diff options
| author | Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> | 2015-02-05 10:37:33 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2015-10-01 12:07:34 +0200 |
| commit | fa83234f6a4e7b378f0da63938a09b9e8d535c4d (patch) | |
| tree | b40d40ee91f8f7be55594917b4c301ff47142e35 /drivers | |
| parent | 7bf24986e3c2e4b818be4a6172aebb3784c6bcda (diff) | |
vhost/scsi: potential memory corruption
commit 59c816c1f24df0204e01851431d3bab3eb76719c upstream.
This code in vhost_scsi_make_tpg() is confusing because we limit "tpgt"
to UINT_MAX but the data type of "tpg->tport_tpgt" and that is a u16.
I looked at the context and it turns out that in
vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(), "tpg->tport_tpgt" is used as an offset into
the vs_tpg[] array which has VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET (256) elements so
anything higher than 255 then it is invalid. I have made that the limit
now.
In vhost_scsi_send_evt() we mask away values higher than 255, but now
that the limit has changed, we don't need the mask.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
[ The affected function was renamed to vhost_scsi_make_tpg before
the vulnerability was announced, I ported it to 3.10 stable and
changed the code in function tcm_vhost_make_tpg]
Signed-off-by: Wang Long <long.wanglong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/vhost/scsi.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/vhost/scsi.c b/drivers/vhost/scsi.c index fb97bc0b80e7..2947eda522b2 100644 --- a/drivers/vhost/scsi.c +++ b/drivers/vhost/scsi.c @@ -1088,7 +1088,7 @@ static void tcm_vhost_send_evt(struct vhost_scsi *vs, struct tcm_vhost_tpg *tpg, * lun[4-7] need to be zero according to virtio-scsi spec. */ evt->event.lun[0] = 0x01; - evt->event.lun[1] = tpg->tport_tpgt & 0xFF; + evt->event.lun[1] = tpg->tport_tpgt; if (lun->unpacked_lun >= 256) evt->event.lun[2] = lun->unpacked_lun >> 8 | 0x40 ; evt->event.lun[3] = lun->unpacked_lun & 0xFF; @@ -1894,12 +1894,12 @@ static struct se_portal_group *tcm_vhost_make_tpg(struct se_wwn *wwn, struct tcm_vhost_tport, tport_wwn); struct tcm_vhost_tpg *tpg; - unsigned long tpgt; + u16 tpgt; int ret; if (strstr(name, "tpgt_") != name) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - if (kstrtoul(name + 5, 10, &tpgt) || tpgt > UINT_MAX) + if (kstrtou16(name + 5, 10, &tpgt) || tpgt >= VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); tpg = kzalloc(sizeof(struct tcm_vhost_tpg), GFP_KERNEL); |