diff options
| author | Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> | 2017-12-04 15:07:29 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2017-12-25 14:26:24 +0100 |
| commit | 25e2999e630c744c27c9179d1279c7f9d503385e (patch) | |
| tree | 34453c5f8d2db94701e5cec5307bace4e192ce15 /arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | |
| parent | e313437c85da22a26fe1ba01d94abec7698b1987 (diff) | |
x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-only
commit c482feefe1aeb150156248ba0fd3e029bc886605 upstream.
The TSS is a fairly juicy target for exploits, and, now that the TSS
is in the cpu_entry_area, it's no longer protected by kASLR. Make it
read-only on x86_64.
On x86_32, it can't be RO because it's written by the CPU during task
switches, and we use a task gate for double faults. I'd also be
nervous about errata if we tried to make it RO even on configurations
without double fault handling.
[ tglx: AMD confirmed that there is no problem on 64-bit with TSS RO. So
it's probably safe to assume that it's a non issue, though Intel
might have been creative in that area. Still waiting for
confirmation. ]
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.733700132@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 17 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h index f933869470b8..e8991d7f7034 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h @@ -340,13 +340,11 @@ struct SYSENTER_stack { unsigned long words[64]; }; -struct tss_struct { - /* - * Space for the temporary SYSENTER stack, used for SYSENTER - * and the entry trampoline as well. - */ - struct SYSENTER_stack SYSENTER_stack; +struct SYSENTER_stack_page { + struct SYSENTER_stack stack; +} __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); +struct tss_struct { /* * The fixed hardware portion. This must not cross a page boundary * at risk of violating the SDM's advice and potentially triggering @@ -363,7 +361,7 @@ struct tss_struct { unsigned long io_bitmap[IO_BITMAP_LONGS + 1]; } __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); -DECLARE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct tss_struct, cpu_tss); +DECLARE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct tss_struct, cpu_tss_rw); /* * sizeof(unsigned long) coming from an extra "long" at the end @@ -378,7 +376,8 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct tss_struct, cpu_tss); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 DECLARE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, cpu_current_top_of_stack); #else -#define cpu_current_top_of_stack cpu_tss.x86_tss.sp1 +/* The RO copy can't be accessed with this_cpu_xyz(), so use the RW copy. */ +#define cpu_current_top_of_stack cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.sp1 #endif /* @@ -538,7 +537,7 @@ static inline void native_set_iopl_mask(unsigned mask) static inline void native_load_sp0(unsigned long sp0) { - this_cpu_write(cpu_tss.x86_tss.sp0, sp0); + this_cpu_write(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.sp0, sp0); } static inline void native_swapgs(void) |