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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2015-09-01 16:13:25 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2015-09-01 16:13:25 -0700 |
| commit | 73b6fa8e49c2d13e04d20186261e5f7855c6d0bf (patch) | |
| tree | 75c972b9f5284d84db83c6eae63611e96c827c57 /include/linux/fs.h | |
| parent | e713c80a4e49d4bed5324d24755e42bf01c87556 (diff) | |
| parent | 4b75de8615050c1b0dd8d7794838c42f74ed36ba (diff) | |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"This finishes up the changes to ensure proc and sysfs do not start
implementing executable files, as the there are application today that
are only secure because such files do not exist.
It akso fixes a long standing misfeature of /proc/<pid>/mountinfo that
did not show the proper source for files bind mounted from
/proc/<pid>/ns/*.
It also straightens out the handling of clone flags related to user
namespaces, fixing an unnecessary failure of unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER)
when files such as /proc/<pid>/environ are read while <pid> is calling
unshare. This winds up fixing a minor bug in unshare flag handling
that dates back to the first version of unshare in the kernel.
Finally, this fixes a minor regression caused by the introduction of
sysfs_create_mount_point, which broke someone's in house application,
by restoring the size of /sys/fs/cgroup to 0 bytes. Apparently that
application uses the directory size to determine if a tmpfs is mounted
on /sys/fs/cgroup.
The bind mount escape fixes are present in Al Viros for-next branch.
and I expect them to come from there. The bind mount escape is the
last of the user namespace related security bugs that I am aware of"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
fs: Set the size of empty dirs to 0.
userns,pidns: Force thread group sharing, not signal handler sharing.
unshare: Unsharing a thread does not require unsharing a vm
nsfs: Add a show_path method to fix mountinfo
mnt: fs_fully_visible enforce noexec and nosuid if !SB_I_NOEXEC
vfs: Commit to never having exectuables on proc and sysfs.
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux/fs.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/fs.h | 3 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index 84b783f277f7..fbd780c33c5f 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -1260,6 +1260,7 @@ struct mm_struct; /* sb->s_iflags */ #define SB_I_CGROUPWB 0x00000001 /* cgroup-aware writeback enabled */ +#define SB_I_NOEXEC 0x00000002 /* Ignore executables on this fs */ /* Possible states of 'frozen' field */ enum { @@ -3041,4 +3042,6 @@ static inline bool dir_relax(struct inode *inode) return !IS_DEADDIR(inode); } +extern bool path_noexec(const struct path *path); + #endif /* _LINUX_FS_H */ |