diff options
| author | Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> | 2011-03-15 13:37:13 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> | 2011-04-28 08:20:57 -0700 |
| commit | 29701eac578602bcb6a1a034b964cb75656c6939 (patch) | |
| tree | 332e5ac49feb89e8471d87cba741aafe2e61eca0 /net | |
| parent | 9c09bd6e205093f8344028671260efd1687f26b9 (diff) | |
ipv6: netfilter: ip6_tables: fix infoleak to userspace
commit 6a8ab060779779de8aea92ce3337ca348f973f54 upstream.
Structures ip6t_replace, compat_ip6t_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.
The first bug was introduced before the git epoch; the second was
introduced in 3bc3fe5e (v2.6.25-rc1); the third is introduced by
6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have
CAP_NET_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c index 211229887e2c..008e1861ad2d 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c @@ -1289,6 +1289,7 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user, unsigned int len) /* overflow check */ if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters)) return -ENOMEM; + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0; newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size); if (!newinfo) @@ -1835,6 +1836,7 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, unsigned int len) return -ENOMEM; if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters)) return -ENOMEM; + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0; newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size); if (!newinfo) @@ -2064,6 +2066,7 @@ do_ip6t_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len) ret = -EFAULT; break; } + rev.name[sizeof(rev.name)-1] = 0; if (cmd == IP6T_SO_GET_REVISION_TARGET) target = 1; |