diff options
| author | Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> | 2019-03-27 08:21:30 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2019-04-17 08:37:50 +0200 |
| commit | adbb8bdd392db14dc80ad1ac29f8f1d37ab57a62 (patch) | |
| tree | 3a97be430b3d390b97e8ec73eb1219e99d19c3c4 /net/core | |
| parent | 0349ad0656a3ea2e6ecb55da946a7000f6abdba5 (diff) | |
netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()
[ Upstream commit 355b98553789b646ed97ad801a619ff898471b92 ]
net_hash_mix() currently uses kernel address of a struct net,
and is used in many places that could be used to reveal this
address to a patient attacker, thus defeating KASLR, for
the typical case (initial net namespace, &init_net is
not dynamically allocated)
I believe the original implementation tried to avoid spending
too many cycles in this function, but security comes first.
Also provide entropy regardless of CONFIG_NET_NS.
Fixes: 0b4419162aa6 ("netns: introduce the net_hash_mix "salt" for hashes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/core')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/core/net_namespace.c | 1 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/core/net_namespace.c b/net/core/net_namespace.c index 0dd6359e5924..60b88718b1d4 100644 --- a/net/core/net_namespace.c +++ b/net/core/net_namespace.c @@ -285,6 +285,7 @@ static __net_init int setup_net(struct net *net, struct user_namespace *user_ns) atomic_set(&net->count, 1); refcount_set(&net->passive, 1); + get_random_bytes(&net->hash_mix, sizeof(u32)); net->dev_base_seq = 1; net->user_ns = user_ns; idr_init(&net->netns_ids); |