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authorNicolas Pitre <nico@cam.org>2006-02-08 21:19:36 +0000
committerRussell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>2006-02-08 21:19:36 +0000
commit99595d0237926b5aba1fe4c844a011a1ba1ee1f8 (patch)
treea879592fe82042e78304919532aeaa89fcf98ce5
parenta73a3ff127df1b35d6771f7d3ce36373def8398f (diff)
[ARM] 3308/1: old ABI compat: struct sockaddr_un
Patch from Nicolas Pitre struct sockaddr_un loses its padding with EABI. Since the size of the structure is used as a validation test in unix_mkname(), we need to change the length argument to 110 whenever it is 112. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@cam.org> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
-rw-r--r--arch/arm/kernel/calls.S8
-rw-r--r--arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c71
2 files changed, 75 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/calls.S b/arch/arm/kernel/calls.S
index d058e7c12568..8c3035d5ffc9 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/calls.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/calls.S
@@ -291,21 +291,21 @@
CALL(sys_mq_getsetattr)
/* 280 */ CALL(sys_waitid)
CALL(sys_socket)
- CALL(sys_bind)
- CALL(sys_connect)
+ CALL(ABI(sys_bind, sys_oabi_bind))
+ CALL(ABI(sys_connect, sys_oabi_connect))
CALL(sys_listen)
/* 285 */ CALL(sys_accept)
CALL(sys_getsockname)
CALL(sys_getpeername)
CALL(sys_socketpair)
CALL(sys_send)
-/* 290 */ CALL(sys_sendto)
+/* 290 */ CALL(ABI(sys_sendto, sys_oabi_sendto))
CALL(sys_recv)
CALL(sys_recvfrom)
CALL(sys_shutdown)
CALL(sys_setsockopt)
/* 295 */ CALL(sys_getsockopt)
- CALL(sys_sendmsg)
+ CALL(ABI(sys_sendmsg, sys_oabi_sendmsg))
CALL(sys_recvmsg)
CALL(ABI(sys_semop, sys_oabi_semop))
CALL(sys_semget)
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c b/arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c
index eafa8e5284af..9d4b76409c64 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c
@@ -59,6 +59,16 @@
* struct sembuf loses its padding with EABI. Since arrays of them are
* used they have to be copyed to remove the padding. Compatibility wrappers
* provided below.
+ *
+ * sys_bind:
+ * sys_connect:
+ * sys_sendmsg:
+ * sys_sendto:
+ *
+ * struct sockaddr_un loses its padding with EABI. Since the size of the
+ * structure is used as a validation test in unix_mkname(), we need to
+ * change the length argument to 110 whenever it is 112. Compatibility
+ * wrappers provided below.
*/
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
@@ -67,6 +77,7 @@
#include <linux/fcntl.h>
#include <linux/eventpoll.h>
#include <linux/sem.h>
+#include <linux/socket.h>
#include <asm/ipc.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -337,3 +348,63 @@ asmlinkage int sys_oabi_ipc(uint call, int first, int second, int third,
return sys_ipc(call, first, second, third, ptr, fifth);
}
}
+
+asmlinkage long sys_oabi_bind(int fd, struct sockaddr __user *addr, int addrlen)
+{
+ sa_family_t sa_family;
+ if (addrlen == 112 &&
+ get_user(sa_family, &addr->sa_family) == 0 &&
+ sa_family == AF_UNIX)
+ addrlen = 110;
+ return sys_bind(fd, addr, addrlen);
+}
+
+asmlinkage long sys_oabi_connect(int fd, struct sockaddr __user *addr, int addrlen)
+{
+ sa_family_t sa_family;
+ if (addrlen == 112 &&
+ get_user(sa_family, &addr->sa_family) == 0 &&
+ sa_family == AF_UNIX)
+ addrlen = 110;
+ return sys_connect(fd, addr, addrlen);
+}
+
+asmlinkage long sys_oabi_sendto(int fd, void __user *buff,
+ size_t len, unsigned flags,
+ struct sockaddr __user *addr,
+ int addrlen)
+{
+ sa_family_t sa_family;
+ if (addrlen == 112 &&
+ get_user(sa_family, &addr->sa_family) == 0 &&
+ sa_family == AF_UNIX)
+ addrlen = 110;
+ return sys_sendto(fd, buff, len, flags, addr, addrlen);
+}
+
+asmlinkage long sys_oabi_sendmsg(int fd, struct msghdr __user *msg, unsigned flags)
+{
+ struct sockaddr __user *addr;
+ int msg_namelen;
+ sa_family_t sa_family;
+ if (msg &&
+ get_user(msg_namelen, &msg->msg_namelen) == 0 &&
+ msg_namelen == 112 &&
+ get_user(addr, &msg->msg_name) == 0 &&
+ get_user(sa_family, &addr->sa_family) == 0 &&
+ sa_family == AF_UNIX)
+ {
+ /*
+ * HACK ALERT: there is a limit to how much backward bending
+ * we should do for what is actually a transitional
+ * compatibility layer. This already has known flaws with
+ * a few ioctls that we don't intend to fix. Therefore
+ * consider this blatent hack as another one... and take care
+ * to run for cover. In most cases it will "just work fine".
+ * If it doesn't, well, tough.
+ */
+ put_user(110, &msg->msg_namelen);
+ }
+ return sys_sendmsg(fd, msg, flags);
+}
+