diff options
| author | Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> | 2018-10-16 16:32:40 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2018-11-10 07:41:42 -0800 |
| commit | 17eb02cc26926b879015590a86380e431048057e (patch) | |
| tree | 5a0e49b05eb97e5d02d357b337db1e654a64038b /drivers/infiniband | |
| parent | 6ede39a8e1f64babac7e50e989f8b6535e7e7dde (diff) | |
IB/ucm: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
commit 0295e39595e1146522f2722715dba7f7fba42217 upstream.
hdr.cmd can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/infiniband/core/ucm.c:1127 ib_ucm_write() warn: potential
spectre issue 'ucm_cmd_table' [r] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing hdr.cmd before using it to index
ucm_cmd_table.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/infiniband')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/infiniband/core/ucm.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucm.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucm.c index 564adf3116e8..4b3a00855f52 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucm.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucm.c @@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> + #include <asm/uaccess.h> #include <rdma/ib.h> @@ -1115,6 +1117,7 @@ static ssize_t ib_ucm_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, if (hdr.cmd >= ARRAY_SIZE(ucm_cmd_table)) return -EINVAL; + hdr.cmd = array_index_nospec(hdr.cmd, ARRAY_SIZE(ucm_cmd_table)); if (hdr.in + sizeof(hdr) > len) return -EINVAL; |