summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>2017-08-01 07:11:34 -0700
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2017-09-20 08:19:57 +0200
commitc7d1ddec251d39415cd488c29e9d60b22d4b61b7 (patch)
treeb22b5c916c460283c4a0df491d4e28a7be619efd /arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
parentcc9618c9fffe6bd362f048928e15effe04e5b6cd (diff)
x86/fsgsbase/64: Fully initialize FS and GS state in start_thread_common
commit 767d035d838f4fd6b5a5bbd7a3f6d293b7f65a49 upstream. execve used to leak FSBASE and GSBASE on AMD CPUs. Fix it. The security impact of this bug is small but not quite zero -- it could weaken ASLR when a privileged task execs a less privileged program, but only if program changed bitness across the exec, or the child binary was highly unusual or actively malicious. A child program that was compromised after the exec would not have access to the leaked base. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Chang Seok <chang.seok.bae@intel.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c9
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
index b3760b3c1ca0..02fa4701cc2e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -216,10 +216,19 @@ start_thread_common(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long new_ip,
unsigned long new_sp,
unsigned int _cs, unsigned int _ss, unsigned int _ds)
{
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(regs != current_pt_regs());
+
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_BUG_NULL_SEG)) {
+ /* Loading zero below won't clear the base. */
+ loadsegment(fs, __USER_DS);
+ load_gs_index(__USER_DS);
+ }
+
loadsegment(fs, 0);
loadsegment(es, _ds);
loadsegment(ds, _ds);
load_gs_index(0);
+
regs->ip = new_ip;
regs->sp = new_sp;
regs->cs = _cs;