From af6ce92977a25540e5d6e0cf90ca187178b0ff9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Date: Mon, 2 Jul 2018 12:29:30 +0200 Subject: x86/KVM/VMX: Add module argument for L1TF mitigation commit a399477e52c17e148746d3ce9a483f681c2aa9a0 upstream Add a mitigation mode parameter "vmentry_l1d_flush" for CVE-2018-3620, aka L1 terminal fault. The valid arguments are: - "always" L1D cache flush on every VMENTER. - "cond" Conditional L1D cache flush, explained below - "never" Disable the L1D cache flush mitigation "cond" is trying to avoid L1D cache flushes on VMENTER if the code executed between VMEXIT and VMENTER is considered safe, i.e. is not bringing any interesting information into L1D which might exploited. [ tglx: Split out from a larger patch ] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) (limited to 'Documentation') diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt index be17577f57d3..d76cb9c8fbb0 100644 --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -2016,6 +2016,18 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. (virtualized real and unpaged mode) on capable Intel chips. Default is 1 (enabled) + kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush=[KVM,Intel] Mitigation for L1 Terminal Fault + CVE-2018-3620. + + Valid arguments: never, cond, always + + always: L1D cache flush on every VMENTER. + cond: Flush L1D on VMENTER only when the code between + VMEXIT and VMENTER can leak host memory. + never: Disables the mitigation + + Default is cond (do L1 cache flush in specific instances) + kvm-intel.vpid= [KVM,Intel] Disable Virtual Processor Identification feature (tagged TLBs) on capable Intel chips. Default is 1 (enabled) -- cgit v1.2.3