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authorMathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>2012-09-13 11:41:26 +0000
committerBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>2012-10-10 03:31:21 +0100
commit468bf9f70353872173b11b92dc15fe84d3dacbb4 (patch)
tree1b5ff3c0aff771fcbf4cfeea860bc8743913157c /net/xfrm
parentbf08fec505c1ab6a12679c214d7ccd20c8841382 (diff)
xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL
[ Upstream commit 864745d291b5ba80ea0bd0edcbe67273de368836 ] When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff. This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map address 0. Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/xfrm')
-rw-r--r--net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c6
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index 7cae73eb4dbe..a092828fa691 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -862,6 +862,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *xfrm_state_netlink(struct sk_buff *in_skb,
{
struct xfrm_dump_info info;
struct sk_buff *skb;
+ int err;
skb = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
@@ -872,9 +873,10 @@ static struct sk_buff *xfrm_state_netlink(struct sk_buff *in_skb,
info.nlmsg_seq = seq;
info.nlmsg_flags = 0;
- if (dump_one_state(x, 0, &info)) {
+ err = dump_one_state(x, 0, &info);
+ if (err) {
kfree_skb(skb);
- return NULL;
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
}
return skb;