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authorKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>2019-04-12 17:50:58 -0400
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2019-05-14 19:18:46 +0200
commitb86151879fa5ee74ebcd76ed54ad59bc27d79b8b (patch)
tree462c6494a2b89ab77ccb0439408f824973c3deba /arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
parent56932cc808295621afaea9331f5c6be79af655c8 (diff)
x86/speculation/mds: Print SMT vulnerable on MSBDS with mitigations off
commit e2c3c94788b08891dcf3dbe608f9880523ecd71b upstream This code is only for CPUs which are affected by MSBDS, but are *not* affected by the other two MDS issues. For such CPUs, enabling the mds_idle_clear mitigation is enough to mitigate SMT. However if user boots with 'mds=off' and still has SMT enabled, we should not report that SMT is mitigated: $cat /sys//devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds Vulnerable; SMT mitigated But rather: Vulnerable; SMT vulnerable Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190412215118.294906495@localhost.localdomain Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c3
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index a1aab2a5afe7..e4016b33b761 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1186,7 +1186,8 @@ static ssize_t mds_show_state(char *buf)
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY)) {
return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation],
- sched_smt_active() ? "mitigated" : "disabled");
+ (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF ? "vulnerable" :
+ sched_smt_active() ? "mitigated" : "disabled"));
}
return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation],