diff options
author | Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> | 2017-09-05 14:54:54 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2017-11-18 11:22:23 +0100 |
commit | 2586fa0007dc6b7745da14250be7e3aae706b128 (patch) | |
tree | ddb7f91c433b39ab6e8728d352aa94428ea4814c /net/6lowpan | |
parent | ac4cfc730e4b39d1367d636a996b965af0557bc3 (diff) |
mac80211: accept key reinstall without changing anything
commit fdf7cb4185b60c68e1a75e61691c4afdc15dea0e upstream.
When a key is reinstalled we can reset the replay counters
etc. which can lead to nonce reuse and/or replay detection
being impossible, breaking security properties, as described
in the "KRACK attacks".
In particular, CVE-2017-13080 applies to GTK rekeying that
happened in firmware while the host is in D3, with the second
part of the attack being done after the host wakes up. In
this case, the wpa_supplicant mitigation isn't sufficient
since wpa_supplicant doesn't know the GTK material.
In case this happens, simply silently accept the new key
coming from userspace but don't take any action on it since
it's the same key; this keeps the PN replay counters intact.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/6lowpan')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions