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Linux 4.1.39
* tag 'v4.1.39': (138 commits)
Linux 4.1.39
KVM: x86: remove data variable from kvm_get_msr_common
KVM: VMX: Fix host initiated access to guest MSR_TSC_AUX
KVM: x86: pass host_initiated to functions that read MSRs
perf/core: Fix the perf_cpu_time_max_percent check
perf/core: Make sysctl_perf_cpu_time_max_percent conform to documentation
perf/core: Fix implicitly enable dynamic interrupt throttle
perf/core: Fix dynamic interrupt throttle
Fix missing sanity check in /dev/sg
printk: use rcuidle console tracepoint
vfs: fix uninitialized flags in splice_to_pipe()
drm/radeon: Use mode h/vdisplay fields to hide out of bounds HW cursor
ARM: 8658/1: uaccess: fix zeroing of 64-bit get_user()
drm/dp/mst: fix kernel oops when turning off secondary monitor
[media] siano: make it work again with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
mmc: core: fix multi-bit bus width without high-speed mode
futex: Move futex_init() to core_initcall
xen-netfront: Delete rx_refill_timer in xennet_disconnect_backend()
scsi: aacraid: Fix INTx/MSI-x issue with older controllers
cpumask: use nr_cpumask_bits for parsing functions
...
Signed-off-by: Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br>
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[ Upstream commit 034dd34ff4916ec1f8f74e39ca3efb04eab2f791 ]
Olga Kornievskaia says: "I ran into this oops in the nfsd (below)
(4.10-rc3 kernel). To trigger this I had a client (unsuccessfully) try
to mount the server with krb5 where the server doesn't have the
rpcsec_gss_krb5 module built."
The problem is that rsci.cred is copied from a svc_cred structure that
gss_proxy didn't properly initialize. Fix that.
[120408.542387] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP
...
[120408.565724] CPU: 0 PID: 3601 Comm: nfsd Not tainted 4.10.0-rc3+ #16
[120408.567037] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual =
Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 07/02/2015
[120408.569225] task: ffff8800776f95c0 task.stack: ffffc90003d58000
[120408.570483] RIP: 0010:gss_mech_put+0xb/0x20 [auth_rpcgss]
...
[120408.584946] ? rsc_free+0x55/0x90 [auth_rpcgss]
[120408.585901] gss_proxy_save_rsc+0xb2/0x2a0 [auth_rpcgss]
[120408.587017] svcauth_gss_proxy_init+0x3cc/0x520 [auth_rpcgss]
[120408.588257] ? __enqueue_entity+0x6c/0x70
[120408.589101] svcauth_gss_accept+0x391/0xb90 [auth_rpcgss]
[120408.590212] ? try_to_wake_up+0x4a/0x360
[120408.591036] ? wake_up_process+0x15/0x20
[120408.592093] ? svc_xprt_do_enqueue+0x12e/0x2d0 [sunrpc]
[120408.593177] svc_authenticate+0xe1/0x100 [sunrpc]
[120408.594168] svc_process_common+0x203/0x710 [sunrpc]
[120408.595220] svc_process+0x105/0x1c0 [sunrpc]
[120408.596278] nfsd+0xe9/0x160 [nfsd]
[120408.597060] kthread+0x101/0x140
[120408.597734] ? nfsd_destroy+0x60/0x60 [nfsd]
[120408.598626] ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90
[120408.599448] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
Fixes: 1d658336b05f "SUNRPC: Add RPC based upcall mechanism for RPCGSS auth"
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
Tested-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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[ Upstream commit a06393ed03167771246c4c43192d9c264bc48412 ]
When removing a bcm tx operation either a hrtimer or a tasklet might run.
As the hrtimer triggers its associated tasklet and vice versa we need to
take care to mutually terminate both handlers.
Reported-by: Michael Josenhans <michael.josenhans@web.de>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Tested-by: Michael Josenhans <michael.josenhans@web.de>
Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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[ Upstream commit c929ea0b910355e1876c64431f3d5802f95b3d75 ]
After removing sunrpc module, I get many kmemleak information as,
unreferenced object 0xffff88003316b1e0 (size 544):
comm "gssproxy", pid 2148, jiffies 4294794465 (age 4200.081s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffffb0cfb58a>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4a/0xa0
[<ffffffffb03507fe>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x15e/0x1f0
[<ffffffffb0639baa>] ida_pre_get+0xaa/0x150
[<ffffffffb0639cfd>] ida_simple_get+0xad/0x180
[<ffffffffc06054fb>] nlmsvc_lookup_host+0x4ab/0x7f0 [lockd]
[<ffffffffc0605e1d>] lockd+0x4d/0x270 [lockd]
[<ffffffffc06061e5>] param_set_timeout+0x55/0x100 [lockd]
[<ffffffffc06cba24>] svc_defer+0x114/0x3f0 [sunrpc]
[<ffffffffc06cbbe7>] svc_defer+0x2d7/0x3f0 [sunrpc]
[<ffffffffc06c71da>] rpc_show_info+0x8a/0x110 [sunrpc]
[<ffffffffb044a33f>] proc_reg_write+0x7f/0xc0
[<ffffffffb038e41f>] __vfs_write+0xdf/0x3c0
[<ffffffffb0390f1f>] vfs_write+0xef/0x240
[<ffffffffb0392fbd>] SyS_write+0xad/0x130
[<ffffffffb0d06c37>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa9
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
I found, the ida information (dynamic memory) isn't cleanup.
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Fixes: 2f048db4680a ("SUNRPC: Add an identifier for struct rpc_clnt")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.12+
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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[ Upstream commit 78794d1890708cf94e3961261e52dcec2cc34722 ]
Context expiry times are in units of seconds since boot, not unix time.
The use of get_seconds() here therefore sets the expiry time decades in
the future. This prevents timely freeing of contexts destroyed by
client RPC_GSS_PROC_DESTROY requests. We'd still free them eventually
(when the module is unloaded or the container shut down), but a lot of
contexts could pile up before then.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c5b29f885afe "sunrpc: use seconds since boot in expiry cache"
Reported-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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[ Upstream commit 753aacfd2e95df6a0caf23c03dc309020765bea9 ]
A single netlink socket might own multiple interfaces *and* a
scheduled scan request (which might belong to another interface),
so when it goes away both may need to be destroyed.
Remove the schedule_scan_stop indirection to fix this - it's only
needed for interface destruction because of the way this works
right now, with a single work taking care of all interfaces.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 93a1e86ce10e4 ("nl80211: Stop scheduled scan if netlink client disappears")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Linux 4.1.38
* tag 'v4.1.38': (109 commits)
Linux 4.1.38
gro: Allow tunnel stacking in the case of FOU/GUE
tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
net: ipv4: Convert IP network timestamps to be y2038 safe
ipip: Properly mark ipip GRO packets as encapsulated.
sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit to be called under KERNEL_DS
fs: exec: apply CLOEXEC before changing dumpable task flags
IB/cma: Fix a race condition in iboe_addr_get_sgid()
Revert "ALSA: usb-audio: Fix race at stopping the stream"
kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
drivers/gpu/drm/ast: Fix infinite loop if read fails
target/user: Fix use-after-free of tcmu_cmds if they are expired
kernel/debug/debug_core.c: more properly delay for secondary CPUs
scsi: avoid a permanent stop of the scsi device's request queue
IB/multicast: Check ib_find_pkey() return value
IPoIB: Avoid reading an uninitialized member variable
block_dev: don't test bdev->bd_contains when it is not stable
btrfs: limit async_work allocation and worker func duration
mm/vmscan.c: set correct defer count for shrinker
Input: drv260x - fix input device's parent assignment
...
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[ Upstream commit c3483384ee511ee2af40b4076366cd82a6a47b86 ]
This patch should fix the issues seen with a recent fix to prevent
tunnel-in-tunnel frames from being generated with GRO. The fix itself is
correct for now as long as we do not add any devices that support
NETIF_F_GSO_GRE_CSUM. When such a device is added it could have the
potential to mess things up due to the fact that the outer transport header
points to the outer UDP header and not the GRE header as would be expected.
Fixes: fac8e0f579695 ("tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Duyck <aduyck@mirantis.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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[ Upstream commit fac8e0f579695a3ecbc4d3cac369139d7f819971 ]
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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[ Upstream commit 822c868532cae2cc1c51f4f18ab61c194d98aaf6 ]
ICMP timestamp messages and IP source route options require
timestamps to be in milliseconds modulo 24 hours from
midnight UT format.
Add inet_current_timestamp() function to support this. The function
returns the required timestamp in network byte order.
Timestamp calculation is also changed to call ktime_get_real_ts64()
which uses struct timespec64. struct timespec64 is y2038 safe.
Previously it called getnstimeofday() which uses struct timespec.
struct timespec is not y2038 safe.
Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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[ Upstream commit b8cba75bdf6a48ea4811bbefb11a94a5c7281b68 ]
ipip encapsulated packets can be merged together by GRO but the result
does not have the proper GSO type set or even marked as being
encapsulated at all. Later retransmission of these packets will likely
fail if the device does not support ipip offloads. This is similar to
the issue resolved in IPv6 sit in feec0cb3
("ipv6: gro: support sit protocol").
Reported-by: Patrick Boutilier <boutilpj@ednet.ns.ca>
Fixes: 9667e9bb ("ipip: Add gro callbacks to ipip offload")
Tested-by: Patrick Boutilier <boutilpj@ednet.ns.ca>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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[ Upstream commit 5c056fdc5b474329037f2aa18401bd73033e0ce0 ]
After sending an authorizer (ceph_x_authorize_a + ceph_x_authorize_b),
the client gets back a ceph_x_authorize_reply, which it is supposed to
verify to ensure the authenticity and protect against replay attacks.
The code for doing this is there (ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply(),
ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply() + plumbing), but it is never
invoked by the the messenger.
AFAICT this goes back to 2009, when ceph authentication protocols
support was added to the kernel client in 4e7a5dcd1bba ("ceph:
negotiate authentication protocol; implement AUTH_NONE protocol").
The second param of ceph_connection_operations::verify_authorizer_reply
is unused all the way down. Pass 0 to facilitate backporting, and kill
it in the next commit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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[ Upstream commit 1cded9d2974fe4fe339fc0ccd6638b80d465ab2c ]
There are two problems with refcounting of auth_gss messages.
First, the reference on the pipe->pipe list (taken by a call
to rpc_queue_upcall()) is not counted. It seems to be
assumed that a message in pipe->pipe will always also be in
pipe->in_downcall, where it is correctly reference counted.
However there is no guaranty of this. I have a report of a
NULL dereferences in rpc_pipe_read() which suggests a msg
that has been freed is still on the pipe->pipe list.
One way I imagine this might happen is:
- message is queued for uid=U and auth->service=S1
- rpc.gssd reads this message and starts processing.
This removes the message from pipe->pipe
- message is queued for uid=U and auth->service=S2
- rpc.gssd replies to the first message. gss_pipe_downcall()
calls __gss_find_upcall(pipe, U, NULL) and it finds the
*second* message, as new messages are placed at the head
of ->in_downcall, and the service type is not checked.
- This second message is removed from ->in_downcall and freed
by gss_release_msg() (even though it is still on pipe->pipe)
- rpc.gssd tries to read another message, and dereferences a pointer
to this message that has just been freed.
I fix this by incrementing the reference count before calling
rpc_queue_upcall(), and decrementing it if that fails, or normally in
gss_pipe_destroy_msg().
It seems strange that the reply doesn't target the message more
precisely, but I don't know all the details. In any case, I think the
reference counting irregularity became a measureable bug when the
extra arg was added to __gss_find_upcall(), hence the Fixes: line
below.
The second problem is that if rpc_queue_upcall() fails, the new
message is not freed. gss_alloc_msg() set the ->count to 1,
gss_add_msg() increments this to 2, gss_unhash_msg() decrements to 1,
then the pointer is discarded so the memory never gets freed.
Fixes: 9130b8dbc6ac ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for same uid but different gss service")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1011250
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Signed-off-by: Troy Kisky <troy.kisky@boundarydevices.com>
Acked-by: Max Krummenacher <max.krummenacher@toradex.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0487f174fa672b60c4fa491b43277b901bcf05d7)
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[ Upstream commit 3de81b758853f0b29c61e246679d20b513c4cfec ]
Qian Zhang (张谦) reported a potential socket buffer overflow in
tipc_msg_build() which is also known as CVE-2016-8632: due to
insufficient checks, a buffer overflow can occur if MTU is too short for
even tipc headers. As anyone can set device MTU in a user/net namespace,
this issue can be abused by a regular user.
As agreed in the discussion on Ben Hutchings' original patch, we should
check the MTU at the moment a bearer is attached rather than for each
processed packet. We also need to repeat the check when bearer MTU is
adjusted to new device MTU. UDP case also needs a check to avoid
overflow when calculating bearer MTU.
References: CVE-2016-8632
Fixes: b97bf3fd8f6a ("[TIPC] Initial merge")
Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Reported-by: Qian Zhang (张谦) <zhangqian-c@360.cn>
Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Conflicts:
net/tipc/bearer.c
net/tipc/bearer.h
due to 1a90632da8c17a27e0c93538ee987764adee43a5: tipc: eliminate remnants of hungarian notation
and b1c29f6b10d5981c89d3ea9b9991ca97141ed6d0 tipc: simplify resetting and disabling of bearers
Signed-off-by: Philipp Hahn <hahn@univention.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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[ Upstream commit 0eab121ef8750a5c8637d51534d5e9143fb0633f ]
Prior to commit c0371da6047a ("put iov_iter into msghdr") in v3.19, there
was no check that the iovec contained enough bytes for an ICMP header,
and the read loop would walk across neighboring stack contents. Since the
iov_iter conversion, bad arguments are noticed, but the returned error is
EFAULT. Returning EINVAL is a clearer error and also solves the problem
prior to v3.19.
This was found using trinity with KASAN on v3.18:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy_fromiovec+0x60/0x114 at addr ffffffc071077da0
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c2/9623
page:ffffffbe034b9a08 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0
flags: 0x0()
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
CPU: 0 PID: 9623 Comm: trinity-c2 Tainted: G BU 3.18.0-dirty #15
Hardware name: Google Tegra210 Smaug Rev 1,3+ (DT)
Call trace:
[<ffffffc000209c98>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1ac arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:90
[<ffffffc000209e54>] show_stack+0x10/0x1c arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:171
[< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffc000f18dc4>] dump_stack+0x7c/0xd0 lib/dump_stack.c:50
[< inline >] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:147
[< inline >] kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:236
[<ffffffc000373dcc>] kasan_report+0x380/0x4b8 mm/kasan/report.c:259
[< inline >] check_memory_region mm/kasan/kasan.c:264
[<ffffffc00037352c>] __asan_load8+0x20/0x70 mm/kasan/kasan.c:507
[<ffffffc0005b9624>] memcpy_fromiovec+0x5c/0x114 lib/iovec.c:15
[< inline >] memcpy_from_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:2667
[<ffffffc000ddeba0>] ping_common_sendmsg+0x50/0x108 net/ipv4/ping.c:674
[<ffffffc000dded30>] ping_v4_sendmsg+0xd8/0x698 net/ipv4/ping.c:714
[<ffffffc000dc91dc>] inet_sendmsg+0xe0/0x12c net/ipv4/af_inet.c:749
[< inline >] __sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:624
[< inline >] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:632
[<ffffffc000cab61c>] sock_sendmsg+0x124/0x164 net/socket.c:643
[< inline >] SYSC_sendto net/socket.c:1797
[<ffffffc000cad270>] SyS_sendto+0x178/0x1d8 net/socket.c:1761
CVE-2016-8399
Reported-by: Qidan He <i@flanker017.me>
Fixes: c319b4d76b9e ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Philipp Hahn <hahn@univention.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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[ Upstream commit 84ac7260236a49c79eede91617700174c2c19b0c ]
When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a
struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value
can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to
set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished.
This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the
struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously
initialized timer will not be deleted.
The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when
changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start
of packet_set_ring.
References: CVE-2016-8655
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <philip.pettersson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Philipp Hahn <hahn@univention.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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[ Debian: net-add-recursion-limit-to-gro.patch ]
Currently, GRO can do unlimited recursion through the gro_receive
handlers. This was fixed for tunneling protocols by limiting tunnel GRO
to one level with encap_mark, but both VLAN and TEB still have this
problem. Thus, the kernel is vulnerable to a stack overflow, if we
receive a packet composed entirely of VLAN headers.
This patch adds a recursion counter to the GRO layer to prevent stack
overflow. When a gro_receive function hits the recursion limit, GRO is
aborted for this skb and it is processed normally.
Thanks to Vladimír Beneš <vbenes@redhat.com> for the initial bug report.
Fixes: CVE-2016-7039
Fixes: 9b174d88c257 ("net: Add Transparent Ethernet Bridging GRO support.")
Fixes: 66e5133f19e9 ("vlan: Add GRO support for non hardware accelerated vlan")
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Philipp Hahn <hahn@univention.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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[ Upstream commit 951b6a0717db97ce420547222647bcc40bf1eacd ]
addr can be NULL and it should not be dereferenced before NULL checking.
References: CVE-2015-8956
Signed-off-by: Jaganath Kanakkassery <jaganath.k@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Philipp Hahn <hahn@univention.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Linux 4.1.36
* tag 'v4.1.36': (72 commits)
Linux 4.1.36
kbuild: add -fno-PIE
firewire: net: fix fragmented datagram_size off-by-one
firewire: net: guard against rx buffer overflows
parisc: Ensure consistent state when switching to kernel stack at syscall entry
ovl: fsync after copy-up
virtio: console: Unlock vqs while freeing buffers
md: be careful not lot leak internal curr_resync value into metadata. -- (all)
md: sync sync_completed has correct value as recovery finishes.
scsi: arcmsr: Send SYNCHRONIZE_CACHE command to firmware
scsi: scsi_debug: Fix memory leak if LBP enabled and module is unloaded
drm/radeon/si_dpm: workaround for SI kickers
drm/dp/mst: Check peer device type before attempting EDID read
drm/dp/mst: add some defines for logical/physical ports
drm/dp/mst: Clear port->pdt when tearing down the i2c adapter
KVM: MIPS: Precalculate MMIO load resume PC
KVM: MIPS: Make ERET handle ERL before EXL
drm/radeon: drop register readback in cayman_cp_int_cntl_setup
scsi: megaraid_sas: Fix data integrity failure for JBOD (passthrough) devices
Revert "drm/radeon: fix DP link training issue with second 4K monitor"
...
|
|
[ Upstream commit ea720935cf6686f72def9d322298bf7e9bd53377 ]
In mac80211, multicast A-MSDUs are accepted in many cases that
they shouldn't be accepted in:
* drop A-MSDUs with a multicast A1 (RA), as required by the
spec in 9.11 (802.11-2012 version)
* drop A-MSDUs with a 4-addr header, since the fourth address
can't actually be useful for them; unless 4-address frame
format is actually requested, even though the fourth address
is still not useful in this case, but ignored
Accepting the first case, in particular, is very problematic
since it allows anyone else with possession of a GTK to send
unicast frames encapsulated in a multicast A-MSDU, even when
the AP has client isolation enabled.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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|
Linux 4.1.35
* tag 'v4.1.35': (98 commits)
Linux 4.1.35
xhci: fix usb2 resume timing and races.
mm: remove gup_flags FOLL_WRITE games from __get_user_pages()
timekeeping: Fix __ktime_get_fast_ns() regression
time: Add cycles to nanoseconds translation
Linux 4.1.34
openrisc: fix the fix of copy_from_user()
avr32: fix 'undefined reference to `___copy_from_user'
fix memory leaks in tracing_buffers_splice_read()
tracing: Move mutex to protect against resetting of seq data
MIPS: SMP: Fix possibility of deadlock when bringing CPUs online
MIPS: Fix pre-r6 emulation FPU initialisation
btrfs: ensure that file descriptor used with subvol ioctls is a dir
fix fault_in_multipages_...() on architectures with no-op access_ok()
ocfs2: fix start offset to ocfs2_zero_range_for_truncate()
fanotify: fix list corruption in fanotify_get_response()
fsnotify: add a way to stop queueing events on group shutdown
autofs: use dentry flags to block walks during expire
autofs races
ocfs2/dlm: fix race between convert and migration
...
Signed-off-by: Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Troy Kisky <troy.kisky@boundarydevices.com>
Signed-off-by: Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Troy Kisky <troy.kisky@boundarydevices.com>
Signed-off-by: Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br>
|
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Signed-off-by: Troy Kisky <troy.kisky@boundarydevices.com>
Signed-off-by: Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br>
|
|
Linux 4.1.33
* tag 'v4.1.33': (1760 commits)
Linux 4.1.33
Revert "ARC: mm: don't loose PTE_SPECIAL in pte_modify()"
x86/AMD: Apply erratum 665 on machines without a BIOS fix
x86/paravirt: Do not trace _paravirt_ident_*() functions
ovl: listxattr: use strnlen()
ovl: remove posix_acl_default from workdir
serial: 8250: added acces i/o products quad and octal serial cards
sysfs: correctly handle read offset on PREALLOC attrs
sysfs: correctly handle short reads on PREALLOC attrs.
kernfs: don't depend on d_find_any_alias() when generating notifications
dm crypt: fix free of bad values after tfm allocation failure
dm crypt: fix error with too large bios
dm log writes: fix check of kthread_run() return value
dm log writes: fix bug with too large bios
dm log writes: move IO accounting earlier to fix error path
NFSv4.x: Fix a refcount leak in nfs_callback_up_net
xfs: prevent dropping ioend completions during buftarg wait
xfs: fix superblock inprogress check
USB: serial: option: add WeTelecom 0x6802 and 0x6803 products
USB: avoid left shift by -1
...
Signed-off-by: Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br>
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[ Upstream commit ad5987b47e96a0fb6d13fea250e936aed000093c ]
Due to an apparent copy/paste bug, the number of counters for the
beacon configuration were checked twice, instead of checking the
number of probe response counters. Fix this to check the number of
probe response counters before parsing those.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 9a774c78e211 ("cfg80211: Support multiple CSA counters")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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[ Upstream commit 751eb6b6042a596b0080967c1a529a9fe98dac1d ]
In general, when DAD detected IPv6 duplicate address, ifp->state
will be set to INET6_IFADDR_STATE_ERRDAD and DAD is stopped by a
delayed work, the call tree should be like this:
ndisc_recv_ns
-> addrconf_dad_failure <- missing ifp put
-> addrconf_mod_dad_work
-> schedule addrconf_dad_work()
-> addrconf_dad_stop() <- missing ifp hold before call it
addrconf_dad_failure() called with ifp refcont holding but not put.
addrconf_dad_work() call addrconf_dad_stop() without extra holding
refcount. This will not cause any issue normally.
But the race between addrconf_dad_failure() and addrconf_dad_work()
may cause ifp refcount leak and netdevice can not be unregister,
dmesg show the following messages:
IPv6: eth0: IPv6 duplicate address fe80::XX:XXXX:XXXX:XX detected!
...
unregister_netdevice: waiting for eth0 to become free. Usage count = 1
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c15b1ccadb32 ("ipv6: move DAD and addrconf_verify processing
to workqueue")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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[ Upstream commit 4d0bd46a4d55383f7b925e6cf7865a77e0f0e020 ]
This reverts commit 3d5fdff46c4b2b9534fa2f9fc78e90a48e0ff724.
Ben Hutchings pointed out that the commit isn't safe since it assumes
that the structure used by the driver is iw_point, when in fact there's
no way to know about that.
Fortunately, the only driver in the tree that ever runs this code path
is the wilc1000 staging driver, so it doesn't really matter.
Clearly I should have investigated this better before applying, sorry.
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [though I guess it doesn't matter much]
Fixes: 3d5fdff46c4b ("wext: Fix 32 bit iwpriv compatibility issue with 64 bit Kernel")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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[ Upstream commit 6b07d9ca9b5363dda959b9582a3fc9c0b89ef3b5 ]
The code currently assumes that buffered multicast PS frames don't have
a pending ACK frame for tx status reporting.
However, hostapd sends a broadcast deauth frame on teardown for which tx
status is requested. This can lead to the "Have pending ack frames"
warning on module reload.
Fix this by using ieee80211_free_txskb/ieee80211_purge_tx_queue.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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[ Upstream commit 083ae308280d13d187512b9babe3454342a7987e ]
The per-socket rate limit for 'challenge acks' was introduced in the
context of limiting ack loops:
commit f2b2c582e824 ("tcp: mitigate ACK loops for connections as tcp_sock")
And I think it can be extended to rate limit all 'challenge acks' on a
per-socket basis.
Since we have the global tcp_challenge_ack_limit, this patch allows for
tcp_challenge_ack_limit to be set to a large value and effectively rely on
the per-socket limit, or set tcp_challenge_ack_limit to a lower value and
still prevents a single connections from consuming the entire challenge ack
quota.
It further moves in the direction of eliminating the global limit at some
point, as Eric Dumazet has suggested. This a follow-up to:
Subject: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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[ Upstream commit 75ff39ccc1bd5d3c455b6822ab09e533c551f758 ]
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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[ Upstream commit d3e6952cfb7ba5f4bfa29d4803ba91f96ce1204d ]
I ran into this:
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 2 PID: 2012 Comm: trinity-c3 Not tainted 4.7.0-rc7+ #19
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
task: ffff8800b745f2c0 ti: ffff880111740000 task.ti: ffff880111740000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff82bbf066>] [<ffffffff82bbf066>] irttp_connect_request+0x36/0x710
RSP: 0018:ffff880111747bb8 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000069dd8358
RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: 0000000000000048
RBP: ffff880111747c00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000069dd8358 R11: 1ffffffff0759723 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff88011a7e4780 R14: 0000000000000027 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007fc738404700(0000) GS:ffff88011af00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fc737fdfb10 CR3: 0000000118087000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
0000000000000200 ffff880111747bd8 ffffffff810ee611 ffff880119f1f220
ffff880119f1f4f8 ffff880119f1f4f0 ffff88011a7e4780 ffff880119f1f232
ffff880119f1f220 ffff880111747d58 ffffffff82bca542 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff82bca542>] irda_connect+0x562/0x1190
[<ffffffff825ae582>] SYSC_connect+0x202/0x2a0
[<ffffffff825b4489>] SyS_connect+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff8100334c>] do_syscall_64+0x19c/0x410
[<ffffffff83295ca5>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
Code: 41 89 ca 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 41 89 d7 53 48 89 fb 48 83 c7 48 48 89 fa 41 89 f6 48 c1 ea 03 48 83 ec 20 4c 8b 65 10 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 84 c0 0f 8e 4c 04 00 00 80 7b 48 00 74
RIP [<ffffffff82bbf066>] irttp_connect_request+0x36/0x710
RSP <ffff880111747bb8>
---[ end trace 4cda2588bc055b30 ]---
The problem is that irda_open_tsap() can fail and leave self->tsap = NULL,
and then irttp_connect_request() almost immediately dereferences it.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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[ Upstream commit 23bc6ab0a0912146fd674a0becc758c3162baabc ]
When we retrieve imtu value from userspace we should use 16 bit pointer
cast instead of 32 as it's defined that way in headers. Fixes setsockopt
calls on big-endian platforms.
Signed-off-by: Amadeusz Sławiński <amadeusz.slawinski@tieto.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Commit 8b13eddfdf04cbfa561725cfc42d6868fe896f56 ("netfilter: refactor NAT
redirect IPv4 to use it from nf_tables") has introduced a trivial logic
change which can result in the following crash.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000030
IP: [<ffffffffa033002d>] nf_nat_redirect_ipv4+0x2d/0xa0 [nf_nat_redirect]
PGD 3ba662067 PUD 3ba661067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: ipv6(E) xt_REDIRECT(E) nf_nat_redirect(E) xt_tcpudp(E) iptable_nat(E) nf_conntrack_ipv4(E) nf_defrag_ipv4(E) nf_nat_ipv4(E) nf_nat(E) nf_conntrack(E) ip_tables(E) x_tables(E) binfmt_misc(E) xfs(E) libcrc32c(E) evbug(E) evdev(E) psmouse(E) i2c_piix4(E) i2c_core(E) acpi_cpufreq(E) button(E) ext4(E) crc16(E) jbd2(E) mbcache(E) dm_mirror(E) dm_region_hash(E) dm_log(E) dm_mod(E)
CPU: 0 PID: 2536 Comm: ip Tainted: G E 4.1.7-15.23.amzn1.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.2.amazon 05/06/2015
task: ffff8800eb438000 ti: ffff8803ba664000 task.ti: ffff8803ba664000
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa0334065>] redirect_tg4+0x15/0x20 [xt_REDIRECT]
[<ffffffffa02e2e99>] ipt_do_table+0x2b9/0x5e1 [ip_tables]
[<ffffffffa0328045>] iptable_nat_do_chain+0x25/0x30 [iptable_nat]
[<ffffffffa031777d>] nf_nat_ipv4_fn+0x13d/0x1f0 [nf_nat_ipv4]
[<ffffffffa0328020>] ? iptable_nat_ipv4_fn+0x20/0x20 [iptable_nat]
[<ffffffffa031785e>] nf_nat_ipv4_in+0x2e/0x90 [nf_nat_ipv4]
[<ffffffffa03280a5>] iptable_nat_ipv4_in+0x15/0x20 [iptable_nat]
[<ffffffff81449137>] nf_iterate+0x57/0x80
[<ffffffff814491f7>] nf_hook_slow+0x97/0x100
[<ffffffff814504d4>] ip_rcv+0x314/0x400
unsigned int
nf_nat_redirect_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
...
{
...
rcu_read_lock();
indev = __in_dev_get_rcu(skb->dev);
if (indev != NULL) {
ifa = indev->ifa_list;
newdst = ifa->ifa_local; <---
}
rcu_read_unlock();
...
}
Before the commit, 'ifa' had been always checked before access. After the
commit, however, it could be accessed even if it's NULL. Interestingly,
this was once fixed in 2003.
http://marc.info/?l=netfilter-devel&m=106668497403047&w=2
In addition to the original one, we have seen the crash when packets that
need to be redirected somehow arrive on an interface which hasn't been
yet fully configured.
This change just reverts the logic to the old behavior to avoid the crash.
Fixes: 8b13eddfdf04 ("netfilter: refactor NAT redirect IPv4 to use it from nf_tables")
Signed-off-by: Munehisa Kamata <kamatam@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0e0e36774081534783aa8eeb9f6fbddf98d3c061 ]
It seems risky to always rely on the caller to ensure the socket's
address family is correct before passing it to the NetLabel kAPI,
especially since we see at least one LSM which didn't. Add address
family checks to the *_delattr() functions to help prevent future
problems.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Maninder Singh <maninder1.s@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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[ Upstream commit 94f9cd81436c85d8c3a318ba92e236ede73752fc ]
Commit 8b13eddfdf04cbfa561725cfc42d6868fe896f56 ("netfilter: refactor NAT
redirect IPv4 to use it from nf_tables") has introduced a trivial logic
change which can result in the following crash.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000030
IP: [<ffffffffa033002d>] nf_nat_redirect_ipv4+0x2d/0xa0 [nf_nat_redirect]
PGD 3ba662067 PUD 3ba661067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: ipv6(E) xt_REDIRECT(E) nf_nat_redirect(E) xt_tcpudp(E) iptable_nat(E) nf_conntrack_ipv4(E) nf_defrag_ipv4(E) nf_nat_ipv4(E) nf_nat(E) nf_conntrack(E) ip_tables(E) x_tables(E) binfmt_misc(E) xfs(E) libcrc32c(E) evbug(E) evdev(E) psmouse(E) i2c_piix4(E) i2c_core(E) acpi_cpufreq(E) button(E) ext4(E) crc16(E) jbd2(E) mbcache(E) dm_mirror(E) dm_region_hash(E) dm_log(E) dm_mod(E)
CPU: 0 PID: 2536 Comm: ip Tainted: G E 4.1.7-15.23.amzn1.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.2.amazon 05/06/2015
task: ffff8800eb438000 ti: ffff8803ba664000 task.ti: ffff8803ba664000
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa0334065>] redirect_tg4+0x15/0x20 [xt_REDIRECT]
[<ffffffffa02e2e99>] ipt_do_table+0x2b9/0x5e1 [ip_tables]
[<ffffffffa0328045>] iptable_nat_do_chain+0x25/0x30 [iptable_nat]
[<ffffffffa031777d>] nf_nat_ipv4_fn+0x13d/0x1f0 [nf_nat_ipv4]
[<ffffffffa0328020>] ? iptable_nat_ipv4_fn+0x20/0x20 [iptable_nat]
[<ffffffffa031785e>] nf_nat_ipv4_in+0x2e/0x90 [nf_nat_ipv4]
[<ffffffffa03280a5>] iptable_nat_ipv4_in+0x15/0x20 [iptable_nat]
[<ffffffff81449137>] nf_iterate+0x57/0x80
[<ffffffff814491f7>] nf_hook_slow+0x97/0x100
[<ffffffff814504d4>] ip_rcv+0x314/0x400
unsigned int
nf_nat_redirect_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
...
{
...
rcu_read_lock();
indev = __in_dev_get_rcu(skb->dev);
if (indev != NULL) {
ifa = indev->ifa_list;
newdst = ifa->ifa_local; <---
}
rcu_read_unlock();
...
}
Before the commit, 'ifa' had been always checked before access. After the
commit, however, it could be accessed even if it's NULL. Interestingly,
this was once fixed in 2003.
http://marc.info/?l=netfilter-devel&m=106668497403047&w=2
In addition to the original one, we have seen the crash when packets that
need to be redirected somehow arrive on an interface which hasn't been
yet fully configured.
This change just reverts the logic to the old behavior to avoid the crash.
Fixes: 8b13eddfdf04 ("netfilter: refactor NAT redirect IPv4 to use it from nf_tables")
Signed-off-by: Munehisa Kamata <kamatam@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 930c532869774ebf8af9efe9484c597f896a7d46 ]
Currently, osd_weight and osd_state fields are updated in the encoding
order. This is wrong, because an incremental map may look like e.g.
new_up_client: { osd=6, addr=... } # set osd_state and addr
new_state: { osd=6, xorstate=EXISTS } # clear osd_state
Suppose osd6's current osd_state is EXISTS (i.e. osd6 is down). After
applying new_up_client, osd_state is changed to EXISTS | UP. Carrying
on with the new_state update, we flip EXISTS and leave osd6 in a weird
"!EXISTS but UP" state. A non-existent OSD is considered down by the
mapping code
2087 for (i = 0; i < pg->pg_temp.len; i++) {
2088 if (ceph_osd_is_down(osdmap, pg->pg_temp.osds[i])) {
2089 if (ceph_can_shift_osds(pi))
2090 continue;
2091
2092 temp->osds[temp->size++] = CRUSH_ITEM_NONE;
and so requests get directed to the second OSD in the set instead of
the first, resulting in OSD-side errors like:
[WRN] : client.4239 192.168.122.21:0/2444980242 misdirected client.4239.1:2827 pg 2.5df899f2 to osd.4 not [1,4,6] in e680/680
and hung rbds on the client:
[ 493.566367] rbd: rbd0: write 400000 at 11cc00000 (0)
[ 493.566805] rbd: rbd0: result -6 xferred 400000
[ 493.567011] blk_update_request: I/O error, dev rbd0, sector 9330688
The fix is to decouple application from the decoding and:
- apply new_weight first
- apply new_state before new_up_client
- twiddle osd_state flags if marking in
- clear out some of the state if osd is destroyed
Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/14901
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.15+: 6dd74e44dc1d: libceph: set 'exists' flag for newly up osd
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.15+
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Durgin <jdurgin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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[ Upstream commit 6dd74e44dc1df85f125982a8d6591bc4a76c9f5d ]
Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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[ Upstream commit f4dc77713f8016d2e8a3295e1c9c53a21f296def ]
The dummy ruleset I used to test the original validation change was broken,
most rules were unreachable and were not tested by mark_source_chains().
In some cases rulesets that used to load in a few seconds now require
several minutes.
sample ruleset that shows the behaviour:
echo "*filter"
for i in $(seq 0 100000);do
printf ":chain_%06x - [0:0]\n" $i
done
for i in $(seq 0 100000);do
printf -- "-A INPUT -j chain_%06x\n" $i
printf -- "-A INPUT -j chain_%06x\n" $i
printf -- "-A INPUT -j chain_%06x\n" $i
done
echo COMMIT
[ pipe result into iptables-restore ]
This ruleset will be about 74mbyte in size, with ~500k searches
though all 500k[1] rule entries. iptables-restore will take forever
(gave up after 10 minutes)
Instead of always searching the entire blob for a match, fill an
array with the start offsets of every single ipt_entry struct,
then do a binary search to check if the jump target is present or not.
After this change ruleset restore times get again close to what one
gets when reverting 36472341017529e (~3 seconds on my workstation).
[1] every user-defined rule gets an implicit RETURN, so we get
300k jumps + 100k userchains + 100k returns -> 500k rule entries
Fixes: 36472341017529e ("netfilter: x_tables: validate targets of jumps")
Reported-by: Jeff Wu <wujiafu@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Jeff Wu <wujiafu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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[ Upstream commit d7591f0c41ce3e67600a982bab6989ef0f07b3ce ]
The three variants use same copy&pasted code, condense this into a
helper and use that.
Make sure info.name is 0-terminated.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
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[ Upstream commit 09d9686047dbbe1cf4faa558d3ecc4aae2046054 ]
This looks like refactoring, but its also a bug fix.
Problem is that the compat path (32bit iptables, 64bit kernel) lacks a few
sanity tests that are done in the normal path.
For example, we do not check for underflows and the base chain policies.
While its possible to also add such checks to the compat path, its more
copy&pastry, for instance we cannot reuse check_underflow() helper as
e->target_offset differs in the compat case.
Other problem is that it makes auditing for validation errors harder; two
places need to be checked and kept in sync.
At a high level 32 bit compat works like this:
1- initial pass over blob:
validate match/entry offsets, bounds checking
lookup all matches and targets
do bookkeeping wrt. size delta of 32/64bit structures
assign match/target.u.kernel pointer (points at kernel
implementation, needed to access ->compatsize etc.)
2- allocate memory according to the total bookkeeping size to
contain the translated ruleset
3- second pass over original blob:
for each entry, copy the 32bit representation to the newly allocated
memory. This also does any special match translations (e.g.
adjust 32bit to 64bit longs, etc).
4- check if ruleset is free of loops (chase all jumps)
5-first pass over translated blob:
call the checkentry function of all matches and targets.
The alternative implemented by this patch is to drop steps 3&4 from the
compat process, the translation is changed into an intermediate step
rather than a full 1:1 translate_table replacement.
In the 2nd pass (step #3), change the 64bit ruleset back to a kernel
representation, i.e. put() the kernel pointer and restore ->u.user.name .
This gets us a 64bit ruleset that is in the format generated by a 64bit
iptables userspace -- we can then use translate_table() to get the
'native' sanity checks.
This has two drawbacks:
1. we re-validate all the match and target entry structure sizes even
though compat translation is supposed to never generate bogus offsets.
2. we put and then re-lookup each match and target.
THe upside is that we get all sanity tests and ruleset validations
provided by the normal path and can remove some duplicated compat code.
iptables-restore time of autogenerated ruleset with 300k chains of form
-A CHAIN0001 -m limit --limit 1/s -j CHAIN0002
-A CHAIN0002 -m limit --limit 1/s -j CHAIN0003
shows no noticeable differences in restore times:
old: 0m30.796s
new: 0m31.521s
64bit: 0m25.674s
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
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[ Upstream commit 0188346f21e6546498c2a0f84888797ad4063fc5 ]
Always returned 0.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
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[ Upstream commit 329a0807124f12fe1c8032f95d8a8eb47047fb0e ]
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
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[ Upstream commit 7d3f843eed29222254c9feab481f55175a1afcc9 ]
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
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[ Upstream commit 8dddd32756f6fe8e4e82a63361119b7e2384e02f ]
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
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[ Upstream commit 7b7eba0f3515fca3296b8881d583f7c1042f5226 ]
Quoting John Stultz:
In updating a 32bit arm device from 4.6 to Linus' current HEAD, I
noticed I was having some trouble with networking, and realized that
/proc/net/ip_tables_names was suddenly empty.
Digging through the registration process, it seems we're catching on the:
if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_standard_target) != next_offset)
return -EINVAL;
Where next_offset seems to be 4 bytes larger then the
offset + standard_target struct size.
next_offset needs to be aligned via XT_ALIGN (so we can access all members
of ip(6)t_entry struct).
This problem didn't show up on i686 as it only needs 4-byte alignment for
u64, but iptables userspace on other 32bit arches does insert extra padding.
Reported-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Tested-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Fixes: 7ed2abddd20cf ("netfilter: x_tables: check standard target size too")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
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[ Upstream commit 13631bfc604161a9d69cd68991dff8603edd66f9 ]
Validate that all matches (if any) add up to the beginning of
the target and that each match covers at least the base structure size.
The compat path should be able to safely re-use the function
as the structures only differ in alignment; added a
BUILD_BUG_ON just in case we have an arch that adds padding as well.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
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[ Upstream commit ce683e5f9d045e5d67d1312a42b359cb2ab2a13c ]
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
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