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2019-10-11ima: always return negative code for errorSascha Hauer
[ Upstream commit f5e1040196dbfe14c77ce3dfe3b7b08d2d961e88 ] integrity_kernel_read() returns the number of bytes read. If this is a short read then this positive value is returned from ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(). Currently this is only indirectly called from ima_calc_file_hash() and this function only tests for the return value being zero or nonzero and also doesn't forward the return value. Nevertheless there's no point in returning a positive value as an error, so translate a short read into -EINVAL. Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-06-09ima: show rules with IMA_INMASK correctlyRoberto Sassu
commit 8cdc23a3d9ec0944000ad43bad588e36afdc38cd upstream. Show the '^' character when a policy rule has flag IMA_INMASK. Fixes: 80eae209d63ac ("IMA: allow reading back the current IMA policy") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-05-16ima: open a new file instance if no read permissionsGoldwyn Rodrigues
[ Upstream commit a408e4a86b36bf98ad15b9ada531cf0e5118ac67 ] Open a new file instance as opposed to changing file->f_mode when the file is not readable. This is done to accomodate overlayfs stacked file operations change. The real struct file is hidden behind the overlays struct file. So, any file->f_mode manipulations are not reflected on the real struct file. Open the file again in read mode if original file cannot be read, read and calculate the hash. Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (linux-4.19) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
2018-12-01ima: re-initialize iint->atomic_flagsMimi Zohar
commit e2598077dc6a26c9644393e5c21f22a90dbdccdb upstream. Intermittently security.ima is not being written for new files. This patch re-initializes the new slab iint->atomic_flags field before freeing it. Fixes: commit 0d73a55208e9 ("ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lock") Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Aditya Kali <adityakali@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-12-01ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lockDmitry Kasatkin
commit 0d73a55208e94fc9fb6deaeea61438cd3280d4c0 upstream. Before IMA appraisal was introduced, IMA was using own integrity cache lock along with i_mutex. process_measurement and ima_file_free took the iint->mutex first and then the i_mutex, while setxattr, chmod and chown took the locks in reverse order. To resolve the potential deadlock, i_mutex was moved to protect entire IMA functionality and the redundant iint->mutex was eliminated. Solution was based on the assumption that filesystem code does not take i_mutex further. But when file is opened with O_DIRECT flag, direct-io implementation takes i_mutex and produces deadlock. Furthermore, certain other filesystem operations, such as llseek, also take i_mutex. More recently some filesystems have replaced their filesystem specific lock with the global i_rwsem to read a file. As a result, when IMA attempts to calculate the file hash, reading the file attempts to take the i_rwsem again. To resolve O_DIRECT related deadlock problem, this patch re-introduces iint->mutex. But to eliminate the original chmod() related deadlock problem, this patch eliminates the requirement for chmod hooks to take the iint->mutex by introducing additional atomic iint->attr_flags to indicate calling of the hooks. The allowed locking order is to take the iint->mutex first and then the i_rwsem. Original flags were cleared in chmod(), setxattr() or removwxattr() hooks and tested when file was closed or opened again. New atomic flags are set or cleared in those hooks and tested to clear iint->flags on close or on open. Atomic flags are following: * IMA_CHANGE_ATTR - indicates that chATTR() was called (chmod, chown, chgrp) and file attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA to clear iint->flags to re-evaluate policy and perform IMA functions again. * IMA_CHANGE_XATTR - indicates that setxattr or removexattr was called and extended attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA to clear iint->flags IMA_DONE_MASK to re-appraise. * IMA_UPDATE_XATTR - indicates that security.ima needs to be updated. It is cleared if file policy changes and no update is needed. * IMA_DIGSIG - indicates that file security.ima has signature and file security.ima must not update to file has on file close. * IMA_MUST_MEASURE - indicates the file is in the measurement policy. Fixes: Commit 6552321831dc ("xfs: remove i_iolock and use i_rwsem in the VFS inode instead") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Aditya Kali <adityakali@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-12-01EVM: Add support for portable signature formatMatthew Garrett
commit 50b977481fce90aa5fbda55e330b9d722733e358 upstream. The EVM signature includes the inode number and (optionally) the filesystem UUID, making it impractical to ship EVM signatures in packages. This patch adds a new portable format intended to allow distributions to include EVM signatures. It is identical to the existing format but hardcodes the inode and generation numbers to 0 and does not include the filesystem UUID even if the kernel is configured to do so. Removing the inode means that the metadata and signature from one file could be copied to another file without invalidating it. This is avoided by ensuring that an IMA xattr is present during EVM validation. Portable signatures are intended to be immutable - ie, they will never be transformed into HMACs. Based on earlier work by Dmitry Kasatkin and Mikhail Kurinnoi. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Cc: Mikhail Kurinnoi <viewizard@viewizard.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Aditya Kali <adityakali@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-12-01ima: always measure and audit files in policyMimi Zohar
commit f3cc6b25dcc5616f0d5c720009b2ac66f97df2ff upstream. All files matching a "measure" rule must be included in the IMA measurement list, even when the file hash cannot be calculated. Similarly, all files matching an "audit" rule must be audited, even when the file hash can not be calculated. The file data hash field contained in the IMA measurement list template data will contain 0's instead of the actual file hash digest. Note: In general, adding, deleting or in anyway changing which files are included in the IMA measurement list is not a good idea, as it might result in not being able to unseal trusted keys sealed to a specific TPM PCR value. This patch not only adds file measurements that were not previously measured, but specifies that the file hash value for these files will be 0's. As the IMA measurement list ordering is not consistent from one boot to the next, it is unlikely that anyone is sealing keys based on the IMA measurement list. Remote attestation servers should be able to process these new measurement records, but might complain about these unknown records. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Cc: Aditya Kali <adityakali@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-11-13ima: fix showing large 'violations' or 'runtime_measurements_count'Eric Biggers
commit 1e4c8dafbb6bf72fb5eca035b861e39c5896c2b7 upstream. The 12 character temporary buffer is not necessarily long enough to hold a 'long' value. Increase it. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-26evm: Don't deadlock if a crypto algorithm is unavailableMatthew Garrett
[ Upstream commit e2861fa71641c6414831d628a1f4f793b6562580 ] When EVM attempts to appraise a file signed with a crypto algorithm the kernel doesn't have support for, it will cause the kernel to trigger a module load. If the EVM policy includes appraisal of kernel modules this will in turn call back into EVM - since EVM is holding a lock until the crypto initialisation is complete, this triggers a deadlock. Add a CRYPTO_NOLOAD flag and skip module loading if it's set, and add that flag in the EVM case in order to fail gracefully with an error message instead of deadlocking. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-08-03ima: based on policy verify firmware signatures (pre-allocated buffer)Mimi Zohar
[ Upstream commit fd90bc559bfba743ae8de87ff23b92a5e4668062 ] Don't differentiate, for now, between kernel_read_file_id READING_FIRMWARE and READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER enumerations. Fixes: a098ecd firmware: support loading into a pre-allocated buffer (since 4.8) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Stephen Boyd <stephen.boyd@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-05-30ima: Fallback to the builtin hash algorithmPetr Vorel
[ Upstream commit ab60368ab6a452466885ef4edf0cefd089465132 ] IMA requires having it's hash algorithm be compiled-in due to it's early use. The default IMA algorithm is protected by Kconfig to be compiled-in. The ima_hash kernel parameter allows to choose the hash algorithm. When the specified algorithm is not available or available as a module, IMA initialization fails, which leads to a kernel panic (mknodat syscall calls ima_post_path_mknod()). Therefore as fallback we force IMA to use the default builtin Kconfig hash algorithm. Fixed crash: $ grep CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD4 .config CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD4=m [ 0.000000] Command line: BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-4.12.14-2.3-default root=UUID=74ae8202-9ca7-4e39-813b-22287ec52f7a video=1024x768-16 plymouth.ignore-serial-consoles console=ttyS0 console=tty resume=/dev/disk/by-path/pci-0000:00:07.0-part3 splash=silent showopts ima_hash=md4 ... [ 1.545190] ima: Can not allocate md4 (reason: -2) ... [ 2.610120] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 2.611903] IP: ima_match_policy+0x23/0x390 [ 2.612967] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 2.613080] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 2.613080] Modules linked in: autofs4 [ 2.613080] Supported: Yes [ 2.613080] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 4.12.14-2.3-default #1 [ 2.613080] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.0.0-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [ 2.613080] task: ffff88003e2d0040 task.stack: ffffc90000190000 [ 2.613080] RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x23/0x390 [ 2.613080] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000193e88 EFLAGS: 00010296 [ 2.613080] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000000c RCX: 0000000000000004 [ 2.613080] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff880037071728 [ 2.613080] RBP: 0000000000008000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 2.613080] R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 61c8864680b583eb R12: 00005580ff10086f [ 2.613080] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000008000 [ 2.613080] FS: 00007f5c1da08940(0000) GS:ffff88003fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 2.613080] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 2.613080] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000037002000 CR4: 00000000003406f0 [ 2.613080] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 2.613080] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 2.613080] Call Trace: [ 2.613080] ? shmem_mknod+0xbf/0xd0 [ 2.613080] ima_post_path_mknod+0x1c/0x40 [ 2.613080] SyS_mknod+0x210/0x220 [ 2.613080] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5 [ 2.613080] RIP: 0033:0x7f5c1bfde570 [ 2.613080] RSP: 002b:00007ffde1c90dc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000085 [ 2.613080] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f5c1bfde570 [ 2.613080] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000008000 RDI: 00005580ff10086f [ 2.613080] RBP: 00007ffde1c91040 R08: 00005580ff10086f R09: 0000000000000000 [ 2.613080] R10: 0000000000104000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005580ffb99660 [ 2.613080] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000002 [ 2.613080] Code: 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 41 56 44 8d 14 09 41 55 41 54 55 53 44 89 d3 09 cb 48 83 ec 38 48 8b 05 c5 03 29 01 <4c> 8b 20 4c 39 e0 0f 84 d7 01 00 00 4c 89 44 24 08 89 54 24 20 [ 2.613080] RIP: ima_match_policy+0x23/0x390 RSP: ffffc90000193e88 [ 2.613080] CR2: 0000000000000000 [ 2.613080] ---[ end trace 9a9f0a8a73079f6a ]--- [ 2.673052] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000009 [ 2.673052] [ 2.675337] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 2.676405] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000009 Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-05-30ima: Fix Kconfig to select TPM 2.0 CRB interfaceJiandi An
[ Upstream commit fac37c628fd5d68fd7298d9b57ae8601ee1b4723 ] TPM_CRB driver provides TPM CRB 2.0 support. If it is built as a module, the TPM chip is registered after IMA init. tpm_pcr_read() in IMA fails and displays the following message even though eventually there is a TPM chip on the system. ima: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass! (rc=-19) Fix IMA Kconfig to select TPM_CRB so TPM_CRB driver is built in the kernel and initializes before IMA. Signed-off-by: Jiandi An <anjiandi@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-05-30integrity/security: fix digsig.c build error with header fileRandy Dunlap
[ Upstream commit 120f3b11ef88fc38ce1d0ff9c9a4b37860ad3140 ] security/integrity/digsig.c has build errors on some $ARCH due to a missing header file, so add it. security/integrity/digsig.c:146:2: error: implicit declaration of function 'vfree' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration] Reported-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Link: http://kisskb.ellerman.id.au/kisskb/head/13396/ Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-03-19ima: relax requiring a file signature for new files with zero lengthMimi Zohar
[ Upstream commit b7e27bc1d42e8e0cc58b602b529c25cd0071b336 ] Custom policies can require file signatures based on LSM labels. These files are normally created and only afterwards labeled, requiring them to be signed. Instead of requiring file signatures based on LSM labels, entire filesystems could require file signatures. In this case, we need the ability of writing new files without requiring file signatures. The definition of a "new" file was originally defined as any file with a length of zero. Subsequent patches redefined a "new" file to be based on the FILE_CREATE open flag. By combining the open flag with a file size of zero, this patch relaxes the file signature requirement. Fixes: 1ac202e978e1 ima: accept previously set IMA_NEW_FILE Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-03ima/policy: fix parsing of fsuuidMike Rapoport
commit 36447456e1cca853188505f2a964dbbeacfc7a7a upstream. The switch to uuid_t invereted the logic of verfication that &entry->fsuuid is zero during parsing of "fsuuid=" rule. Instead of making sure the &entry->fsuuid field is not attempted to be overwritten, we bail out for perfectly correct rule. Fixes: 787d8c530af7 ("ima/policy: switch to use uuid_t") Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-10ima: fix hash algorithm initializationBoshi Wang
[ Upstream commit ebe7c0a7be92bbd34c6ff5b55810546a0ee05bee ] The hash_setup function always sets the hash_setup_done flag, even when the hash algorithm is invalid. This prevents the default hash algorithm defined as CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH from being used. This patch sets hash_setup_done flag only for valid hash algorithms. Fixes: e7a2ad7eb6f4 "ima: enable support for larger default filedata hash algorithms" Signed-off-by: Boshi Wang <wangboshi@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-24ima: do not update security.ima if appraisal status is not INTEGRITY_PASSRoberto Sassu
commit 020aae3ee58c1af0e7ffc4e2cc9fe4dc630338cb upstream. Commit b65a9cfc2c38 ("Untangling ima mess, part 2: deal with counters") moved the call of ima_file_check() from may_open() to do_filp_open() at a point where the file descriptor is already opened. This breaks the assumption made by IMA that file descriptors being closed belong to files whose access was granted by ima_file_check(). The consequence is that security.ima and security.evm are updated with good values, regardless of the current appraisal status. For example, if a file does not have security.ima, IMA will create it after opening the file for writing, even if access is denied. Access to the file will be allowed afterwards. Avoid this issue by checking the appraisal status before updating security.ima. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-02License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no licenseGreg Kroah-Hartman
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-07-05Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security layer updates from James Morris: - a major update for AppArmor. From JJ: * several bug fixes and cleanups * the patch to add symlink support to securityfs that was floated on the list earlier and the apparmorfs changes that make use of securityfs symlinks * it introduces the domain labeling base code that Ubuntu has been carrying for several years, with several cleanups applied. And it converts the current mediation over to using the domain labeling base, which brings domain stacking support with it. This finally will bring the base upstream code in line with Ubuntu and provide a base to upstream the new feature work that Ubuntu carries. * This does _not_ contain any of the newer apparmor mediation features/controls (mount, signals, network, keys, ...) that Ubuntu is currently carrying, all of which will be RFC'd on top of this. - Notable also is the Infiniband work in SELinux, and the new file:map permission. From Paul: "While we're down to 21 patches for v4.13 (it was 31 for v4.12), the diffstat jumps up tremendously with over 2k of line changes. Almost all of these changes are the SELinux/IB work done by Daniel Jurgens; some other noteworthy changes include a NFS v4.2 labeling fix, a new file:map permission, and reporting of policy capabilities on policy load" There's also now genfscon labeling support for tracefs, which was lost in v4.1 with the separation from debugfs. - Smack incorporates a safer socket check in file_receive, and adds a cap_capable call in privilege check. - TPM as usual has a bunch of fixes and enhancements. - Multiple calls to security_add_hooks() can now be made for the same LSM, to allow LSMs to have hook declarations across multiple files. - IMA now supports different "ima_appraise=" modes (eg. log, fix) from the boot command line. * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (126 commits) apparmor: put back designators in struct initialisers seccomp: Switch from atomic_t to recount_t seccomp: Adjust selftests to avoid double-join seccomp: Clean up core dump logic IMA: update IMA policy documentation to include pcr= option ima: Log the same audit cause whenever a file has no signature ima: Simplify policy_func_show. integrity: Small code improvements ima: fix get_binary_runtime_size() ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse template data ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse measurements headers ima: introduce ima_parse_buf() ima: Add cgroups2 to the defaults list ima: use memdup_user_nul ima: fix up #endif comments IMA: Correct Kconfig dependencies for hash selection ima: define is_ima_appraise_enabled() ima: define Kconfig IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM option ima: define a set of appraisal rules requiring file signatures ima: extend the "ima_policy" boot command line to support multiple policies ...
2017-06-21ima: Log the same audit cause whenever a file has no signatureThiago Jung Bauermann
If the file doesn't have an xattr, ima_appraise_measurement sets cause to "missing-hash" while if there's an xattr but it's a digest instead of a signature it sets cause to "IMA-signature-required". Fix it by setting cause to "IMA-signature-required" in both cases. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-06-21ima: Simplify policy_func_show.Thiago Jung Bauermann
If the func_tokens array uses the same indices as enum ima_hooks, policy_func_show can be a lot simpler, and the func_* enum becomes unnecessary. Also, if we use the same macro trick used by kernel_read_file_id_str we can use one hooks list for both the enum and the string array, making sure they are always in sync (suggested by Mimi Zohar). Finally, by using the printf pattern for the function token directly instead of using the pt macro we can simplify policy_func_show even further and avoid needing a temporary buffer. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-06-21integrity: Small code improvementsThiago Jung Bauermann
These changes are too small to warrant their own patches: The keyid and sig_size members of struct signature_v2_hdr are in BE format, so use a type that makes this assumption explicit. Also, use beXX_to_cpu instead of __beXX_to_cpu to read them. Change integrity_kernel_read to take a void * buffer instead of char * buffer, so that callers don't have to use a cast if they provide a buffer that isn't a char *. Add missing #endif comment in ima.h pointing out which macro it refers to. Add missing fall through comment in ima_appraise.c. Constify mask_tokens and func_tokens arrays. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-06-21ima: fix get_binary_runtime_size()Roberto Sassu
Remove '+ 1' from 'size += strlen(entry->template_desc->name) + 1;', as the template name is sent to userspace without the '\0' character. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-06-21ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse template dataRoberto Sassu
The binary_field_data structure definition has been removed from ima_restore_template_data(). The lengths and data pointers are directly stored into the template_data array of the ima_template_entry structure. For template data, both the number of fields and buffer end checks can be done, as these information are known (respectively from the template descriptor, and from the measurement header field). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-06-21ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse measurements headersRoberto Sassu
The binary_hdr_v1 and binary_data_v1 structures defined in ima_restore_measurement_list() have been replaced with an array of four ima_field_data structures where pcr, digest, template name and template data lengths and pointers are stored. The length of pcr and digest in the ima_field_data array and the bits in the bitmap are set before ima_parse_buf() is called. The ENFORCE_FIELDS bit is set for all entries except the last one (there is still data to parse), and ENFORCE_BUFEND is set only for the last entry. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-06-21ima: introduce ima_parse_buf()Roberto Sassu
ima_parse_buf() takes as input the buffer start and end pointers, and stores the result in a static array of ima_field_data structures, where the len field contains the length parsed from the buffer, and the data field contains the address of the buffer just after the length. Optionally, the function returns the current value of the buffer pointer and the number of array elements written. A bitmap has been added as parameter of ima_parse_buf() to handle the cases where the length is not prepended to data. Each bit corresponds to an element of the ima_field_data array. If a bit is set, the length is not parsed from the buffer, but is read from the corresponding element of the array (the length must be set before calling the function). ima_parse_buf() can perform three checks upon request by callers, depending on the enforce mask passed to it: - ENFORCE_FIELDS: matching of number of fields (length-data combination) - there must be enough data in the buffer to parse the number of fields requested (output: current value of buffer pointer) - ENFORCE_BUFEND: matching of buffer end - the ima_field_data array must be large enough to contain lengths and data pointers for the amount of data requested (output: number of fields written) - ENFORCE_FIELDS | ENFORCE_BUFEND: matching of both Use cases - measurement entry header: ENFORCE_FIELDS | ENFORCE_BUFEND - four fields must be parsed: pcr, digest, template name, template data - ENFORCE_BUFEND is enforced only for the last measurement entry - template digest (Crypto Agile): ENFORCE_BUFEND - since only the total template digest length is known, the function parses length-data combinations until the buffer end is reached - template data: ENFORCE_FIELDS | ENFORCE_BUFEND - since the number of fields and the total template data length are known, the function can perform both checks Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-06-21ima: Add cgroups2 to the defaults listLaura Abbott
cgroups2 is beginning to show up in wider usage. Add it to the default nomeasure/noappraise list like other filesystems. Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-06-21ima: use memdup_user_nulGeliang Tang
Use memdup_user_nul() helper instead of open-coding to simplify the code. Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-06-21ima: fix up #endif commentsTycho Andersen
While reading the code, I noticed that these #endif comments don't match how they're actually nested. This patch fixes that. Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-06-21IMA: Correct Kconfig dependencies for hash selectionBen Hutchings
IMA uses the hash algorithm too early to be able to use a module. Require the selected hash algorithm to be built-in. Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-06-21ima: define is_ima_appraise_enabled()Mimi Zohar
Only return enabled if in enforcing mode, not fix or log modes. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Changes: - Define is_ima_appraise_enabled() as a bool (Thiago Bauermann)
2017-06-21ima: define Kconfig IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM optionMimi Zohar
Permit enabling the different "ima_appraise=" modes (eg. log, fix) from the boot command line. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-06-21ima: define a set of appraisal rules requiring file signaturesMimi Zohar
The builtin "ima_appraise_tcb" policy should require file signatures for at least a few of the hooks (eg. kernel modules, firmware, and the kexec kernel image), but changing it would break the existing userspace/kernel ABI. This patch defines a new builtin policy named "secure_boot", which can be specified on the "ima_policy=" boot command line, independently or in conjunction with the "ima_appraise_tcb" policy, by specifing ima_policy="appraise_tcb | secure_boot". The new appraisal rules requiring file signatures will be added prior to the "ima_appraise_tcb" rules. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Changelog: - Reference secure boot in the new builtin policy name. (Thiago Bauermann)
2017-06-21ima: extend the "ima_policy" boot command line to support multiple policiesMimi Zohar
Add support for providing multiple builtin policies on the "ima_policy=" boot command line. Use "|" as the delimitor separating the policy names. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-06-05fs: switch ->s_uuid to uuid_tChristoph Hellwig
For some file systems we still memcpy into it, but in various places this already allows us to use the proper uuid helpers. More to come.. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (Changes to IMA/EVM) Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
2017-06-05ima/policy: switch to use uuid_tChristoph Hellwig
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
2017-06-05block: remove blk_part_pack_uuidChristoph Hellwig
This helper was only used by IMA of all things, which would get spurious errors if CONFIG_BLOCK is disabled. Just opencode the call there. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
2017-04-19Merge branch 'next' of ↵James Morris
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into next
2017-04-04KEYS: Use structure to capture key restriction function and dataMat Martineau
Replace struct key's restrict_link function pointer with a pointer to the new struct key_restriction. The structure contains pointers to the restriction function as well as relevant data for evaluating the restriction. The garbage collector checks restrict_link->keytype when key types are unregistered. Restrictions involving a removed key type are converted to use restrict_link_reject so that restrictions cannot be removed by unregistering key types. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
2017-03-13ima: provide ">" and "<" operators for fowner/uid/euid rules.Mikhail Kurinnoi
For now we have only "=" operator for fowner/uid/euid rules. This patch provide two more operators - ">" and "<" in order to make fowner/uid/euid rules more flexible. Examples of usage. Appraise all files owned by special and system users (SYS_UID_MAX 999): appraise fowner<1000 Don't appraise files owned by normal users (UID_MIN 1000): dont_appraise fowner>999 Appraise all files owned by users with UID 1000-1010: dont_appraise fowner>1010 appraise fowner>999 Changelog v3: - Removed code duplication in ima_parse_rule(). - Fix ima_policy_show() - (Mimi) Changelog v2: - Fixed default policy rules. Signed-off-by: Mikhail Kurinnoi <viewizard@viewizard.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 115 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 87 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
2017-03-07ima: accept previously set IMA_NEW_FILEDaniel Glöckner
Modifying the attributes of a file makes ima_inode_post_setattr reset the IMA cache flags. So if the file, which has just been created, is opened a second time before the first file descriptor is closed, verification fails since the security.ima xattr has not been written yet. We therefore have to look at the IMA_NEW_FILE even if the file already existed. With this patch there should no longer be an error when cat tries to open testfile: $ rm -f testfile $ ( echo test >&3 ; touch testfile ; cat testfile ) 3>testfile A file being new is no reason to accept that it is missing a digital signature demanded by the policy. Signed-off-by: Daniel Glöckner <dg@emlix.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-03-06integrity: mark default IMA rules as __ro_after_initJames Morris
The default IMA rules are loaded during init and then do not change, so mark them as __ro_after_init. Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-03-02sched/headers: Prepare to remove the <linux/magic.h> include from ↵Ingo Molnar
<linux/sched/task_stack.h> Update files that depend on the magic.h inclusion. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-27ima: allow to check MAY_APPENDLans Zhang
Otherwise some mask and inmask tokens with MAY_APPEND flag may not work as expected. Signed-off-by: Lans Zhang <jia.zhang@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2017-01-27ima: fix ima_d_path() possible race with renameMimi Zohar
On failure to return a pathname from ima_d_path(), a pointer to dname is returned, which is subsequently used in the IMA measurement list, the IMA audit records, and other audit logging. Saving the pointer to dname for later use has the potential to race with rename. Intead of returning a pointer to dname on failure, this patch returns a pointer to a copy of the filename. Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2016-12-20ima: platform-independent hash valueAndreas Steffen
For remote attestion it is important for the ima measurement values to be platform-independent. Therefore integer fields to be hashed must be converted to canonical format. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1480554346-29071-11-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Andreas Steffen <andreas.steffen@strongswan.org> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Sklar <sklar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-12-20ima: define a canonical binary_runtime_measurements list formatMimi Zohar
The IMA binary_runtime_measurements list is currently in platform native format. To allow restoring a measurement list carried across kexec with a different endianness than the targeted kernel, this patch defines little-endian as the canonical format. For big endian systems wanting to save/restore the measurement list from a system with a different endianness, a new boot command line parameter named "ima_canonical_fmt" is defined. Considerations: use of the "ima_canonical_fmt" boot command line option will break existing userspace applications on big endian systems expecting the binary_runtime_measurements list to be in platform native format. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1480554346-29071-10-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Andreas Steffen <andreas.steffen@strongswan.org> Cc: Josh Sklar <sklar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-12-20ima: support restoring multiple template formatsMimi Zohar
The configured IMA measurement list template format can be replaced at runtime on the boot command line, including a custom template format. This patch adds support for restoring a measuremement list containing multiple builtin/custom template formats. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1480554346-29071-9-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Andreas Steffen <andreas.steffen@strongswan.org> Cc: Josh Sklar <sklar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-12-20ima: store the builtin/custom template definitions in a listMimi Zohar
The builtin and single custom templates are currently stored in an array. In preparation for being able to restore a measurement list containing multiple builtin/custom templates, this patch stores the builtin and custom templates as a linked list. This will permit defining more than one custom template per boot. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1480554346-29071-8-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Andreas Steffen <andreas.steffen@strongswan.org> Cc: Josh Sklar <sklar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-12-20ima: on soft reboot, save the measurement listMimi Zohar
The TPM PCRs are only reset on a hard reboot. In order to validate a TPM's quote after a soft reboot (eg. kexec -e), the IMA measurement list of the running kernel must be saved and restored on boot. This patch uses the kexec buffer passing mechanism to pass the serialized IMA binary_runtime_measurements to the next kernel. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1480554346-29071-7-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> Cc: Andreas Steffen <andreas.steffen@strongswan.org> Cc: Josh Sklar <sklar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Stewart Smith <stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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