and consume all
cfs_b->runtime in this cfs_b period.
According to Ben Segall, the throttled cfs_rq can have
account_cfs_rq_runtime called on it because it is throttled before
idle_balance, and the idle_balance calls update_rq_clock to add time
that is accounted to the task.
This commit prevents cfs_rq to be assgined new runtime if it has been
throttled until that distribute_cfs_runtime is called.
Signed-off-by: Liangyan <liangyan.peng@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: shanpeic@linux.alibaba.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: xlpang@linux.alibaba.com
Fixes: d3d9dc330236 ("sched: Throttle entities exceeding their allowed bandwidth")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190826121633.6538-1-liangyan.peng@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f1c6ece23729257fb46562ff9224cf5f61b818da ]
lockdep reports the following deadlock scenario:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
kworker/1:1/48 is trying to acquire lock:
000000008d7a62b2 (text_mutex){+.+.}, at: kprobe_optimizer+0x163/0x290
but task is already holding lock:
00000000850b5e2d (module_mutex){+.+.}, at: kprobe_optimizer+0x31/0x290
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (module_mutex){+.+.}:
__mutex_lock+0xac/0x9f0
mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20
set_all_modules_text_rw+0x22/0x90
ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare+0x1c/0x20
ftrace_run_update_code+0xe/0x30
ftrace_startup_enable+0x2e/0x50
ftrace_startup+0xa7/0x100
register_ftrace_function+0x27/0x70
arm_kprobe+0xb3/0x130
enable_kprobe+0x83/0xa0
enable_trace_kprobe.part.0+0x2e/0x80
kprobe_register+0x6f/0xc0
perf_trace_event_init+0x16b/0x270
perf_kprobe_init+0xa7/0xe0
perf_kprobe_event_init+0x3e/0x70
perf_try_init_event+0x4a/0x140
perf_event_alloc+0x93a/0xde0
__do_sys_perf_event_open+0x19f/0xf30
__x64_sys_perf_event_open+0x20/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x65/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
-> #0 (text_mutex){+.+.}:
__lock_acquire+0xfcb/0x1b60
lock_acquire+0xca/0x1d0
__mutex_lock+0xac/0x9f0
mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20
kprobe_optimizer+0x163/0x290
process_one_work+0x22b/0x560
worker_thread+0x50/0x3c0
kthread+0x112/0x150
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(module_mutex);
lock(text_mutex);
lock(module_mutex);
lock(text_mutex);
*** DEADLOCK ***
As a reproducer I've been using bcc's funccount.py
(https://github.com/iovisor/bcc/blob/master/tools/funccount.py),
for example:
# ./funccount.py '*interrupt*'
That immediately triggers the lockdep splat.
Fix by acquiring text_mutex before module_mutex in kprobe_optimizer().
Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: d5b844a2cf50 ("ftrace/x86: Remove possible deadlock between register_kprobe() and ftrace_run_update_code()")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190812184302.GA7010@xps-13
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 372e0d01da71c84dcecf7028598a33813b0d5256 upstream.
The race between adding a function probe and reading the probes that exist
is very subtle. It needs a comment. Also, the issue can also happen if the
probe has has the EMPTY_HASH as its func_hash.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 7b60f3d876156 ("ftrace: Dynamically create the probe ftrace_ops for the trace_array")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5b0022dd32b7c2e15edf1827ba80aa1407edf9ff upstream.
In register_ftrace_function_probe(), we are not checking the return
value of alloc_and_copy_ftrace_hash(). The subsequent call to
ftrace_match_records() may end up dereferencing the same. Add a check to
ensure this doesn't happen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/26e92574f25ad23e7cafa3cf5f7a819de1832cbe.1562249521.git.naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1ec3a81a0cf42 ("ftrace: Have each function probe use its own ftrace_ops")
Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7bd46644ea0f6021dc396a39a8bfd3a58f6f1f9f upstream.
LTP testsuite on powerpc results in the below crash:
Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000000
Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000029d800
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
LE SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV
...
CPU: 68 PID: 96584 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W
NIP: c00000000029d800 LR: c00000000029dac4 CTR: c0000000001e6ad0
REGS: c0002017fae8ba10 TRAP: 0300 Tainted: G W
MSR: 9000000000009033 <SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28022422 XER: 20040000
CFAR: c00000000029d90c DAR: 0000000000000000 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 0
...
NIP [c00000000029d800] t_probe_next+0x60/0x180
LR [c00000000029dac4] t_mod_start+0x1a4/0x1f0
Call Trace:
[c0002017fae8bc90] [c000000000cdbc40] _cond_resched+0x10/0xb0 (unreliable)
[c0002017fae8bce0] [c0000000002a15b0] t_start+0xf0/0x1c0
[c0002017fae8bd30] [c0000000004ec2b4] seq_read+0x184/0x640
[c0002017fae8bdd0] [c0000000004a57bc] sys_read+0x10c/0x300
[c0002017fae8be30] [c00000000000b388] system_call+0x5c/0x70
The test (ftrace_set_ftrace_filter.sh) is part of ftrace stress tests
and the crash happens when the test does 'cat
$TRACING_PATH/set_ftrace_filter'.
The address points to the second line below, in t_probe_next(), where
filter_hash is dereferenced:
hash = iter->probe->ops.func_hash->filter_hash;
size = 1 << hash->size_bits;
This happens due to a race with register_ftrace_function_probe(). A new
ftrace_func_probe is created and added into the func_probes list in
trace_array under ftrace_lock. However, before initializing the filter,
we drop ftrace_lock, and re-acquire it after acquiring regex_lock. If
another process is trying to read set_ftrace_filter, it will be able to
acquire ftrace_lock during this window and it will end up seeing a NULL
filter_hash.
Fix this by just checking for a NULL filter_hash in t_probe_next(). If
the filter_hash is NULL, then this probe is just being added and we can
simply return from here.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/05e021f757625cbbb006fad41380323dbe4e3b43.1562249521.git.naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 7b60f3d876156 ("ftrace: Dynamically create the probe ftrace_ops for the trace_array")
Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d0ff14fdc987303aeeb7de6f1bd72c3749ae2a9b upstream.
If alloc_descs() fails before irq_sysfs_init() has run, free_desc() in the
cleanup path will call kobject_del() even though the kobject has not been
added with kobject_add().
Fix this by making the call to kobject_del() conditional on whether
irq_sysfs_init() has run.
This problem surfaced because commit aa30f47cf666 ("kobject: Add support
for default attribute groups to kobj_type") makes kobject_del() stricter
about pairing with kobject_add(). If the pairing is incorrrect, a WARNING
and backtrace occur in sysfs_remove_group() because there is no parent.
[ tglx: Add a comment to the code and make it work with CONFIG_SYSFS=n ]
Fixes: ecb3f394c5db ("genirq: Expose interrupt information through sysfs")
Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1564703564-4116-1-git-send-email-mikelley@microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit fdadd04931c2d7cd294dc5b2b342863f94be53a3 ]
Michael and Sandipan report:
Commit ede95a63b5 introduced a bpf_jit_limit tuneable to limit BPF
JIT allocations. At compile time it defaults to PAGE_SIZE * 40000,
and is adjusted again at init time if MODULES_VADDR is defined.
For ppc64 kernels, MODULES_VADDR isn't defined, so we're stuck with
the compile-time default at boot-time, which is 0x9c400000 when
using 64K page size. This overflows the signed 32-bit bpf_jit_limit
value:
root@ubuntu:/tmp# cat /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_limit
-1673527296
and can cause various unexpected failures throughout the network
stack. In one case `strace dhclient eth0` reported:
setsockopt(5, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ATTACH_FILTER, {len=11, filter=0x105dd27f8},
16) = -1 ENOTSUPP (Unknown error 524)
and similar failures can be seen with tools like tcpdump. This doesn't
always reproduce however, and I'm not sure why. The more consistent
failure I've seen is an Ubuntu 18.04 KVM guest booted on a POWER9
host would time out on systemd/netplan configuring a virtio-net NIC
with no noticeable errors in the logs.
Given this and also given that in near future some architectures like
arm64 will have a custom area for BPF JIT image allocations we should
get rid of the BPF_JIT_LIMIT_DEFAULT fallback / default entirely. For
4.21, we have an overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec(), bpf_jit_free_exec()
so therefore add another overridable bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() helper
function which returns the possible size of the memory area for deriving
the default heuristic in bpf_jit_charge_init().
Like bpf_jit_alloc_exec() and bpf_jit_free_exec(), the new
bpf_jit_alloc_exec_limit() assumes that module_alloc() is the default
JIT memory provider, and therefore in case archs implement their custom
module_alloc() we use MODULES_{END,_VADDR} for limits and otherwise for
vmalloc_exec() cases like on ppc64 we use VMALLOC_{END,_START}.
Additionally, for archs supporting large page sizes, we should change
the sysctl to be handled as long to not run into sysctl restrictions
in future.
Fixes: ede95a63b5e8 ("bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations")
Reported-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit ede95a63b5e84ddeea6b0c473b36ab8bfd8c6ce3 upstream.
Rick reported that the BPF JIT could potentially fill the entire module
space with BPF programs from unprivileged users which would prevent later
attempts to load normal kernel modules or privileged BPF programs, for
example. If JIT was enabled but unsuccessful to generate the image, then
before commit 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config")
we would always fall back to the BPF interpreter. Nowadays in the case
where the CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON could be set, then the load will abort
with a failure since the BPF interpreter was compiled out.
Add a global limit and enforce it for unprivileged users such that in case
of BPF interpreter compiled out we fail once the limit has been reached
or we fall back to BPF interpreter earlier w/o using module mem if latter
was compiled in. In a next step, fair share among unprivileged users can
be resolved in particular for the case where we would fail hard once limit
is reached.
Fixes: 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config")
Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64")
Co-Developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fa9dd599b4dae841924b022768354cfde9affecb upstream.
Having a pure_initcall() callback just to permanently enable BPF
JITs under CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON is unnecessary and could leave
a small race window in future where JIT is still disabled on boot.
Since we know about the setting at compilation time anyway, just
initialize it properly there. Also consolidate all the individual
bpf_jit_enable variables into a single one and move them under one
location. Moreover, don't allow for setting unspecified garbage
values on them.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.14 as dependency of commit 2e4a30983b0f
"bpf: restrict access to core bpf sysctls":
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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