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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2012-08-22 09:56:06 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2012-08-22 09:56:06 -0700
commit467e9e51d07d43d32a1dd8b6ead2351e28fff084 (patch)
treed925caa3c94036ba2457f0de64b6e6c40236ca46 /fs
parent23dcfa61bac244e1200ff9ad19c6e9144dcb6bb5 (diff)
parent88ec2789d856056344161aa20420dd37e893b0fe (diff)
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull assorted fixes - mostly vfs - from Al Viro: "Assorted fixes, with an unexpected detour into vfio refcounting logics (fell out when digging in an analog of eventpoll race in there)." * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: task_work: add a scheduling point in task_work_run() fs: fix fs/namei.c kernel-doc warnings eventpoll: use-after-possible-free in epoll_create1() vfio: grab vfio_device reference *before* exposing the sucker via fd_install() vfio: get rid of vfio_device_put()/vfio_group_get_device* races vfio: get rid of open-coding kref_put_mutex introduce kref_put_mutex() vfio: don't dereference after kfree... mqueue: lift mnt_want_write() outside ->i_mutex, clean up a bit
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
-rw-r--r--fs/eventpoll.c2
-rw-r--r--fs/namei.c2
2 files changed, 3 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/fs/eventpoll.c b/fs/eventpoll.c
index 1c8b55670804..eedec84c1809 100644
--- a/fs/eventpoll.c
+++ b/fs/eventpoll.c
@@ -1654,8 +1654,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(epoll_create1, int, flags)
error = PTR_ERR(file);
goto out_free_fd;
}
- fd_install(fd, file);
ep->file = file;
+ fd_install(fd, file);
return fd;
out_free_fd:
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index db76b866a097..dd1ed1b8e98e 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -352,6 +352,7 @@ int __inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
/**
* sb_permission - Check superblock-level permissions
* @sb: Superblock of inode to check permission on
+ * @inode: Inode to check permission on
* @mask: Right to check for (%MAY_READ, %MAY_WRITE, %MAY_EXEC)
*
* Separate out file-system wide checks from inode-specific permission checks.
@@ -656,6 +657,7 @@ int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 1;
/**
* may_follow_link - Check symlink following for unsafe situations
* @link: The path of the symlink
+ * @nd: nameidata pathwalk data
*
* In the case of the sysctl_protected_symlinks sysctl being enabled,
* CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE needs to be specifically ignored if the symlink is