summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/net
AgeCommit message (Collapse)Author
2014-02-10phonet: Check input from user before allocatingSasha Levin
commit bcf1b70ac6eb0ed8286c66e6bf37cb747cbaa04c upstream. A phonet packet is limited to USHRT_MAX bytes, this is never checked during tx which means that the user can specify any size he wishes, and the kernel will attempt to allocate that size. In the good case, it'll lead to the following warning, but it may also cause the kernel to kick in the OOM and kill a random task on the server. [ 8921.744094] WARNING: at mm/page_alloc.c:2255 __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x65/0x730() [ 8921.749770] Pid: 5081, comm: trinity Tainted: G W 3.4.0-rc1-next-20120402-sasha #46 [ 8921.756672] Call Trace: [ 8921.758185] [<ffffffff810b2ba7>] warn_slowpath_common+0x87/0xb0 [ 8921.762868] [<ffffffff810b2be5>] warn_slowpath_null+0x15/0x20 [ 8921.765399] [<ffffffff8117eae5>] __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x65/0x730 [ 8921.769226] [<ffffffff81179c8a>] ? zone_watermark_ok+0x1a/0x20 [ 8921.771686] [<ffffffff8117d045>] ? get_page_from_freelist+0x625/0x660 [ 8921.773919] [<ffffffff8117f3a8>] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x1f8/0x240 [ 8921.776248] [<ffffffff811c03e0>] kmalloc_large_node+0x70/0xc0 [ 8921.778294] [<ffffffff811c4bd4>] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x34/0x1c0 [ 8921.780847] [<ffffffff821b0e3c>] ? sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xbc/0x260 [ 8921.783179] [<ffffffff821b3c65>] __alloc_skb+0x75/0x170 [ 8921.784971] [<ffffffff821b0e3c>] sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xbc/0x260 [ 8921.787111] [<ffffffff821b002e>] ? release_sock+0x7e/0x90 [ 8921.788973] [<ffffffff821b0ff0>] sock_alloc_send_skb+0x10/0x20 [ 8921.791052] [<ffffffff824cfc20>] pep_sendmsg+0x60/0x380 [ 8921.792931] [<ffffffff824cb4a6>] ? pn_socket_bind+0x156/0x180 [ 8921.794917] [<ffffffff824cb50f>] ? pn_socket_autobind+0x3f/0x90 [ 8921.797053] [<ffffffff824cb63f>] pn_socket_sendmsg+0x4f/0x70 [ 8921.798992] [<ffffffff821ab8e7>] sock_aio_write+0x187/0x1b0 [ 8921.801395] [<ffffffff810e325e>] ? sub_preempt_count+0xae/0xf0 [ 8921.803501] [<ffffffff8111842c>] ? __lock_acquire+0x42c/0x4b0 [ 8921.805505] [<ffffffff821ab760>] ? __sock_recv_ts_and_drops+0x140/0x140 [ 8921.807860] [<ffffffff811e07cc>] do_sync_readv_writev+0xbc/0x110 [ 8921.809986] [<ffffffff811958e7>] ? might_fault+0x97/0xa0 [ 8921.811998] [<ffffffff817bd99e>] ? security_file_permission+0x1e/0x90 [ 8921.814595] [<ffffffff811e17e2>] do_readv_writev+0xe2/0x1e0 [ 8921.816702] [<ffffffff810b8dac>] ? do_setitimer+0x1ac/0x200 [ 8921.818819] [<ffffffff810e2ec1>] ? get_parent_ip+0x11/0x50 [ 8921.820863] [<ffffffff810e325e>] ? sub_preempt_count+0xae/0xf0 [ 8921.823318] [<ffffffff811e1926>] vfs_writev+0x46/0x60 [ 8921.825219] [<ffffffff811e1a3f>] sys_writev+0x4f/0xb0 [ 8921.827127] [<ffffffff82658039>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 8921.829384] ---[ end trace dffe390f30db9eb7 ]--- Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com> Acked-by: Rémi Denis-Courmont <remi.denis-courmont@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10cipso: don't follow a NULL pointer when setsockopt() is calledPaul Moore
commit a9d0acf8d157c30374af76d43e7f05b5b108be0c upstream. [ Upstream commit 89d7ae34cdda4195809a5a987f697a517a2a3177 ] As reported by Alan Cox, and verified by Lin Ming, when a user attempts to add a CIPSO option to a socket using the CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL tag the kernel dies a terrible death when it attempts to follow a NULL pointer (the skb argument to cipso_v4_validate() is NULL when called via the setsockopt() syscall). This patch fixes this by first checking to ensure that the skb is non-NULL before using it to find the incoming network interface. In the unlikely case where the skb is NULL and the user attempts to add a CIPSO option with the _TAG_LOCAL tag we return an error as this is not something we want to allow. A simple reproducer, kindly supplied by Lin Ming, although you must have the CIPSO DOI #3 configure on the system first or you will be caught early in cipso_v4_validate(): #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <linux/ip.h> #include <linux/in.h> #include <string.h> struct local_tag { char type; char length; char info[4]; }; struct cipso { char type; char length; char doi[4]; struct local_tag local; }; int main(int argc, char **argv) { int sockfd; struct cipso cipso = { .type = IPOPT_CIPSO, .length = sizeof(struct cipso), .local = { .type = 128, .length = sizeof(struct local_tag), }, }; memset(cipso.doi, 0, 4); cipso.doi[3] = 3; sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); #define SOL_IP 0 setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_OPTIONS, &cipso, sizeof(struct cipso)); return 0; } CC: Lin Ming <mlin@ss.pku.edu.cn> Reported-by: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10svcrpc: fix svc_xprt_enqueue/svc_recv busy-loopingJ. Bruce Fields
commit d10f27a750312ed5638c876e4bd6aa83664cccd8 upstream. The rpc server tries to ensure that there will be room to send a reply before it receives a request. It does this by tracking, in xpt_reserved, an upper bound on the total size of the replies that is has already committed to for the socket. Currently it is adding in the estimate for a new reply *before* it checks whether there is space available. If it finds that there is not space, it then subtracts the estimate back out. This may lead the subsequent svc_xprt_enqueue to decide that there is space after all. The results is a svc_recv() that will repeatedly return -EAGAIN, causing server threads to loop without doing any actual work. Reported-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru> Tested-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10svcrpc: sends on closed socket should stop immediatelyJ. Bruce Fields
commit f06f00a24d76e168ecb38d352126fd203937b601 upstream. svc_tcp_sendto sets XPT_CLOSE if we fail to transmit the entire reply. However, the XPT_CLOSE won't be acted on immediately. Meanwhile other threads could send further replies before the socket is really shut down. This can manifest as data corruption: for example, if a truncated read reply is followed by another rpc reply, that second reply will look to the client like further read data. Symptoms were data corruption preceded by svc_tcp_sendto logging something like kernel: rpc-srv/tcp: nfsd: sent only 963696 when sending 1048708 bytes - shutting down socket Reported-by: Malahal Naineni <malahal@us.ibm.com> Tested-by: Malahal Naineni <malahal@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10dccp: check ccid before dereferencingMathias Krause
commit 276bdb82dedb290511467a5a4fdbe9f0b52dce6f upstream. ccid_hc_rx_getsockopt() and ccid_hc_tx_getsockopt() might be called with a NULL ccid pointer leading to a NULL pointer dereference. This could lead to a privilege escalation if the attacker is able to map page 0 and prepare it with a fake ccid_ops pointer. Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Cc: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10Bluetooth: fix possible info leak in bt_sock_recvmsg()Mathias Krause
commit 4683f42fde3977bdb4e8a09622788cc8b5313778 upstream. In case the socket is already shutting down, bt_sock_recvmsg() returns with 0 without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory. Fix this by moving the msg_namelen assignment in front of the shutdown test. Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org> Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10Bluetooth: L2CAP - Fix info leak via getsockname()Mathias Krause
commit 792039c73cf176c8e39a6e8beef2c94ff46522ed upstream. The L2CAP code fails to initialize the l2_bdaddr_type member of struct sockaddr_l2 and the padding byte added for alignment. It that for leaks two bytes kernel stack via the getsockname() syscall. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak. Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org> Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [PG: net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c --> net/bluetooth/l2cap.c in .34] Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix missing msg_namelen update in rfcomm_sock_recvmsg()Mathias Krause
commit e11e0455c0d7d3d62276a0c55d9dfbc16779d691 upstream. If RFCOMM_DEFER_SETUP is set in the flags, rfcomm_sock_recvmsg() returns early with 0 without updating the possibly set msg_namelen member. This, in turn, leads to a 128 byte kernel stack leak in net/socket.c. Fix this by updating msg_namelen in this case. For all other cases it will be handled in bt_sock_stream_recvmsg(). Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org> Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak via getsockname()Mathias Krause
commit 9344a972961d1a6d2c04d9008b13617bcb6ec2ef upstream. The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the trailing padding byte of struct sockaddr_rc added for alignment. It that for leaks one byte kernel stack via the getsockname() syscall. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak. Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org> Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10Bluetooth: HCI - Fix info leak in getsockopt(HCI_FILTER)Mathias Krause
commit e15ca9a0ef9a86f0477530b0f44a725d67f889ee upstream. The HCI code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct hci_ufilter before copying it to userland -- that for leaking two bytes kernel stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak. Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org> Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10Bluetooth: Fix incorrect strncpy() in hidp_setup_hid()Anderson Lizardo
commit 0a9ab9bdb3e891762553f667066190c1d22ad62b upstream. The length parameter should be sizeof(req->name) - 1 because there is no guarantee that string provided by userspace will contain the trailing '\0'. Can be easily reproduced by manually setting req->name to 128 non-zero bytes prior to ioctl(HIDPCONNADD) and checking the device name setup on input subsystem: $ cat /sys/devices/pnp0/00\:04/tty/ttyS0/hci0/hci0\:1/input8/name AAAAAA[...]AAAAAAAAf0:af:f0:af:f0:af ("f0:af:f0:af:f0:af" is the device bluetooth address, taken from "phys" field in struct hid_device due to overflow.) Signed-off-by: Anderson Lizardo <anderson.lizardo@openbossa.org> Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10kernel panic when mount NFSv4Trond Myklebust
commit beb0f0a9fba1fa98b378329a9a5b0a73f25097ae upstream. On Tue, 2010-12-14 at 16:58 +0800, Mi Jinlong wrote: > Hi, > > When testing NFSv4 at RHEL6 with kernel 2.6.32, I got a kernel panic > at NFS client's __rpc_create_common function. > > The panic place is: > rpc_mkpipe > __rpc_lookup_create() <=== find pipefile *idmap* > __rpc_mkpipe() <=== pipefile is *idmap* > __rpc_create_common() > ****** BUG_ON(!d_unhashed(dentry)); ****** *panic* > > It means that the dentry's d_flags have be set DCACHE_UNHASHED, > but it should not be set here. > > Is someone known this bug? or give me some idea? > > A reproduce program is append, but it can't reproduce the bug every time. > the export is: "/nfsroot *(rw,no_root_squash,fsid=0,insecure)" > > And the panic message is append. > > ============================================================================ > #!/bin/sh > > LOOPTOTAL=768 > LOOPCOUNT=0 > ret=0 > > while [ $LOOPCOUNT -ne $LOOPTOTAL ] > do > ((LOOPCOUNT += 1)) > service nfs restart > /usr/sbin/rpc.idmapd > mount -t nfs4 127.0.0.1:/ /mnt|| return 1; > ls -l /var/lib/nfs/rpc_pipefs/nfs/*/ > umount /mnt > echo $LOOPCOUNT > done > > =============================================================================== > Code: af 60 01 00 00 89 fa 89 f0 e8 64 cf 89 f0 e8 5c 7c 64 cf 31 c0 8b 5c 24 10 8b > 74 24 14 8b 7c 24 18 8b 6c 24 1c 83 c4 20 c3 <0f> 0b eb fc 8b 46 28 c7 44 24 08 20 > de ee f0 c7 44 24 04 56 ea > EIP:[<f0ee92ea>] __rpc_create_common+0x8a/0xc0 [sunrpc] SS:ESP 0068:eccb5d28 > ---[ end trace 8f5606cd08928ed2]--- > Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception > Pid:7131, comm: mount.nfs4 Tainted: G D -------------------2.6.32 #1 > Call Trace: > [<c080ad18>] ? panic+0x42/0xed > [<c080e42c>] ? oops_end+0xbc/0xd0 > [<c040b090>] ? do_invalid_op+0x0/0x90 > [<c040b10f>] ? do_invalid_op+0x7f/0x90 > [<f0ee92ea>] ? __rpc_create_common+0x8a/0xc0[sunrpc] > [<f0edc433>] ? rpc_free_task+0x33/0x70[sunrpc] > [<f0ed6508>] ? prc_call_sync+0x48/0x60[sunrpc] > [<f0ed656e>] ? rpc_ping+0x4e/0x60[sunrpc] > [<f0ed6eaf>] ? rpc_create+0x38f/0x4f0[sunrpc] > [<c080d80b>] ? error_code+0x73/0x78 > [<f0ee92ea>] ? __rpc_create_common+0x8a/0xc0[sunrpc] > [<c0532bda>] ? d_lookup+0x2a/0x40 > [<f0ee94b1>] ? rpc_mkpipe+0x111/0x1b0[sunrpc] > [<f10a59f4>] ? nfs_create_rpc_client+0xb4/0xf0[nfs] > [<f10d6c6d>] ? nfs_fscache_get_client_cookie+0x1d/0x50[nfs] > [<f10d3fcb>] ? nfs_idmap_new+0x7b/0x140[nfs] > [<c05e76aa>] ? strlcpy+0x3a/0x60 > [<f10a60ca>] ? nfs4_set_client+0xea/0x2b0[nfs] > [<f10a6d0c>] ? nfs4_create_server+0xac/0x1b0[nfs] > [<c04f1400>] ? krealloc+0x40/0x50 > [<f10b0e8b>] ? nfs4_remote_get_sb+0x6b/0x250[nfs] > [<c04f14ec>] ? kstrdup+0x3c/0x60 > [<c0520739>] ? vfs_kern_mount+0x69/0x170 > [<f10b1a3c>] ? nfs_do_root_mount+0x6c/0xa0[nfs] > [<f10b1b47>] ? nfs4_try_mount+0x37/0xa0[nfs] > [<f10afe6d>] ? nfs4_validate_text_mount_data+-x7d/0xf0[nfs] > [<f10b1c42>] ? nfs4_get_sb+0x92/0x2f0 > [<c0520739>] ? vfs_kern_mount+0x69/0x170 > [<c05366d2>] ? get_fs_type+0x32/0xb0 > [<c052089f>] ? do_kern_mount+0x3f/0xe0 > [<c053954f>] ? do_mount+0x2ef/0x740 > [<c0537740>] ? copy_mount_options+0xb0/0x120 > [<c0539a0e>] ? sys_mount+0x6e/0xa0 Hi, Does the following patch fix the problem? Cheers Trond -------------------------- SUNRPC: Fix a BUG in __rpc_create_common From: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Mi Jinlong reports: When testing NFSv4 at RHEL6 with kernel 2.6.32, I got a kernel panic at NFS client's __rpc_create_common function. The panic place is: rpc_mkpipe __rpc_lookup_create() <=== find pipefile *idmap* __rpc_mkpipe() <=== pipefile is *idmap* __rpc_create_common() ****** BUG_ON(!d_unhashed(dentry)); ****** *panic* The test is wrong: we can find ourselves with a hashed negative dentry here if the idmapper tried to look up the file before we got round to creating it. Just replace the BUG_ON() with a d_drop(dentry). Reported-by: Mi Jinlong <mijinlong@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL #2Mathias Krause
commit c25463722509fef0ed630b271576a8c9a70236f3 upstream. When dump_one_policy() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small buffer to dump the whole xfrm policy, xfrm_policy_netlink() returns NULL instead of an error pointer. But its caller expects an error pointer and therefore continues to operate on a NULL skbuff. Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULLMathias Krause
commit 864745d291b5ba80ea0bd0edcbe67273de368836 upstream. When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff. This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map address 0. Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_tmpl()Mathias Krause
commit 1f86840f897717f86d523a13e99a447e6a5d2fa5 upstream. The memory used for the template copy is a local stack variable. As struct xfrm_user_tmpl contains multiple holes added by the compiler for alignment, not initializing the memory will lead to leaking stack bytes to userland. Add an explicit memset(0) to avoid the info leak. Initial version of the patch by Brad Spengler. Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_policy()Mathias Krause
commit 7b789836f434c87168eab067cfbed1ec4783dffd upstream. The memory reserved to dump the xfrm policy includes multiple padding bytes added by the compiler for alignment (padding bytes in struct xfrm_selector and struct xfrm_userpolicy_info). Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the buffer to avoid the heap info leak. Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_state()Mathias Krause
commit f778a636713a435d3a922c60b1622a91136560c1 upstream. The memory reserved to dump the xfrm state includes the padding bytes of struct xfrm_usersa_info added by the compiler for alignment (7 for amd64, 3 for i386). Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the buffer to avoid the info leak. Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10drop_monitor: dont sleep in atomic contextEric Dumazet
commit bec4596b4e6770c7037f21f6bd27567b152dc0d6 upstream. drop_monitor calls several sleeping functions while in atomic context. BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slub.c:943 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 2103, name: kworker/0:2 Pid: 2103, comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 3.5.0-rc1+ #55 Call Trace: [<ffffffff810697ca>] __might_sleep+0xca/0xf0 [<ffffffff811345a3>] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1b3/0x1c0 [<ffffffff8105578c>] ? queue_delayed_work_on+0x11c/0x130 [<ffffffff815343fb>] __alloc_skb+0x4b/0x230 [<ffffffffa00b0360>] ? reset_per_cpu_data+0x160/0x160 [drop_monitor] [<ffffffffa00b022f>] reset_per_cpu_data+0x2f/0x160 [drop_monitor] [<ffffffffa00b03ab>] send_dm_alert+0x4b/0xb0 [drop_monitor] [<ffffffff810568e0>] process_one_work+0x130/0x4c0 [<ffffffff81058249>] worker_thread+0x159/0x360 [<ffffffff810580f0>] ? manage_workers.isra.27+0x240/0x240 [<ffffffff8105d403>] kthread+0x93/0xa0 [<ffffffff816be6d4>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10 [<ffffffff8105d370>] ? kthread_freezable_should_stop+0x80/0x80 [<ffffffff816be6d0>] ? gs_change+0xb/0xb Rework the logic to call the sleeping functions in right context. Use standard timer/workqueue api to let system chose any cpu to perform the allocation and netlink send. Also avoid a loop if reset_per_cpu_data() cannot allocate memory : use mod_timer() to wait 1/10 second before next try. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [PG: diffstat here is less by one line due to blank line removal] Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10drop_monitor: prevent init path from scheduling on the wrong cpuNeil Horman
commit 4fdcfa12843bca38d0c9deff70c8720e4e8f515f upstream. I just noticed after some recent updates, that the init path for the drop monitor protocol has a minor error. drop monitor maintains a per cpu structure, that gets initalized from a single cpu. Normally this is fine, as the protocol isn't in use yet, but I recently made a change that causes a failed skb allocation to reschedule itself . Given the current code, the implication is that this workqueue reschedule will take place on the wrong cpu. If drop monitor is used early during the boot process, its possible that two cpus will access a single per-cpu structure in parallel, possibly leading to data corruption. This patch fixes the situation, by storing the cpu number that a given instance of this per-cpu data should be accessed from. In the case of a need for a reschedule, the cpu stored in the struct is assigned the rescheule, rather than the currently executing cpu Tested successfully by myself. Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> CC: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10drop_monitor: Make updating data->skb smp safeNeil Horman
commit 3885ca785a3618593226687ced84f3f336dc3860 upstream. Eric Dumazet pointed out to me that the drop_monitor protocol has some holes in its smp protections. Specifically, its possible to replace data->skb while its being written. This patch corrects that by making data->skb an rcu protected variable. That will prevent it from being overwritten while a tracepoint is modifying it. Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> CC: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [PG: The "__rcu" sparse addition is only present in 2.6.37+ kernels.] Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10drop_monitor: fix sleeping in invalid context warningNeil Horman
commit cde2e9a651b76d8db36ae94cd0febc82b637e5dd upstream. Eric Dumazet pointed out this warning in the drop_monitor protocol to me: [ 38.352571] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/mutex.c:85 [ 38.352576] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 4415, name: dropwatch [ 38.352580] Pid: 4415, comm: dropwatch Not tainted 3.4.0-rc2+ #71 [ 38.352582] Call Trace: [ 38.352592] [<ffffffff8153aaf0>] ? trace_napi_poll_hit+0xd0/0xd0 [ 38.352599] [<ffffffff81063f2a>] __might_sleep+0xca/0xf0 [ 38.352606] [<ffffffff81655b16>] mutex_lock+0x26/0x50 [ 38.352610] [<ffffffff8153aaf0>] ? trace_napi_poll_hit+0xd0/0xd0 [ 38.352616] [<ffffffff810b72d9>] tracepoint_probe_register+0x29/0x90 [ 38.352621] [<ffffffff8153a585>] set_all_monitor_traces+0x105/0x170 [ 38.352625] [<ffffffff8153a8ca>] net_dm_cmd_trace+0x2a/0x40 [ 38.352630] [<ffffffff8154a81a>] genl_rcv_msg+0x21a/0x2b0 [ 38.352636] [<ffffffff810f8029>] ? zone_statistics+0x99/0xc0 [ 38.352640] [<ffffffff8154a600>] ? genl_rcv+0x30/0x30 [ 38.352645] [<ffffffff8154a059>] netlink_rcv_skb+0xa9/0xd0 [ 38.352649] [<ffffffff8154a5f0>] genl_rcv+0x20/0x30 [ 38.352653] [<ffffffff81549a7e>] netlink_unicast+0x1ae/0x1f0 [ 38.352658] [<ffffffff81549d76>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2b6/0x310 [ 38.352663] [<ffffffff8150824f>] sock_sendmsg+0x10f/0x130 [ 38.352668] [<ffffffff8150abe0>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x60/0xb0 [ 38.352673] [<ffffffff81515f04>] ? verify_iovec+0x64/0xe0 [ 38.352677] [<ffffffff81509c46>] __sys_sendmsg+0x386/0x390 [ 38.352682] [<ffffffff810ffaf9>] ? handle_mm_fault+0x139/0x210 [ 38.352687] [<ffffffff8165b5bc>] ? do_page_fault+0x1ec/0x4f0 [ 38.352693] [<ffffffff8106ba4d>] ? set_next_entity+0x9d/0xb0 [ 38.352699] [<ffffffff81310b49>] ? tty_ldisc_deref+0x9/0x10 [ 38.352703] [<ffffffff8106d363>] ? pick_next_task_fair+0x63/0x140 [ 38.352708] [<ffffffff8150b8d4>] sys_sendmsg+0x44/0x80 [ 38.352713] [<ffffffff8165f8e2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b It stems from holding a spinlock (trace_state_lock) while attempting to register or unregister tracepoint hooks, making in_atomic() true in this context, leading to the warning when the tracepoint calls might_sleep() while its taking a mutex. Since we only use the trace_state_lock to prevent trace protocol state races, as well as hardware stat list updates on an rcu write side, we can just convert the spinlock to a mutex to avoid this problem. Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> CC: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10tcp: do_tcp_sendpages() must try to push data out on oom conditionsWilly Tarreau
commit bad115cfe5b509043b684d3a007ab54b80090aa1 upstream. Since recent changes on TCP splicing (starting with commits 2f533844 "tcp: allow splice() to build full TSO packets" and 35f9c09f "tcp: tcp_sendpages() should call tcp_push() once"), I started seeing massive stalls when forwarding traffic between two sockets using splice() when pipe buffers were larger than socket buffers. Latest changes (net: netdev_alloc_skb() use build_skb()) made the problem even more apparent. The reason seems to be that if do_tcp_sendpages() fails on out of memory condition without being able to send at least one byte, tcp_push() is not called and the buffers cannot be flushed. After applying the attached patch, I cannot reproduce the stalls at all and the data rate it perfectly stable and steady under any condition which previously caused the problem to be permanent. The issue seems to have been there since before the kernel migrated to git, which makes me think that the stalls I occasionally experienced with tux during stress-tests years ago were probably related to the same issue. This issue was first encountered on 3.0.31 and 3.2.17, so please backport to -stable. Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10tcp: drop SYN+FIN messagesEric Dumazet
commit fdf5af0daf8019cec2396cdef8fb042d80fe71fa upstream. Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his linux machines to their limits. Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10tcp: perform DMA to userspace only if there is a task waiting for itJiri Kosina
commit 59ea33a68a9083ac98515e4861c00e71efdc49a1 upstream. Back in 2006, commit 1a2449a87b ("[I/OAT]: TCP recv offload to I/OAT") added support for receive offloading to IOAT dma engine if available. The code in tcp_rcv_established() tries to perform early DMA copy if applicable. It however does so without checking whether the userspace task is actually expecting the data in the buffer. This is not a problem under normal circumstances, but there is a corner case where this doesn't work -- and that's when MSG_TRUNC flag to recvmsg() is used. If the IOAT dma engine is not used, the code properly checks whether there is a valid ucopy.task and the socket is owned by userspace, but misses the check in the dmaengine case. This problem can be observed in real trivially -- for example 'tbench' is a good reproducer, as it makes a heavy use of MSG_TRUNC. On systems utilizing IOAT, you will soon find tbench waiting indefinitely in sk_wait_data(), as they have been already early-copied in tcp_rcv_established() using dma engine. This patch introduces the same check we are performing in the simple iovec copy case to the IOAT case as well. It fixes the indefinite recvmsg(MSG_TRUNC) hangs. Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10net/core: Fix potential memory leak in dev_set_alias()Alexey Khoroshilov
commit 7364e445f62825758fa61195d237a5b8ecdd06ec upstream. Do not leak memory by updating pointer with potentially NULL realloc return value. Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org). Signed-off-by: Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@ispras.ru> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10net: reduce net_rx_action() latency to 2 HZEric Dumazet
commit d1f41b67ff7735193bc8b418b98ac99a448833e2 upstream. We should use time_after_eq() to get maximum latency of two ticks, instead of three. Bug added in commit 24f8b2385 (net: increase receive packet quantum) Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10netlink: fix races after skb queueingEric Dumazet
commit 4a7e7c2ad540e54c75489a70137bf0ec15d3a127 upstream. As soon as an skb is queued into socket receive_queue, another thread can consume it, so we are not allowed to reference skb anymore, or risk use after free. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10netlink: wake up netlink listeners sooner (v2)stephen hemminger
commit 2c64580046a122fa15bb586d8ca4fd5e4b69a1e7 upstream. This patch changes it to yield sooner at halfway instead. Still not a cure-all for listener overrun if listner is slow, but works much reliably. Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10net_sched: gred: Fix oops in gred_dump() in WRED modeDavid Ward
commit 244b65dbfede788f2fa3fe2463c44d0809e97c6b upstream. A parameter set exists for WRED mode, called wred_set, to hold the same values for qavg and qidlestart across all VQs. The WRED mode values had been previously held in the VQ for the default DP. After these values were moved to wred_set, the VQ for the default DP was no longer created automatically (so that it could be omitted on purpose, to have packets in the default DP enqueued directly to the device without using RED). However, gred_dump() was overlooked during that change; in WRED mode it still reads qavg/qidlestart from the VQ for the default DP, which might not even exist. As a result, this command sequence will cause an oops: tc qdisc add dev $DEV handle $HANDLE parent $PARENT gred setup \ DPs 3 default 2 grio tc qdisc change dev $DEV handle $HANDLE gred DP 0 prio 8 $RED_OPTIONS tc qdisc change dev $DEV handle $HANDLE gred DP 1 prio 8 $RED_OPTIONS This fixes gred_dump() in WRED mode to use the values held in wred_set. Signed-off-by: David Ward <david.ward@ll.mit.edu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [PG: in 2.6.34 it is tab[]->parms vs. tab[]->vars of 3.4 baseline] Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10netem: fix possible skb leakEric Dumazet
commit 116a0fc31c6c9b8fc821be5a96e5bf0b43260131 upstream. skb_checksum_help(skb) can return an error, we must free skb in this case. qdisc_drop(skb, sch) can also be feeded with a NULL skb (if skb_unshare() failed), so lets use this generic helper. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10af_packet: remove BUG statement in tpacket_destruct_skbdanborkmann@iogearbox.net
commit 7f5c3e3a80e6654cf48dfba7cf94f88c6b505467 upstream. Here's a quote of the comment about the BUG macro from asm-generic/bug.h: Don't use BUG() or BUG_ON() unless there's really no way out; one example might be detecting data structure corruption in the middle of an operation that can't be backed out of. If the (sub)system can somehow continue operating, perhaps with reduced functionality, it's probably not BUG-worthy. If you're tempted to BUG(), think again: is completely giving up really the *only* solution? There are usually better options, where users don't need to reboot ASAP and can mostly shut down cleanly. In our case, the status flag of a ring buffer slot is managed from both sides, the kernel space and the user space. This means that even though the kernel side might work as expected, the user space screws up and changes this flag right between the send(2) is triggered when the flag is changed to TP_STATUS_SENDING and a given skb is destructed after some time. Then, this will hit the BUG macro. As David suggested, the best solution is to simply remove this statement since it cannot be used for kernel side internal consistency checks. I've tested it and the system still behaves /stable/ in this case, so in accordance with the above comment, we should rather remove it. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel.borkmann@tik.ee.ethz.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10bridge: set priority of STP packetsStephen Hemminger
commit 547b4e718115eea74087e28d7fa70aec619200db upstream. Spanning Tree Protocol packets should have always been marked as control packets, this causes them to get queued in the high prirority FIFO. As Radia Perlman mentioned in her LCA talk, STP dies if bridge gets overloaded and can't communicate. This is a long-standing bug back to the first versions of Linux bridge. Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10net_sched: gact: Fix potential panic in tcf_gact().Hiroaki SHIMODA
commit 696ecdc10622d86541f2e35cc16e15b6b3b1b67e upstream. gact_rand array is accessed by gact->tcfg_ptype whose value is assumed to less than MAX_RAND, but any range checks are not performed. So add a check in tcf_gact_init(). And in tcf_gact(), we can reduce a branch. Signed-off-by: Hiroaki SHIMODA <shimoda.hiroaki@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10net: sched: integer overflow fixStefan Hasko
commit d2fe85da52e89b8012ffad010ef352a964725d5f upstream. Fixed integer overflow in function htb_dequeue Signed-off-by: Stefan Hasko <hasko.stevo@gmail.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10net: prevent setting ttl=0 via IP_TTLCong Wang
commit c9be4a5c49cf51cc70a993f004c5bb30067a65ce upstream. A regression is introduced by the following commit: commit 4d52cfbef6266092d535237ba5a4b981458ab171 Author: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Date: Tue Jun 2 00:42:16 2009 -0700 net: ipv4/ip_sockglue.c cleanups Pure cleanups but it is not a pure cleanup... - if (val != -1 && (val < 1 || val>255)) + if (val != -1 && (val < 0 || val > 255)) Since there is no reason provided to allow ttl=0, change it back. Reported-by: nitin padalia <padalia.nitin@gmail.com> Cc: nitin padalia <padalia.nitin@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10net: fix divide by zero in tcp algorithm illinoisJesper Dangaard Brouer
commit 8f363b77ee4fbf7c3bbcf5ec2c5ca482d396d664 upstream. Reading TCP stats when using TCP Illinois congestion control algorithm can cause a divide by zero kernel oops. The division by zero occur in tcp_illinois_info() at: do_div(t, ca->cnt_rtt); where ca->cnt_rtt can become zero (when rtt_reset is called) Steps to Reproduce: 1. Register tcp_illinois: # sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control=illinois 2. Monitor internal TCP information via command "ss -i" # watch -d ss -i 3. Establish new TCP conn to machine Either it fails at the initial conn, or else it needs to wait for a loss or a reset. This is only related to reading stats. The function avg_delay() also performs the same divide, but is guarded with a (ca->cnt_rtt > 0) at its calling point in update_params(). Thus, simply fix tcp_illinois_info(). Function tcp_illinois_info() / get_info() is called without socket lock. Thus, eliminate any race condition on ca->cnt_rtt by using a local stack variable. Simply reuse info.tcpv_rttcnt, as its already set to ca->cnt_rtt. Function avg_delay() is not affected by this race condition, as its called with the socket lock. Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10net: guard tcp_set_keepalive() to tcp socketsEric Dumazet
commit 3e10986d1d698140747fcfc2761ec9cb64c1d582 upstream. Its possible to use RAW sockets to get a crash in tcp_set_keepalive() / sk_reset_timer() Fix is to make sure socket is a SOCK_STREAM one. Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10net: fix info leak in compat dev_ifconf()Mathias Krause
commit 43da5f2e0d0c69ded3d51907d9552310a6b545e8 upstream. The implementation of dev_ifconf() for the compat ioctl interface uses an intermediate ifc structure allocated in userland for the duration of the syscall. Though, it fails to initialize the padding bytes inserted for alignment and that for leaks four bytes of kernel stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak. Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10tcp: preserve ACK clocking in TSOEric Dumazet
commit f4541d60a449afd40448b06496dcd510f505928e upstream. A long standing problem with TSO is the fact that tcp_tso_should_defer() rearms the deferred timer, while it should not. Current code leads to following bad bursty behavior : 20:11:24.484333 IP A > B: . 297161:316921(19760) ack 1 win 119 20:11:24.484337 IP B > A: . ack 263721 win 1117 20:11:24.485086 IP B > A: . ack 265241 win 1117 20:11:24.485925 IP B > A: . ack 266761 win 1117 20:11:24.486759 IP B > A: . ack 268281 win 1117 20:11:24.487594 IP B > A: . ack 269801 win 1117 20:11:24.488430 IP B > A: . ack 271321 win 1117 20:11:24.489267 IP B > A: . ack 272841 win 1117 20:11:24.490104 IP B > A: . ack 274361 win 1117 20:11:24.490939 IP B > A: . ack 275881 win 1117 20:11:24.491775 IP B > A: . ack 277401 win 1117 20:11:24.491784 IP A > B: . 316921:332881(15960) ack 1 win 119 20:11:24.492620 IP B > A: . ack 278921 win 1117 20:11:24.493448 IP B > A: . ack 280441 win 1117 20:11:24.494286 IP B > A: . ack 281961 win 1117 20:11:24.495122 IP B > A: . ack 283481 win 1117 20:11:24.495958 IP B > A: . ack 285001 win 1117 20:11:24.496791 IP B > A: . ack 286521 win 1117 20:11:24.497628 IP B > A: . ack 288041 win 1117 20:11:24.498459 IP B > A: . ack 289561 win 1117 20:11:24.499296 IP B > A: . ack 291081 win 1117 20:11:24.500133 IP B > A: . ack 292601 win 1117 20:11:24.500970 IP B > A: . ack 294121 win 1117 20:11:24.501388 IP B > A: . ack 295641 win 1117 20:11:24.501398 IP A > B: . 332881:351881(19000) ack 1 win 119 While the expected behavior is more like : 20:19:49.259620 IP A > B: . 197601:202161(4560) ack 1 win 119 20:19:49.260446 IP B > A: . ack 154281 win 1212 20:19:49.261282 IP B > A: . ack 155801 win 1212 20:19:49.262125 IP B > A: . ack 157321 win 1212 20:19:49.262136 IP A > B: . 202161:206721(4560) ack 1 win 119 20:19:49.262958 IP B > A: . ack 158841 win 1212 20:19:49.263795 IP B > A: . ack 160361 win 1212 20:19:49.264628 IP B > A: . ack 161881 win 1212 20:19:49.264637 IP A > B: . 206721:211281(4560) ack 1 win 119 20:19:49.265465 IP B > A: . ack 163401 win 1212 20:19:49.265886 IP B > A: . ack 164921 win 1212 20:19:49.266722 IP B > A: . ack 166441 win 1212 20:19:49.266732 IP A > B: . 211281:215841(4560) ack 1 win 119 20:19:49.267559 IP B > A: . ack 167961 win 1212 20:19:49.268394 IP B > A: . ack 169481 win 1212 20:19:49.269232 IP B > A: . ack 171001 win 1212 20:19:49.269241 IP A > B: . 215841:221161(5320) ack 1 win 119 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Van Jacobson <vanj@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Nandita Dukkipati <nanditad@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10tcp: tcp_sendpages() should call tcp_push() onceEric Dumazet
commit 35f9c09fe9c72eb8ca2b8e89a593e1c151f28fc2 upstream. commit 2f533844242 (tcp: allow splice() to build full TSO packets) added a regression for splice() calls using SPLICE_F_MORE. We need to call tcp_flush() at the end of the last page processed in tcp_sendpages(), or else transmits can be deferred and future sends stall. Add a new internal flag, MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST, acting like MSG_MORE, but with different semantic. For all sendpage() providers, its a transparent change. Only sock_sendpage() and tcp_sendpages() can differentiate the two different flags provided by pipe_to_sendpage() Reported-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Cc: Nandita Dukkipati <nanditad@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: H.K. Jerry Chu <hkchu@google.com> Cc: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com> Cc: Mahesh Bandewar <maheshb@google.com> Cc: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10tcp: allow splice() to build full TSO packetsEric Dumazet
commit 2f53384424251c06038ae612e56231b96ab610ee upstream. vmsplice()/splice(pipe, socket) call do_tcp_sendpages() one page at a time, adding at most 4096 bytes to an skb. (assuming PAGE_SIZE=4096) The call to tcp_push() at the end of do_tcp_sendpages() forces an immediate xmit when pipe is not already filled, and tso_fragment() try to split these skb to MSS multiples. 4096 bytes are usually split in a skb with 2 MSS, and a remaining sub-mss skb (assuming MTU=1500) This makes slow start suboptimal because many small frames are sent to qdisc/driver layers instead of big ones (constrained by cwnd and packets in flight of course) In fact, applications using sendmsg() (adding an additional memory copy) instead of vmsplice()/splice()/sendfile() are a bit faster because of this anomaly, especially if serving small files in environments with large initial [c]wnd. Call tcp_push() only if MSG_MORE is not set in the flags parameter. This bit is automatically provided by splice() internals but for the last page, or on all pages if user specified SPLICE_F_MORE splice() flag. In some workloads, this can reduce number of sent logical packets by an order of magnitude, making zero-copy TCP actually faster than one-copy :) Reported-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Cc: Nandita Dukkipati <nanditad@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: H.K. Jerry Chu <hkchu@google.com> Cc: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com> Cc: Mahesh Bandewar <maheshb@google.com> Cc: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10unix: fix a race condition in unix_release()Paul Moore
commit ded34e0fe8fe8c2d595bfa30626654e4b87621e0 upstream. As reported by Jan, and others over the past few years, there is a race condition caused by unix_release setting the sock->sk pointer to NULL before properly marking the socket as dead/orphaned. This can cause a problem with the LSM hook security_unix_may_send() if there is another socket attempting to write to this partially released socket in between when sock->sk is set to NULL and it is marked as dead/orphaned. This patch fixes this by only setting sock->sk to NULL after the socket has been marked as dead; I also take the opportunity to make unix_release_sock() a void function as it only ever returned 0/success. Dave, I think this one should go on the -stable pile. Special thanks to Jan for coming up with a reproducer for this problem. Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jan.stancek@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10sctp: fix memory leak in sctp_datamsg_from_user() when copy from user space ↵Tommi Rantala
fails commit be364c8c0f17a3dd42707b5a090b318028538eb9 upstream. Trinity (the syscall fuzzer) discovered a memory leak in SCTP, reproducible e.g. with the sendto() syscall by passing invalid user space pointer in the second argument: #include <string.h> #include <arpa/inet.h> #include <sys/socket.h> int main(void) { int fd; struct sockaddr_in sa; fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 132 /*IPPROTO_SCTP*/); if (fd < 0) return 1; memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa)); sa.sin_family = AF_INET; sa.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1"); sa.sin_port = htons(11111); sendto(fd, NULL, 1, 0, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa)); return 0; } As far as I can tell, the leak has been around since ~2003. Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10net: sctp: sctp_setsockopt_auth_key: use kzfree instead of kfreeDaniel Borkmann
commit 6ba542a291a5e558603ac51cda9bded347ce7627 upstream. In sctp_setsockopt_auth_key, we create a temporary copy of the user passed shared auth key for the endpoint or association and after internal setup, we free it right away. Since it's sensitive data, we should zero out the key before returning the memory back to the allocator. Thus, use kzfree instead of kfree, just as we do in sctp_auth_key_put(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10net: sctp: sctp_endpoint_free: zero out secret key dataDaniel Borkmann
commit b5c37fe6e24eec194bb29d22fdd55d73bcc709bf upstream. On sctp_endpoint_destroy, previously used sensitive keying material should be zeroed out before the memory is returned, as we already do with e.g. auth keys when released. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10net: sctp: sctp_auth_key_put: use kzfree instead of kfreeDaniel Borkmann
commit 586c31f3bf04c290dc0a0de7fc91d20aa9a5ee53 upstream. For sensitive data like keying material, it is common practice to zero out keys before returning the memory back to the allocator. Thus, use kzfree instead of kfree. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10netfilter: nf_ct_ipv4: packets with wrong ihl are invalidJozsef Kadlecsik
commit 07153c6ec074257ade76a461429b567cff2b3a1e upstream. It was reported that the Linux kernel sometimes logs: klogd: [2629147.402413] kernel BUG at net / netfilter / nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c: 447! klogd: [1072212.887368] kernel BUG at net / netfilter / nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c: 392 ipv4_get_l4proto() in nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4.c and tcp_error() in nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c should catch malformed packets, so the errors at the indicated lines - TCP options parsing - should not happen. However, tcp_error() relies on the "dataoff" offset to the TCP header, calculated by ipv4_get_l4proto(). But ipv4_get_l4proto() does not check bogus ihl values in IPv4 packets, which then can slip through tcp_error() and get caught at the TCP options parsing routines. The patch fixes ipv4_get_l4proto() by invalidating packets with bogus ihl value. The patch closes netfilter bugzilla id 771. Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10ipvs: fix info leak in getsockopt(IP_VS_SO_GET_TIMEOUT)Mathias Krause
commit 2d8a041b7bfe1097af21441cb77d6af95f4f4680 upstream. If at least one of CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP or CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP is not set, __ip_vs_get_timeouts() does not fully initialize the structure that gets copied to userland and that for leaks up to 12 bytes of kernel stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before passing the structure to __ip_vs_get_timeouts() to avoid the info leak. Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Cc: Wensong Zhang <wensong@linux-vs.org> Cc: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10atm: update msg_namelen in vcc_recvmsg()Mathias Krause
commit 9b3e617f3df53822345a8573b6d358f6b9e5ed87 upstream. The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set. It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory. Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared about vcc_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set. Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2014-02-10atm: fix info leak via getsockname()Mathias Krause
commit 3c0c5cfdcd4d69ffc4b9c0907cec99039f30a50a upstream. The ATM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct sockaddr_atmpvc inserted for alignment. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak. Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.0.4) at 2024-06-15 20:41:03 +0000