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commit c568503ef02030f169c9e19204def610a3510918 upstream.
syzbot reports following splat:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ebt_stp_mt_check+0x24b/0x450
net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_stp.c:162
ebt_stp_mt_check+0x24b/0x450 net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_stp.c:162
xt_check_match+0x1438/0x1650 net/netfilter/x_tables.c:506
ebt_check_match net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:372 [inline]
ebt_check_entry net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:702 [inline]
The uninitialised access is
xt_mtchk_param->nft_compat
... which should be set to 0.
Fix it by zeroing the struct beforehand, same for tgchk.
ip(6)tables targetinfo uses c99-style initialiser, so no change
needed there.
Reported-by: syzbot+da4494182233c23a5fcf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 55917a21d0cc0 ("netfilter: x_tables: add context to know if extension runs from nft_compat")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ba062ebb2cd561d404e0fba8ee4b3f5ebce7cbfc upstream.
Three attributes are currently not verified, thus can trigger KMSAN
warnings such as :
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __arch_swab32 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/swab.h:10 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __fswab32 include/uapi/linux/swab.h:59 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in nfqnl_recv_config+0x939/0x17d0 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:1268
CPU: 1 PID: 4521 Comm: syz-executor120 Not tainted 4.17.0+ #5
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
kmsan_report+0x188/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1117
__msan_warning_32+0x70/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:620
__arch_swab32 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/swab.h:10 [inline]
__fswab32 include/uapi/linux/swab.h:59 [inline]
nfqnl_recv_config+0x939/0x17d0 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c:1268
nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0xb2e/0xc80 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:212
netlink_rcv_skb+0x37e/0x600 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2448
nfnetlink_rcv+0x2fe/0x680 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:513
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x1680/0x1750 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
netlink_sendmsg+0x104f/0x1350 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:639 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xec8/0x1320 net/socket.c:2117
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2155 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2164 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x460 net/socket.c:2162
do_syscall_64+0x15b/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x43fd59
RSP: 002b:00007ffde0e30d28 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 000000000043fd59
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 00000000004002c8 R09: 00000000004002c8
R10: 00000000004002c8 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 0000000000401680
R13: 0000000000401710 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Uninit was created at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:279 [inline]
kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xb8/0x1b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:189
kmsan_kmalloc+0x94/0x100 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:315
kmsan_slab_alloc+0x10/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:322
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2753 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xb35/0x11b0 mm/slub.c:4395
__kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline]
__alloc_skb+0x2cb/0x9e0 net/core/skbuff.c:206
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:988 [inline]
netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1182 [inline]
netlink_sendmsg+0x76e/0x1350 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1876
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:639 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xec8/0x1320 net/socket.c:2117
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2155 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2164 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x460 net/socket.c:2162
do_syscall_64+0x15b/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Fixes: fdb694a01f1f ("netfilter: Add fail-open support")
Fixes: 829e17a1a602 ("[NETFILTER]: nfnetlink_queue: allow changing queue length through netlink")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ce00bf07cc95a57cd20b208e02b3c2604e532ae8 upstream.
The old code would indefinitely block other users of nf_log_mutex if
a userspace access in proc_dostring() blocked e.g. due to a userfaultfd
region. Fix it by moving proc_dostring() out of the locked region.
This is a followup to commit 266d07cb1c9a ("netfilter: nf_log: fix
sleeping function called from invalid context"), which changed this code
from using rcu_read_lock() to taking nf_log_mutex.
Fixes: 266d07cb1c9a ("netfilter: nf_log: fix sleeping function calle[...]")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit adc972c5b88829d38ede08b1069718661c7330ae upstream.
When depth of chain is bigger than NFT_JUMP_STACK_SIZE, the nft_do_chain
crashes. But there is no need to crash hard here.
Suggested-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The validation code modified by commit 5b5e7a0de2bb ("net: metrics:
add proper netlink validation") is organised differently in older
kernel versions. The fib_convert_metrics() function that is modified
in the backports to 4.4 and 4.9 needs to returns an error code, not a
success flag.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 082f2300cfa1a3d9d5221c38c5eba85d4ab98bd8 upstream.
Local random address needs to be updated before creating connection if
RPA from LE Direct Advertising Report was resolved in host. Otherwise
remote device might ignore connection request due to address mismatch.
This was affecting following qualification test cases:
GAP/CONN/SCEP/BV-03-C, GAP/CONN/GCEP/BV-05-C, GAP/CONN/DCEP/BV-05-C
Before patch:
< HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6 #11350 [hci0] 84680.231216
Address: 56:BC:E8:24:11:68 (Resolvable)
Identity type: Random (0x01)
Identity: F2:F1:06:3D:9C:42 (Static)
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11351 [hci0] 84680.246022
LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1
Status: Success (0x00)
< HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7 #11352 [hci0] 84680.246417
Type: Passive (0x00)
Interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060)
Window: 30.000 msec (0x0030)
Own address type: Random (0x01)
Filter policy: Accept all advertisement, inc. directed unresolved RPA (0x02)
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11353 [hci0] 84680.248854
LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1
Status: Success (0x00)
< HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #11354 [hci0] 84680.249466
Scanning: Enabled (0x01)
Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01)
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11355 [hci0] 84680.253222
LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1
Status: Success (0x00)
> HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 18 #11356 [hci0] 84680.458387
LE Direct Advertising Report (0x0b)
Num reports: 1
Event type: Connectable directed - ADV_DIRECT_IND (0x01)
Address type: Random (0x01)
Address: 53:38:DA:46:8C:45 (Resolvable)
Identity type: Public (0x00)
Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33)
Direct address type: Random (0x01)
Direct address: 7C:D6:76:8C:DF:82 (Resolvable)
Identity type: Random (0x01)
Identity: F2:F1:06:3D:9C:42 (Static)
RSSI: -74 dBm (0xb6)
< HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #11357 [hci0] 84680.458737
Scanning: Disabled (0x00)
Filter duplicates: Disabled (0x00)
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11358 [hci0] 84680.469982
LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1
Status: Success (0x00)
< HCI Command: LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) plen 25 #11359 [hci0] 84680.470444
Scan interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060)
Scan window: 60.000 msec (0x0060)
Filter policy: White list is not used (0x00)
Peer address type: Random (0x01)
Peer address: 53:38:DA:46:8C:45 (Resolvable)
Identity type: Public (0x00)
Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33)
Own address type: Random (0x01)
Min connection interval: 30.00 msec (0x0018)
Max connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028)
Connection latency: 0 (0x0000)
Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a)
Min connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000)
Max connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000)
> HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 #11360 [hci0] 84680.474971
LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) ncmd 1
Status: Success (0x00)
< HCI Command: LE Create Connection Cancel (0x08|0x000e) plen 0 #11361 [hci0] 84682.545385
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11362 [hci0] 84682.551014
LE Create Connection Cancel (0x08|0x000e) ncmd 1
Status: Success (0x00)
> HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 19 #11363 [hci0] 84682.551074
LE Connection Complete (0x01)
Status: Unknown Connection Identifier (0x02)
Handle: 0
Role: Master (0x00)
Peer address type: Public (0x00)
Peer address: 00:00:00:00:00:00 (OUI 00-00-00)
Connection interval: 0.00 msec (0x0000)
Connection latency: 0 (0x0000)
Supervision timeout: 0 msec (0x0000)
Master clock accuracy: 0x00
After patch:
< HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7 #210 [hci0] 667.152459
Type: Passive (0x00)
Interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060)
Window: 30.000 msec (0x0030)
Own address type: Random (0x01)
Filter policy: Accept all advertisement, inc. directed unresolved RPA (0x02)
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #211 [hci0] 667.153613
LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1
Status: Success (0x00)
< HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #212 [hci0] 667.153704
Scanning: Enabled (0x01)
Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01)
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #213 [hci0] 667.154584
LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1
Status: Success (0x00)
> HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 18 #214 [hci0] 667.182619
LE Direct Advertising Report (0x0b)
Num reports: 1
Event type: Connectable directed - ADV_DIRECT_IND (0x01)
Address type: Random (0x01)
Address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable)
Identity type: Public (0x00)
Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33)
Direct address type: Random (0x01)
Direct address: 7C:C1:57:A5:B7:A8 (Resolvable)
Identity type: Random (0x01)
Identity: F4:28:73:5D:38:B0 (Static)
RSSI: -70 dBm (0xba)
< HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #215 [hci0] 667.182704
Scanning: Disabled (0x00)
Filter duplicates: Disabled (0x00)
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #216 [hci0] 667.183599
LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1
Status: Success (0x00)
< HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6 #217 [hci0] 667.183645
Address: 7C:C1:57:A5:B7:A8 (Resolvable)
Identity type: Random (0x01)
Identity: F4:28:73:5D:38:B0 (Static)
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #218 [hci0] 667.184590
LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1
Status: Success (0x00)
< HCI Command: LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) plen 25 #219 [hci0] 667.184613
Scan interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060)
Scan window: 60.000 msec (0x0060)
Filter policy: White list is not used (0x00)
Peer address type: Random (0x01)
Peer address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable)
Identity type: Public (0x00)
Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33)
Own address type: Random (0x01)
Min connection interval: 30.00 msec (0x0018)
Max connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028)
Connection latency: 0 (0x0000)
Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a)
Min connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000)
Max connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000)
> HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 #220 [hci0] 667.186558
LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) ncmd 1
Status: Success (0x00)
> HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 19 #221 [hci0] 667.485824
LE Connection Complete (0x01)
Status: Success (0x00)
Handle: 0
Role: Master (0x00)
Peer address type: Random (0x01)
Peer address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable)
Identity type: Public (0x00)
Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33)
Connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028)
Connection latency: 0 (0x0000)
Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a)
Master clock accuracy: 0x07
@ MGMT Event: Device Connected (0x000b) plen 13 {0x0002} [hci0] 667.485996
LE Address: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33)
Flags: 0x00000000
Data length: 0
Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@codecoup.pl>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 862591bf4f519d1b8d859af720fafeaebdd0162a upstream.
syzkaller triggered following KASAN splat:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xfrm_hash_rebuild+0xdbe/0xf00 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:618
read of size 2 at addr ffff8801c8e92fe4 by task kworker/1:1/23 [..]
Workqueue: events xfrm_hash_rebuild [..]
__asan_report_load2_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:428
xfrm_hash_rebuild+0xdbe/0xf00 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:618
process_one_work+0xbbf/0x1b10 kernel/workqueue.c:2112
worker_thread+0x223/0x1990 kernel/workqueue.c:2246 [..]
The reproducer triggers:
1016 if (error) {
1017 list_move_tail(&walk->walk.all, &x->all);
1018 goto out;
1019 }
in xfrm_policy_walk() via pfkey (it sets tiny rcv space, dump
callback returns -ENOBUFS).
In this case, *walk is located the pfkey socket struct, so this socket
becomes visible in the global policy list.
It looks like this is intentional -- phony walker has walk.dead set to 1
and all other places skip such "policies".
Ccing original authors of the two commits that seem to expose this
issue (first patch missed ->dead check, second patch adds pfkey
sockets to policies dumper list).
Fixes: 880a6fab8f6ba5b ("xfrm: configure policy hash table thresholds by netlink")
Fixes: 12a169e7d8f4b1c ("ipsec: Put dumpers on the dump list")
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Timo Teras <timo.teras@iki.fi>
Cc: Christophe Gouault <christophe.gouault@6wind.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <bot+c028095236fcb6f4348811565b75084c754dc729@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Zubin Mithra <zsm@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6916fb3b10b3cbe3b1f9f5b680675f53e4e299eb upstream.
Whenever thresholds are changed the hash tables are rebuilt. This is
done by enumerating all policies and hashing and inserting them into
the right table according to the thresholds and direction.
Because socket policies are also contained in net->xfrm.policy_all but
no hash tables are defined for their direction (dir + XFRM_POLICY_MAX)
this causes a NULL or invalid pointer dereference after returning from
policy_hash_bysel() if the rebuild is done while any socket policies
are installed.
Since the rebuild after changing thresholds is scheduled this crash
could even occur if the userland sets thresholds seemingly before
installing any socket policies.
Fixes: 53c2e285f970 ("xfrm: Do not hash socket policies")
Signed-off-by: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Zubin Mithra <zsm@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4fd44a98ffe0d048246efef67ed640fdf2098a62 ]
commit 079096f103fa ("tcp/dccp: install syn_recv requests into ehash
table") introduced an optimization for the handling of child sockets
created for a new TCP connection.
But this optimization passes any data associated with the last ACK of the
connection handshake up the stack without verifying its checksum, because it
calls tcp_child_process(), which in turn calls tcp_rcv_state_process()
directly. These lower-level processing functions do not do any checksum
verification.
Insert a tcp_checksum_complete call in the TCP_NEW_SYN_RECEIVE path to
fix this.
Fixes: 079096f103fa ("tcp/dccp: install syn_recv requests into ehash table")
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 02db55718d53f9d426cee504c27fb768e9ed4ffe upstream.
While rcvbuf is properly clamped by tcp_rmem[2], rcvwin
is left to a potentially too big value.
It has no serious effect, since :
1) tcp_grow_window() has very strict checks.
2) window_clamp can be mangled by user space to any value anyway.
tcp_init_buffer_space() and companions use tcp_full_space(),
we use tcp_win_from_space() to avoid reloading sk->sk_rcvbuf
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Acked-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Benjamin Gilbert <benjamin.gilbert@coreos.com>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 52f96757905bbf0edef47f3ee6c7c784e7f8ff8a ]
syzkaller reports for buffer overflow for interface name
when starting sync daemons [1]
What we do is that we copy user structure into larger stack
buffer but later we search NUL past the stack buffer.
The same happens for sched_name when adding/editing virtual server.
We are restricted by IP_VS_SCHEDNAME_MAXLEN and IP_VS_IFNAME_MAXLEN
being used as size in include/uapi/linux/ip_vs.h, so they
include the space for NUL.
As using strlcpy is wrong for unsafe source, replace it with
strscpy and add checks to return EINVAL if source string is not
NUL-terminated. The incomplete strlcpy fix comes from 2.6.13.
For the netlink interface reduce the len parameter for
IPVS_DAEMON_ATTR_MCAST_IFN and IPVS_SVC_ATTR_SCHED_NAME,
so that we get proper EINVAL.
[1]
kernel BUG at lib/string.c:1052!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 373 Comm: syz-executor936 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc4+ #45
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:fortify_panic+0x13/0x20 lib/string.c:1051
RSP: 0018:ffff8801c976f800 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000022 RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000022 RSI: ffffffff8160f6f1 RDI: ffffed00392edef6
RBP: ffff8801c976f800 R08: ffff8801cf4c62c0 R09: ffffed003b5e4fb0
R10: ffffed003b5e4fb0 R11: ffff8801daf27d87 R12: ffff8801c976fa20
R13: ffff8801c976fae4 R14: ffff8801c976fae0 R15: 000000000000048b
FS: 00007fd99f75e700(0000) GS:ffff8801daf00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000200001c0 CR3: 00000001d6843000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
strlen include/linux/string.h:270 [inline]
strlcpy include/linux/string.h:293 [inline]
do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x31c/0x1d00 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2388
nf_sockopt net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:106 [inline]
nf_setsockopt+0x7d/0xd0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:115
ip_setsockopt+0xd8/0xf0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1253
udp_setsockopt+0x62/0xa0 net/ipv4/udp.c:2487
ipv6_setsockopt+0x149/0x170 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:917
tcp_setsockopt+0x93/0xe0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3057
sock_common_setsockopt+0x9a/0xe0 net/core/sock.c:3046
__sys_setsockopt+0x1bd/0x390 net/socket.c:1903
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1914 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1911 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0xbe/0x150 net/socket.c:1911
do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x447369
RSP: 002b:00007fd99f75dda8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006e39e4 RCX: 0000000000447369
RDX: 000000000000048b RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000018 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000200001c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000006e39e0
R13: 75a1ff93f0896195 R14: 6f745f3168746576 R15: 0000000000000001
Code: 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 0f 0b 48 89 df e8 d2 8f 48 fa eb
de 55 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 60 65 64 88 48 89 e5 e8 91 dd f3 f9 <0f> 0b 90 90
90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56
RIP: fortify_panic+0x13/0x20 lib/string.c:1051 RSP: ffff8801c976f800
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+aac887f77319868646df@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: e4ff67513096 ("ipvs: add sync_maxlen parameter for the sync daemon")
Fixes: 4da62fc70d7c ("[IPVS]: Fix for overflows")
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Acked-by: Simon Horman <horms+renesas@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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[ Upstream commit 94c752f99954797da583a84c4907ff19e92550a4 ]
strlcpy() can't be safely used on a user-space provided string,
as it can try to read beyond the buffer's end, if the latter is
not NULL terminated.
Leveraging the above, syzbot has been able to trigger the following
splat:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in strlcpy include/linux/string.h:300
[inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in compat_mtw_from_user
net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:1957 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ebt_size_mwt
net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2059 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in size_entry_mwt
net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2155 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in compat_copy_entries+0x96c/0x14a0
net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2194
Write of size 33 at addr ffff8801b0abf888 by task syz-executor0/4504
CPU: 0 PID: 4504 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc2+ #40
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x6c/0x20b mm/kasan/report.c:256
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
kasan_report.cold.7+0x242/0x2fe mm/kasan/report.c:412
check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline]
check_memory_region+0x13e/0x1b0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267
memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303
strlcpy include/linux/string.h:300 [inline]
compat_mtw_from_user net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:1957 [inline]
ebt_size_mwt net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2059 [inline]
size_entry_mwt net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2155 [inline]
compat_copy_entries+0x96c/0x14a0 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2194
compat_do_replace+0x483/0x900 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2285
compat_do_ebt_set_ctl+0x2ac/0x324 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2367
compat_nf_sockopt net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:144 [inline]
compat_nf_setsockopt+0x9b/0x140 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:156
compat_ip_setsockopt+0xff/0x140 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1279
inet_csk_compat_setsockopt+0x97/0x120 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1041
compat_tcp_setsockopt+0x49/0x80 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2901
compat_sock_common_setsockopt+0xb4/0x150 net/core/sock.c:3050
__compat_sys_setsockopt+0x1ab/0x7c0 net/compat.c:403
__do_compat_sys_setsockopt net/compat.c:416 [inline]
__se_compat_sys_setsockopt net/compat.c:413 [inline]
__ia32_compat_sys_setsockopt+0xbd/0x150 net/compat.c:413
do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:323 [inline]
do_fast_syscall_32+0x345/0xf9b arch/x86/entry/common.c:394
entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x70/0x7f arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:139
RIP: 0023:0xf7fb3cb9
RSP: 002b:00000000fff0c26c EFLAGS: 00000282 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000016e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000080 RSI: 0000000020000300 RDI: 00000000000005f4
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0006c2afc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
flags: 0x2fffc0000000000()
raw: 02fffc0000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff
raw: 0000000000000000 ffffea0006c20101 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Fix the issue replacing the unsafe function with strscpy() and
taking care of possible errors.
Fixes: 81e675c227ec ("netfilter: ebtables: add CONFIG_COMPAT support")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+4e42a04e0bc33cb6c087@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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[ Upstream commit d9f92772e8ec388d070752ee8f187ef8fa18621f ]
syzbot found a way to trigger an infinitie loop by overflowing
@offset variable that has been forced to use u16 for some very
obscure reason in the past.
We probably want to look at NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT handling which looks
wrong, in a separate patch.
In net-next, we shall try to use skb_header_pointer() instead of
pskb_may_pull().
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 134s! [syz-executor738:4553]
Modules linked in:
irq event stamp: 13885653
hardirqs last enabled at (13885652): [<ffffffff878009d5>] restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel+0x0/0x2b
hardirqs last disabled at (13885653): [<ffffffff87800905>] interrupt_entry+0xb5/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:625
softirqs last enabled at (13614028): [<ffffffff84df0809>] tun_napi_alloc_frags drivers/net/tun.c:1478 [inline]
softirqs last enabled at (13614028): [<ffffffff84df0809>] tun_get_user+0x1dd9/0x4290 drivers/net/tun.c:1825
softirqs last disabled at (13614032): [<ffffffff84df1b6f>] tun_get_user+0x313f/0x4290 drivers/net/tun.c:1942
CPU: 1 PID: 4553 Comm: syz-executor738 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc3+ #40
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:check_kcov_mode kernel/kcov.c:67 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x20/0x50 kernel/kcov.c:101
RSP: 0018:ffff8801d8cfe250 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
RAX: ffff8801d88a8080 RBX: ffff8801d7389e40 RCX: 0000000000000006
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff868da4ad RDI: ffff8801c8a53277
RBP: ffff8801d8cfe250 R08: ffff8801d88a8080 R09: ffff8801d8cfe3e8
R10: ffffed003b19fc87 R11: ffff8801d8cfe43f R12: ffff8801c8a5327f
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8801c8a4e5fe R15: ffff8801d8cfe3e8
FS: 0000000000d88940(0000) GS:ffff8801daf00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffff600400 CR3: 00000001acab3000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
_decode_session6+0xc1d/0x14f0 net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c:150
__xfrm_decode_session+0x71/0x140 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2368
xfrm_decode_session_reverse include/net/xfrm.h:1213 [inline]
icmpv6_route_lookup+0x395/0x6e0 net/ipv6/icmp.c:372
icmp6_send+0x1982/0x2da0 net/ipv6/icmp.c:551
icmpv6_send+0x17a/0x300 net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c:43
ip6_input_finish+0x14e1/0x1a30 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:305
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:288 [inline]
ip6_input+0xe1/0x5e0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:327
dst_input include/net/dst.h:450 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish+0x29c/0xa10 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:71
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:288 [inline]
ipv6_rcv+0xeb8/0x2040 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:208
__netif_receive_skb_core+0x2468/0x3650 net/core/dev.c:4646
__netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1e0 net/core/dev.c:4711
netif_receive_skb_internal+0x126/0x7b0 net/core/dev.c:4785
napi_frags_finish net/core/dev.c:5226 [inline]
napi_gro_frags+0x631/0xc40 net/core/dev.c:5299
tun_get_user+0x3168/0x4290 drivers/net/tun.c:1951
tun_chr_write_iter+0xb9/0x154 drivers/net/tun.c:1996
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1784 [inline]
do_iter_readv_writev+0x859/0xa50 fs/read_write.c:680
do_iter_write+0x185/0x5f0 fs/read_write.c:959
vfs_writev+0x1c7/0x330 fs/read_write.c:1004
do_writev+0x112/0x2f0 fs/read_write.c:1039
__do_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1112 [inline]
__se_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1109 [inline]
__x64_sys_writev+0x75/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:1109
do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+0053c8...@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 4b66af2d6356a00e94bcdea3e7fea324e8b5c6f4 upstream.
Key extensions (struct sadb_key) include a user-specified number of key
bits. The kernel uses that number to determine how much key data to copy
out of the message in pfkey_msg2xfrm_state().
The length of the sadb_key message must be verified to be long enough,
even in the case of SADB_X_AALG_NULL. Furthermore, the sadb_key_len value
must be long enough to include both the key data and the struct sadb_key
itself.
Introduce a helper function verify_key_len(), and call it from
parse_exthdrs() where other exthdr types are similarly checked for
correctness.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Easton <kevin@guarana.org>
Reported-by: syzbot+5022a34ca5a3d49b84223653fab632dfb7b4cf37@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Zubin Mithra <zsm@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 5b5e7a0de2bbf2a1afcd9f49e940010e9fb80d53 ]
Before using nla_get_u32(), better make sure the attribute
is of the proper size.
Code recently was changed, but bug has been there from beginning
of git.
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in rtnetlink_put_metrics+0x553/0x960 net/core/rtnetlink.c:746
CPU: 1 PID: 14139 Comm: syz-executor6 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc5+ #103
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
kmsan_report+0x149/0x260 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1084
__msan_warning_32+0x6e/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:686
rtnetlink_put_metrics+0x553/0x960 net/core/rtnetlink.c:746
fib_dump_info+0xc42/0x2190 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1361
rtmsg_fib+0x65f/0x8c0 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:419
fib_table_insert+0x2314/0x2b50 net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:1287
inet_rtm_newroute+0x210/0x340 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:779
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xa32/0x1560 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4646
netlink_rcv_skb+0x378/0x600 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2448
rtnetlink_rcv+0x50/0x60 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4664
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x1678/0x1750 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
netlink_sendmsg+0x104f/0x1350 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:639 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2117
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2155 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2164 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x460 net/socket.c:2162
do_syscall_64+0x152/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x455a09
RSP: 002b:00007faae5fd8c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007faae5fd96d4 RCX: 0000000000455a09
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000013
RBP: 000000000072bea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 00000000000005d0 R14: 00000000006fdc20 R15: 0000000000000000
Uninit was stored to memory at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:279 [inline]
kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:294 [inline]
kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x12b/0x210 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:685
__msan_chain_origin+0x69/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:529
fib_convert_metrics net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1056 [inline]
fib_create_info+0x2d46/0x9dc0 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1150
fib_table_insert+0x3e4/0x2b50 net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:1146
inet_rtm_newroute+0x210/0x340 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:779
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xa32/0x1560 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4646
netlink_rcv_skb+0x378/0x600 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2448
rtnetlink_rcv+0x50/0x60 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4664
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x1678/0x1750 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
netlink_sendmsg+0x104f/0x1350 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:639 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2117
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2155 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2164 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x460 net/socket.c:2162
do_syscall_64+0x152/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Uninit was created at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:279 [inline]
kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xb8/0x1b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:189
kmsan_kmalloc+0x94/0x100 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:315
kmsan_slab_alloc+0x10/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:322
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2753 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xb32/0x11b0 mm/slub.c:4395
__kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline]
__alloc_skb+0x2cb/0x9e0 net/core/skbuff.c:206
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:988 [inline]
netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1182 [inline]
netlink_sendmsg+0x76e/0x1350 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1876
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:639 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2117
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2155 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2164 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x460 net/socket.c:2162
do_syscall_64+0x152/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Fixes: a919525ad832 ("net: Move fib_convert_metrics to metrics file")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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[ Upstream commit 644c7eebbfd59e72982d11ec6cc7d39af12450ae ]
It seems that rtnl_group_changelink() can call do_setlink
while a prior call to validate_linkmsg(dev = NULL, ...) could
not validate IFLA_ADDRESS / IFLA_BROADCAST
Make sure do_setlink() calls validate_linkmsg() instead
of letting its callers having this responsibility.
With help from Dmitry Vyukov, thanks a lot !
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in is_valid_ether_addr include/linux/etherdevice.h:199 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in eth_prepare_mac_addr_change net/ethernet/eth.c:275 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in eth_mac_addr+0x203/0x2b0 net/ethernet/eth.c:308
CPU: 1 PID: 8695 Comm: syz-executor3 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc5+ #103
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
kmsan_report+0x149/0x260 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1084
__msan_warning_32+0x6e/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:686
is_valid_ether_addr include/linux/etherdevice.h:199 [inline]
eth_prepare_mac_addr_change net/ethernet/eth.c:275 [inline]
eth_mac_addr+0x203/0x2b0 net/ethernet/eth.c:308
dev_set_mac_address+0x261/0x530 net/core/dev.c:7157
do_setlink+0xbc3/0x5fc0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2317
rtnl_group_changelink net/core/rtnetlink.c:2824 [inline]
rtnl_newlink+0x1fe9/0x37a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2976
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xa32/0x1560 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4646
netlink_rcv_skb+0x378/0x600 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2448
rtnetlink_rcv+0x50/0x60 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4664
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x1678/0x1750 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
netlink_sendmsg+0x104f/0x1350 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:639 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2117
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2155 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2164 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x460 net/socket.c:2162
do_syscall_64+0x152/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x455a09
RSP: 002b:00007fc07480ec68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fc07480f6d4 RCX: 0000000000455a09
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200003c0 RDI: 0000000000000014
RBP: 000000000072bea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 00000000000005d0 R14: 00000000006fdc20 R15: 0000000000000000
Uninit was stored to memory at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:279 [inline]
kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:294 [inline]
kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x12b/0x210 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:685
kmsan_memcpy_origins+0x11d/0x170 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:527
__msan_memcpy+0x109/0x160 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:478
do_setlink+0xb84/0x5fc0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2315
rtnl_group_changelink net/core/rtnetlink.c:2824 [inline]
rtnl_newlink+0x1fe9/0x37a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2976
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xa32/0x1560 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4646
netlink_rcv_skb+0x378/0x600 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2448
rtnetlink_rcv+0x50/0x60 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4664
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x1678/0x1750 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
netlink_sendmsg+0x104f/0x1350 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:639 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2117
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2155 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2164 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x460 net/socket.c:2162
do_syscall_64+0x152/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Uninit was created at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:279 [inline]
kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xb8/0x1b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:189
kmsan_kmalloc+0x94/0x100 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:315
kmsan_slab_alloc+0x10/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:322
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2753 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xb32/0x11b0 mm/slub.c:4395
__kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline]
__alloc_skb+0x2cb/0x9e0 net/core/skbuff.c:206
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:988 [inline]
netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1182 [inline]
netlink_sendmsg+0x76e/0x1350 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1876
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:639 [inline]
___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2117
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2155 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2164 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x460 net/socket.c:2162
do_syscall_64+0x152/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Fixes: e7ed828f10bd ("netlink: support setting devgroup parameters")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 9aad13b087ab0a588cd68259de618f100053360e ]
Commit b84bbaf7a6c8 ("packet: in packet_snd start writing at link
layer allocation") ensures that packet_snd always starts writing
the link layer header in reserved headroom allocated for this
purpose.
This is needed because packets may be shorter than hard_header_len,
in which case the space up to hard_header_len may be zeroed. But
that necessary padding is not accounted for in skb->len.
The fix, however, is buggy. It calls skb_push, which grows skb->len
when moving skb->data back. But in this case packet length should not
change.
Instead, call skb_reserve, which moves both skb->data and skb->tail
back, without changing length.
Fixes: b84bbaf7a6c8 ("packet: in packet_snd start writing at link layer allocation")
Reported-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit eb73190f4fbeedf762394e92d6a4ec9ace684c88 ]
syzbot was able to trick af_packet again [1]
Various commits tried to address the problem in the past,
but failed to take into account V3 header size.
[1]
tpacket_rcv: packet too big, clamped from 72 to 4294967224. macoff=96
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in prb_run_all_ft_ops net/packet/af_packet.c:1016 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in prb_fill_curr_block.isra.59+0x4e5/0x5c0 net/packet/af_packet.c:1039
Write of size 2 at addr ffff8801cb62000e by task kworker/1:2/2106
CPU: 1 PID: 2106 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc7+ #77
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x6c/0x20b mm/kasan/report.c:256
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
kasan_report.cold.7+0x242/0x2fe mm/kasan/report.c:412
__asan_report_store2_noabort+0x17/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:436
prb_run_all_ft_ops net/packet/af_packet.c:1016 [inline]
prb_fill_curr_block.isra.59+0x4e5/0x5c0 net/packet/af_packet.c:1039
__packet_lookup_frame_in_block net/packet/af_packet.c:1094 [inline]
packet_current_rx_frame net/packet/af_packet.c:1117 [inline]
tpacket_rcv+0x1866/0x3340 net/packet/af_packet.c:2282
dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x891/0xb90 net/core/dev.c:2018
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3049 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x16b/0xc10 net/core/dev.c:3069
__dev_queue_xmit+0x2724/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3584
dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3617
neigh_resolve_output+0x679/0xad0 net/core/neighbour.c:1358
neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:482 [inline]
ip6_finish_output2+0xc9c/0x2810 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:120
ip6_finish_output+0x5fe/0xbc0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:154
NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:277 [inline]
ip6_output+0x227/0x9b0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:171
dst_output include/net/dst.h:444 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:288 [inline]
ndisc_send_skb+0x100d/0x1570 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:491
ndisc_send_ns+0x3c1/0x8d0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:633
addrconf_dad_work+0xbef/0x1340 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:4033
process_one_work+0xc1e/0x1b50 kernel/workqueue.c:2145
worker_thread+0x1cc/0x1440 kernel/workqueue.c:2279
kthread+0x345/0x410 kernel/kthread.c:240
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:412
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea00072d8800 count:0 mapcount:-127 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff8801cb620e80
flags: 0x2fffc0000000000()
raw: 02fffc0000000000 0000000000000000 ffff8801cb620e80 00000000ffffff80
raw: ffffea00072e3820 ffffea0007132d20 0000000000000002 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8801cb61ff00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff8801cb61ff80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff8801cb620000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
^
ffff8801cb620080: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
ffff8801cb620100: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
Fixes: 2b6867c2ce76 ("net/packet: fix overflow in check for priv area size")
Fixes: dc808110bb62 ("packet: handle too big packets for PACKET_V3")
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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[ Upstream commit 730c54d59403658a62af6517338fa8d4922c1b28 ]
A precondition check in ip_recv_error triggered on an otherwise benign
race. Remove the warning.
The warning triggers when passing an ipv6 socket to this ipv4 error
handling function. RaceFuzzer was able to trigger it due to a race
in setsockopt IPV6_ADDRFORM.
---
CPU0
do_ipv6_setsockopt
sk->sk_socket->ops = &inet_dgram_ops;
---
CPU1
sk->sk_prot->recvmsg
udp_recvmsg
ip_recv_error
WARN_ON_ONCE(sk->sk_family == AF_INET6);
---
CPU0
do_ipv6_setsockopt
sk->sk_family = PF_INET;
This socket option converts a v6 socket that is connected to a v4 peer
to an v4 socket. It updates the socket on the fly, changing fields in
sk as well as other structs. This is inherently non-atomic. It races
with the lockless udp_recvmsg path.
No other code makes an assumption that these fields are updated
atomically. It is benign here, too, as ip_recv_error cares only about
the protocol of the skbs enqueued on the error queue, for which
sk_family is not a precise predictor (thanks to another isue with
IPV6_ADDRFORM).
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180518120826.GA19515@dragonet.kaist.ac.kr
Fixes: 7ce875e5ecb8 ("ipv4: warn once on passing AF_INET6 socket to ip_recv_error")
Reported-by: DaeRyong Jeong <threeearcat@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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[ Upstream commit 848235edb5c93ed086700584c8ff64f6d7fc778d ]
Currently, raw6_sk(sk)->ip6mr_table is set unconditionally during
ip6_mroute_setsockopt(MRT6_TABLE). A subsequent attempt at the same
setsockopt will fail with -ENOENT, since we haven't actually created
that table.
A similar fix for ipv4 was included in commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr:
various fixes and cleanups").
Fixes: d1db275dd3f6 ("ipv6: ip6mr: support multiple tables")
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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[ Upstream commit 2677d20677314101293e6da0094ede7b5526d2b1 ]
Syzbot reported the use-after-free in timer_is_static_object() [1].
This can happen because the structure for the rto timer (ccid2_hc_tx_sock)
is removed in dccp_disconnect(), and ccid2_hc_tx_rto_expire() can be
called after that.
The report [1] is similar to the one in commit 120e9dabaf55 ("dccp:
defer ccid_hc_tx_delete() at dismantle time"). And the fix is the same,
delay freeing ccid2_hc_tx_sock structure, so that it is freed in
dccp_sk_destruct().
[1]
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in timer_is_static_object+0x80/0x90
kernel/time/timer.c:607
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801bebb5118 by task syz-executor2/25299
CPU: 1 PID: 25299 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc5+ #54
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x6c/0x20b mm/kasan/report.c:256
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
kasan_report.cold.7+0x242/0x2fe mm/kasan/report.c:412
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:433
timer_is_static_object+0x80/0x90 kernel/time/timer.c:607
debug_object_activate+0x2d9/0x670 lib/debugobjects.c:508
debug_timer_activate kernel/time/timer.c:709 [inline]
debug_activate kernel/time/timer.c:764 [inline]
__mod_timer kernel/time/timer.c:1041 [inline]
mod_timer+0x4d3/0x13b0 kernel/time/timer.c:1102
sk_reset_timer+0x22/0x60 net/core/sock.c:2742
ccid2_hc_tx_rto_expire+0x587/0x680 net/dccp/ccids/ccid2.c:147
call_timer_fn+0x230/0x940 kernel/time/timer.c:1326
expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1363 [inline]
__run_timers+0x79e/0xc50 kernel/time/timer.c:1666
run_timer_softirq+0x4c/0x70 kernel/time/timer.c:1692
__do_softirq+0x2e0/0xaf5 kernel/softirq.c:285
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:365 [inline]
irq_exit+0x1d1/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:405
exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:525 [inline]
smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x17e/0x710 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1052
apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:863
</IRQ>
...
Allocated by task 25374:
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
kasan_kmalloc+0xc4/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553
kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:490
kmem_cache_alloc+0x12e/0x760 mm/slab.c:3554
ccid_new+0x25b/0x3e0 net/dccp/ccid.c:151
dccp_hdlr_ccid+0x27/0x150 net/dccp/feat.c:44
__dccp_feat_activate+0x184/0x270 net/dccp/feat.c:344
dccp_feat_activate_values+0x3a7/0x819 net/dccp/feat.c:1538
dccp_create_openreq_child+0x472/0x610 net/dccp/minisocks.c:128
dccp_v4_request_recv_sock+0x12c/0xca0 net/dccp/ipv4.c:408
dccp_v6_request_recv_sock+0x125d/0x1f10 net/dccp/ipv6.c:415
dccp_check_req+0x455/0x6a0 net/dccp/minisocks.c:197
dccp_v4_rcv+0x7b8/0x1f3f net/dccp/ipv4.c:841
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x2e3/0xd80 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:215
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:288 [inline]
ip_local_deliver+0x1e1/0x720 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:256
dst_input include/net/dst.h:450 [inline]
ip_rcv_finish+0x81b/0x2200 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:396
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:288 [inline]
ip_rcv+0xb70/0x143d net/ipv4/ip_input.c:492
__netif_receive_skb_core+0x26f5/0x3630 net/core/dev.c:4592
__netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1e0 net/core/dev.c:4657
process_backlog+0x219/0x760 net/core/dev.c:5337
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5735 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x7b7/0x1930 net/core/dev.c:5801
__do_softirq+0x2e0/0xaf5 kernel/softirq.c:285
Freed by task 25374:
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x11a/0x170 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521
kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528
__cache_free mm/slab.c:3498 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x2d0 mm/slab.c:3756
ccid_hc_tx_delete+0xc3/0x100 net/dccp/ccid.c:190
dccp_disconnect+0x130/0xc66 net/dccp/proto.c:286
dccp_close+0x3bc/0xe60 net/dccp/proto.c:1045
inet_release+0x104/0x1f0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:427
inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:460
sock_release+0x96/0x1b0 net/socket.c:594
sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1149
__fput+0x34d/0x890 fs/file_table.c:209
____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:243
task_work_run+0x1e4/0x290 kernel/task_work.c:113
tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:191 [inline]
exit_to_usermode_loop+0x2bd/0x310 arch/x86/entry/common.c:166
prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:196 [inline]
syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:265 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x6ac/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801bebb4cc0
which belongs to the cache ccid2_hc_tx_sock of size 1240
The buggy address is located 1112 bytes inside of
1240-byte region [ffff8801bebb4cc0, ffff8801bebb5198)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0006faed00 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801bebb41c0
index:0xffff8801bebb5240 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x2fffc0000008100(slab|head)
raw: 02fffc0000008100 ffff8801bebb41c0 ffff8801bebb5240 0000000100000003
raw: ffff8801cdba3138 ffffea0007634120 ffff8801cdbaab40 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
...
==================================================================
Reported-by: syzbot+5d47e9ec91a6f15dbd6f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit 607065bad9931e72207b0cac365d7d4abc06bd99 upstream.
When using large tcp_rmem[2] values (I did tests with 500 MB),
I noticed overflows while computing rcvwin.
Lets fix this before the following patch.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Acked-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[Backport: sysctl_tcp_rmem is not Namespace-ify'd in older kernels]
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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This reverts commit 33cebc976c3b77bdf8f3fb4478cf776131ebfe4f which is
03080e5ec727 ("vti4: Don't override MTU passed on link creation via
IFLA_MTU") upstream as it causes test failures.
This commit should not have been backported to anything older than 4.16,
despite what the changelog said as the mtu must be set in older kernels,
unlike is needed in 4.16 and newer.
Thanks to Alistair Strachan for the debugging help figuring this out,
and for 'git bisect' for making my life a whole lot easier.
Cc: Alistair Strachan <astrachan@google.com>
Cc: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Cc: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 213d7f94775322ba44e0bbb55ec6946e9de88cea ]
When resolving a fallback label, check the sk_buff version as it
is possible (e.g. SCTP) to have family = PF_INET6 while
receiving ip_hdr(skb)->version = 4.
Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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[ Upstream commit ae4745730cf8e693d354ccd4dbaf59ea440c09a9 ]
In some situation vlan packets do not have ethernet headers. One example
is packets from tun devices. Users can specify vlan protocol in tun_pi
field instead of IP protocol, and skb_vlan_untag() attempts to untag such
packets.
skb_vlan_untag() (more precisely, skb_reorder_vlan_header() called by it)
however did not expect packets without ethernet headers, so in such a case
size argument for memmove() underflowed and triggered crash.
====
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff8801cccb8000
IP: __memmove+0x24/0x1a0 arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S:43
PGD 9cee067 P4D 9cee067 PUD 1d9401063 PMD 1cccb7063 PTE 2810100028101
Oops: 000b [#1] SMP KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 17663 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc7+ #368
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__memmove+0x24/0x1a0 arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S:43
RSP: 0018:ffff8801cc046e28 EFLAGS: 00010287
RAX: ffff8801ccc244c4 RBX: fffffffffffffffe RCX: fffffffffff6c4c2
RDX: fffffffffffffffe RSI: ffff8801cccb7ffc RDI: ffff8801cccb8000
RBP: ffff8801cc046e48 R08: ffff8801ccc244be R09: ffffed0039984899
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0039984898 R12: ffff8801ccc244c4
R13: ffff8801ccc244c0 R14: ffff8801d96b7c06 R15: ffff8801d96b7b40
FS: 00007febd562d700(0000) GS:ffff8801db300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffff8801cccb8000 CR3: 00000001ccb2f006 CR4: 00000000001606e0
DR0: 0000000020000000 DR1: 0000000020000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
Call Trace:
memmove include/linux/string.h:360 [inline]
skb_reorder_vlan_header net/core/skbuff.c:5031 [inline]
skb_vlan_untag+0x470/0xc40 net/core/skbuff.c:5061
__netif_receive_skb_core+0x119c/0x3460 net/core/dev.c:4460
__netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1b0 net/core/dev.c:4627
netif_receive_skb_internal+0x10b/0x670 net/core/dev.c:4701
netif_receive_skb+0xae/0x390 net/core/dev.c:4725
tun_rx_batched.isra.50+0x5ee/0x870 drivers/net/tun.c:1555
tun_get_user+0x299e/0x3c20 drivers/net/tun.c:1962
tun_chr_write_iter+0xb9/0x160 drivers/net/tun.c:1990
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1782 [inline]
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:469 [inline]
__vfs_write+0x684/0x970 fs/read_write.c:482
vfs_write+0x189/0x510 fs/read_write.c:544
SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:589 [inline]
SyS_write+0xef/0x220 fs/read_write.c:581
do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
RIP: 0033:0x454879
RSP: 002b:00007febd562cc68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007febd562d6d4 RCX: 0000000000454879
RDX: 0000000000000157 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000014
RBP: 000000000072bea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 00000000000006b0 R14: 00000000006fc120 R15: 0000000000000000
Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 48 89 f8 48 83 fa 20 0f 82 03 01 00 00 48 39 fe 7d 0f 49 89 f0 49 01 d0 49 39 f8 0f 8f 9f 00 00 00 48 89 d1 <f3> a4 c3 48 81 fa a8 02 00 00 72 05 40 38 fe 74 3b 48 83 ea 20
RIP: __memmove+0x24/0x1a0 arch/x86/lib/memmove_64.S:43 RSP: ffff8801cc046e28
CR2: ffff8801cccb8000
====
We don't need to copy headers for packets which do not have preceding
headers of vlan headers, so skip memmove() in that case.
Fixes: 4bbb3e0e8239 ("net: Fix vlan untag for bridge and vlan_dev with reorder_hdr off")
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Toshiaki Makita <makita.toshiaki@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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[ Upstream commit b85ab56c3f81c5a24b5a5213374f549df06430da ]
llc_conn_send_pdu() pushes the skb into write queue and
calls llc_conn_send_pdus() to flush them out. However, the
status of dev_queue_xmit() is not returned to caller,
in this case, llc_conn_state_process().
llc_conn_state_process() needs hold the skb no matter
success or failure, because it still uses it after that,
therefore we should hold skb before dev_queue_xmit() when
that skb is the one being processed by llc_conn_state_process().
For other callers, they can just pass NULL and ignore
the return value as they are.
Reported-by: Noam Rathaus <noamr@beyondsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a752c0a4524889cdc0765925258fd1fd72344100 ]
DHCP connectivity issues can currently occur if the following conditions
are met:
1) A DHCP packet from a client to a server
2) This packet has a multicast destination
3) This destination has a matching entry in the translation table
(FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF for IPv4, 33:33:00:01:00:02/33:33:00:01:00:03
for IPv6)
4) The orig-node determined by TT for the multicast destination
does not match the orig-node determined by best-gateway-selection
In this case the DHCP packet will be dropped.
The "gateway-out-of-range" check is supposed to only be applied to
unicasted DHCP packets to a specific DHCP server.
In that case dropping the the unicasted frame forces the client to
retry via a broadcasted one, but now directed to the new best
gateway.
A DHCP packet with broadcast/multicast destination is already ensured to
always be delivered to the best gateway. Dropping a multicasted
DHCP packet here will only prevent completing DHCP as there is no
other fallback.
So far, it seems the unicast check was implicitly performed by
expecting the batadv_transtable_search() to return NULL for multicast
destinations. However, a multicast address could have always ended up in
the translation table and in fact is now common.
To fix this potential loss of a DHCP client-to-server packet to a
multicast address this patch adds an explicit multicast destination
check to reliably bail out of the gateway-out-of-range check for such
destinations.
The issue and fix were tested in the following three node setup:
- Line topology, A-B-C
- A: gateway client, DHCP client
- B: gateway server, hop-penalty increased: 30->60, DHCP server
- C: gateway server, code modifications to announce FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF
Without this patch, A would never transmit its DHCP Discover packet
due to an always "out-of-range" condition. With this patch,
a full DHCP handshake between A and B was possible again.
Fixes: be7af5cf9cae ("batman-adv: refactoring gateway handling code")
Signed-off-by: Linus Lüssing <linus.luessing@c0d3.blue>
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f8fb3419ead44f9a3136995acd24e35da4525177 ]
For multicast frames AP isolation is only supposed to be checked on
the receiving nodes and never on the originating one.
Furthermore, the isolation or wifi flag bits should only be intepreted
as such for unicast and never multicast TT entries.
By injecting flags to the multicast TT entry claimed by a single
target node it was verified in tests that this multicast address
becomes unreachable, leading to packet loss.
Omitting the "src" parameter to the batadv_transtable_search() call
successfully skipped the AP isolation check and made the target
reachable again.
Fixes: 1d8ab8d3c176 ("batman-adv: Modified forwarding behaviour for multicast packets")
Signed-off-by: Linus Lüssing <linus.luessing@c0d3.blue>
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 03080e5ec72740c1a62e6730f2a5f3f114f11b19 ]
Don't hardcode a MTU value on vti tunnel initialization,
ip_tunnel_newlink() is able to deal with this already. See also
commit ffc2b6ee4174 ("ip_gre: fix IFLA_MTU ignored on NEWLINK").
Fixes: 1181412c1a67 ("net/ipv4: VTI support new module for ip_vti.")
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit dd1df24737727e119c263acf1be2a92763938297 ]
This re-introduces the effect of commit a32452366b72 ("vti4:
Don't count header length twice.") which was accidentally
reverted by merge commit f895f0cfbb77 ("Merge branch 'master' of
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec").
The commit message from Steffen Klassert said:
We currently count the size of LL_MAX_HEADER and struct iphdr
twice for vti4 devices, this leads to a wrong device mtu.
The size of LL_MAX_HEADER and struct iphdr is already counted in
ip_tunnel_bind_dev(), so don't do it again in vti_tunnel_init().
And this is still the case now: ip_tunnel_bind_dev() already
accounts for the header length of the link layer (not
necessarily LL_MAX_HEADER, if the output device is found), plus
one IP header.
For example, with a vti device on top of veth, with MTU of 1500,
the existing implementation would set the initial vti MTU to
1332, accounting once for LL_MAX_HEADER (128, included in
hard_header_len by vti) and twice for the same IP header (once
from hard_header_len, once from ip_tunnel_bind_dev()).
It should instead be 1480, because ip_tunnel_bind_dev() is able
to figure out that the output device is veth, so no additional
link layer header is attached, and will properly count one
single IP header.
The existing issue had the side effect of avoiding PMTUD for
most xfrm policies, by arbitrarily lowering the initial MTU.
However, the only way to get a consistent PMTU value is to let
the xfrm PMTU discovery do its course, and commit d6af1a31cc72
("vti: Add pmtu handling to vti_xmit.") now takes care of local
delivery cases where the application ignores local socket
notifications.
Fixes: b9959fd3b0fa ("vti: switch to new ip tunnel code")
Fixes: f895f0cfbb77 ("Merge branch 'master' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec")
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6f27d2c2a8c236d296201c19abb8533ec20d212b ]
Checking for 0 is insufficient: when an SKB without a batadv header, but
with a VLAN header is received, hdr_size will be 4, making the following
code interpret the Ethernet header as a batadv header.
Fixes: be1db4f6615b ("batman-adv: make the Distributed ARP Table vlan aware")
Signed-off-by: Matthias Schiffer <mschiffer@universe-factory.net>
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4bbb3e0e8239f9079bf1fe20b3c0cb598714ae61 ]
When we have a bridge with vlan_filtering on and a vlan device on top of
it, packets would be corrupted in skb_vlan_untag() called from
br_dev_xmit().
The problem sits in skb_reorder_vlan_header() used in skb_vlan_untag(),
which makes use of skb->mac_len. In this function mac_len is meant for
handling rx path with vlan devices with reorder_header disabled, but in
tx path mac_len is typically 0 and cannot be used, which is the problem
in this case.
The current code even does not properly handle rx path (skb_vlan_untag()
called from __netif_receive_skb_core()) with reorder_header off actually.
In rx path single tag case, it works as follows:
- Before skb_reorder_vlan_header()
mac_header data
v v
+-------------------+-------------+------+----
| ETH | VLAN | ETH |
| ADDRS | TPID | TCI | TYPE |
+-------------------+-------------+------+----
<-------- mac_len --------->
<------------->
to be removed
- After skb_reorder_vlan_header()
mac_header data
v v
+-------------------+------+----
| ETH | ETH |
| ADDRS | TYPE |
+-------------------+------+----
<-------- mac_len --------->
This is ok, but in rx double tag case, it corrupts packets:
- Before skb_reorder_vlan_header()
mac_header data
v v
+-------------------+-------------+-------------+------+----
| ETH | VLAN | VLAN | ETH |
| ADDRS | TPID | TCI | TPID | TCI | TYPE |
+-------------------+-------------+-------------+------+----
<--------------- mac_len ---------------->
<------------->
should be removed
<--------------------------->
actually will be removed
- After skb_reorder_vlan_header()
mac_header data
v v
+-------------------+------+----
| ETH | ETH |
| ADDRS | TYPE |
+-------------------+------+----
<--------------- mac_len ---------------->
So, two of vlan tags are both removed while only inner one should be
removed and mac_header (and mac_len) is broken.
skb_vlan_untag() is meant for removing the vlan header at (skb->data - 2),
so use skb->data and skb->mac_header to calculate the right offset.
Reported-by: Brandon Carpenter <brandon.carpenter@cypherpath.com>
Fixes: a6e18ff11170 ("vlan: Fix untag operations of stacked vlans with REORDER_HEADER off")
Signed-off-by: Toshiaki Makita <makita.toshiaki@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d52e5a7e7ca49457dd31fc8b42fb7c0d58a31221 ]
Prior to the rework of PMTU information storage in commit
2c8cec5c10bc ("ipv4: Cache learned PMTU information in inetpeer."),
when a PMTU event advertising a PMTU smaller than
net.ipv4.route.min_pmtu was received, we would disable setting the DF
flag on packets by locking the MTU metric, and set the PMTU to
net.ipv4.route.min_pmtu.
Since then, we don't disable DF, and set PMTU to
net.ipv4.route.min_pmtu, so the intermediate router that has this link
with a small MTU will have to drop the packets.
This patch reestablishes pre-2.6.39 behavior by splitting
rtable->rt_pmtu into a bitfield with rt_mtu_locked and rt_pmtu.
rt_mtu_locked indicates that we shouldn't set the DF bit on that path,
and is checked in ip_dont_fragment().
One possible workaround is to set net.ipv4.route.min_pmtu to a value low
enough to accommodate the lowest MTU encountered.
Fixes: 2c8cec5c10bc ("ipv4: Cache learned PMTU information in inetpeer.")
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 932909d9b28d27e807ff8eecb68c7748f6701628 ]
The last rule in the blob has next_entry offset that is same as total size.
This made "ebtables32 -A OUTPUT -d de:ad:be:ef:01:02" fail on 64 bit kernel.
Fixes: b71812168571fa ("netfilter: ebtables: CONFIG_COMPAT: don't trust userland offsets")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ecc832758a654e375924ebf06a4ac971acb5ce60 ]
The link to the pdf containing the algorithm description is now a
dead link; it seems http://www.ifp.illinois.edu/~srikant/ has been
moved to https://sites.google.com/a/illinois.edu/srikant/ and none of
the original papers can be found there...
I have replaced it with the only working copy I was able to find.
n.b. there is also a copy available at:
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.296.6350&rep=rep1&type=pdf
However, this seems to only be a *cached* version, so I am unsure
exactly how reliable that link can be expected to remain over time
and have decided against using that one.
Signed-off-by: Joey Pabalinas <joeypabalinas@gmail.com>
net/ipv4/tcp_illinois.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2b3957c34b6d7f03544b12ebbf875eee430745db ]
Commit 128bb975dc3c ("ip6_gre: init dev->mtu and dev->hard_header_len
correctly") fixed IFLA_MTU ignored on NEWLINK for ip6_gre. The same
mtu fix is also needed for sit.
Note that dev->hard_header_len setting for sit works fine, no need to
fix it. sit is actually ipv4 tunnel, it can't call ip6_tnl_change_mtu
to set mtu.
Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit fc6a5d0601c5ac1d02f283a46f60b87b2033e5ca ]
All of these conditions are not fatal and should have
been WARN_ONs from the get-go.
Convert them to WARN_ONs and bail out.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3bf2a09da956b43ecfaa630a2ef9a477f991a46a ]
A more sophisticated implementation could try to combine fragment checksums
when all fragments have CHECKSUM_COMPLETE and are split at even offsets.
For now, we just set ip_summed to CHECKSUM_NONE to avoid "hw csum failure"
warnings in the kernel log when fragmented frames are received. In
consequence, skb_pull_rcsum() can be replaced with skb_pull().
Note that in usual setups, packets don't reach batman-adv with
CHECKSUM_COMPLETE (I assume NICs bail out of checksumming when they see
batadv's ethtype?), which is why the log messages do not occur on every
system using batman-adv. I could reproduce this issue by stacking
batman-adv on top of a VXLAN interface.
Fixes: 610bfc6bc99b ("batman-adv: Receive fragmented packets and merge")
Tested-by: Maximilian Wilhelm <max@sdn.clinic>
Signed-off-by: Matthias Schiffer <mschiffer@universe-factory.net>
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit abd6360591d3f8259f41c34e31ac4826dfe621b8 ]
eth_type_trans() internally calls skb_pull(), which does not adjust the
skb checksum; skb_postpull_rcsum() is necessary to avoid log spam of the
form "bat0: hw csum failure" when packets with CHECKSUM_COMPLETE are
received.
Note that in usual setups, packets don't reach batman-adv with
CHECKSUM_COMPLETE (I assume NICs bail out of checksumming when they see
batadv's ethtype?), which is why the log messages do not occur on every
system using batman-adv. I could reproduce this issue by stacking
batman-adv on top of a VXLAN interface.
Fixes: c6c8fea29769 ("net: Add batman-adv meshing protocol")
Tested-by: Maximilian Wilhelm <max@sdn.clinic>
Signed-off-by: Matthias Schiffer <mschiffer@universe-factory.net>
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit fe9c842695e26d8116b61b80bfb905356f07834b ]
The tlv_len is u8, so we need to limit the size of the SDP URI. Enforce
this both in the NLA policy and in the code that performs the allocation
and copy, to avoid writing past the end of the allocated buffer.
Fixes: d9b8d8e19b073 ("NFC: llcp: Service Name Lookup netlink interface")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2c0aa08631b86a4678dbc93b9caa5248014b4458 ]
Scenario:
1. Port down and do fail over
2. Ap do rds_bind syscall
PID: 47039 TASK: ffff89887e2fe640 CPU: 47 COMMAND: "kworker/u:6"
#0 [ffff898e35f159f0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103abf9
#1 [ffff898e35f15a60] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b96e3
#2 [ffff898e35f15b30] oops_end at ffffffff8150f518
#3 [ffff898e35f15b60] no_context at ffffffff8104854c
#4 [ffff898e35f15ba0] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff81048675
#5 [ffff898e35f15bf0] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff810487d3
#6 [ffff898e35f15c00] do_page_fault at ffffffff815120b8
#7 [ffff898e35f15d10] page_fault at ffffffff8150ea95
[exception RIP: unknown or invalid address]
RIP: 0000000000000000 RSP: ffff898e35f15dc8 RFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff889b77f6fc00 RCX:ffffffff81c99d88
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff896019ee08e8 RDI:ffff889b77f6fc00
RBP: ffff898e35f15df0 R8: ffff896019ee08c8 R9:0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12:ffff896019ee08c0
R13: ffff889b77f6fe68 R14: ffffffff81c99d80 R15: ffffffffa022a1e0
ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018
#8 [ffff898e35f15dc8] cma_ndev_work_handler at ffffffffa022a228 [rdma_cm]
#9 [ffff898e35f15df8] process_one_work at ffffffff8108a7c6
#10 [ffff898e35f15e58] worker_thread at ffffffff8108bda0
#11 [ffff898e35f15ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090fe6
PID: 45659 TASK: ffff880d313d2500 CPU: 31 COMMAND: "oracle_45659_ap"
#0 [ffff881024ccfc98] __schedule at ffffffff8150bac4
#1 [ffff881024ccfd40] schedule at ffffffff8150c2cf
#2 [ffff881024ccfd50] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8150cee7
#3 [ffff881024ccfdc0] mutex_lock at ffffffff8150cdeb
#4 [ffff881024ccfde0] rdma_destroy_id at ffffffffa022a027 [rdma_cm]
#5 [ffff881024ccfe10] rds_ib_laddr_check at ffffffffa0357857 [rds_rdma]
#6 [ffff881024ccfe50] rds_trans_get_preferred at ffffffffa0324c2a [rds]
#7 [ffff881024ccfe80] rds_bind at ffffffffa031d690 [rds]
#8 [ffff881024ccfeb0] sys_bind at ffffffff8142a670
PID: 45659 PID: 47039
rds_ib_laddr_check
/* create id_priv with a null event_handler */
rdma_create_id
rdma_bind_addr
cma_acquire_dev
/* add id_priv to cma_dev->id_list */
cma_attach_to_dev
cma_ndev_work_handler
/* event_hanlder is null */
id_priv->id.event_handler
Signed-off-by: Guanglei Li <guanglei.li@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Honglei Wang <honglei.wang@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Yanjun Zhu <yanjun.zhu@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a7cfebcb7594a24609268f91299ab85ba064bf82 upstream.
There's currently no limit on wiphy names, other than netlink
message size and memory limitations, but that causes issues when,
for example, the wiphy name is used in a uevent, e.g. in rfkill
where we use the same name for the rfkill instance, and then the
buffer there is "only" 2k for the environment variables.
This was reported by syzkaller, which used a 4k name.
Limit the name to something reasonable, I randomly picked 128.
Reported-by: syzbot+230d9e642a85d3fec29c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7f582b248d0a86bae5788c548d7bb5bca6f7691a ]
syzkaller found a reliable way to crash the host, hitting a BUG()
in __tcp_retransmit_skb()
Malicous MSG_FASTOPEN is the root cause. We need to purge write queue
in tcp_connect_init() at the point we init snd_una/write_seq.
This patch also replaces the BUG() by a less intrusive WARN_ON_ONCE()
kernel BUG at net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2837!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 5276 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc3+ #51
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__tcp_retransmit_skb+0x2992/0x2eb0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2837
RSP: 0000:ffff8801dae06ff8 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: ffff8801b9fe61c0 RBX: 00000000ffc18a16 RCX: ffffffff864e1a49
RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: ffffffff864e2e12 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: ffff8801dae073a0 R08: ffff8801b9fe61c0 R09: ffffed0039c40dd2
R10: ffffed0039c40dd2 R11: ffff8801ce206e93 R12: 00000000421eeaad
R13: ffff8801ce206d4e R14: ffff8801ce206cc0 R15: ffff8801cd4f4a80
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8801dae00000(0063) knlGS:00000000096bc900
CS: 0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020000000 CR3: 00000001c47b6000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
tcp_retransmit_skb+0x2e/0x250 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2923
tcp_retransmit_timer+0xc50/0x3060 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:488
tcp_write_timer_handler+0x339/0x960 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:573
tcp_write_timer+0x111/0x1d0 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:593
call_timer_fn+0x230/0x940 kernel/time/timer.c:1326
expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1363 [inline]
__run_timers+0x79e/0xc50 kernel/time/timer.c:1666
run_timer_softirq+0x4c/0x70 kernel/time/timer.c:1692
__do_softirq+0x2e0/0xaf5 kernel/softirq.c:285
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:365 [inline]
irq_exit+0x1d1/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:405
exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:525 [inline]
smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x17e/0x710 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1052
apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:863
Fixes: cf60af03ca4e ("net-tcp: Fast Open client - sendmsg(MSG_FASTOPEN)")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9709020c86f6bf8439ca3effc58cfca49a5de192 ]
We must not call sock_diag_has_destroy_listeners(sk) on a socket
that has no reference on net structure.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in sock_diag_has_destroy_listeners include/linux/sock_diag.h:75 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __sk_free+0x329/0x340 net/core/sock.c:1609
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88018a02e3a0 by task swapper/1/0
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc5+ #54
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x6c/0x20b mm/kasan/report.c:256
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
kasan_report.cold.7+0x242/0x2fe mm/kasan/report.c:412
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:433
sock_diag_has_destroy_listeners include/linux/sock_diag.h:75 [inline]
__sk_free+0x329/0x340 net/core/sock.c:1609
sk_free+0x42/0x50 net/core/sock.c:1623
sock_put include/net/sock.h:1664 [inline]
reqsk_free include/net/request_sock.h:116 [inline]
reqsk_put include/net/request_sock.h:124 [inline]
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop_and_put net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:672 [inline]
reqsk_timer_handler+0xe27/0x10e0 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:739
call_timer_fn+0x230/0x940 kernel/time/timer.c:1326
expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1363 [inline]
__run_timers+0x79e/0xc50 kernel/time/timer.c:1666
run_timer_softirq+0x4c/0x70 kernel/time/timer.c:1692
__do_softirq+0x2e0/0xaf5 kernel/softirq.c:285
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:365 [inline]
irq_exit+0x1d1/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:405
exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:525 [inline]
smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x17e/0x710 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1052
apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:863
</IRQ>
RIP: 0010:native_safe_halt+0x6/0x10 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:54
RSP: 0018:ffff8801d9ae7c38 EFLAGS: 00000282 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff1003b35cf8a RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 1ffffffff11a30d0 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffff88d18680
RBP: ffff8801d9ae7c38 R08: ffffed003b5e46c3 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffff8801d9ae7cf0 R14: ffffffff897bef20 R15: 0000000000000000
arch_safe_halt arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:94 [inline]
default_idle+0xc2/0x440 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:354
arch_cpu_idle+0x10/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:345
default_idle_call+0x6d/0x90 kernel/sched/idle.c:93
cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:153 [inline]
do_idle+0x395/0x560 kernel/sched/idle.c:262
cpu_startup_entry+0x104/0x120 kernel/sched/idle.c:368
start_secondary+0x426/0x5b0 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:269
secondary_startup_64+0xa5/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:242
Allocated by task 4557:
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
kasan_kmalloc+0xc4/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553
kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:490
kmem_cache_alloc+0x12e/0x760 mm/slab.c:3554
kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:691 [inline]
net_alloc net/core/net_namespace.c:383 [inline]
copy_net_ns+0x159/0x4c0 net/core/net_namespace.c:423
create_new_namespaces+0x69d/0x8f0 kernel/nsproxy.c:107
unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xc3/0x1f0 kernel/nsproxy.c:206
ksys_unshare+0x708/0xf90 kernel/fork.c:2408
__do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2476 [inline]
__se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2474 [inline]
__x64_sys_unshare+0x31/0x40 kernel/fork.c:2474
do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 69:
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x11a/0x170 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521
kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528
__cache_free mm/slab.c:3498 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x2d0 mm/slab.c:3756
net_free net/core/net_namespace.c:399 [inline]
net_drop_ns.part.14+0x11a/0x130 net/core/net_namespace.c:406
net_drop_ns net/core/net_namespace.c:405 [inline]
cleanup_net+0x6a1/0xb20 net/core/net_namespace.c:541
process_one_work+0xc1e/0x1b50 kernel/workqueue.c:2145
worker_thread+0x1cc/0x1440 kernel/workqueue.c:2279
kthread+0x345/0x410 kernel/kthread.c:240
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:412
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88018a02c140
which belongs to the cache net_namespace of size 8832
The buggy address is located 8800 bytes inside of
8832-byte region [ffff88018a02c140, ffff88018a02e3c0)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0006280b00 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88018a02c140 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x2fffc0000008100(slab|head)
raw: 02fffc0000008100 ffff88018a02c140 0000000000000000 0000000100000001
raw: ffffea00062a1320 ffffea0006268020 ffff8801d9bdde40 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Fixes: b922622ec6ef ("sock_diag: don't broadcast kernel sockets")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Craig Gallek <kraig@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit b84bbaf7a6c8cca24f8acf25a2c8e46913a947ba ]
Packet sockets allow construction of packets shorter than
dev->hard_header_len to accommodate protocols with variable length
link layer headers. These packets are padded to dev->hard_header_len,
because some device drivers interpret that as a minimum packet size.
packet_snd reserves dev->hard_header_len bytes on allocation.
SOCK_DGRAM sockets call skb_push in dev_hard_header() to ensure that
link layer headers are stored in the reserved range. SOCK_RAW sockets
do the same in tpacket_snd, but not in packet_snd.
Syzbot was able to send a zero byte packet to a device with massive
116B link layer header, causing padding to cross over into skb_shinfo.
Fix this by writing from the start of the llheader reserved range also
in the case of packet_snd/SOCK_RAW.
Update skb_set_network_header to the new offset. This also corrects
it for SOCK_DGRAM, where it incorrectly double counted reserve due to
the skb_push in dev_hard_header.
Fixes: 9ed988cd5915 ("packet: validate variable length ll headers")
Reported-by: syzbot+71d74a5406d02057d559@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 113f99c3358564a0647d444c2ae34e8b1abfd5b9 ]
Device features may change during transmission. In particular with
corking, a device may toggle scatter-gather in between allocating
and writing to an skb.
Do not unconditionally assume that !NETIF_F_SG at write time implies
that the same held at alloc time and thus the skb has sufficient
tailroom.
This issue predates git history.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit de3b58bc359a861d5132300f53f95e83f71954b3 upstream.
Revert commit 820da5357572 ("l2tp: fix missing print session offset
info"). The peer_offset parameter is removed.
Signed-off-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 75bf50f4aaa1c78d769d854ab3d975884909e4fb upstream.
copy geniv when cloning the xfrm state.
x->geniv was not copied to the new state and migration would fail.
xfrm_do_migrate
..
xfrm_state_clone()
..
..
esp_init_aead()
crypto_alloc_aead()
crypto_alloc_tfm()
crypto_find_alg() return EAGAIN and failed
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony@phenome.org>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 59d8d4434f429b4fa8a346fd889058bda427a837 ]
Now sctp only delays the authentication for the normal cookie-echo
chunk by setting chunk->auth_chunk in sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv(). But
for the duplicated one with auth, in sctp_assoc_bh_rcv(), it does
authentication first based on the old asoc, which will definitely
fail due to the different auth info in the old asoc.
The duplicated cookie-echo chunk will create a new asoc with the
auth info from this chunk, and the authentication should also be
done with the new asoc's auth info for all of the collision 'A',
'B' and 'D'. Otherwise, the duplicated cookie-echo chunk with auth
will never pass the authentication and create the new connection.
This issue exists since very beginning, and this fix is to make
sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() follow the way sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv() does
for the normal cookie-echo chunk to delay the authentication.
While at it, remove the unused params from sctp_sf_authenticate()
and define sctp_auth_chunk_verify() used for all the places that
do the delayed authentication.
v1->v2:
fix the typo in changelog as Marcelo noticed.
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ce402f044e4e432c296f90eaabb8dbe8f3624391 ]
When auth is enabled for cookie-ack chunk, in sctp_inq_pop, sctp
processes auth chunk first, then continues to the next chunk in
this packet if chunk_end + chunk_hdr size < skb_tail_pointer().
Otherwise, it will go to the next packet or discard this chunk.
However, it missed the fact that cookie-ack chunk's size is equal
to chunk_hdr size, which couldn't match that check, and thus this
chunk would not get processed.
This patch fixes it by changing the check to chunk_end + chunk_hdr
size <= skb_tail_pointer().
Fixes: 26b87c788100 ("net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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