diff options
| author | Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> | 2020-11-20 11:06:59 +1100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2020-11-22 09:56:57 +0100 |
| commit | 4a1e90af718d1489ffcecc8f52486c4f5dc0f7a6 (patch) | |
| tree | fdcfd3e0ee354285f70377dd7c51d83e9e406ac2 /arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S | |
| parent | f65bd491ca41e2a19edc92715ddb04e87cca0db9 (diff) | |
powerpc/64s: flush L1D on kernel entry
commit f79643787e0a0762d2409b7b8334e83f22d85695 upstream.
IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache before
it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It is not possible
for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible memory using this method,
since these systems implement a combination of hardware and software security measures
to prevent scenarios where protected data could be leaked.
However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that the
attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass "kernel
user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony Steinhauser of
Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself, but there is a possibility
it could be used in conjunction with side-channels or other weaknesses in the
privileged code to construct an attack.
This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege boundaries
of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache on kernel entry.
This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S | 38 |
1 files changed, 38 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S index 3d843e1a162c..7715fd89bb94 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S @@ -1712,6 +1712,44 @@ hrfi_flush_fallback: GET_SCRATCH0(r13); hrfid + .globl entry_flush_fallback +entry_flush_fallback: + std r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13) + std r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13) + std r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13) + mfctr r9 + ld r10,PACA_RFI_FLUSH_FALLBACK_AREA(r13) + ld r11,PACA_L1D_FLUSH_SIZE(r13) + srdi r11,r11,(7 + 3) /* 128 byte lines, unrolled 8x */ + mtctr r11 + DCBT_STOP_ALL_STREAM_IDS(r11) /* Stop prefetch streams */ + + /* order ld/st prior to dcbt stop all streams with flushing */ + sync + + /* + * The load addresses are at staggered offsets within cachelines, + * which suits some pipelines better (on others it should not + * hurt). + */ +1: + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*0(r10) + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*1(r10) + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*2(r10) + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*3(r10) + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*4(r10) + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*5(r10) + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*6(r10) + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*7(r10) + addi r10,r10,0x80*8 + bdnz 1b + + mtctr r9 + ld r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13) + ld r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13) + ld r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13) + blr + /* * Hash table stuff */ |