diff options
| author | Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> | 2014-12-05 18:01:11 -0600 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2015-01-08 10:00:50 -0800 |
| commit | f077e88fc9f0befcf0441be2fed9516881ab02ef (patch) | |
| tree | 75071c6d3e84f07f38592707615ac3a9bbc8c66c /kernel/groups.c | |
| parent | 096b0c8d7033ef56d4c0eb13a29865a021eedea5 (diff) | |
userns: Don't allow setgroups until a gid mapping has been setablished
commit 273d2c67c3e179adb1e74f403d1e9a06e3f841b5 upstream.
setgroups is unique in not needing a valid mapping before it can be called,
in the case of setgroups(0, NULL) which drops all supplemental groups.
The design of the user namespace assumes that CAP_SETGID can not actually
be used until a gid mapping is established. Therefore add a helper function
to see if the user namespace gid mapping has been established and call
that function in the setgroups permission check.
This is part of the fix for CVE-2014-8989, being able to drop groups
without privilege using user namespaces.
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/groups.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/groups.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/groups.c b/kernel/groups.c index 984bb629c68c..67b4ba30475f 100644 --- a/kernel/groups.c +++ b/kernel/groups.c @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> /* init to 2 - one for init_task, one to ensure it is never freed */ @@ -227,7 +228,8 @@ bool may_setgroups(void) { struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns(); - return ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SETGID); + return ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SETGID) && + userns_may_setgroups(user_ns); } /* |