SPM: Introduce Secure Partition Manager

A Secure Partition is a software execution environment instantiated in
S-EL0 that can be used to implement simple management and security
services. Since S-EL0 is an unprivileged exception level, a Secure
Partition relies on privileged firmware e.g. ARM Trusted Firmware to be
granted access to system and processor resources. Essentially, it is a
software sandbox that runs under the control of privileged software in
the Secure World and accesses the following system resources:

- Memory and device regions in the system address map.
- PE system registers.
- A range of asynchronous exceptions e.g. interrupts.
- A range of synchronous exceptions e.g. SMC function identifiers.

A Secure Partition enables privileged firmware to implement only the
absolutely essential secure services in EL3 and instantiate the rest in
a partition. Since the partition executes in S-EL0, its implementation
cannot be overly complex.

The component in ARM Trusted Firmware responsible for managing a Secure
Partition is called the Secure Partition Manager (SPM). The SPM is
responsible for the following:

- Validating and allocating resources requested by a Secure Partition.
- Implementing a well defined interface that is used for initialising a
  Secure Partition.
- Implementing a well defined interface that is used by the normal world
  and other secure services for accessing the services exported by a
  Secure Partition.
- Implementing a well defined interface that is used by a Secure
  Partition to fulfil service requests.
- Instantiating the software execution environment required by a Secure
  Partition to fulfil a service request.

Change-Id: I6f7862d6bba8732db5b73f54e789d717a35e802f
Co-authored-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Achin Gupta <achin.gupta@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>

8 files changed, 1100 insertions, 3 deletions

diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/aarch64/spm_helpers.S b/services/std_svc/spm/aarch64/spm_helpers.S
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..aa35811f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/std_svc/spm/aarch64/spm_helpers.S
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <asm_macros.S>
+#include "../spm_private.h"
+
+	.global spm_secure_partition_enter
+	.global spm_secure_partition_exit
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * This function is called with SP_EL0 as stack. Here we stash our EL3
+	 * callee-saved registers on to the stack as a part of saving the C
+	 * runtime and enter the secure payload.
+	 * 'x0' contains a pointer to the memory where the address of the C
+	 *  runtime context is to be saved.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+func spm_secure_partition_enter
+	/* Make space for the registers that we're going to save */
+	mov	x3, sp
+	str	x3, [x0, #0]
+	sub	sp, sp, #SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE
+
+	/* Save callee-saved registers on to the stack */
+	stp	x19, x20, [sp, #SP_C_RT_CTX_X19]
+	stp	x21, x22, [sp, #SP_C_RT_CTX_X21]
+	stp	x23, x24, [sp, #SP_C_RT_CTX_X23]
+	stp	x25, x26, [sp, #SP_C_RT_CTX_X25]
+	stp	x27, x28, [sp, #SP_C_RT_CTX_X27]
+	stp	x29, x30, [sp, #SP_C_RT_CTX_X29]
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * Everything is setup now. el3_exit() will use the secure context to
+	 * restore to the general purpose and EL3 system registers to ERET
+	 * into the secure payload.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	b	el3_exit
+endfunc spm_secure_partition_enter
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * This function is called with 'x0' pointing to a C runtime context
+	 * saved in spm_secure_partition_enter().
+	 * It restores the saved registers and jumps to that runtime with 'x0'
+	 * as the new SP register. This destroys the C runtime context that had
+	 * been built on the stack below the saved context by the caller. Later
+	 * the second parameter 'x1' is passed as a return value to the caller.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+func spm_secure_partition_exit
+	/* Restore the previous stack */
+	mov	sp, x0
+
+	/* Restore callee-saved registers on to the stack */
+	ldp	x19, x20, [x0, #(SP_C_RT_CTX_X19 - SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)]
+	ldp	x21, x22, [x0, #(SP_C_RT_CTX_X21 - SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)]
+	ldp	x23, x24, [x0, #(SP_C_RT_CTX_X23 - SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)]
+	ldp	x25, x26, [x0, #(SP_C_RT_CTX_X25 - SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)]
+	ldp	x27, x28, [x0, #(SP_C_RT_CTX_X27 - SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)]
+	ldp	x29, x30, [x0, #(SP_C_RT_CTX_X29 - SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE)]
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 * This should take us back to the instruction after the call to the
+	 * last spm_secure_partition_enter().* Place the second parameter to x0
+	 * so that the caller will see it as a return value from the original
+	 * entry call.
+	 * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+	mov	x0, x1
+	ret
+endfunc spm_secure_partition_exit
diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/aarch64/spm_shim_exceptions.S b/services/std_svc/spm/aarch64/spm_shim_exceptions.S
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..218245d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/std_svc/spm/aarch64/spm_shim_exceptions.S
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <arch.h>
+#include <asm_macros.S>
+#include <bl_common.h>
+#include <context.h>
+
+/* -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Very simple stackless exception handlers used by the spm shim layer.
+ * -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+	.globl	spm_shim_exceptions_ptr
+
+vector_base spm_shim_exceptions_ptr, .spm_shim_exceptions
+
+	/* -----------------------------------------------------
+	 * Current EL with SP0 : 0x0 - 0x200
+	 * -----------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+vector_entry SynchronousExceptionSP0, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+	check_vector_size SynchronousExceptionSP0
+
+vector_entry IrqSP0, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+	check_vector_size IrqSP0
+
+vector_entry FiqSP0, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+	check_vector_size FiqSP0
+
+vector_entry SErrorSP0, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+	check_vector_size SErrorSP0
+
+	/* -----------------------------------------------------
+	 * Current EL with SPx: 0x200 - 0x400
+	 * -----------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+vector_entry SynchronousExceptionSPx, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+	check_vector_size SynchronousExceptionSPx
+
+vector_entry IrqSPx, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+	check_vector_size IrqSPx
+
+vector_entry FiqSPx, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+	check_vector_size FiqSPx
+
+vector_entry SErrorSPx, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+	check_vector_size SErrorSPx
+
+	/* -----------------------------------------------------
+	 * Lower EL using AArch64 : 0x400 - 0x600. No exceptions
+	 * are handled since secure_partition does not implement
+	 * a lower EL
+	 * -----------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+vector_entry SynchronousExceptionA64, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	msr	tpidr_el1, x30
+	mrs	x30, esr_el1
+	ubfx	x30, x30, #ESR_EC_SHIFT, #ESR_EC_LENGTH
+
+	cmp	x30, #EC_AARCH64_SVC
+	b.eq 	do_smc
+
+	cmp	x30, #EC_AARCH32_SVC
+	b.eq	do_smc
+
+	cmp	x30, #EC_AARCH64_SYS
+	b.eq	handle_sys_trap
+
+	/* Fail in all the other cases */
+	b	panic
+
+	/* ---------------------------------------------
+	 * Tell SPM that we are done initialising
+	 * ---------------------------------------------
+	 */
+do_smc:
+	mrs	x30, tpidr_el1
+	smc	#0
+	eret
+
+	/* AArch64 system instructions trap are handled as a panic for now */
+handle_sys_trap:
+panic:
+	b	panic
+	check_vector_size SynchronousExceptionA64
+
+vector_entry IrqA64, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+	check_vector_size IrqA64
+
+vector_entry FiqA64, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+	check_vector_size FiqA64
+
+vector_entry SErrorA64, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+	check_vector_size SErrorA64
+
+	/* -----------------------------------------------------
+	 * Lower EL using AArch32 : 0x600 - 0x800
+	 * -----------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+vector_entry SynchronousExceptionA32, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+	check_vector_size SynchronousExceptionA32
+
+vector_entry IrqA32, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+	check_vector_size IrqA32
+
+vector_entry FiqA32, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+	check_vector_size FiqA32
+
+vector_entry SErrorA32, .spm_shim_exceptions
+	b	.
+	check_vector_size SErrorA32
diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/secure_partition_setup.c b/services/std_svc/spm/secure_partition_setup.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6624e2b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/std_svc/spm/secure_partition_setup.c
@@ -0,0 +1,310 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <arch.h>
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <arm_spm_def.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <common_def.h>
+#include <context.h>
+#include <context_mgmt.h>
+#include <debug.h>
+#include <platform_def.h>
+#include <platform.h>
+#include <secure_partition.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <types.h>
+#include <xlat_tables_v2.h>
+
+#include "spm_private.h"
+#include "spm_shim_private.h"
+
+/* Allocate and initialise the translation context for the secure partition. */
+REGISTER_XLAT_CONTEXT2(secure_partition,
+			PLAT_SP_IMAGE_MMAP_REGIONS,
+			PLAT_SP_IMAGE_MAX_XLAT_TABLES,
+			PLAT_VIRT_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE, PLAT_PHY_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE,
+			EL1_EL0_REGIME);
+
+/* Export a handle on the secure partition translation context */
+xlat_ctx_t *secure_partition_xlat_ctx_handle = &secure_partition_xlat_ctx;
+
+/* Setup context of the Secure Partition */
+void secure_partition_setup(void)
+{
+	VERBOSE("S-EL1/S-EL0 context setup start...\n");
+
+	cpu_context_t *ctx = cm_get_context(SECURE);
+
+	/* Make sure that we got a Secure context. */
+	assert(ctx != NULL);
+
+	/* Assert we are in Secure state. */
+	assert((read_scr_el3() & SCR_NS_BIT) == 0);
+
+	/* Disable MMU at EL1. */
+	disable_mmu_icache_el1();
+
+	/* Invalidate TLBs at EL1. */
+	tlbivmalle1();
+
+	/*
+	 * General-Purpose registers
+	 * -------------------------
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 * X0: Virtual address of a buffer shared between EL3 and Secure EL0.
+	 *     The buffer will be mapped in the Secure EL1 translation regime
+	 *     with Normal IS WBWA attributes and RO data and Execute Never
+	 *     instruction access permissions.
+	 *
+	 * X1: Size of the buffer in bytes
+	 *
+	 * X2: cookie value (Implementation Defined)
+	 *
+	 * X3: cookie value (Implementation Defined)
+	 *
+	 * X4 to X30 = 0 (already done by cm_init_my_context())
+	 */
+	write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_GPREG_X0, PLAT_SPM_BUF_BASE);
+	write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_GPREG_X1, PLAT_SPM_BUF_SIZE);
+	write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_GPREG_X2, PLAT_SPM_COOKIE_0);
+	write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_GPREG_X3, PLAT_SPM_COOKIE_1);
+
+	/*
+	 * SP_EL0: A non-zero value will indicate to the SP that the SPM has
+	 * initialized the stack pointer for the current CPU through
+	 * implementation defined means. The value will be 0 otherwise.
+	 */
+	write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_GPREG_SP_EL0,
+			PLAT_SP_IMAGE_STACK_BASE + PLAT_SP_IMAGE_STACK_PCPU_SIZE);
+
+	/*
+	 * Setup translation tables
+	 * ------------------------
+	 */
+
+#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS
+
+	/* Get max granularity supported by the platform. */
+
+	u_register_t id_aa64prf0_el1 = read_id_aa64pfr0_el1();
+
+	int tgran64_supported =
+		((id_aa64prf0_el1 >> ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN64_SHIFT) &
+		 ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN64_MASK) ==
+		 ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN64_SUPPORTED;
+
+	int tgran16_supported =
+		((id_aa64prf0_el1 >> ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN16_SHIFT) &
+		 ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN16_MASK) ==
+		 ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN16_SUPPORTED;
+
+	int tgran4_supported =
+		((id_aa64prf0_el1 >> ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN4_SHIFT) &
+		 ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN4_MASK) ==
+		 ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_TGRAN4_SUPPORTED;
+
+	uintptr_t max_granule_size;
+
+	if (tgran64_supported) {
+		max_granule_size = 64 * 1024;
+	} else if (tgran16_supported) {
+		max_granule_size = 16 * 1024;
+	} else {
+		assert(tgran4_supported);
+		max_granule_size = 4 * 1024;
+	}
+
+	VERBOSE("Max translation granule supported: %lu KiB\n",
+		max_granule_size);
+
+	uintptr_t max_granule_size_mask = max_granule_size - 1;
+
+	/* Base must be aligned to the max granularity */
+	assert((ARM_SP_IMAGE_NS_BUF_BASE & max_granule_size_mask) == 0);
+
+	/* Size must be a multiple of the max granularity */
+	assert((ARM_SP_IMAGE_NS_BUF_SIZE & max_granule_size_mask) == 0);
+
+#endif /* ENABLE_ASSERTIONS */
+
+	/* This region contains the exception vectors used at S-EL1. */
+	const mmap_region_t sel1_exception_vectors =
+		MAP_REGION_FLAT(SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_START,
+				SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_SIZE,
+				MT_CODE | MT_SECURE | MT_PRIVILEGED);
+	mmap_add_region_ctx(&secure_partition_xlat_ctx,
+			    &sel1_exception_vectors);
+
+	mmap_add_ctx(&secure_partition_xlat_ctx,
+		     plat_get_secure_partition_mmap(NULL));
+
+	init_xlat_tables_ctx(&secure_partition_xlat_ctx);
+
+	/*
+	 * MMU-related registers
+	 * ---------------------
+	 */
+
+	/* Set attributes in the right indices of the MAIR */
+	u_register_t mair_el1 =
+		MAIR_ATTR_SET(ATTR_DEVICE, ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX) |
+		MAIR_ATTR_SET(ATTR_IWBWA_OWBWA_NTR, ATTR_IWBWA_OWBWA_NTR_INDEX) |
+		MAIR_ATTR_SET(ATTR_NON_CACHEABLE, ATTR_NON_CACHEABLE_INDEX);
+
+	write_ctx_reg(get_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_MAIR_EL1, mair_el1);
+
+	/* Setup TCR_EL1. */
+	u_register_t tcr_ps_bits = tcr_physical_addr_size_bits(PLAT_PHY_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE);
+
+	u_register_t tcr_el1 =
+		/* Size of region addressed by TTBR0_EL1 = 2^(64-T0SZ) bytes. */
+		(64 - __builtin_ctzl(PLAT_VIRT_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE))		|
+		/* Inner and outer WBWA, shareable. */
+		TCR_SH_INNER_SHAREABLE | TCR_RGN_OUTER_WBA | TCR_RGN_INNER_WBA	|
+		/* Set the granularity to 4KB. */
+		TCR_TG0_4K							|
+		/* Limit Intermediate Physical Address Size. */
+		tcr_ps_bits << TCR_EL1_IPS_SHIFT				|
+		/* Disable translations using TBBR1_EL1. */
+		TCR_EPD1_BIT
+		/* The remaining fields related to TBBR1_EL1 are left as zero. */
+	;
+
+	tcr_el1 &= ~(
+		/* Enable translations using TBBR0_EL1 */
+		TCR_EPD0_BIT
+	);
+
+	write_ctx_reg(get_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_TCR_EL1, tcr_el1);
+
+	/* Setup SCTLR_EL1 */
+	u_register_t sctlr_el1 = read_ctx_reg(get_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_SCTLR_EL1);
+
+	sctlr_el1 |=
+		/*SCTLR_EL1_RES1 |*/
+		/* Don't trap DC CVAU, DC CIVAC, DC CVAC, DC CVAP, or IC IVAU */
+		SCTLR_UCI_BIT							|
+		/* RW regions at xlat regime EL1&0 are forced to be XN. */
+		SCTLR_WXN_BIT							|
+		/* Don't trap to EL1 execution of WFI or WFE at EL0. */
+		SCTLR_NTWI_BIT | SCTLR_NTWE_BIT					|
+		/* Don't trap to EL1 accesses to CTR_EL0 from EL0. */
+		SCTLR_UCT_BIT							|
+		/* Don't trap to EL1 execution of DZ ZVA at EL0. */
+		SCTLR_DZE_BIT							|
+		/* Enable SP Alignment check for EL0 */
+		SCTLR_SA0_BIT							|
+		/* Allow cacheable data and instr. accesses to normal memory. */
+		SCTLR_C_BIT | SCTLR_I_BIT					|
+		/* Alignment fault checking enabled when at EL1 and EL0. */
+		SCTLR_A_BIT							|
+		/* Enable MMU. */
+		SCTLR_M_BIT
+	;
+
+	sctlr_el1 &= ~(
+		/* Explicit data accesses at EL0 are little-endian. */
+		SCTLR_E0E_BIT							|
+		/* Accesses to DAIF from EL0 are trapped to EL1. */
+		SCTLR_UMA_BIT
+	);
+
+	write_ctx_reg(get_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_SCTLR_EL1, sctlr_el1);
+
+	/* Point TTBR0_EL1 at the tables of the context created for the SP. */
+	write_ctx_reg(get_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_TTBR0_EL1,
+			(u_register_t)secure_partition_base_xlat_table);
+
+	/*
+	 * Setup other system registers
+	 * ----------------------------
+	 */
+
+	/* Shim Exception Vector Base Address */
+	write_ctx_reg(get_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_VBAR_EL1,
+			SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_PTR);
+
+	/*
+	 * FPEN: Forbid the Secure Partition to access FP/SIMD registers.
+	 * TTA: Enable access to trace registers.
+	 * ZEN (v8.2): Trap SVE instructions and access to SVE registers.
+	 */
+	write_ctx_reg(get_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_CPACR_EL1,
+			CPACR_EL1_FPEN(CPACR_EL1_FP_TRAP_ALL));
+
+	/*
+	 * Prepare information in buffer shared between EL3 and S-EL0
+	 * ----------------------------------------------------------
+	 */
+
+	void *shared_buf_ptr = (void *) PLAT_SPM_BUF_BASE;
+
+	/* Copy the boot information into the shared buffer with the SP. */
+	assert((uintptr_t)shared_buf_ptr + sizeof(secure_partition_boot_info_t)
+	       <= (PLAT_SPM_BUF_BASE + PLAT_SPM_BUF_SIZE));
+
+	assert(PLAT_SPM_BUF_BASE <= (UINTPTR_MAX - PLAT_SPM_BUF_SIZE + 1));
+
+	const secure_partition_boot_info_t *sp_boot_info =
+			plat_get_secure_partition_boot_info(NULL);
+
+	assert(sp_boot_info != NULL);
+
+	memcpy((void *) shared_buf_ptr, (const void *) sp_boot_info,
+	       sizeof(secure_partition_boot_info_t));
+
+	/* Pointer to the MP information from the platform port. */
+	secure_partition_mp_info_t *sp_mp_info =
+		((secure_partition_boot_info_t *) shared_buf_ptr)->mp_info;
+
+	assert(sp_mp_info != NULL);
+
+	/*
+	 * Point the shared buffer MP information pointer to where the info will
+	 * be populated, just after the boot info.
+	 */
+	((secure_partition_boot_info_t *) shared_buf_ptr)->mp_info =
+		((secure_partition_mp_info_t *) shared_buf_ptr) +
+		sizeof(secure_partition_boot_info_t);
+
+	/*
+	 * Update the shared buffer pointer to where the MP information for the
+	 * payload will be populated
+	 */
+	shared_buf_ptr = ((secure_partition_boot_info_t *) shared_buf_ptr)->mp_info;
+
+	/*
+	 * Copy the cpu information into the shared buffer area after the boot
+	 * information.
+	 */
+	assert(sp_boot_info->num_cpus <= PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT);
+
+	assert((uintptr_t)shared_buf_ptr
+	       <= (PLAT_SPM_BUF_BASE + PLAT_SPM_BUF_SIZE -
+		       (sp_boot_info->num_cpus * sizeof(*sp_mp_info))));
+
+	memcpy(shared_buf_ptr, (const void *) sp_mp_info,
+		sp_boot_info->num_cpus * sizeof(*sp_mp_info));
+
+	/*
+	 * Calculate the linear indices of cores in boot information for the
+	 * secure partition and flag the primary CPU
+	 */
+	sp_mp_info = (secure_partition_mp_info_t *) shared_buf_ptr;
+
+	for (unsigned int index = 0; index < sp_boot_info->num_cpus; index++) {
+		u_register_t mpidr = sp_mp_info[index].mpidr;
+
+		sp_mp_info[index].linear_id = plat_core_pos_by_mpidr(mpidr);
+		if (plat_my_core_pos() == sp_mp_info[index].linear_id)
+			sp_mp_info[index].flags |= MP_INFO_FLAG_PRIMARY_CPU;
+	}
+
+	VERBOSE("S-EL1/S-EL0 context setup end.\n");
+}
diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/spm.mk b/services/std_svc/spm/spm.mk
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..562eaee4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/std_svc/spm/spm.mk
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+#
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+#
+
+ifneq (${SPD},none)
+        $(error "Error: SPD and SPM are incompatible build options.")
+endif
+ifneq (${ARCH},aarch64)
+        $(error "Error: SPM is only supported on aarch64.")
+endif
+
+# SPM sources
+
+
+SPM_SOURCES	:=	$(addprefix services/std_svc/spm/,	\
+			spm_main.c				\
+			${ARCH}/spm_helpers.S			\
+			secure_partition_setup.c		\
+			${ARCH}/spm_shim_exceptions.S)
+
+
+# Let the top-level Makefile know that we intend to include a BL32 image
+NEED_BL32		:=	yes
diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/spm_main.c b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_main.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1b40d81d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,452 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <bl31.h>
+#include <context_mgmt.h>
+#include <debug.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <platform.h>
+#include <runtime_svc.h>
+#include <secure_partition.h>
+#include <smcc.h>
+#include <smcc_helpers.h>
+#include <spinlock.h>
+#include <spm_svc.h>
+#include <utils.h>
+#include <xlat_tables_v2.h>
+
+#include "spm_private.h"
+
+/* Lock used for SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_GET and SP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_SET */
+static spinlock_t mem_attr_smc_lock;
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Secure Partition context information.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static secure_partition_context_t sp_ctx;
+unsigned int sp_init_in_progress;
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Replace the S-EL1 re-entry information with S-EL0 re-entry
+ * information
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void spm_setup_next_eret_into_sel0(cpu_context_t *secure_context)
+{
+	assert(secure_context == cm_get_context(SECURE));
+
+	cm_set_elr_spsr_el3(SECURE, read_elr_el1(), read_spsr_el1());
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function takes an SP context pointer and:
+ * 1. Applies the S-EL1 system register context from sp_ctx->cpu_ctx.
+ * 2. Saves the current C runtime state (callee-saved registers) on the stack
+ *    frame and saves a reference to this state.
+ * 3. Calls el3_exit() so that the EL3 system and general purpose registers
+ *    from the sp_ctx->cpu_ctx are used to enter the secure payload image.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static uint64_t spm_synchronous_sp_entry(secure_partition_context_t *sp_ctx_ptr)
+{
+	uint64_t rc;
+
+	assert(sp_ctx_ptr != NULL);
+	assert(sp_ctx_ptr->c_rt_ctx == 0);
+	assert(cm_get_context(SECURE) == &sp_ctx_ptr->cpu_ctx);
+
+	/* Apply the Secure EL1 system register context and switch to it */
+	cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE);
+	cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE);
+
+	VERBOSE("%s: We're about to enter the Secure partition...\n", __func__);
+
+	rc = spm_secure_partition_enter(&sp_ctx_ptr->c_rt_ctx);
+#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS
+	sp_ctx_ptr->c_rt_ctx = 0;
+#endif
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function takes a Secure partition context pointer and:
+ * 1. Saves the S-EL1 system register context tp sp_ctx->cpu_ctx.
+ * 2. Restores the current C runtime state (callee saved registers) from the
+ *    stack frame using the reference to this state saved in
+ *    spm_secure_partition_enter().
+ * 3. It does not need to save any general purpose or EL3 system register state
+ *    as the generic smc entry routine should have saved those.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static void __dead2 spm_synchronous_sp_exit(
+			secure_partition_context_t *sp_ctx_ptr, uint64_t ret)
+{
+	assert(sp_ctx_ptr != NULL);
+	/* Save the Secure EL1 system register context */
+	assert(cm_get_context(SECURE) == &sp_ctx_ptr->cpu_ctx);
+	cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE);
+
+	assert(sp_ctx_ptr->c_rt_ctx != 0);
+	spm_secure_partition_exit(sp_ctx_ptr->c_rt_ctx, ret);
+
+	/* Should never reach here */
+	assert(0);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function passes control to the Secure Partition image (BL32) for the
+ * first time on the primary cpu after a cold boot. It assumes that a valid
+ * secure context has already been created by spm_setup() which can be directly
+ * used. This function performs a synchronous entry into the Secure payload.
+ * The SP passes control back to this routine through a SMC.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int32_t spm_init(void)
+{
+	entry_point_info_t *secure_partition_ep_info;
+	uint64_t rc;
+
+	VERBOSE("%s entry\n", __func__);
+
+	/*
+	 * Get information about the Secure Partition (BL32) image. Its
+	 * absence is a critical failure.
+	 */
+	secure_partition_ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE);
+	assert(secure_partition_ep_info);
+
+	/*
+	 * Initialise the common context and then overlay the S-EL0 specific
+	 * context on top of it.
+	 */
+	cm_init_my_context(secure_partition_ep_info);
+	secure_partition_setup();
+
+	/*
+	 * Arrange for an entry into the secure payload.
+	 */
+	sp_init_in_progress = 1;
+	rc = spm_synchronous_sp_entry(&sp_ctx);
+	assert(rc == 0);
+	sp_init_in_progress = 0;
+	VERBOSE("SP_MEM_ATTRIBUTES_SET_AARCH64 availability has been revoked\n");
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Given a secure payload entrypoint info pointer, entry point PC & pointer to
+ * a context data structure, this function will initialize the SPM context and
+ * entry point info for the secure payload
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void spm_init_sp_ep_state(struct entry_point_info *sp_ep_info,
+			  uint64_t pc,
+			  secure_partition_context_t *sp_ctx_ptr)
+{
+	uint32_t ep_attr;
+
+	assert(sp_ep_info);
+	assert(pc);
+	assert(sp_ctx_ptr);
+
+	cm_set_context(&sp_ctx_ptr->cpu_ctx, SECURE);
+
+	/* initialise an entrypoint to set up the CPU context */
+	ep_attr = SECURE | EP_ST_ENABLE;
+	if (read_sctlr_el3() & SCTLR_EE_BIT)
+		ep_attr |= EP_EE_BIG;
+	SET_PARAM_HEAD(sp_ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, ep_attr);
+
+	sp_ep_info->pc = pc;
+	/* The SPM payload runs in S-EL0 */
+	sp_ep_info->spsr = SPSR_64(MODE_EL0,
+				   MODE_SP_EL0,
+				   DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS);
+
+	zeromem(&sp_ep_info->args, sizeof(sp_ep_info->args));
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Secure Partition Manager setup. The SPM finds out the SP entrypoint if not
+ * already known and initialises the context for entry into the SP for its
+ * initialisation.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int32_t spm_setup(void)
+{
+	entry_point_info_t *secure_partition_ep_info;
+
+	VERBOSE("%s entry\n", __func__);
+
+	/*
+	 * Get information about the Secure Partition (BL32) image. Its
+	 * absence is a critical failure.
+	 */
+	secure_partition_ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE);
+	if (!secure_partition_ep_info) {
+		WARN("No SPM provided by BL2 boot loader, Booting device"
+			" without SPM initialization. SMCs destined for SPM"
+			" will return SMC_UNK\n");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If there's no valid entry point for SP, we return a non-zero value
+	 * signalling failure initializing the service. We bail out without
+	 * registering any handlers
+	 */
+	if (!secure_partition_ep_info->pc) {
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	spm_init_sp_ep_state(secure_partition_ep_info,
+			      secure_partition_ep_info->pc,
+			      &sp_ctx);
+
+	/*
+	 * All SPM initialization done. Now register our init function with
+	 * BL31 for deferred invocation
+	 */
+	bl31_register_bl32_init(&spm_init);
+
+	VERBOSE("%s exit\n", __func__);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attributes are encoded using a different format in the SMC interface than in
+ * the Trusted Firmware, where the mmap_attr_t enum type is used. This function
+ * converts an attributes value from the SMC format to the mmap_attr_t format by
+ * setting MT_RW/MT_RO, MT_USER/MT_PRIVILEGED and MT_EXECUTE/MT_EXECUTE_NEVER.
+ * The other fields are left as 0 because they are ignored by the function
+ * change_mem_attributes().
+ */
+static mmap_attr_t smc_attr_to_mmap_attr(unsigned int attributes)
+{
+	mmap_attr_t tf_attr = 0;
+
+	unsigned int access = (attributes & SP_MEM_ATTR_ACCESS_MASK)
+			      >> SP_MEM_ATTR_ACCESS_SHIFT;
+
+	if (access == SP_MEM_ATTR_ACCESS_RW) {
+		tf_attr |= MT_RW | MT_USER;
+	} else if (access ==  SP_MEM_ATTR_ACCESS_RO) {
+		tf_attr |= MT_RO | MT_USER;
+	} else {
+		/* Other values are reserved. */
+		assert(access ==  SP_MEM_ATTR_ACCESS_NOACCESS);
+		/* The only requirement is that there's no access from EL0 */
+		tf_attr |= MT_RO | MT_PRIVILEGED;
+	}
+
+	if ((attributes & SP_MEM_ATTR_NON_EXEC) == 0) {
+		tf_attr |= MT_EXECUTE;
+	} else {
+		tf_attr |= MT_EXECUTE_NEVER;
+	}
+
+	return tf_attr;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function converts attributes from the Trusted Firmware format into the
+ * SMC interface format.
+ */
+static int smc_mmap_to_smc_attr(mmap_attr_t attr)
+{
+	int smc_attr = 0;
+
+	int data_access;
+
+	if ((attr & MT_USER) == 0) {
+		/* No access from EL0. */
+		data_access = SP_MEM_ATTR_ACCESS_NOACCESS;
+	} else {
+		if ((attr & MT_RW) != 0) {
+			assert(MT_TYPE(attr) != MT_DEVICE);
+			data_access = SP_MEM_ATTR_ACCESS_RW;
+		} else {
+			data_access = SP_MEM_ATTR_ACCESS_RO;
+		}
+	}
+
+	smc_attr |= (data_access & SP_MEM_ATTR_ACCESS_MASK) << SP_MEM_ATTR_ACCESS_SHIFT;
+
+	if (attr & MT_EXECUTE_NEVER) {
+		smc_attr |= SP_MEM_ATTR_NON_EXEC;
+	}
+
+	return smc_attr;
+}
+
+static int spm_memory_attributes_get_smc_handler(uintptr_t base_va)
+{
+	spin_lock(&mem_attr_smc_lock);
+
+	mmap_attr_t attributes;
+	int rc = get_mem_attributes(secure_partition_xlat_ctx_handle,
+				     base_va, &attributes);
+
+	spin_unlock(&mem_attr_smc_lock);
+
+	/* Convert error codes of get_mem_attributes() into SPM ones. */
+	assert(rc == 0 || rc == -EINVAL);
+
+	if (rc == 0) {
+		return smc_mmap_to_smc_attr(attributes);
+	} else {
+		return SPM_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+	}
+}
+
+static int spm_memory_attributes_set_smc_handler(u_register_t page_address,
+					u_register_t pages_count,
+					u_register_t smc_attributes)
+{
+	uintptr_t base_va = (uintptr_t) page_address;
+	size_t size = (size_t) (pages_count * PAGE_SIZE);
+	unsigned int attributes = (unsigned int) smc_attributes;
+
+	INFO("  Start address  : 0x%lx\n", base_va);
+	INFO("  Number of pages: %i (%zi bytes)\n", (int) pages_count, size);
+	INFO("  Attributes     : 0x%x\n", attributes);
+
+	spin_lock(&mem_attr_smc_lock);
+
+	int ret = change_mem_attributes(secure_partition_xlat_ctx_handle,
+			base_va, size, smc_attr_to_mmap_attr(attributes));
+
+	spin_unlock(&mem_attr_smc_lock);
+
+	/* Convert error codes of change_mem_attributes() into SPM ones. */
+	assert(ret == 0 || ret == -EINVAL);
+
+	return (ret == 0) ? SPM_SUCCESS : SPM_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+}
+
+
+uint64_t spm_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid,
+			 uint64_t x1,
+			 uint64_t x2,
+			 uint64_t x3,
+			 uint64_t x4,
+			 void *cookie,
+			 void *handle,
+			 uint64_t flags)
+{
+	cpu_context_t *ns_cpu_context;
+	unsigned int ns;
+
+	/* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */
+	ns = is_caller_non_secure(flags);
+
+	if (ns == SMC_FROM_SECURE) {
+
+		/* Handle SMCs from Secure world. */
+
+		switch (smc_fid) {
+
+		case  SPM_VERSION_AARCH32:
+			SMC_RET1(handle, SPM_VERSION_COMPILED);
+
+		case SP_EVENT_COMPLETE_AARCH64:
+			assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE));
+			cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE);
+			spm_setup_next_eret_into_sel0(handle);
+
+			if (sp_init_in_progress) {
+				/*
+				 * SPM reports completion. The SPM must have
+				 * initiated the original request through a
+				 * synchronous entry into the secure
+				 * partition. Jump back to the original C
+				 * runtime context.
+				 */
+				spm_synchronous_sp_exit(&sp_ctx, x1);
+				assert(0);
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * This is the result from the Secure partition of an
+			 * earlier request. Copy the result into the non-secure
+			 * context, save the secure state and return to the
+			 * non-secure state.
+			 */
+
+			/* Get a reference to the non-secure context */
+			ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE);
+			assert(ns_cpu_context);
+
+			/* Restore non-secure state */
+			cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
+			cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
+
+			/* Return to normal world */
+			SMC_RET1(ns_cpu_context, x1);
+
+		case SP_MEM_ATTRIBUTES_GET_AARCH64:
+			INFO("Received SP_MEM_ATTRIBUTES_GET_AARCH64 SMC\n");
+
+			if (!sp_init_in_progress) {
+				WARN("SP_MEM_ATTRIBUTES_GET_AARCH64 is available at boot time only\n");
+				SMC_RET1(handle, SPM_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+			}
+			SMC_RET1(handle, spm_memory_attributes_get_smc_handler(x1));
+
+		case SP_MEM_ATTRIBUTES_SET_AARCH64:
+			INFO("Received SP_MEM_ATTRIBUTES_SET_AARCH64 SMC\n");
+
+			if (!sp_init_in_progress) {
+				WARN("SP_MEM_ATTRIBUTES_SET_AARCH64 is available at boot time only\n");
+				SMC_RET1(handle, SPM_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+			}
+			SMC_RET1(handle, spm_memory_attributes_set_smc_handler(x1, x2, x3));
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	} else {
+
+		/* Handle SMCs from Non-secure world. */
+
+		switch (smc_fid) {
+
+		case  SP_VERSION_AARCH64:
+		case  SP_VERSION_AARCH32:
+			SMC_RET1(handle, SP_VERSION_COMPILED);
+
+		case SP_COMMUNICATE_AARCH32:
+		case SP_COMMUNICATE_AARCH64:
+
+			/* Save the Normal world context */
+			cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE);
+
+			/*
+			 * Restore the secure world context and prepare for
+			 * entry in S-EL0
+			 */
+			assert(&sp_ctx.cpu_ctx == cm_get_context(SECURE));
+			cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE);
+			cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE);
+
+			if (x2 != 0) {
+				VERBOSE("SP_COMMUNICATE_AARCH32/64: X2 is not 0 as recommended.");
+			}
+
+			SMC_RET4(&sp_ctx.cpu_ctx,
+				 smc_fid, x2, x3, plat_my_core_pos());
+
+		case SP_MEM_ATTRIBUTES_GET_AARCH64:
+		case SP_MEM_ATTRIBUTES_SET_AARCH64:
+			/* SMC interfaces reserved for secure callers. */
+			SMC_RET1(handle, SPM_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
+}
diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/spm_private.h b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_private.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..16993e8c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_private.h
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#ifndef __SPM_PRIVATE_H__
+#define __SPM_PRIVATE_H__
+
+#include <context.h>
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Constants that allow assembler code to preserve callee-saved registers of the
+ * C runtime context while performing a security state switch.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X19		0x0
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X20		0x8
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X21		0x10
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X22		0x18
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X23		0x20
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X24		0x28
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X25		0x30
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X26		0x38
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X27		0x40
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X28		0x48
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X29		0x50
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_X30		0x58
+
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE	0x60
+#define SP_C_RT_CTX_ENTRIES	(SP_C_RT_CTX_SIZE >> DWORD_SHIFT)
+
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <xlat_tables_v2.h>
+
+/* Handle on the Secure partition translation context */
+extern xlat_ctx_t *secure_partition_xlat_ctx_handle;
+
+struct entry_point_info;
+
+typedef struct secure_partition_context {
+	uint64_t c_rt_ctx;
+	cpu_context_t cpu_ctx;
+} secure_partition_context_t;
+
+uint64_t spm_secure_partition_enter(uint64_t *c_rt_ctx);
+void __dead2 spm_secure_partition_exit(uint64_t c_rt_ctx, uint64_t ret);
+void spm_init_sp_ep_state(struct entry_point_info *sp_ep_info,
+			  uint64_t pc,
+			  secure_partition_context_t *sp_ctx_ptr);
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#endif /* __SPM_PRIVATE_H__ */
diff --git a/services/std_svc/spm/spm_shim_private.h b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_shim_private.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ad953cde
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/std_svc/spm/spm_shim_private.h
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#ifndef __SPM_SHIM_PRIVATE__
+#define __SPM_SHIM_PRIVATE__
+
+#include <types.h>
+
+/* Assembly source */
+extern uintptr_t spm_shim_exceptions_ptr;
+
+/* Linker symbols */
+extern uintptr_t __SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_START__;
+extern uintptr_t __SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_END__;
+
+/* Definitions */
+#define SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_PTR		(uintptr_t)(&spm_shim_exceptions_ptr)
+
+#define SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_START	\
+	(uintptr_t)(&__SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_START__)
+#define SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_END		\
+	(uintptr_t)(&__SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_END__)
+#define SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_SIZE	\
+	(SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_END - SPM_SHIM_EXCEPTIONS_START)
+
+#endif /* __SPM_SHIM_PRIVATE__ */
diff --git a/services/std_svc/std_svc_setup.c b/services/std_svc/std_svc_setup.c
index 8e690467..977ed7f6 100644
--- a/services/std_svc/std_svc_setup.c
+++ b/services/std_svc/std_svc_setup.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright (c) 2014-2016, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2014-2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
  *
  * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
  */
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <runtime_instr.h>
 #include <runtime_svc.h>
 #include <smcc_helpers.h>
+#include <spm_svc.h>
 #include <std_svc.h>
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include <uuid.h>
@@ -25,15 +26,26 @@ DEFINE_SVC_UUID(arm_svc_uid,
 static int32_t std_svc_setup(void)
 {
 	uintptr_t svc_arg;
+	int ret = 0;
 
 	svc_arg = get_arm_std_svc_args(PSCI_FID_MASK);
 	assert(svc_arg);
 
 	/*
-	 * PSCI is the only specification implemented as a Standard Service.
+	 * PSCI is one of the specifications implemented as a Standard Service.
 	 * The `psci_setup()` also does EL3 architectural setup.
 	 */
-	return psci_setup((const psci_lib_args_t *)svc_arg);
+	if (psci_setup((const psci_lib_args_t *)svc_arg) != PSCI_E_SUCCESS) {
+		ret = 1;
+	}
+
+#if ENABLE_SPM
+	if (spm_setup() != 0) {
+		ret = 1;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -80,6 +92,18 @@ uintptr_t std_svc_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid,
 		SMC_RET1(handle, ret);
 	}
 
+
+#if ENABLE_SPM
+	/*
+	 * Dispatch SPM calls to SPM SMC handler and return its return
+	 * value
+	 */
+	if (is_spm_fid(smc_fid)) {
+		return spm_smc_handler(smc_fid, x1, x2, x3, x4, cookie,
+				       handle, flags);
+	}
+#endif
+
 	switch (smc_fid) {
 	case ARM_STD_SVC_CALL_COUNT:
 		/*