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authorJohan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@nokia.com>2011-01-19 12:06:50 +0530
committerGustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>2011-01-19 14:40:43 -0200
commit8556edd32f01c50a3c99e44dc2c3b1252ea59605 (patch)
treeb0e9d426b7a17ad201c782d4e0c09fbddfe81730 /net
parent65cf686ee102b7eb0477a4bab82ff227071a0258 (diff)
Bluetooth: Create a unified auth_type evaluation function
The logic for determining the needed auth_type for an L2CAP socket is rather complicated and has so far been duplicated in l2cap_check_security as well as l2cap_do_connect. Additionally the l2cap_check_security code was completely missing the handling of SOCK_RAW type sockets. This patch creates a unified function for the evaluation and makes l2cap_do_connect and l2cap_check_security use that function. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@nokia.com> Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/l2cap.c77
1 files changed, 28 insertions, 49 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c
index 4fd88eb0a464..ae227bf25563 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c
@@ -305,33 +305,44 @@ static void l2cap_chan_del(struct sock *sk, int err)
}
}
-/* Service level security */
-static inline int l2cap_check_security(struct sock *sk)
+static inline u8 l2cap_get_auth_type(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct l2cap_conn *conn = l2cap_pi(sk)->conn;
- __u8 auth_type;
+ if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_RAW) {
+ switch (l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level) {
+ case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
+ return HCI_AT_DEDICATED_BONDING_MITM;
+ case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
+ return HCI_AT_DEDICATED_BONDING;
+ default:
+ return HCI_AT_NO_BONDING;
+ }
+ } else if (l2cap_pi(sk)->psm == cpu_to_le16(0x0001)) {
+ if (l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW)
+ l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_SDP;
- if (l2cap_pi(sk)->psm == cpu_to_le16(0x0001)) {
if (l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
- auth_type = HCI_AT_NO_BONDING_MITM;
+ return HCI_AT_NO_BONDING_MITM;
else
- auth_type = HCI_AT_NO_BONDING;
-
- if (l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW)
- l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_SDP;
+ return HCI_AT_NO_BONDING;
} else {
switch (l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level) {
case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
- auth_type = HCI_AT_GENERAL_BONDING_MITM;
- break;
+ return HCI_AT_GENERAL_BONDING_MITM;
case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
- auth_type = HCI_AT_GENERAL_BONDING;
- break;
+ return HCI_AT_GENERAL_BONDING;
default:
- auth_type = HCI_AT_NO_BONDING;
- break;
+ return HCI_AT_NO_BONDING;
}
}
+}
+
+/* Service level security */
+static inline int l2cap_check_security(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = l2cap_pi(sk)->conn;
+ __u8 auth_type;
+
+ auth_type = l2cap_get_auth_type(sk);
return hci_conn_security(conn->hcon, l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level,
auth_type);
@@ -1068,39 +1079,7 @@ static int l2cap_do_connect(struct sock *sk)
err = -ENOMEM;
- if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_RAW) {
- switch (l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level) {
- case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
- auth_type = HCI_AT_DEDICATED_BONDING_MITM;
- break;
- case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
- auth_type = HCI_AT_DEDICATED_BONDING;
- break;
- default:
- auth_type = HCI_AT_NO_BONDING;
- break;
- }
- } else if (l2cap_pi(sk)->psm == cpu_to_le16(0x0001)) {
- if (l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
- auth_type = HCI_AT_NO_BONDING_MITM;
- else
- auth_type = HCI_AT_NO_BONDING;
-
- if (l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW)
- l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_SDP;
- } else {
- switch (l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level) {
- case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
- auth_type = HCI_AT_GENERAL_BONDING_MITM;
- break;
- case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
- auth_type = HCI_AT_GENERAL_BONDING;
- break;
- default:
- auth_type = HCI_AT_NO_BONDING;
- break;
- }
- }
+ auth_type = l2cap_get_auth_type(sk);
hcon = hci_connect(hdev, ACL_LINK, dst,
l2cap_pi(sk)->sec_level, auth_type);