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commit 27d6379894be4a81984da4d48002196a83939ca9 upstream.
Fix an incorrect error check that returns 1 for error instead of the
expected error code.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 0da9dfdd2cd9889201bc6f6f43580c99165cd087 upstream.
This fixes CVE-2013-1792.
There is a race in install_user_keyrings() that can cause a NULL pointer
dereference when called concurrently for the same user if the uid and
uid-session keyrings are not yet created. It might be possible for an
unprivileged user to trigger this by calling keyctl() from userspace in
parallel immediately after logging in.
Assume that we have two threads both executing lookup_user_key(), both
looking for KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING.
THREAD A THREAD B
=============================== ===============================
==>call install_user_keyrings();
if (!cred->user->session_keyring)
==>call install_user_keyrings()
...
user->uid_keyring = uid_keyring;
if (user->uid_keyring)
return 0;
<==
key = cred->user->session_keyring [== NULL]
user->session_keyring = session_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage); [oops]
At the point thread A dereferences cred->user->session_keyring, thread B
hasn't updated user->session_keyring yet, but thread A assumes it is
populated because install_user_keyrings() returned ok.
The race window is really small but can be exploited if, for example,
thread B is interrupted or preempted after initializing uid_keyring, but
before doing setting session_keyring.
This couldn't be reproduced on a stock kernel. However, after placing
systemtap probe on 'user->session_keyring = session_keyring;' that
introduced some delay, the kernel could be crashed reliably.
Fix this by checking both pointers before deciding whether to return.
Alternatively, the test could be done away with entirely as it is checked
inside the mutex - but since the mutex is global, that may not be the best
way.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 9f35a33b8d06263a165efe3541d9aa0cdbd70b3b upstream.
Fix a NULL pointer deref in the user-defined key type whereby updating a
negative key into a fully instantiated key will cause an oops to occur
when the code attempts to free the non-existent old payload.
This results in an oops that looks something like the following:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008
IP: [<ffffffff81085fa1>] __call_rcu+0x11/0x13e
PGD 3391d067 PUD 3894a067 PMD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
CPU 1
Pid: 4354, comm: keyctl Not tainted 3.1.0-fsdevel+ #1140 /DG965RY
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81085fa1>] [<ffffffff81085fa1>] __call_rcu+0x11/0x13e
RSP: 0018:ffff88003d591df8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000000000006e
RDX: ffffffff8161d0c0 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff88003d591e18 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff8152fa6c
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000300 R12: ffff88003b8f9538
R13: ffffffff8161d0c0 R14: ffff88003b8f9d50 R15: ffff88003c69f908
FS: 00007f97eb18c720(0000) GS:ffff88003bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000003d47a000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process keyctl (pid: 4354, threadinfo ffff88003d590000, task ffff88003c78a040)
Stack:
ffff88003e0ffde0 ffff88003b8f9538 0000000000000001 ffff88003b8f9d50
ffff88003d591e28 ffffffff810860f0 ffff88003d591e68 ffffffff8117bfea
ffff88003d591e68 ffffffff00000000 ffff88003e0ffde1 ffff88003e0ffde0
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810860f0>] call_rcu_sched+0x10/0x12
[<ffffffff8117bfea>] user_update+0x8d/0xa2
[<ffffffff8117723a>] key_create_or_update+0x236/0x270
[<ffffffff811789b1>] sys_add_key+0x123/0x17e
[<ffffffff813b84bb>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[PG: pre-3.0 kernels dont have kfree_rcu, so tweak accordingly]
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit d52fc5dde171f030170a6cb78034d166b13c9445 upstream.
If a process increases permissions using fcaps all of the dangerous
personality flags which are cleared for suid apps should also be cleared.
Thus programs given priviledge with fcaps will continue to have address space
randomization enabled even if the parent tried to disable it to make it
easier to attack.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 51b79bee627d526199b2f6a6bef8ee0c0739b6d1 upstream.
Add missing "personality.h"
security/commoncap.c: In function 'cap_bprm_set_creds':
security/commoncap.c:510: error: 'PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID' undeclared (first use in this function)
security/commoncap.c:510: error: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once
security/commoncap.c:510: error: for each function it appears in.)
Signed-off-by: Jonghwan Choi <jhbird.choi@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 2edeaa34a6e3f2c43b667f6c4f7b27944b811695 upstream.
In cred_alloc_blank() since 2.6.32, abort_creds(new) is called with
new->security == NULL and new->magic == 0 when security_cred_alloc_blank()
returns an error. As a result, BUG() will be triggered if SELinux is enabled
or CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS=y.
If CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS=y, BUG() is called from __invalid_creds() because
cred->magic == 0. Failing that, BUG() is called from selinux_cred_free()
because selinux_cred_free() is not expecting cred->security == NULL. This does
not affect smack_cred_free(), tomoyo_cred_free() or apparmor_cred_free().
Fix these bugs by
(1) Set new->magic before calling security_cred_alloc_blank().
(2) Handle null cred->security in creds_are_invalid() and selinux_cred_free().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 415103f9932d45f7927f4b17e3a9a13834cdb9a1 upstream.
selinux_inode_init_security computes transitions sids even for filesystems
that use mount point labeling. It shouldn't do that. It should just use
the mount point label always and no matter what.
This causes 2 problems. 1) it makes file creation slower than it needs to be
since we calculate the transition sid and 2) it allows files to be created
with a different label than the mount point!
# id -Z
staff_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
# sesearch --type --class file --source sysadm_t --target tmp_t
Found 1 semantic te rules:
type_transition sysadm_t tmp_t : file user_tmp_t;
# mount -o loop,context="system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0" /tmp/fs /mnt/tmp
# ls -lZ /mnt/tmp
drwx------. root root system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 lost+found
# touch /mnt/tmp/file1
# ls -lZ /mnt/tmp
-rw-r--r--. root root staff_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 file1
drwx------. root root system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 lost+found
Whoops, we have a mount point labeled filesystem tmp_t with a user_tmp_t
labeled file!
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 350e4f31e0eaf56dfc3b328d24a11bdf42a41fb8 upstream.
Commit 2f90b865 added two new netlink message types to the netlink route
socket. SELinux has hooks to define if netlink messages are allowed to
be sent or received, but it did not know about these two new message
types. By default we allow such actions so noone likely noticed. This
patch adds the proper definitions and thus proper permissions
enforcement.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 867c20265459d30a01b021a9c1e81fb4c5832aa9 upstream.
If security_filter_rule_init() doesn't return a rule, then not everything
is as fine as the return code implies.
This bug only occurs when the LSM (eg. SELinux) is disabled at runtime.
Adding an empty LSM rule causes ima_match_rules() to always succeed,
ignoring any remaining rules.
default IMA TCB policy:
# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0
# SYSFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572
# DEBUGFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
# TMPFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
< LSM specific rule >
dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t
measure func=BPRM_CHECK
measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
Thus without the patch, with the boot parameters 'tcb selinux=0', adding
the above 'dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t' rule to the default IMA TCB
measurement policy, would result in nothing being measured. The patch
prevents the default TCB policy from being replaced.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 3d96406c7da1ed5811ea52a3b0905f4f0e295376 upstream.
Fix a bug in keyctl_session_to_parent() whereby it tries to check the ownership
of the parent process's session keyring whether or not the parent has a session
keyring [CVE-2010-2960].
This results in the following oops:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000a0
IP: [<ffffffff811ae4dd>] keyctl_session_to_parent+0x251/0x443
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff811ae2f3>] ? keyctl_session_to_parent+0x67/0x443
[<ffffffff8109d286>] ? __do_fault+0x24b/0x3d0
[<ffffffff811af98c>] sys_keyctl+0xb4/0xb8
[<ffffffff81001eab>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
if the parent process has no session keyring.
If the system is using pam_keyinit then it mostly protected against this as all
processes derived from a login will have inherited the session keyring created
by pam_keyinit during the log in procedure.
To test this, pam_keyinit calls need to be commented out in /etc/pam.d/.
Reported-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@cmpxchg8b.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@cmpxchg8b.com>
Cc: dann frazier <dannf@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 9d1ac65a9698513d00e5608d93fca0c53f536c14 upstream.
There's an protected access to the parent process's credentials in the middle
of keyctl_session_to_parent(). This results in the following RCU warning:
===================================================
[ INFO: suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage. ]
---------------------------------------------------
security/keys/keyctl.c:1291 invoked rcu_dereference_check() without protection!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0
1 lock held by keyctl-session-/2137:
#0: (tasklist_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff811ae2ec>] keyctl_session_to_parent+0x60/0x236
stack backtrace:
Pid: 2137, comm: keyctl-session- Not tainted 2.6.36-rc2-cachefs+ #1
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8105606a>] lockdep_rcu_dereference+0xaa/0xb3
[<ffffffff811ae379>] keyctl_session_to_parent+0xed/0x236
[<ffffffff811af77e>] sys_keyctl+0xb4/0xb6
[<ffffffff81001eab>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
The code should take the RCU read lock to make sure the parents credentials
don't go away, even though it's holding a spinlock and has IRQ disabled.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 4d09ec0f705cf88a12add029c058b53f288cfaa2 upstream.
We were using the wrong variable here so the error codes weren't being returned
properly. The original code returns -ENOKEY.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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Redirecting directly to lsm, here's the patch discussed on lkml:
http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/4/22/219
The mmap_min_addr value is useful information for an admin to see without
being root ("is my system vulnerable to kernel NULL pointer attacks?") and
its setting is trivially easy for an attacker to determine by calling
mmap() in PAGE_SIZE increments starting at 0, so trying to keep it private
has no value.
Only require CAP_SYS_RAWIO if changing the value, not reading it.
Comment from Serge :
Me, I like to write my passwords with light blue pen on dark blue
paper, pasted on my window - if you're going to get my password, you're
gonna get a headache.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
(cherry picked from commit 822cceec7248013821d655545ea45d1c6a9d15b3)
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call_sbin_request_key() creates a keyring and then attempts to insert a link to
the authorisation key into that keyring, but does so without holding a write
lock on the keyring semaphore.
It will normally get away with this because it hasn't told anyone that the
keyring exists yet. The new keyring, however, has had its serial number
published, which means it can be accessed directly by that handle.
This was found by a previous patch that adds RCU lockdep checks to the code
that reads the keyring payload pointer, which includes a check that the keyring
semaphore is actually locked.
Without this patch, the following command:
keyctl request2 user b a @s
will provoke the following lockdep warning is displayed in dmesg:
===================================================
[ INFO: suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage. ]
---------------------------------------------------
security/keys/keyring.c:727 invoked rcu_dereference_check() without protection!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0
2 locks held by keyctl/2076:
#0: (key_types_sem){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff811a5b29>] key_type_lookup+0x1c/0x71
#1: (keyring_serialise_link_sem){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff811a6d1e>] __key_link+0x4d/0x3c5
stack backtrace:
Pid: 2076, comm: keyctl Not tainted 2.6.34-rc6-cachefs #54
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81051fdc>] lockdep_rcu_dereference+0xaa/0xb2
[<ffffffff811a6d1e>] ? __key_link+0x4d/0x3c5
[<ffffffff811a6e6f>] __key_link+0x19e/0x3c5
[<ffffffff811a5952>] ? __key_instantiate_and_link+0xb1/0xdc
[<ffffffff811a59bf>] ? key_instantiate_and_link+0x42/0x5f
[<ffffffff811aa0dc>] call_sbin_request_key+0xe7/0x33b
[<ffffffff8139376a>] ? mutex_unlock+0x9/0xb
[<ffffffff811a5952>] ? __key_instantiate_and_link+0xb1/0xdc
[<ffffffff811a59bf>] ? key_instantiate_and_link+0x42/0x5f
[<ffffffff811aa6fa>] ? request_key_auth_new+0x1c2/0x23c
[<ffffffff810aaf15>] ? cache_alloc_debugcheck_after+0x108/0x173
[<ffffffff811a9d00>] ? request_key_and_link+0x146/0x300
[<ffffffff810ac568>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xe1/0x118
[<ffffffff811a9e45>] request_key_and_link+0x28b/0x300
[<ffffffff811a89ac>] sys_request_key+0xf7/0x14a
[<ffffffff81052c0b>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x10c/0x130
[<ffffffff81394fb9>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
[<ffffffff81001eeb>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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The keyring key type code should use RCU dereference wrappers, even when it
holds the keyring's key semaphore.
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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find_keyring_by_name() can gain access to a keyring that has had its reference
count reduced to zero, and is thus ready to be freed. This then allows the
dead keyring to be brought back into use whilst it is being destroyed.
The following timeline illustrates the process:
|(cleaner) (user)
|
| free_user(user) sys_keyctl()
| | |
| key_put(user->session_keyring) keyctl_get_keyring_ID()
| || //=> keyring->usage = 0 |
| |schedule_work(&key_cleanup_task) lookup_user_key()
| || |
| kmem_cache_free(,user) |
| . |[KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING]
| . install_user_keyrings()
| . ||
| key_cleanup() [<= worker_thread()] ||
| | ||
| [spin_lock(&key_serial_lock)] |[mutex_lock(&key_user_keyr..mutex)]
| | ||
| atomic_read() == 0 ||
| |{ rb_ease(&key->serial_node,) } ||
| | ||
| [spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock)] |find_keyring_by_name()
| | |||
| keyring_destroy(keyring) ||[read_lock(&keyring_name_lock)]
| || |||
| |[write_lock(&keyring_name_lock)] ||atomic_inc(&keyring->usage)
| |. ||| *** GET freeing keyring ***
| |. ||[read_unlock(&keyring_name_lock)]
| || ||
| |list_del() |[mutex_unlock(&key_user_k..mutex)]
| || |
| |[write_unlock(&keyring_name_lock)] ** INVALID keyring is returned **
| | .
| kmem_cache_free(,keyring) .
| .
| atomic_dec(&keyring->usage)
v *** DESTROYED ***
TIME
If CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG=y then we may see the following message generated:
=============================================================================
BUG key_jar: Poison overwritten
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
INFO: 0xffff880197a7e200-0xffff880197a7e200. First byte 0x6a instead of 0x6b
INFO: Allocated in key_alloc+0x10b/0x35f age=25 cpu=1 pid=5086
INFO: Freed in key_cleanup+0xd0/0xd5 age=12 cpu=1 pid=10
INFO: Slab 0xffffea000592cb90 objects=16 used=2 fp=0xffff880197a7e200 flags=0x200000000000c3
INFO: Object 0xffff880197a7e200 @offset=512 fp=0xffff880197a7e300
Bytes b4 0xffff880197a7e1f0: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ
Object 0xffff880197a7e200: 6a 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b jkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
Alternatively, we may see a system panic happen, such as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffff810e61a3>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x5b/0xe9
PGD 6b2b4067 PUD 6a80d067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file: /sys/kernel/kexec_crash_loaded
CPU 1
...
Pid: 31245, comm: su Not tainted 2.6.34-rc5-nofixed-nodebug #2 D2089/PRIMERGY
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810e61a3>] [<ffffffff810e61a3>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x5b/0xe9
RSP: 0018:ffff88006af3bd98 EFLAGS: 00010002
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffff88007d19900b
RDX: 0000000100000000 RSI: 00000000000080d0 RDI: ffffffff81828430
RBP: ffffffff81828430 R08: ffff88000a293750 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000100000 R12: 00000000000080d0
R13: 00000000000080d0 R14: 0000000000000296 R15: ffffffff810f20ce
FS: 00007f97116bc700(0000) GS:ffff88000a280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000001 CR3: 000000006a91c000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process su (pid: 31245, threadinfo ffff88006af3a000, task ffff8800374414c0)
Stack:
0000000512e0958e 0000000000008000 ffff880037f8d180 0000000000000001
0000000000000000 0000000000008001 ffff88007d199000 ffffffff810f20ce
0000000000008000 ffff88006af3be48 0000000000000024 ffffffff810face3
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810f20ce>] ? get_empty_filp+0x70/0x12f
[<ffffffff810face3>] ? do_filp_open+0x145/0x590
[<ffffffff810ce208>] ? tlb_finish_mmu+0x2a/0x33
[<ffffffff810ce43c>] ? unmap_region+0xd3/0xe2
[<ffffffff810e4393>] ? virt_to_head_page+0x9/0x2d
[<ffffffff81103916>] ? alloc_fd+0x69/0x10e
[<ffffffff810ef4ed>] ? do_sys_open+0x56/0xfc
[<ffffffff81008a02>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Code: 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 c6 fa 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 65 4c 8b 04 25 60 e8 00 00 48 8b 45 00 49 01 c0 49 8b 18 48 85 db 74 0d 48 63 45 18 <48> 8b 04 03 49 89 00 eb 14 4c 89 f9 83 ca ff 44 89 e6 48 89 ef
RIP [<ffffffff810e61a3>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x5b/0xe9
This problem is that find_keyring_by_name does not confirm that the keyring is
valid before accepting it.
Skipping keyrings that have been reduced to a zero count seems the way to go.
To this end, use atomic_inc_not_zero() to increment the usage count and skip
the candidate keyring if that returns false.
The following script _may_ cause the bug to happen, but there's no guarantee
as the window of opportunity is small:
#!/bin/sh
LOOP=100000
USER=dummy_user
/bin/su -c "exit;" $USER || { /usr/sbin/adduser -m $USER; add=1; }
for ((i=0; i<LOOP; i++))
do
/bin/su -c "echo '$i' > /dev/null" $USER
done
(( add == 1 )) && /usr/sbin/userdel -r $USER
exit
Note that the nominated user must not be in use.
An alternative way of testing this may be:
for ((i=0; i<100000; i++))
do
keyctl session foo /bin/true || break
done >&/dev/null
as that uses a keyring named "foo" rather than relying on the user and
user-session named keyrings.
Reported-by: Toshiyuki Okajima <toshi.okajima@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Toshiyuki Okajima <toshi.okajima@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
key_gc_keyring() needs to either hold the RCU read lock or hold the keyring
semaphore if it's going to scan the keyring's list. Given that it only needs
to read the key list, and it's doing so under a spinlock, the RCU read lock is
the thing to use.
Furthermore, the RCU check added in e7b0a61b7929632d36cf052d9e2820ef0a9c1bfe is
incorrect as holding the spinlock on key_serial_lock is not grounds for
assuming a keyring's pointer list can be read safely. Instead, a simple
rcu_dereference() inside of the previously mentioned RCU read lock is what we
want.
Reported-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
Fix an RCU warning in the reading of user keys:
===================================================
[ INFO: suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage. ]
---------------------------------------------------
security/keys/user_defined.c:202 invoked rcu_dereference_check() without protection!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0
1 lock held by keyctl/3637:
#0: (&key->sem){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffff811a80ae>] keyctl_read_key+0x9c/0xcf
stack backtrace:
Pid: 3637, comm: keyctl Not tainted 2.6.34-rc5-cachefs #18
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81051f6c>] lockdep_rcu_dereference+0xaa/0xb2
[<ffffffff811aa55f>] user_read+0x47/0x91
[<ffffffff811a80be>] keyctl_read_key+0xac/0xcf
[<ffffffff811a8a06>] sys_keyctl+0x75/0xb7
[<ffffffff81001eeb>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6:
keys: don't need to use RCU in keyring_read() as semaphore is held
|
|
The request_key() system call and request_key_and_link() should make a
link from an existing key to the destination keyring (if supplied), not
just from a new key to the destination keyring.
This can be tested by:
ring=`keyctl newring fred @s`
keyctl request2 user debug:a a
keyctl request user debug:a $ring
keyctl list $ring
If it says:
keyring is empty
then it didn't work. If it shows something like:
1 key in keyring:
1070462727: --alswrv 0 0 user: debug:a
then it did.
request_key() system call is meant to recursively search all your keyrings for
the key you desire, and, optionally, if it doesn't exist, call out to userspace
to create one for you.
If request_key() finds or creates a key, it should, optionally, create a link
to that key from the destination keyring specified.
Therefore, if, after a successful call to request_key() with a desination
keyring specified, you see the destination keyring empty, the code didn't work
correctly.
If you see the found key in the keyring, then it did - which is what the patch
is required for.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
keyring_read() doesn't need to use rcu_dereference() to access the keyring
payload as the caller holds the key semaphore to prevent modifications
from happening whilst the data is read out.
This should solve the following warning:
===================================================
[ INFO: suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage. ]
---------------------------------------------------
security/keys/keyring.c:204 invoked rcu_dereference_check() without protection!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0
1 lock held by keyctl/2144:
#0: (&key->sem){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffff81177f7c>] keyctl_read_key+0x9c/0xcf
stack backtrace:
Pid: 2144, comm: keyctl Not tainted 2.6.34-rc2-cachefs #113
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8105121f>] lockdep_rcu_dereference+0xaa/0xb2
[<ffffffff811762d5>] keyring_read+0x4d/0xe7
[<ffffffff81177f8c>] keyctl_read_key+0xac/0xcf
[<ffffffff811788d4>] sys_keyctl+0x75/0xb9
[<ffffffff81001eeb>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
Fix the following RCU warning:
===================================================
[ INFO: suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage. ]
---------------------------------------------------
security/keys/request_key.c:116 invoked rcu_dereference_check() without protection!
This was caused by doing:
[root@andromeda ~]# keyctl newring fred @s
539196288
[root@andromeda ~]# keyctl request2 user a a 539196288
request_key: Required key not available
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
There is a typo here. We should be testing "*dentry" instead of
"dentry". If "*dentry" is an ERR_PTR, it gets dereferenced in either
mkdir() or create() which would cause an OOPs.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
Reduce MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS so that the avtab allocation is an order 2
allocation rather than an order 4 allocation on x86_64. This
addresses reports of page allocation failures:
http://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=126757230625867&w=2
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=570433
Reported-by: Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
|
|
The original code returns a freed pointer. This function is expected to
return NULL on errors.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
Conflicts:
Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
arch/arm/mach-u300/include/mach/debug-macro.S
drivers/net/qlge/qlge_ethtool.c
drivers/net/qlge/qlge_main.c
drivers/net/typhoon.c
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: (52 commits)
init: Open /dev/console from rootfs
mqueue: fix typo "failues" -> "failures"
mqueue: only set error codes if they are really necessary
mqueue: simplify do_open() error handling
mqueue: apply mathematics distributivity on mq_bytes calculation
mqueue: remove unneeded info->messages initialization
mqueue: fix mq_open() file descriptor leak on user-space processes
fix race in d_splice_alias()
set S_DEAD on unlink() and non-directory rename() victims
vfs: add NOFOLLOW flag to umount(2)
get rid of ->mnt_parent in tomoyo/realpath
hppfs can use existing proc_mnt, no need for do_kern_mount() in there
Mirror MS_KERNMOUNT in ->mnt_flags
get rid of useless vfsmount_lock use in put_mnt_ns()
Take vfsmount_lock to fs/internal.h
get rid of insanity with namespace roots in tomoyo
take check for new events in namespace (guts of mounts_poll()) to namespace.c
Don't mess with generic_permission() under ->d_lock in hpfs
sanitize const/signedness for udf
nilfs: sanitize const/signedness in dealing with ->d_name.name
...
Fix up fairly trivial (famous last words...) conflicts in
drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c and security/tomoyo/realpath.c
|
|
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
passing *any* namespace root to __d_path() as root is equivalent
to just passing it {NULL, NULL}; no need to bother with finding
the root of our namespace in there.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
(mnt,mnt_mountpoint) pair is conceptually wrong; if you want
to use it for generating pathname and for nothing else *and*
if you know that vfsmount tree is unchanging, you can get
away with that, but the right solution for that is (mnt,mnt_root).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'core-rcu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: (44 commits)
rcu: Fix accelerated GPs for last non-dynticked CPU
rcu: Make non-RCU_PROVE_LOCKING rcu_read_lock_sched_held() understand boot
rcu: Fix accelerated grace periods for last non-dynticked CPU
rcu: Export rcu_scheduler_active
rcu: Make rcu_read_lock_sched_held() take boot time into account
rcu: Make lockdep_rcu_dereference() message less alarmist
sched, cgroups: Fix module export
rcu: Add RCU_CPU_STALL_VERBOSE to dump detailed per-task information
rcu: Fix rcutorture mod_timer argument to delay one jiffy
rcu: Fix deadlock in TREE_PREEMPT_RCU CPU stall detection
rcu: Convert to raw_spinlocks
rcu: Stop overflowing signed integers
rcu: Use canonical URL for Mathieu's dissertation
rcu: Accelerate grace period if last non-dynticked CPU
rcu: Fix citation of Mathieu's dissertation
rcu: Documentation update for CONFIG_PROVE_RCU
security: Apply lockdep-based checking to rcu_dereference() uses
idr: Apply lockdep-based diagnostics to rcu_dereference() uses
radix-tree: Disable RCU lockdep checking in radix tree
vfs: Abstract rcu_dereference_check for files-fdtable use
...
|
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Make selinux_kernel_create_files_as() return an error when it gets one, rather
than unconditionally returning 0.
Without this, cachefiles doesn't return an error if the SELinux policy doesn't
let it create files with the label of the directory at the base of the cache.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
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Holding tasklist_lock is no longer sufficient for find_task_by_vpid().
Explicit rcu_read_lock() is required.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
--
security/tomoyo/common.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
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Apply lockdep-ified RCU primitives to key_gc_keyring() and
keyring_destroy().
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: laijs@cn.fujitsu.com
Cc: dipankar@in.ibm.com
Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@polymtl.ca
Cc: josh@joshtriplett.org
Cc: dvhltc@us.ibm.com
Cc: niv@us.ibm.com
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com
LKML-Reference: <1266887105-1528-12-git-send-email-paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
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This fixes corrupted CIPSO packets when SELinux categories greater than 127
are used. The bug occured on the second (and later) loops through the
while; the inner for loop through the ebitmap->maps array used the same
index as the NetLabel catmap->bitmap array, even though the NetLabel bitmap
is twice as long as the SELinux bitmap.
Signed-off-by: Joshua Roys <joshua.roys@gtri.gatech.edu>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
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If radix_tree_preload is failed in ima_inode_alloc, we don't need
radix_tree_preload_end because kernel is alread preempt enabled
Signed-off-by: Xiaotian Feng <dfeng@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
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Enhance the security framework to support resetting the active security
module. This eliminates the need for direct use of the security_ops and
default_security_ops variables outside of security.c, so make security_ops
and default_security_ops static. Also remove the secondary_ops variable as
a cleanup since there is no use for that. secondary_ops was originally used by
SELinux to call the "secondary" security module (capability or dummy),
but that was replaced by direct calls to capability and the only
remaining use is to save and restore the original security ops pointer
value if SELinux is disabled by early userspace based on /etc/selinux/config.
Further, if we support this directly in the security framework, then we can
just use &default_security_ops for this purpose since that is now available.
Signed-off-by: Zhitong Wang <zhitong.wangzt@alibaba-inc.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
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This patch revert the commit of 7d52a155e38d5a165759dbbee656455861bf7801
which removed a part of type_attribute_bounds_av as a dead code.
However, at that time, we didn't find out the target side boundary allows
to handle some of pseudo /proc/<pid>/* entries with its process's security
context well.
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
--
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
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__func__ is used for only debug printk(). We can remove it.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
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Fix a couple of sparse warnings for callers of
context_struct_to_string, which takes a *u32, not an *int.
These cases are harmless as the values are not used.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
|
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tomoyo_path_perm() tomoyo_path2_perm() and tomoyo_check_rewrite_permission()
always receive tomoyo_domain(). We can move it from caller to callee.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
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Use shorter name to reduce newlines needed for 80 columns limit.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
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Use enum to declare index numbers.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
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This patch adds garbage collector support to TOMOYO.
Elements are protected by "struct srcu_struct tomoyo_ss".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
Add refcounter to "struct tomoyo_domain_info" since garbage collector needs to
determine whether this struct is referred by "struct cred"->security or not.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
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Gather structures and constants scattered around security/tomoyo/ directory.
This is for preparation for adding garbage collector since garbage collector
needs to know structures and constants which TOMOYO uses.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
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Add refcounter to "struct tomoyo_name_entry" and replace tomoyo_save_name()
with tomoyo_get_name()/tomoyo_put_name() pair so that we can kfree() when
garbage collector is added.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
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Since the codes for adding an entry and removing an entry are similar, we can
save some lines by using "if (is_delete) { ... } else { ... }" branches.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
