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commit 5981a8821b774ada0be512fd9bad7c241e17657e upstream.
This patch fixes authentication failure on LE link re-connection when
BlueZ acts as slave (peripheral). LTK is removed from the internal list
after its first use causing PIN or Key missing reply when re-connecting
the link. The LE Long Term Key Request event indicates that the master
is attempting to encrypt or re-encrypt the link.
Pre-condition: BlueZ host paired and running as slave.
How to reproduce(master):
1) Establish an ACL LE encrypted link
2) Disconnect the link
3) Try to re-establish the ACL LE encrypted link (fails)
> HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 19
LE Connection Complete (0x01)
Status: Success (0x00)
Handle: 64
Role: Slave (0x01)
...
@ Device Connected: 00:02:72:DC:29:C9 (1) flags 0x0000
> HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 13
LE Long Term Key Request (0x05)
Handle: 64
Random number: 875be18439d9aa37
Encryption diversifier: 0x76ed
< HCI Command: LE Long Term Key Request Reply (0x08|0x001a) plen 18
Handle: 64
Long term key: 2aa531db2fce9f00a0569c7d23d17409
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 6
LE Long Term Key Request Reply (0x08|0x001a) ncmd 1
Status: Success (0x00)
Handle: 64
> HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4
Status: Success (0x00)
Handle: 64
Encryption: Enabled with AES-CCM (0x01)
...
@ Device Disconnected: 00:02:72:DC:29:C9 (1) reason 3
< HCI Command: LE Set Advertise Enable (0x08|0x000a) plen 1
Advertising: Enabled (0x01)
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4
LE Set Advertise Enable (0x08|0x000a) ncmd 1
Status: Success (0x00)
> HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 19
LE Connection Complete (0x01)
Status: Success (0x00)
Handle: 64
Role: Slave (0x01)
...
@ Device Connected: 00:02:72:DC:29:C9 (1) flags 0x0000
> HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 13
LE Long Term Key Request (0x05)
Handle: 64
Random number: 875be18439d9aa37
Encryption diversifier: 0x76ed
< HCI Command: LE Long Term Key Request Neg Reply (0x08|0x001b) plen 2
Handle: 64
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 6
LE Long Term Key Request Neg Reply (0x08|0x001b) ncmd 1
Status: Success (0x00)
Handle: 64
> HCI Event: Disconnect Complete (0x05) plen 4
Status: Success (0x00)
Handle: 64
Reason: Authentication Failure (0x05)
@ Device Disconnected: 00:02:72:DC:29:C9 (1) reason 0
Signed-off-by: Claudio Takahasi <claudio.takahasi@openbossa.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit bf39b4247b8799935ea91d90db250ab608a58e50 ]
Binding might result in a NULL device which is later dereferenced
without checking.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 43a43b6040165f7b40b5b489fe61a4cb7f8c4980 ]
After commit c15b1ccadb323ea ("ipv6: move DAD and addrconf_verify
processing to workqueue") some counters are now updated in process context
and thus need to disable bh before doing so, otherwise deadlocks can
happen on 32-bit archs. Fabio Estevam noticed this while while mounting
a NFS volume on an ARM board.
As a compensation for missing this I looked after the other *_STATS_BH
and found three other calls which need updating:
1) icmp6_send: ip6_fragment -> icmpv6_send -> icmp6_send (error handling)
2) ip6_push_pending_frames: rawv6_sendmsg -> rawv6_push_pending_frames -> ...
(only in case of icmp protocol with raw sockets in error handling)
3) ping6_v6_sendmsg (error handling)
Fixes: c15b1ccadb323ea ("ipv6: move DAD and addrconf_verify processing to workqueue")
Reported-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@freescale.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e367c2d03dba4c9bcafad24688fadb79dd95b218 ]
In ip6_append_data_mtu(), when the xfrm mode is not tunnel(such as
transport),the ipsec header need to be added in the first fragment, so the mtu
will decrease to reserve space for it, then the second fragment come, the mtu
should be turn back, as the commit 0c1833797a5a6ec23ea9261d979aa18078720b74
said. however, in the commit a493e60ac4bbe2e977e7129d6d8cbb0dd236be, it use
*mtu = min(*mtu, ...) to change the mtu, which lead to the new mtu is alway
equal with the first fragment's. and cannot turn back.
when I test through ping6 -c1 -s5000 $ip (mtu=1280):
...frag (0|1232) ESP(spi=0x00002000,seq=0xb), length 1232
...frag (1232|1216)
...frag (2448|1216)
...frag (3664|1216)
...frag (4880|164)
which should be:
...frag (0|1232) ESP(spi=0x00001000,seq=0x1), length 1232
...frag (1232|1232)
...frag (2464|1232)
...frag (3696|1232)
...frag (4928|116)
so delete the min() when change back the mtu.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Fixes: 75a493e60ac4bb ("ipv6: ip6_append_data_mtu did not care about pmtudisc and frag_size")
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ecab67015ef6e3f3635551dcc9971cf363cc1cd5 ]
tmp_prefered_lft is an offset to ifp->tstamp, not now. Therefore
age needs to be added to the condition.
Age calculation in ipv6_create_tempaddr is different from the one
in addrconf_verify and doesn't consider ADDRCONF_TIMER_FUZZ_MINUS.
This can cause age in ipv6_create_tempaddr to be less than the one
in addrconf_verify and therefore unnecessary temporary address to
be generated.
Use age calculation as in addrconf_modify to avoid this.
Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <heiner.kallweit@web.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit dbb490b96584d4e958533fb637f08b557f505657 ]
When copying in a struct msghdr from the user, if the user has set the
msg_namelen parameter to a negative value it gets clamped to a valid
size due to a comparison between signed and unsigned values.
Ensure the syscall errors when the user passes in a negative value.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Leach <matthew.leach@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit dd38743b4cc2f86be250eaf156cf113ba3dd531a ]
With TX VLAN offload enabled the source MAC address for frames sent using the
VLAN interface is currently set to the address of the real interface. This is
wrong since the VLAN interface may be configured with a different address.
The bug was introduced in commit 2205369a314e12fcec4781cc73ac9c08fc2b47de
("vlan: Fix header ops passthru when doing TX VLAN offload.").
This patch sets the source address before calling the create function of the
real interface.
Signed-off-by: Peter Boström <peter.bostrom@netrounds.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c88507fbad8055297c1d1e21e599f46960cbee39 ]
DST_NOCOUNT should only be used if an authorized user adds routes
locally. In case of routes which are added on behalf of router
advertisments this flag must not get used as it allows an unlimited
number of routes getting added remotely.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit de1443916791d75fdd26becb116898277bb0273f ]
Some applications didn't expect recvmsg() on a non blocking socket
could return -EINTR. This possibility was added as a side effect
of commit b3ca9b02b00704 ("net: fix multithreaded signal handling in
unix recv routines").
To hit this bug, you need to be a bit unlucky, as the u->readlock
mutex is usually held for very small periods.
Fixes: b3ca9b02b00704 ("net: fix multithreaded signal handling in unix recv routines")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6565b9eeef194afbb3beec80d6dd2447f4091f8c ]
MLD queries are supposed to have an IPv6 link-local source address
according to RFC2710, section 4 and RFC3810, section 5.1.14. This patch
adds a sanity check to ignore such broken MLD queries.
Without this check, such malformed MLD queries can result in a
denial of service: The queries are ignored by any MLD listener
therefore they will not respond with an MLD report. However,
without this patch these malformed MLD queries would enable the
snooping part in the bridge code, potentially shutting down the
according ports towards these hosts for multicast traffic as the
bridge did not learn about these listeners.
Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Lüssing <linus.luessing@web.de>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c485658bae87faccd7aed540fd2ca3ab37992310 ]
While working on ec0223ec48a9 ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to
verify if we/peer is AUTH capable"), we noticed that there's a skb
memory leakage in the error path.
Running the same reproducer as in ec0223ec48a9 and by unconditionally
jumping to the error label (to simulate an error condition) in
sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() receive path lets kmemleak detector bark about
the unfreed chunk->auth_chunk skb clone:
Unreferenced object 0xffff8800b8f3a000 (size 256):
comm "softirq", pid 0, jiffies 4294769856 (age 110.757s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
89 ab 75 5e d4 01 58 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..u^..X.........
backtrace:
[<ffffffff816660be>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
[<ffffffff8119f328>] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x210
[<ffffffff81566929>] skb_clone+0x49/0xb0
[<ffffffffa0467459>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x1d9/0x230 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa046fdbc>] sctp_inq_push+0x4c/0x70 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa047e8de>] sctp_rcv+0x82e/0x9a0 [sctp]
[<ffffffff815abd38>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xa8/0x210
[<ffffffff815a64af>] nf_reinject+0xbf/0x180
[<ffffffffa04b4762>] nfqnl_recv_verdict+0x1d2/0x2b0 [nfnetlink_queue]
[<ffffffffa04aa40b>] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x14b/0x250 [nfnetlink]
[<ffffffff815a3269>] netlink_rcv_skb+0xa9/0xc0
[<ffffffffa04aa7cf>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x23f/0x408 [nfnetlink]
[<ffffffff815a2bd8>] netlink_unicast+0x168/0x250
[<ffffffff815a2fa1>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2e1/0x3f0
[<ffffffff8155cc6b>] sock_sendmsg+0x8b/0xc0
[<ffffffff8155d449>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x369/0x380
What happens is that commit bbd0d59809f9 clones the skb containing
the AUTH chunk in sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv() when having the edge case
that an endpoint requires COOKIE-ECHO chunks to be authenticated:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ECHO ---------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
When we enter sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() and before we actually get to
the point where we process (and subsequently free) a non-NULL
chunk->auth_chunk, we could hit the "goto nomem_init" path from
an error condition and thus leave the cloned skb around w/o
freeing it.
The fix is to centrally free such clones in sctp_chunk_destroy()
handler that is invoked from sctp_chunk_free() after all refs have
dropped; and also move both kfree_skb(chunk->auth_chunk) there,
so that chunk->auth_chunk is either NULL (since sctp_chunkify()
allocs new chunks through kmem_cache_zalloc()) or non-NULL with
a valid skb pointer. chunk->skb and chunk->auth_chunk are the
only skbs in the sctp_chunk structure that need to be handeled.
While at it, we should use consume_skb() for both. It is the same
as dev_kfree_skb() but more appropriately named as we are not
a device but a protocol. Also, this effectively replaces the
kfree_skb() from both invocations into consume_skb(). Functions
are the same only that kfree_skb() assumes that the frame was
being dropped after a failure (e.g. for tools like drop monitor),
usage of consume_skb() seems more appropriate in function
sctp_chunk_destroy() though.
Fixes: bbd0d59809f9 ("[SCTP]: Implement the receive and verification of AUTH chunk")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <yasevich@gmail.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b22f5126a24b3b2f15448c3f2a254fc10cbc2b92 upstream.
Some occurences in the netfilter tree use skb_header_pointer() in
the following way ...
struct dccp_hdr _dh, *dh;
...
skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &dh);
... where dh itself is a pointer that is being passed as the copy
buffer. Instead, we need to use &_dh as the forth argument so that
we're copying the data into an actual buffer that sits on the stack.
Currently, we probably could overwrite memory on the stack (e.g.
with a possibly mal-formed DCCP packet), but unintentionally, as
we only want the buffer to be placed into _dh variable.
Fixes: 2bc780499aa3 ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack: add DCCP protocol support")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9a1ea2dbff11547a8e664f143c1ffefc586a577a upstream.
With the current full handling, there is a race between osds and
clients getting the first map marked full. If the osd wins, it will
return -ENOSPC to any writes, but the client may already have writes
in flight. This results in the client getting the error and
propagating it up the stack. For rbd, the block layer turns this into
EIO, which can cause corruption in filesystems above it.
To avoid this race, osds are being changed to drop writes that came
from clients with an osdmap older than the last osdmap marked full.
In order for this to work, clients must resend all writes after they
encounter a full -> not full transition in the osdmap. osds will wait
for an updated map instead of processing a request from a client with
a newer map, so resent writes will not be dropped by the osd unless
there is another not full -> full transition.
This approach requires both osds and clients to be fixed to avoid the
race. Old clients talking to osds with this fix may hang instead of
returning EIO and potentially corrupting an fs. New clients talking to
old osds have the same behavior as before if they encounter this race.
Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/6938
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Durgin <josh.durgin@inktank.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1d147bfa64293b2723c4fec50922168658e613ba upstream.
There is a race between the TX path and the STA wakeup: while
a station is sleeping, mac80211 buffers frames until it wakes
up, then the frames are transmitted. However, the RX and TX
path are concurrent, so the packet indicating wakeup can be
processed while a packet is being transmitted.
This can lead to a situation where the buffered frames list
is emptied on the one side, while a frame is being added on
the other side, as the station is still seen as sleeping in
the TX path.
As a result, the newly added frame will not be send anytime
soon. It might be sent much later (and out of order) when the
station goes to sleep and wakes up the next time.
Additionally, it can lead to the crash below.
Fix all this by synchronising both paths with a new lock.
Both path are not fastpath since they handle PS situations.
In a later patch we'll remove the extra skb queue locks to
reduce locking overhead.
BUG: unable to handle kernel
NULL pointer dereference at 000000b0
IP: [<ff6f1791>] ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
EIP: 0060:[<ff6f1791>] EFLAGS: 00210282 CPU: 1
EIP is at ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
EAX: e5900da0 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000000
ESI: e41d00c0 EDI: e5900da0 EBP: ebe458e4 ESP: ebe458b0
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
CR0: 8005003b CR2: 000000b0 CR3: 25a78000 CR4: 000407d0
DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400
Process iperf (pid: 3934, ti=ebe44000 task=e757c0b0 task.ti=ebe44000)
iwlwifi 0000:02:00.0: I iwl_pcie_enqueue_hcmd Sending command LQ_CMD (#4e), seq: 0x0903, 92 bytes at 3[3]:9
Stack:
e403b32c ebe458c4 00200002 00200286 e403b338 ebe458cc c10960bb e5900da0
ff76a6ec ebe458d8 00000000 e41d00c0 e5900da0 ebe458f0 ff6f1b75 e403b210
ebe4598c ff723dc1 00000000 ff76a6ec e597c978 e403b758 00000002 00000002
Call Trace:
[<ff6f1b75>] ieee80211_free_txskb+0x15/0x20 [mac80211]
[<ff723dc1>] invoke_tx_handlers+0x1661/0x1780 [mac80211]
[<ff7248a5>] ieee80211_tx+0x75/0x100 [mac80211]
[<ff7249bf>] ieee80211_xmit+0x8f/0xc0 [mac80211]
[<ff72550e>] ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x4fe/0xe20 [mac80211]
[<c149ef70>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x450/0x950
[<c14b9aa9>] sch_direct_xmit+0xa9/0x250
[<c14b9c9b>] __qdisc_run+0x4b/0x150
[<c149f732>] dev_queue_xmit+0x2c2/0xca0
Reported-by: Yaara Rozenblum <yaara.rozenblum@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
[reword commit log, use a separate lock]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ec0223ec48a90cb605244b45f7c62de856403729 ]
RFC4895 introduced AUTH chunks for SCTP; during the SCTP
handshake RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO are negotiated (CHUNKS
being optional though):
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
A special case is when an endpoint requires COOKIE-ECHO
chunks to be authenticated:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ECHO ---------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
RFC4895, section 6.3. Receiving Authenticated Chunks says:
The receiver MUST use the HMAC algorithm indicated in
the HMAC Identifier field. If this algorithm was not
specified by the receiver in the HMAC-ALGO parameter in
the INIT or INIT-ACK chunk during association setup, the
AUTH chunk and all the chunks after it MUST be discarded
and an ERROR chunk SHOULD be sent with the error cause
defined in Section 4.1. [...] If no endpoint pair shared
key has been configured for that Shared Key Identifier,
all authenticated chunks MUST be silently discarded. [...]
When an endpoint requires COOKIE-ECHO chunks to be
authenticated, some special procedures have to be followed
because the reception of a COOKIE-ECHO chunk might result
in the creation of an SCTP association. If a packet arrives
containing an AUTH chunk as a first chunk, a COOKIE-ECHO
chunk as the second chunk, and possibly more chunks after
them, and the receiver does not have an STCB for that
packet, then authentication is based on the contents of
the COOKIE-ECHO chunk. In this situation, the receiver MUST
authenticate the chunks in the packet by using the RANDOM
parameters, CHUNKS parameters and HMAC_ALGO parameters
obtained from the COOKIE-ECHO chunk, and possibly a local
shared secret as inputs to the authentication procedure
specified in Section 6.3. If authentication fails, then
the packet is discarded. If the authentication is successful,
the COOKIE-ECHO and all the chunks after the COOKIE-ECHO
MUST be processed. If the receiver has an STCB, it MUST
process the AUTH chunk as described above using the STCB
from the existing association to authenticate the
COOKIE-ECHO chunk and all the chunks after it. [...]
Commit bbd0d59809f9 introduced the possibility to receive
and verification of AUTH chunk, including the edge case for
authenticated COOKIE-ECHO. On reception of COOKIE-ECHO,
the function sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() handles processing,
unpacks and creates a new association if it passed sanity
checks and also tests for authentication chunks being
present. After a new association has been processed, it
invokes sctp_process_init() on the new association and
walks through the parameter list it received from the INIT
chunk. It checks SCTP_PARAM_RANDOM, SCTP_PARAM_HMAC_ALGO
and SCTP_PARAM_CHUNKS, and copies them into asoc->peer
meta data (peer_random, peer_hmacs, peer_chunks) in case
sysctl -w net.sctp.auth_enable=1 is set. If in INIT's
SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_EXT parameter SCTP_CID_AUTH is set,
peer_random != NULL and peer_hmacs != NULL the peer is to be
assumed asoc->peer.auth_capable=1, in any other case
asoc->peer.auth_capable=0.
Now, if in sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() chunk->auth_chunk is
available, we set up a fake auth chunk and pass that on to
sctp_sf_authenticate(), which at latest in
sctp_auth_calculate_hmac() reliably dereferences a NULL pointer
at position 0..0008 when setting up the crypto key in
crypto_hash_setkey() by using asoc->asoc_shared_key that is
NULL as condition key_id == asoc->active_key_id is true if
the AUTH chunk was injected correctly from remote. This
happens no matter what net.sctp.auth_enable sysctl says.
The fix is to check for net->sctp.auth_enable and for
asoc->peer.auth_capable before doing any operations like
sctp_sf_authenticate() as no key is activated in
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() for each case.
Now as RFC4895 section 6.3 states that if the used HMAC-ALGO
passed from the INIT chunk was not used in the AUTH chunk, we
SHOULD send an error; however in this case it would be better
to just silently discard such a maliciously prepared handshake
as we didn't even receive a parameter at all. Also, as our
endpoint has no shared key configured, section 6.3 says that
MUST silently discard, which we are doing from now onwards.
Before calling sctp_sf_pdiscard(), we need not only to free
the association, but also the chunk->auth_chunk skb, as
commit bbd0d59809f9 created a skb clone in that case.
I have tested this locally by using netfilter's nfqueue and
re-injecting packets into the local stack after maliciously
modifying the INIT chunk (removing RANDOM; HMAC-ALGO param)
and the SCTP packet containing the COOKIE_ECHO (injecting
AUTH chunk before COOKIE_ECHO). Fixed with this patch applied.
Fixes: bbd0d59809f9 ("[SCTP]: Implement the receive and verification of AUTH chunk")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <yasevich@gmail.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a3c3cac5d31879cd9ae2de7874dc6544ca704aec upstream.
The lockless RPC_IS_QUEUED() test in __rpc_execute means that we need to
be careful about ordering the calls to rpc_test_and_set_running(task) and
rpc_clear_queued(task). If we get the order wrong, then we may end up
testing the RPC_TASK_RUNNING flag after __rpc_execute() has looped
and changed the state of the rpc_task.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Weng Meiling <wengmeiling.weng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 506026c3ec270e18402f0c9d33fee37482c23861 upstream.
rpc_make_runnable is not generally called with the queue lock held, unless
it's waking up a task that has been sitting on a waitqueue. This is safe
when the task has not entered the FSM yet, but the comments don't really
spell this out.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Weng Meiling <wengmeiling.weng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 73d9f7eef3d98c3920e144797cc1894c6b005a1e upstream.
For nofail == false request, if __map_request failed, the caller does
cleanup work, like releasing the relative pages. It doesn't make any sense
to retry this request.
Signed-off-by: Jianpeng Ma <majianpeng@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust indentation]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Rui Xiang <rui.xiang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 06ea0bfe6e6043cb56a78935a19f6f8ebc636226 upstream.
When a send failure occurs due to the socket being out of buffer space,
we call xs_nospace() in order to have the RPC task wait until the
socket has drained enough to make it worth while trying again.
The current patch fixes a race in which the socket is drained before
we get round to setting up the machinery in xs_nospace(), and which
is reported to cause hangs.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140210170315.33dfc621@notabene.brown
Fixes: a9a6b52ee1ba (SUNRPC: Don't start the retransmission timer...)
Reported-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fe6cc55f3a9a053482a76f5a6b2257cee51b4663 upstream.
[ use zero netdev_feature mask to avoid backport of
netif_skb_dev_features function ]
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner reported problems when the forwarding link path
has a lower mtu than the incoming one if the inbound interface supports GRO.
Given:
Host <mtu1500> R1 <mtu1200> R2
Host sends tcp stream which is routed via R1 and R2. R1 performs GRO.
In this case, the kernel will fail to send ICMP fragmentation needed
messages (or pkt too big for ipv6), as GSO packets currently bypass dstmtu
checks in forward path. Instead, Linux tries to send out packets exceeding
the mtu.
When locking route MTU on Host (i.e., no ipv4 DF bit set), R1 does
not fragment the packets when forwarding, and again tries to send out
packets exceeding R1-R2 link mtu.
This alters the forwarding dstmtu checks to take the individual gso
segment lengths into account.
For ipv6, we send out pkt too big error for gso if the individual
segments are too big.
For ipv4, we either send icmp fragmentation needed, or, if the DF bit
is not set, perform software segmentation and let the output path
create fragments when the packet is leaving the machine.
It is not 100% correct as the error message will contain the headers of
the GRO skb instead of the original/segmented one, but it seems to
work fine in my (limited) tests.
Eric Dumazet suggested to simply shrink mss via ->gso_size to avoid
sofware segmentation.
However it turns out that skb_segment() assumes skb nr_frags is related
to mss size so we would BUG there. I don't want to mess with it considering
Herbert and Eric disagree on what the correct behavior should be.
Hannes Frederic Sowa notes that when we would shrink gso_size
skb_segment would then also need to deal with the case where
SKB_MAX_FRAGS would be exceeded.
This uses sofware segmentation in the forward path when we hit ipv4
non-DF packets and the outgoing link mtu is too small. Its not perfect,
but given the lack of bug reports wrt. GRO fwd being broken this is a
rare case anyway. Also its not like this could not be improved later
once the dust settles.
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reported-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit de960aa9ab4decc3304959f69533eef64d05d8e8 upstream.
[ no skb_gso_seglen helper in 3.4, leave tbf alone ]
This moves part of Eric Dumazets skb_gso_seglen helper from tbf sched to
skbuff core so it may be reused by upcoming ip forwarding path patch.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ffd5939381c609056b33b7585fb05a77b4c695f3 ]
SCTP's sctp_connectx() abi breaks for 64bit kernels compiled with 32bit
emulation (e.g. ia32 emulation or x86_x32). Due to internal usage of
'struct sctp_getaddrs_old' which includes a struct sockaddr pointer,
sizeof(param) check will always fail in kernel as the structure in
64bit kernel space is 4bytes larger than for user binaries compiled
in 32bit mode. Thus, applications making use of sctp_connectx() won't
be able to run under such circumstances.
Introduce a compat interface in the kernel to deal with such
situations by using a 'struct compat_sctp_getaddrs_old' structure
where user data is copied into it, and then sucessively transformed
into a 'struct sctp_getaddrs_old' structure with the help of
compat_ptr(). That fixes sctp_connectx() abi without any changes
needed in user space, and lets the SCTP test suite pass when compiled
in 32bit and run on 64bit kernels.
Fixes: f9c67811ebc0 ("sctp: Fix regression introduced by new sctp_connectx api")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 946c032e5a53992ea45e062ecb08670ba39b99e3 ]
ip rules with iif/oif references do not update:
(detach/attach) across interface renames.
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
CC: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
CC: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
CC: Chris Davis <chrismd@google.com>
CC: Carlo Contavalli <ccontavalli@google.com>
Google-Bug-Id: 12936021
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 338f977f4eb441e69bb9a46eaa0ac715c931a67f upstream.
The "new" fragmentation code (since my rewrite almost 5 years ago)
erroneously sets skb->len rather than using skb_trim() to adjust
the length of the first fragment after copying out all the others.
This leaves the skb tail pointer pointing to after where the data
originally ended, and thus causes the encryption MIC to be written
at that point, rather than where it belongs: immediately after the
data.
The impact of this is that if software encryption is done, then
a) encryption doesn't work for the first fragment, the connection
becomes unusable as the first fragment will never be properly
verified at the receiver, the MIC is practically guaranteed to
be wrong
b) we leak up to 8 bytes of plaintext (!) of the packet out into
the air
This is only mitigated by the fact that many devices are capable
of doing encryption in hardware, in which case this can't happen
as the tail pointer is irrelevant in that case. Additionally,
fragmentation is not used very frequently and would normally have
to be configured manually.
Fix this by using skb_trim() properly.
Fixes: 2de8e0d999b8 ("mac80211: rewrite fragmentation")
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6ff33b7dd0228b7d7ed44791bbbc98b03fd15d9d upstream.
When a task enters call_refreshresult with status 0 from call_refresh and
!rpcauth_uptodatecred(task) it enters call_refresh again with no rate-limiting
or max number of retries.
Instead of trying forever, make use of the retry path that other errors use.
This only seems to be possible when the crrefresh callback is gss_refresh_null,
which only happens when destroying the context.
To reproduce:
1) mount with sec=krb5 (or sec=sys with krb5 negotiated for non FSID specific
operations).
2) reboot - the client will be stuck and will need to be hard rebooted
BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 22s! [kworker/0:2:46]
Modules linked in: rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsv4 nfs fscache ppdev crc32c_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 glue_helper lrw gf128mul ablk_helper cryptd serio_raw i2c_piix4 i2c_core e1000 parport_pc parport shpchp nfsd auth_rpcgss oid_registry exportfs nfs_acl lockd sunrpc autofs4 mptspi scsi_transport_spi mptscsih mptbase ata_generic floppy
irq event stamp: 195724
hardirqs last enabled at (195723): [<ffffffff814a925c>] restore_args+0x0/0x30
hardirqs last disabled at (195724): [<ffffffff814b0a6a>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x6a/0x80
softirqs last enabled at (195722): [<ffffffff8103f583>] __do_softirq+0x1df/0x276
softirqs last disabled at (195717): [<ffffffff8103f852>] irq_exit+0x53/0x9a
CPU: 0 PID: 46 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 3.13.0-rc3-branch-dros_testing+ #4
Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 07/31/2013
Workqueue: rpciod rpc_async_schedule [sunrpc]
task: ffff8800799c4260 ti: ffff880079002000 task.ti: ffff880079002000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0064fd4>] [<ffffffffa0064fd4>] __rpc_execute+0x8a/0x362 [sunrpc]
RSP: 0018:ffff880079003d18 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 0000000000000005 RBX: 0000000000000007 RCX: 0000000000000007
RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: ffff88007aecbae8 RDI: ffff8800783d8900
RBP: ffff880079003d78 R08: ffff88006e30e9f8 R09: ffffffffa005a3d7
R10: ffff88006e30e7b0 R11: ffff8800783d8900 R12: ffffffffa006675e
R13: ffff880079003ce8 R14: ffff88006e30e7b0 R15: ffff8800783d8900
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88007f200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f3072333000 CR3: 0000000001a0b000 CR4: 00000000001407f0
Stack:
ffff880079003d98 0000000000000246 0000000000000000 ffff88007a9a4830
ffff880000000000 ffffffff81073f47 ffff88007f212b00 ffff8800799c4260
ffff8800783d8988 ffff88007f212b00 ffffe8ffff604800 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81073f47>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x145/0x1a1
[<ffffffffa00652d3>] rpc_async_schedule+0x27/0x32 [sunrpc]
[<ffffffff81052974>] process_one_work+0x211/0x3a5
[<ffffffff810528d5>] ? process_one_work+0x172/0x3a5
[<ffffffff81052eeb>] worker_thread+0x134/0x202
[<ffffffff81052db7>] ? rescuer_thread+0x280/0x280
[<ffffffff81052db7>] ? rescuer_thread+0x280/0x280
[<ffffffff810584a0>] kthread+0xc9/0xd1
[<ffffffff810583d7>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x61/0x61
[<ffffffff814afd6c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[<ffffffff810583d7>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x61/0x61
Code: e8 87 63 fd e0 c6 05 10 dd 01 00 01 48 8b 43 70 4c 8d 6b 70 45 31 e4 a8 02 0f 85 d5 02 00 00 4c 8b 7b 48 48 c7 43 48 00 00 00 00 <4c> 8b 4b 50 4d 85 ff 75 0c 4d 85 c9 4d 89 cf 0f 84 32 01 00 00
And the output of "rpcdebug -m rpc -s all":
RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0)
RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0)
RPC: 61 refreshing RPCSEC_GSS cred ffff88007a413cf0
RPC: 61 refreshing RPCSEC_GSS cred ffff88007a413cf0
RPC: 61 call_refreshresult (status 0)
RPC: 61 refreshing RPCSEC_GSS cred ffff88007a413cf0
RPC: 61 call_refreshresult (status 0)
RPC: 61 refreshing RPCSEC_GSS cred ffff88007a413cf0
RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0)
RPC: 61 call_refreshresult (status 0)
RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0)
RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0)
RPC: 61 refreshing RPCSEC_GSS cred ffff88007a413cf0
RPC: 61 call_refreshresult (status 0)
RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0)
RPC: 61 refreshing RPCSEC_GSS cred ffff88007a413cf0
RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0)
RPC: 61 refreshing RPCSEC_GSS cred ffff88007a413cf0
RPC: 61 refreshing RPCSEC_GSS cred ffff88007a413cf0
RPC: 61 call_refreshresult (status 0)
RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0)
RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0)
RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0)
RPC: 61 call_refresh (status 0)
RPC: 61 call_refreshresult (status 0)
RPC: 61 refreshing RPCSEC_GSS cred ffff88007a413cf0
Signed-off-by: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 95f4a45de1a0f172b35451fc52283290adb21f6e ]
Bob Falken reported that after 4G packets, multicast forwarding stopped
working. This was because of a rule reference counter overflow which
freed the rule as soon as the overflow happend.
This patch solves this by adding the FIB_LOOKUP_NOREF flag to
fib_rules_lookup calls. This is safe even from non-rcu locked sections
as in this case the flag only implies not taking a reference to the rule,
which we don't need at all.
Rules only hold references to the namespace, which are guaranteed to be
available during the call of the non-rcu protected function reg_vif_xmit
because of the interface reference which itself holds a reference to
the net namespace.
Fixes: f0ad0860d01e47 ("ipv4: ipmr: support multiple tables")
Fixes: d1db275dd3f6e4 ("ipv6: ip6mr: support multiple tables")
Reported-by: Bob Falken <NetFestivalHaveFun@gmx.com>
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Based upon upstream commit 70315d22d3c7383f9a508d0aab21e2eb35b2303a ]
Fix inet_diag_dump_icsk() to reflect the fact that both TIME_WAIT and
FIN_WAIT2 connections are represented by inet_timewait_sock (not just
TIME_WAIT). Thus:
(a) We need to iterate through the time_wait buckets if the user wants
either TIME_WAIT or FIN_WAIT2. (Before fixing this, "ss -nemoi state
fin-wait-2" would not return any sockets, even if there were some in
FIN_WAIT2.)
(b) We need to check tw_substate to see if the user wants to dump
sockets in the particular substate (TIME_WAIT or FIN_WAIT2) that a
given connection is in. (Before fixing this, "ss -nemoi state
time-wait" would actually return sockets in state FIN_WAIT2.)
An analogous fix is in v3.13: 70315d22d3c7383f9a508d0aab21e2eb35b2303a
("inet_diag: fix inet_diag_dump_icsk() to use correct state for
timewait sockets") but that patch is quite different because 3.13 code
is very different in this area due to the unification of TCP hash
tables in 05dbc7b ("tcp/dccp: remove twchain") in v3.13-rc1.
I tested that this applies cleanly between v3.3 and v3.12, and tested
that it works in both 3.3 and 3.12. It does not apply cleanly to 3.2
and earlier (though it makes semantic sense), and semantically is not
the right fix for 3.13 and beyond (as mentioned above).
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2def2ef2ae5f3990aabdbe8a755911902707d268 upstream.
The x32 case for the recvmsg() timout handling is broken:
asmlinkage long compat_sys_recvmmsg(int fd, struct compat_mmsghdr __user *mmsg,
unsigned int vlen, unsigned int flags,
struct compat_timespec __user *timeout)
{
int datagrams;
struct timespec ktspec;
if (flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT)
return -EINVAL;
if (COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME)
return __sys_recvmmsg(fd, (struct mmsghdr __user *)mmsg, vlen,
flags | MSG_CMSG_COMPAT,
(struct timespec *) timeout);
...
The timeout pointer parameter is provided by userland (hence the __user
annotation) but for x32 syscalls it's simply cast to a kernel pointer
and is passed to __sys_recvmmsg which will eventually directly
dereference it for both reading and writing. Other callers to
__sys_recvmmsg properly copy from userland to the kernel first.
The bug was introduced by commit ee4fa23c4bfc ("compat: Use
COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in net/compat.c") and should affect all kernels
since 3.4 (and perhaps vendor kernels if they backported x32 support
along with this code).
Note that CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI gets enabled at build time and only if
CONFIG_X86_X32 is enabled and ld can build x32 executables.
Other uses of COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME seem fine.
This addresses CVE-2014-0038.
Signed-off-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit fe0d692bbc645786bce1a98439e548ae619269f5 ]
br_multicast_set_hash_max() is called from process context in
net/bridge/br_sysfs_br.c by the sysfs store_hash_max() function.
br_multicast_set_hash_max() calls spin_lock(&br->multicast_lock),
which can deadlock the CPU if a softirq that also tries to take the
same lock interrupts br_multicast_set_hash_max() while the lock is
held . This can happen quite easily when any of the bridge multicast
timers expire, which try to take the same lock.
The fix here is to use spin_lock_bh(), preventing other softirqs from
executing on this CPU.
Steps to reproduce:
1. Create a bridge with several interfaces (I used 4).
2. Set the "multicast query interval" to a low number, like 2.
3. Enable the bridge as a multicast querier.
4. Repeatedly set the bridge hash_max parameter via sysfs.
# brctl addbr br0
# brctl addif br0 eth1 eth2 eth3 eth4
# brctl setmcqi br0 2
# brctl setmcquerier br0 1
# while true ; do echo 4096 > /sys/class/net/br0/bridge/hash_max; done
Signed-off-by: Curt Brune <curt@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Scott Feldman <sfeldma@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4d231b76eef6c4a6bd9c96769e191517765942cb ]
While commit 30a584d944fb fixes datagram interface in LLC, a use
after free bug has been introduced for SOCK_STREAM sockets that do
not make use of MSG_PEEK.
The flow is as follow ...
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
...
sk_eat_skb(sk, skb, false);
...
}
...
if (used + offset < skb->len)
continue;
... where sk_eat_skb() calls __kfree_skb(). Therefore, cache
original length and work on skb_len to check partial reads.
Fixes: 30a584d944fb ("[LLX]: SOCK_DGRAM interface fixes")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2205369a314e12fcec4781cc73ac9c08fc2b47de ]
When the vlan code detects that the real device can do TX VLAN offloads
in hardware, it tries to arrange for the real device's header_ops to
be invoked directly.
But it does so illegally, by simply hooking the real device's
header_ops up to the VLAN device.
This doesn't work because we will end up invoking a set of header_ops
routines which expect a device type which matches the real device, but
will see a VLAN device instead.
Fix this by providing a pass-thru set of header_ops which will arrange
to pass the proper real device instead.
To facilitate this add a dev_rebuild_header(). There are
implementations which provide a ->cache and ->create but not a
->rebuild (f.e. PLIP). So we need a helper function just like
dev_hard_header() to avoid crashes.
Use this helper in the one existing place where the
header_ops->rebuild was being invoked, the neighbour code.
With lots of help from Florian Westphal.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f81152e35001e91997ec74a7b4e040e6ab0acccf ]
recvmsg handler in net/rose/af_rose.c performs size-check ->msg_namelen.
After commit f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
(net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic), we now
always take the else branch due to namelen being initialized to 0.
Digging in netdev-vger-cvs git repo shows that msg_namelen was
initialized with a fixed-size since at least 1995, so the else branch
was never taken.
Compile tested only.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c2349758acf1874e4c2b93fe41d072336f1a31d0 ]
Binding might result in a NULL device, which is dereferenced
causing this BUG:
[ 1317.260548] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000000000000097
4
[ 1317.261847] IP: [<ffffffff84225f52>] rds_ib_laddr_check+0x82/0x110
[ 1317.263315] PGD 418bcb067 PUD 3ceb21067 PMD 0
[ 1317.263502] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
[ 1317.264179] Dumping ftrace buffer:
[ 1317.264774] (ftrace buffer empty)
[ 1317.265220] Modules linked in:
[ 1317.265824] CPU: 4 PID: 836 Comm: trinity-child46 Tainted: G W 3.13.0-rc4-
next-20131218-sasha-00013-g2cebb9b-dirty #4159
[ 1317.267415] task: ffff8803ddf33000 ti: ffff8803cd31a000 task.ti: ffff8803cd31a000
[ 1317.268399] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff84225f52>] [<ffffffff84225f52>] rds_ib_laddr_check+
0x82/0x110
[ 1317.269670] RSP: 0000:ffff8803cd31bdf8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 1317.270230] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88020b0dd388 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] RDX: ffffffff8439822e RSI: 00000000000c000a RDI: 0000000000000286
[ 1317.270230] RBP: ffff8803cd31be38 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] R13: 0000000054086700 R14: 0000000000a25de0 R15: 0000000000000031
[ 1317.270230] FS: 00007ff40251d700(0000) GS:ffff88022e200000(0000) knlGS:000000000000
0000
[ 1317.270230] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 1317.270230] CR2: 0000000000000974 CR3: 00000003cd478000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 1317.270230] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000090602
[ 1317.270230] Stack:
[ 1317.270230] 0000000054086700 5408670000a25de0 5408670000000002 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] ffffffff84223542 00000000ea54c767 0000000000000000 ffffffff86d26160
[ 1317.270230] ffff8803cd31be68 ffffffff84223556 ffff8803cd31beb8 ffff8800c6765280
[ 1317.270230] Call Trace:
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff84223542>] ? rds_trans_get_preferred+0x42/0xa0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff84223556>] rds_trans_get_preferred+0x56/0xa0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff8421c9c3>] rds_bind+0x73/0xf0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff83e4ce62>] SYSC_bind+0x92/0xf0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff812493f8>] ? context_tracking_user_exit+0xb8/0x1d0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff8119313d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff8107a852>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x32/0x290
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff83e4cece>] SyS_bind+0xe/0x10
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff843a6ad0>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
[ 1317.270230] Code: 00 8b 45 cc 48 8d 75 d0 48 c7 45 d8 00 00 00 00 66 c7 45 d0 02 00
89 45 d4 48 89 df e8 78 49 76 ff 41 89 c4 85 c0 75 0c 48 8b 03 <80> b8 74 09 00 00 01 7
4 06 41 bc 9d ff ff ff f6 05 2a b6 c2 02
[ 1317.270230] RIP [<ffffffff84225f52>] rds_ib_laddr_check+0x82/0x110
[ 1317.270230] RSP <ffff8803cd31bdf8>
[ 1317.270230] CR2: 0000000000000974
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit b1aac815c0891fe4a55a6b0b715910142227700f ]
Jakub reported while working with nlmon netlink sniffer that parts of
the inet_diag_sockid are not initialized when r->idiag_family != AF_INET6.
That is, fields of r->id.idiag_src[1 ... 3], r->id.idiag_dst[1 ... 3].
In fact, it seems that we can leak 6 * sizeof(u32) byte of kernel [slab]
memory through this. At least, in udp_dump_one(), we allocate a skb in ...
rep = nlmsg_new(sizeof(struct inet_diag_msg) + ..., GFP_KERNEL);
... and then pass that to inet_sk_diag_fill() that puts the whole struct
inet_diag_msg into the skb, where we only fill out r->id.idiag_src[0],
r->id.idiag_dst[0] and leave the rest untouched:
r->id.idiag_src[0] = inet->inet_rcv_saddr;
r->id.idiag_dst[0] = inet->inet_daddr;
struct inet_diag_msg embeds struct inet_diag_sockid that is correctly /
fully filled out in IPv6 case, but for IPv4 not.
So just zero them out by using plain memset (for this little amount of
bytes it's probably not worth the extra check for idiag_family == AF_INET).
Similarly, fix also other places where we fill that out.
Reported-by: Jakub Zawadzki <darkjames-ws@darkjames.pl>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 37ab4fa7844a044dc21fde45e2a0fc2f3c3b6490 ]
This is similar to the set_peek_off patch where calling bind while the
socket is stuck in unix_dgram_recvmsg() will block and cause a hung task
spew after a while.
This is also the last place that did a straightforward mutex_lock(), so
there shouldn't be any more of these patches.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 12663bfc97c8b3fdb292428105dd92d563164050 ]
unix_dgram_recvmsg() will hold the readlock of the socket until recv
is complete.
In the same time, we may try to setsockopt(SO_PEEK_OFF) which will hang until
unix_dgram_recvmsg() will complete (which can take a while) without allowing
us to break out of it, triggering a hung task spew.
Instead, allow set_peek_off to fail, this way userspace will not hang.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d323e92cc3f4edd943610557c9ea1bb4bb5056e8 ]
maxattr in genl_family should be used to save the max attribute
type, but not the max command type. Drop monitor doesn't support
any attributes, so we should leave it as zero.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a3300ef4bbb1f1e33ff0400e1e6cf7733d988f4f ]
Brett Ciphery reported that new ipv6 addresses failed to get installed
because the addrconf generated dsts where counted against the dst gc
limit. We don't need to count those routes like we currently don't count
administratively added routes.
Because the max_addresses check enforces a limit on unbounded address
generation first in case someone plays with router advertisments, we
are still safe here.
Reported-by: Brett Ciphery <brett.ciphery@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 18fc25c94eadc52a42c025125af24657a93638c0 ]
After congestion update on a local connection, when rds_ib_xmit returns
less bytes than that are there in the message, rds_send_xmit calls
back rds_ib_xmit with an offset that causes BUG_ON(off & RDS_FRAG_SIZE)
to trigger.
For a 4Kb PAGE_SIZE rds_ib_xmit returns min(8240,4096)=4096 when actually
the message contains 8240 bytes. rds_send_xmit thinks there is more to send
and calls rds_ib_xmit again with a data offset "off" of 4096-48(rds header)
=4048 bytes thus hitting the BUG_ON(off & RDS_FRAG_SIZE) [RDS_FRAG_SIZE=4k].
The commit 6094628bfd94323fc1cea05ec2c6affd98c18f7f
"rds: prevent BUG_ON triggering on congestion map updates" introduced
this regression. That change was addressing the triggering of a different
BUG_ON in rds_send_xmit() on PowerPC architecture with 64Kbytes PAGE_SIZE:
BUG_ON(ret != 0 &&
conn->c_xmit_sg == rm->data.op_nents);
This was the sequence it was going through:
(rds_ib_xmit)
/* Do not send cong updates to IB loopback */
if (conn->c_loopback
&& rm->m_inc.i_hdr.h_flags & RDS_FLAG_CONG_BITMAP) {
rds_cong_map_updated(conn->c_fcong, ~(u64) 0);
return sizeof(struct rds_header) + RDS_CONG_MAP_BYTES;
}
rds_ib_xmit returns 8240
rds_send_xmit:
c_xmit_data_off = 0 + 8240 - 48 (rds header accounted only the first time)
= 8192
c_xmit_data_off < 65536 (sg->length), so calls rds_ib_xmit again
rds_ib_xmit returns 8240
rds_send_xmit:
c_xmit_data_off = 8192 + 8240 = 16432, calls rds_ib_xmit again
and so on (c_xmit_data_off 24672,32912,41152,49392,57632)
rds_ib_xmit returns 8240
On this iteration this sequence causes the BUG_ON in rds_send_xmit:
while (ret) {
tmp = min_t(int, ret, sg->length - conn->c_xmit_data_off);
[tmp = 65536 - 57632 = 7904]
conn->c_xmit_data_off += tmp;
[c_xmit_data_off = 57632 + 7904 = 65536]
ret -= tmp;
[ret = 8240 - 7904 = 336]
if (conn->c_xmit_data_off == sg->length) {
conn->c_xmit_data_off = 0;
sg++;
conn->c_xmit_sg++;
BUG_ON(ret != 0 &&
conn->c_xmit_sg == rm->data.op_nents);
[c_xmit_sg = 1, rm->data.op_nents = 1]
What the current fix does:
Since the congestion update over loopback is not actually transmitted
as a message, all that rds_ib_xmit needs to do is let the caller think
the full message has been transmitted and not return partial bytes.
It will return 8240 (RDS_CONG_MAP_BYTES+48) when PAGE_SIZE is 4Kb.
And 64Kb+48 when page size is 64Kb.
Reported-by: Josh Hunt <joshhunt00@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Honggang Li <honli@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Bang Nguyen <bang.nguyen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Venkat Venkatsubra <venkat.x.venkatsubra@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bd02cd2549cfcdfc57cb5ce57ffc3feb94f70575 upstream.
Evan Huus found (by fuzzing in wireshark) that the radiotap
iterator code can access beyond the length of the buffer if
the first bitmap claims an extension but then there's no
data at all. Fix this.
Reported-by: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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It turns out that commit: d3f7d56a7a4671d395e8af87071068a195257bf6 was
applied to the tree twice, which didn't hurt anything, but it's good to
fix this up.
Reported-by: Veaceslav Falico <veaceslav@falico.eu>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Shawn Landden <shawnlandden@gmail.com>
Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 051a41fa4ee14f5c39668f0980973b9a195de560 upstream.
Multicast frames can't be transmitted as part of an aggregation
session (such a session couldn't even be set up) so don't try to
reorder them. Trying to do so would cause the reorder to stop
working correctly since multicast QoS frames (as transmitted by
the Aruba APs this was found with) would cause sequence number
confusion in the buffer.
Reported-by: Blaise Gassend <blaise@suitabletech.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d3f7d56a7a4671d395e8af87071068a195257bf6 upstream.
Commit 35f9c09fe (tcp: tcp_sendpages() should call tcp_push() once)
added an internal flag MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST, similar to
MSG_MORE.
algif_hash, algif_skcipher, and udp used MSG_MORE from tcp_sendpages()
and need to see the new flag as identical to MSG_MORE.
This fixes sendfile() on AF_ALG.
v3: also fix udp
Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Reported-and-tested-by: Shawn Landden <shawnlandden@gmail.com>
Original-patch: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Landden <shawn@churchofgit.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3868204d6b89ea373a273e760609cb08020beb1a ]
commit a553e4a6317b2cfc7659542c10fe43184ffe53da ("[PKTGEN]: IPSEC support")
tried to support IPsec ESP transport transformation for pktgen, but acctually
this doesn't work at all for two reasons(The orignal transformed packet has
bad IPv4 checksum value, as well as wrong auth value, reported by wireshark)
- After transpormation, IPv4 header total length needs update,
because encrypted payload's length is NOT same as that of plain text.
- After transformation, IPv4 checksum needs re-caculate because of payload
has been changed.
With this patch, armmed pktgen with below cofiguration, Wireshark is able to
decrypted ESP packet generated by pktgen without any IPv4 checksum error or
auth value error.
pgset "flag IPSEC"
pgset "flows 1"
Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7f88c6b23afbd31545c676dea77ba9593a1a14bf ]
IPv6 stats are 64 bits and thus are protected with a seqlock. By not
disabling bottom-half we could deadlock here if we don't disable bh and
a softirq reentrantly updates the same mib.
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f1d8cba61c3c4b1eb88e507249c4cb8d635d9a76 ]
In commit c9e9042994d3 ("ipv4: fix possible seqlock deadlock") I left
another places where IP_INC_STATS_BH() were improperly used.
udp_sendmsg(), ping_v4_sendmsg() and tcp_v4_connect() are called from
process context, not from softirq context.
This was detected by lockdep seqlock support.
Reported-by: jongman heo <jongman.heo@samsung.com>
Fixes: 584bdf8cbdf6 ("[IPV4]: Fix "ipOutNoRoutes" counter error for TCP and UDP")
Fixes: c319b4d76b9e ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d3f7d56a7a4671d395e8af87071068a195257bf6 ]
Commit 35f9c09fe (tcp: tcp_sendpages() should call tcp_push() once)
added an internal flag MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST, similar to
MSG_MORE.
algif_hash, algif_skcipher, and udp used MSG_MORE from tcp_sendpages()
and need to see the new flag as identical to MSG_MORE.
This fixes sendfile() on AF_ALG.
v3: also fix udp
Reported-and-tested-by: Shawn Landden <shawnlandden@gmail.com>
Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Original-patch: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Landden <shawn@churchofgit.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ec6f809ff6f19fafba3212f6aff0dda71dfac8e8 ]
Currently we're using plain spin_lock() in prb_shutdown_retire_blk_timer(),
however the timer might fire right in the middle and thus try to re-aquire
the same spinlock, leaving us in a endless loop.
To fix that, use the spin_lock_bh() to block it.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
CC: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
CC: Phil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc>
CC: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Veaceslav Falico <vfalico@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e40526cb20b5ee53419452e1f03d97092f144418 ]
Salam reported a use after free bug in PF_PACKET that occurs when
we're sending out frames on a socket bound device and suddenly the
net device is being unregistered. It appears that commit 827d9780
introduced a possible race condition between {t,}packet_snd() and
packet_notifier(). In the case of a bound socket, packet_notifier()
can drop the last reference to the net_device and {t,}packet_snd()
might end up suddenly sending a packet over a freed net_device.
To avoid reverting 827d9780 and thus introducing a performance
regression compared to the current state of things, we decided to
hold a cached RCU protected pointer to the net device and maintain
it on write side via bind spin_lock protected register_prot_hook()
and __unregister_prot_hook() calls.
In {t,}packet_snd() path, we access this pointer under rcu_read_lock
through packet_cached_dev_get() that holds reference to the device
to prevent it from being freed through packet_notifier() while
we're in send path. This is okay to do as dev_put()/dev_hold() are
per-cpu counters, so this should not be a performance issue. Also,
the code simplifies a bit as we don't need need_rls_dev anymore.
Fixes: 827d978037d7 ("af-packet: Use existing netdev reference for bound sockets.")
Reported-by: Salam Noureddine <noureddine@aristanetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Salam Noureddine <noureddine@aristanetworks.com>
Cc: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f873042093c0b418d2351fe142222b625c740149 ]
When the following commands are executed:
brctl addbr br0
ifconfig br0 hw ether <addr>
rmmod bridge
The calltrace will occur:
[ 563.312114] device eth1 left promiscuous mode
[ 563.312188] br0: port 1(eth1) entered disabled state
[ 563.468190] kmem_cache_destroy bridge_fdb_cache: Slab cache still has objects
[ 563.468197] CPU: 6 PID: 6982 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G O 3.12.0-0.7-default+ #9
[ 563.468199] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2007
[ 563.468200] 0000000000000880 ffff88010f111e98 ffffffff814d1c92 ffff88010f111eb8
[ 563.468204] ffffffff81148efd ffff88010f111eb8 0000000000000000 ffff88010f111ec8
[ 563.468206] ffffffffa062a270 ffff88010f111ed8 ffffffffa063ac76 ffff88010f111f78
[ 563.468209] Call Trace:
[ 563.468218] [<ffffffff814d1c92>] dump_stack+0x6a/0x78
[ 563.468234] [<ffffffff81148efd>] kmem_cache_destroy+0xfd/0x100
[ 563.468242] [<ffffffffa062a270>] br_fdb_fini+0x10/0x20 [bridge]
[ 563.468247] [<ffffffffa063ac76>] br_deinit+0x4e/0x50 [bridge]
[ 563.468254] [<ffffffff810c7dc9>] SyS_delete_module+0x199/0x2b0
[ 563.468259] [<ffffffff814e0922>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 570.377958] Bridge firewalling registered
--------------------------- cut here -------------------------------
The reason is that when the bridge dev's address is changed, the
br_fdb_change_mac_address() will add new address in fdb, but when
the bridge was removed, the address entry in the fdb did not free,
the bridge_fdb_cache still has objects when destroy the cache, Fix
this by flushing the bridge address entry when removing the bridge.
v2: according to the Toshiaki Makita and Vlad's suggestion, I only
delete the vlan0 entry, it still have a leak here if the vlan id
is other number, so I need to call fdb_delete_by_port(br, NULL, 1)
to flush all entries whose dst is NULL for the bridge.
Suggested-by: Toshiaki Makita <toshiaki.makita1@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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