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authorDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>2008-08-14 11:37:28 +0100
committerJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>2008-08-14 22:59:43 +1000
commit5cd9c58fbe9ec92b45b27e131719af4f2bd9eb40 (patch)
tree8573db001b4dc3c2ad97102dda42b841c40b5f6c /security/root_plug.c
parent8d0968abd03ec6b407df117adc773562386702fa (diff)
security: Fix setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable()
Fix the setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() as it could corrupt the flags the target process if that is not the current process and it is trying to change its own flags in a different way at the same time. __capable() is using neither atomic ops nor locking to protect t->flags. This patch removes __capable() and introduces has_capability() that doesn't set PF_SUPERPRIV on the process being queried. This patch further splits security_ptrace() in two: (1) security_ptrace_may_access(). This passes judgement on whether one process may access another only (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH for ptrace() and PTRACE_MODE_READ for /proc), and takes a pointer to the child process. current is the parent. (2) security_ptrace_traceme(). This passes judgement on PTRACE_TRACEME only, and takes only a pointer to the parent process. current is the child. In Smack and commoncap, this uses has_capability() to determine whether the parent will be permitted to use PTRACE_ATTACH if normal checks fail. This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV. Two of the instances of __capable() actually only act on current, and so have been changed to calls to capable(). Of the places that were using __capable(): (1) The OOM killer calls __capable() thrice when weighing the killability of a process. All of these now use has_capability(). (2) cap_ptrace() and smack_ptrace() were using __capable() to check to see whether the parent was allowed to trace any process. As mentioned above, these have been split. For PTRACE_ATTACH and /proc, capable() is now used, and for PTRACE_TRACEME, has_capability() is used. (3) cap_safe_nice() only ever saw current, so now uses capable(). (4) smack_setprocattr() rejected accesses to tasks other than current just after calling __capable(), so the order of these two tests have been switched and capable() is used instead. (5) In smack_file_send_sigiotask(), we need to allow privileged processes to receive SIGIO on files they're manipulating. (6) In smack_task_wait(), we let a process wait for a privileged process, whether or not the process doing the waiting is privileged. I've tested this with the LTP SELinux and syscalls testscripts. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/root_plug.c')
-rw-r--r--security/root_plug.c3
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/root_plug.c b/security/root_plug.c
index be0ebec2580b..c3f68b5b372d 100644
--- a/security/root_plug.c
+++ b/security/root_plug.c
@@ -72,7 +72,8 @@ static int rootplug_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
static struct security_operations rootplug_security_ops = {
/* Use the capability functions for some of the hooks */
- .ptrace = cap_ptrace,
+ .ptrace_may_access = cap_ptrace_may_access,
+ .ptrace_traceme = cap_ptrace_traceme,
.capget = cap_capget,
.capset_check = cap_capset_check,
.capset_set = cap_capset_set,