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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2011-03-16 09:15:43 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2011-03-16 09:15:43 -0700
commit0f6e0e8448a16d8d22119ce91d8dd24b44865b51 (patch)
tree7c295c02db035fc6a0b867465911a2bc9dc6b1ef /security
parent0d2ecee2bdb2a19d04bc5cefac0f86e790f1aad4 (diff)
parenta002951c97ff8da49938c982a4c236bf2fafdc9f (diff)
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (33 commits) AppArmor: kill unused macros in lsm.c AppArmor: cleanup generated files correctly KEYS: Add an iovec version of KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE KEYS: Add a new keyctl op to reject a key with a specified error code KEYS: Add a key type op to permit the key description to be vetted KEYS: Add an RCU payload dereference macro AppArmor: Cleanup make file to remove cruft and make it easier to read SELinux: implement the new sb_remount LSM hook LSM: Pass -o remount options to the LSM SELinux: Compute SID for the newly created socket SELinux: Socket retains creator role and MLS attribute SELinux: Auto-generate security_is_socket_class TOMOYO: Fix memory leak upon file open. Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking" selinux: drop unused packet flow permissions selinux: Fix packet forwarding checks on postrouting selinux: Fix wrong checks for selinux_policycap_netpeer selinux: Fix check for xfrm selinux context algorithm ima: remove unnecessary call to ima_must_measure IMA: remove IMA imbalance checking ...
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/Makefile38
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lsm.c2
-rw-r--r--security/capability.c15
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima.h3
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c13
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c5
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c136
-rw-r--r--security/keys/compat.c50
-rw-r--r--security/keys/encrypted.c3
-rw-r--r--security/keys/internal.h8
-rw-r--r--security/keys/key.c27
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c143
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyring.c4
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted.c3
-rw-r--r--security/keys/user_defined.c3
-rw-r--r--security/security.c19
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c350
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/classmap.h7
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/security.h8
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/avtab.h23
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h1
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/mls.c5
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/mls.h3
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.c130
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.h14
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c73
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/xfrm.c2
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack.h17
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_access.c52
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c287
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smackfs.c370
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/file.c5
33 files changed, 1243 insertions, 578 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
index f204869399ea..2dafe50a2e25 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -6,19 +6,47 @@ apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
resource.o sid.o file.o
-clean-files: capability_names.h af_names.h
+clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
+
+# Build a lower case string table of capability names
+# Transforms lines from
+# #define CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE 1
+# to
+# [1] = "dac_override",
quiet_cmd_make-caps = GEN $@
-cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *capability_names[] = {" > $@ ; sed -n -e "/CAP_FS_MASK/d" -e "s/^\#define[ \\t]\\+CAP_\\([A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)[ \\t]\\+\\([0-9]\\+\\)\$$/[\\2] = \"\\1\",/p" $< | tr A-Z a-z >> $@ ; echo "};" >> $@
+cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+ sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e '/CAP_FS_MASK/d' \
+ -e 's/^\#define[ \t]+CAP_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
+ echo "};" >> $@
+
+# Build a lower case string table of rlimit names.
+# Transforms lines from
+# #define RLIMIT_STACK 3 /* max stack size */
+# to
+# [RLIMIT_STACK] = "stack",
+#
+# and build a second integer table (with the second sed cmd), that maps
+# RLIMIT defines to the order defined in asm-generic/resource.h Thi is
+# required by policy load to map policy ordering of RLIMITs to internal
+# ordering for architectures that redefine an RLIMIT.
+# Transforms lines from
+# #define RLIMIT_STACK 3 /* max stack size */
+# to
+# RLIMIT_STACK,
quiet_cmd_make-rlim = GEN $@
-cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *rlim_names[] = {" > $@ ; sed -n --e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "s/^\# \\?define[ \\t]\\+RLIMIT_\\([A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)[ \\t]\\+\\([0-9]\\+\\)\\(.*\\)\$$/[\\2] = \"\\1\",/p" $< | tr A-Z a-z >> $@ ; echo "};" >> $@ ; echo "static const int rlim_map[] = {" >> $@ ; sed -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "s/^\# \\?define[ \\t]\\+\\(RLIMIT_[A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)[ \\t]\\+\\([0-9]\\+\\)\\(.*\\)\$$/\\1,/p" $< >> $@ ; echo "};" >> $@
+cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *rlim_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+ sed $< >> $@ -r -n \
+ -e 's/^\# ?define[ \t]+(RLIMIT_([A-Z0-9_]+)).*/[\1] = "\L\2",/p';\
+ echo "};" >> $@ ;\
+ echo "static const int rlim_map[] = {" >> $@ ;\
+ sed -r -n "s/^\# ?define[ \t]+(RLIMIT_[A-Z0-9_]+).*/\1,/p" $< >> $@ ;\
+ echo "};" >> $@
$(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
$(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
$(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h
$(call cmd,make-caps)
-$(obj)/af_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h
- $(call cmd,make-af)
$(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/asm-generic/resource.h
$(call cmd,make-rlim)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index b7106f192b75..d21a427a35ae 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -693,11 +693,9 @@ static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = {
static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
-#define param_check_audit(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
-#define param_check_mode(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
/* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters
* We define special types as we want to do additional mediation.
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 2a5df2b7da83..ab3d807accc3 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -12,11 +12,6 @@
#include <linux/security.h>
-static int cap_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
static int cap_syslog(int type)
{
return 0;
@@ -59,6 +54,11 @@ static int cap_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
return 0;
}
+static int cap_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int cap_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
{
return 0;
@@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ static void cap_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
}
static int cap_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
- char **name, void **value, size_t *len)
+ const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
+ void **value, size_t *len)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
@@ -880,7 +881,6 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capable);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, quotactl);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, quota_on);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sysctl);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, syslog);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, settime);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, vm_enough_memory);
@@ -892,6 +892,7 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_alloc_security);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_free_security);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_copy_data);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_remount);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_kern_mount);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_show_options);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_statfs);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index ac79032bdf23..08408bd71462 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -110,8 +110,7 @@ struct ima_iint_cache {
};
/* LIM API function definitions */
-int ima_must_measure(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode,
- int mask, int function);
+int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function);
int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
const unsigned char *filename);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index d3963de6003d..da36d2c085a4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -105,20 +105,13 @@ err_out:
* mask: contains the permission mask
* fsmagic: hex value
*
- * Must be called with iint->mutex held.
- *
- * Return 0 to measure. Return 1 if already measured.
- * For matching a DONT_MEASURE policy, no policy, or other
- * error, return an error code.
+ * Return 0 to measure. For matching a DONT_MEASURE policy, no policy,
+ * or other error, return an error code.
*/
-int ima_must_measure(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode,
- int mask, int function)
+int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
{
int must_measure;
- if (iint && iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)
- return 1;
-
must_measure = ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask);
return must_measure ? 0 : -EACCES;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
index c442e47b6785..4ae73040ab7b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
@@ -137,11 +137,6 @@ void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
{
struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
- if (inode->i_readcount)
- printk(KERN_INFO "%s: readcount: %u\n", __func__, inode->i_readcount);
-
- inode->i_readcount = 0;
-
if (!IS_IMA(inode))
return;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 203de979d305..39d66dc2b8e9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -36,67 +36,17 @@ static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
}
__setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
-struct ima_imbalance {
- struct hlist_node node;
- unsigned long fsmagic;
-};
-
-/*
- * ima_limit_imbalance - emit one imbalance message per filesystem type
- *
- * Maintain list of filesystem types that do not measure files properly.
- * Return false if unknown, true if known.
- */
-static bool ima_limit_imbalance(struct file *file)
-{
- static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ima_imbalance_lock);
- static HLIST_HEAD(ima_imbalance_list);
-
- struct super_block *sb = file->f_dentry->d_sb;
- struct ima_imbalance *entry;
- struct hlist_node *node;
- bool found = false;
-
- rcu_read_lock();
- hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, node, &ima_imbalance_list, node) {
- if (entry->fsmagic == sb->s_magic) {
- found = true;
- break;
- }
- }
- rcu_read_unlock();
- if (found)
- goto out;
-
- entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_NOFS);
- if (!entry)
- goto out;
- entry->fsmagic = sb->s_magic;
- spin_lock(&ima_imbalance_lock);
- /*
- * we could have raced and something else might have added this fs
- * to the list, but we don't really care
- */
- hlist_add_head_rcu(&entry->node, &ima_imbalance_list);
- spin_unlock(&ima_imbalance_lock);
- printk(KERN_INFO "IMA: unmeasured files on fsmagic: %lX\n",
- entry->fsmagic);
-out:
- return found;
-}
-
/*
- * ima_counts_get - increment file counts
+ * ima_rdwr_violation_check
*
- * Maintain read/write counters for all files, but only
- * invalidate the PCR for measured files:
+ * Only invalidate the PCR for measured files:
* - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
* results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
* - Opening a file for read when already open for write,
* could result in a file measurement error.
*
*/
-void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)
+static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
{
struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
@@ -104,32 +54,25 @@ void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)
int rc;
bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false;
- if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+ if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !ima_initialized)
return;
- spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
-
- if (!ima_initialized)
- goto out;
+ mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); /* file metadata: permissions, xattr */
if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
- if (inode->i_readcount && IS_IMA(inode))
+ if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode))
send_tomtou = true;
goto out;
}
- rc = ima_must_measure(NULL, inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
+ rc = ima_must_measure(inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
if (rc < 0)
goto out;
if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0)
send_writers = true;
out:
- /* remember the vfs deals with i_writecount */
- if ((mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
- inode->i_readcount++;
-
- spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
+ mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
if (send_tomtou)
ima_add_violation(inode, dentry->d_name.name, "invalid_pcr",
@@ -139,71 +82,25 @@ out:
"open_writers");
}
-/*
- * Decrement ima counts
- */
-static void ima_dec_counts(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-{
- mode_t mode = file->f_mode;
-
- assert_spin_locked(&inode->i_lock);
-
- if ((mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ) {
- if (unlikely(inode->i_readcount == 0)) {
- if (!ima_limit_imbalance(file)) {
- printk(KERN_INFO "%s: open/free imbalance (r:%u)\n",
- __func__, inode->i_readcount);
- dump_stack();
- }
- return;
- }
- inode->i_readcount--;
- }
-}
-
static void ima_check_last_writer(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
struct inode *inode,
struct file *file)
{
mode_t mode = file->f_mode;
- BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&iint->mutex));
- assert_spin_locked(&inode->i_lock);
-
+ mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
if (mode & FMODE_WRITE &&
atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1 &&
iint->version != inode->i_version)
iint->flags &= ~IMA_MEASURED;
-}
-
-static void ima_file_free_iint(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode,
- struct file *file)
-{
- mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
- spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
-
- ima_dec_counts(inode, file);
- ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file);
-
- spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
}
-static void ima_file_free_noiint(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-{
- spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
-
- ima_dec_counts(inode, file);
-
- spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
-}
-
/**
* ima_file_free - called on __fput()
* @file: pointer to file structure being freed
*
- * Flag files that changed, based on i_version;
- * and decrement the i_readcount.
+ * Flag files that changed, based on i_version
*/
void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
{
@@ -214,12 +111,10 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
return;
iint = ima_iint_find(inode);
+ if (!iint)
+ return;
- if (iint)
- ima_file_free_iint(iint, inode, file);
- else
- ima_file_free_noiint(inode, file);
-
+ ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file);
}
static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
@@ -232,7 +127,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return 0;
- rc = ima_must_measure(NULL, inode, mask, function);
+ rc = ima_must_measure(inode, mask, function);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
retry:
@@ -246,7 +141,7 @@ retry:
mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
- rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, mask, function);
+ rc = iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED ? 1 : 0;
if (rc != 0)
goto out;
@@ -317,6 +212,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
{
int rc;
+ ima_rdwr_violation_check(file);
rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
FILE_CHECK);
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
index 07a5f35e3970..338b510e9027 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -12,9 +12,52 @@
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/keyctl.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
#include "internal.h"
/*
+ * Instantiate a key with the specified compatibility multipart payload and
+ * link the key into the destination keyring if one is given.
+ *
+ * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
+ * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 will be returned.
+ */
+long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
+ key_serial_t id,
+ const struct compat_iovec __user *_payload_iov,
+ unsigned ioc,
+ key_serial_t ringid)
+{
+ struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack;
+ long ret;
+
+ if (_payload_iov == 0 || ioc == 0)
+ goto no_payload;
+
+ ret = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack),
+ iovstack, &iov);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ if (ret == 0)
+ goto no_payload_free;
+
+ ret = keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, iov, ioc, ret, ringid);
+
+ if (iov != iovstack)
+ kfree(iov);
+ return ret;
+
+no_payload_free:
+ if (iov != iovstack)
+ kfree(iov);
+no_payload:
+ return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, NULL, 0, 0, ringid);
+}
+
+/*
* The key control system call, 32-bit compatibility version for 64-bit archs
*
* This should only be called if the 64-bit arch uses weird pointers in 32-bit
@@ -85,6 +128,13 @@ asmlinkage long compat_sys_keyctl(u32 option,
case KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT:
return keyctl_session_to_parent();
+ case KEYCTL_REJECT:
+ return keyctl_reject_key(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
+
+ case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV:
+ return compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
+ arg2, compat_ptr(arg3), arg4, arg5);
+
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted.c
index 9e7e4ce3fae8..69907a58a683 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted.c
@@ -765,8 +765,7 @@ static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
size_t asciiblob_len;
int ret;
- epayload = rcu_dereference_protected(key->payload.data,
- rwsem_is_locked(&((struct key *)key)->sem));
+ epayload = rcu_dereference_key(key);
/* returns the hex encoded iv, encrypted-data, and hmac as ascii */
asciiblob_len = epayload->datablob_len + ivsize + 1
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index a52aa7c88b41..07a025f81902 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -214,6 +214,14 @@ extern long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t);
extern long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer,
size_t buflen);
extern long keyctl_session_to_parent(void);
+extern long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t, unsigned, unsigned, key_serial_t);
+extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t,
+ const struct iovec __user *,
+ unsigned, key_serial_t);
+
+extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t,
+ const struct iovec __user *,
+ unsigned, size_t, key_serial_t);
/*
* Debugging key validation
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 1c2d43dc5107..f7f9d93f08d9 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -249,6 +249,14 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
if (!desc || !*desc)
goto error;
+ if (type->vet_description) {
+ ret = type->vet_description(desc);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ key = ERR_PTR(ret);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
desclen = strlen(desc) + 1;
quotalen = desclen + type->def_datalen;
@@ -503,26 +511,29 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_instantiate_and_link);
/**
- * key_negate_and_link - Negatively instantiate a key and link it into the keyring.
+ * key_reject_and_link - Negatively instantiate a key and link it into the keyring.
* @key: The key to instantiate.
* @timeout: The timeout on the negative key.
+ * @error: The error to return when the key is hit.
* @keyring: Keyring to create a link in on success (or NULL).
* @authkey: The authorisation token permitting instantiation.
*
* Negatively instantiate a key that's in the uninstantiated state and, if
- * successful, set its timeout and link it in to the destination keyring if one
- * is supplied. The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage
- * collected after the timeout expires.
+ * successful, set its timeout and stored error and link it in to the
+ * destination keyring if one is supplied. The key and any links to the key
+ * will be automatically garbage collected after the timeout expires.
*
* Negative keys are used to rate limit repeated request_key() calls by causing
- * them to return -ENOKEY until the negative key expires.
+ * them to return the stored error code (typically ENOKEY) until the negative
+ * key expires.
*
* If successful, 0 is returned, the authorisation token is revoked and anyone
* waiting for the key is woken up. If the key was already instantiated,
* -EBUSY will be returned.
*/
-int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key,
+int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
unsigned timeout,
+ unsigned error,
struct key *keyring,
struct key *authkey)
{
@@ -548,6 +559,7 @@ int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key,
atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys);
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags);
+ key->type_data.reject_error = -error;
now = current_kernel_time();
key->expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout;
key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay);
@@ -577,8 +589,7 @@ int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key,
return ret == 0 ? link_ret : ret;
}
-
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_negate_and_link);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_reject_and_link);
/*
* Garbage collect keys in process context so that we don't have to disable
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 31a0fd8189f1..427fddcaeb19 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -913,6 +913,21 @@ static int keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(struct key *key)
}
/*
+ * Copy the iovec data from userspace
+ */
+static long copy_from_user_iovec(void *buffer, const struct iovec *iov,
+ unsigned ioc)
+{
+ for (; ioc > 0; ioc--) {
+ if (copy_from_user(buffer, iov->iov_base, iov->iov_len) != 0)
+ return -EFAULT;
+ buffer += iov->iov_len;
+ iov++;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
* Instantiate a key with the specified payload and link the key into the
* destination keyring if one is given.
*
@@ -921,10 +936,11 @@ static int keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(struct key *key)
*
* If successful, 0 will be returned.
*/
-long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id,
- const void __user *_payload,
- size_t plen,
- key_serial_t ringid)
+long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id,
+ const struct iovec *payload_iov,
+ unsigned ioc,
+ size_t plen,
+ key_serial_t ringid)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct request_key_auth *rka;
@@ -953,7 +969,7 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id,
/* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
payload = NULL;
- if (_payload) {
+ if (payload_iov) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!payload) {
@@ -965,8 +981,8 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id,
goto error;
}
- ret = -EFAULT;
- if (copy_from_user(payload, _payload, plen) != 0)
+ ret = copy_from_user_iovec(payload, payload_iov, ioc);
+ if (ret < 0)
goto error2;
}
@@ -997,6 +1013,72 @@ error:
}
/*
+ * Instantiate a key with the specified payload and link the key into the
+ * destination keyring if one is given.
+ *
+ * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
+ * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 will be returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id,
+ const void __user *_payload,
+ size_t plen,
+ key_serial_t ringid)
+{
+ if (_payload && plen) {
+ struct iovec iov[1] = {
+ [0].iov_base = (void __user *)_payload,
+ [0].iov_len = plen
+ };
+
+ return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, iov, 1, plen, ringid);
+ }
+
+ return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, NULL, 0, 0, ringid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Instantiate a key with the specified multipart payload and link the key into
+ * the destination keyring if one is given.
+ *
+ * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
+ * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 will be returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t id,
+ const struct iovec __user *_payload_iov,
+ unsigned ioc,
+ key_serial_t ringid)
+{
+ struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack;
+ long ret;
+
+ if (_payload_iov == 0 || ioc == 0)
+ goto no_payload;
+
+ ret = rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), iovstack, &iov);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ if (ret == 0)
+ goto no_payload_free;
+
+ ret = keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, iov, ioc, ret, ringid);
+
+ if (iov != iovstack)
+ kfree(iov);
+ return ret;
+
+no_payload_free:
+ if (iov != iovstack)
+ kfree(iov);
+no_payload:
+ return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, NULL, 0, 0, ringid);
+}
+
+/*
* Negatively instantiate the key with the given timeout (in seconds) and link
* the key into the destination keyring if one is given.
*
@@ -1013,12 +1095,42 @@ error:
*/
long keyctl_negate_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, key_serial_t ringid)
{
+ return keyctl_reject_key(id, timeout, ENOKEY, ringid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Negatively instantiate the key with the given timeout (in seconds) and error
+ * code and link the key into the destination keyring if one is given.
+ *
+ * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
+ * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
+ *
+ * The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected
+ * after the timeout expires.
+ *
+ * Negative keys are used to rate limit repeated request_key() calls by causing
+ * them to return the specified error code until the negative key expires.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 will be returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, unsigned error,
+ key_serial_t ringid)
+{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct request_key_auth *rka;
struct key *instkey, *dest_keyring;
long ret;
- kenter("%d,%u,%d", id, timeout, ringid);
+ kenter("%d,%u,%u,%d", id, timeout, error, ringid);
+
+ /* must be a valid error code and mustn't be a kernel special */
+ if (error <= 0 ||
+ error >= MAX_ERRNO ||
+ error == ERESTARTSYS ||
+ error == ERESTARTNOINTR ||
+ error == ERESTARTNOHAND ||
+ error == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
+ return -EINVAL;
/* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been
* assumed before calling this */
@@ -1038,7 +1150,7 @@ long keyctl_negate_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, key_serial_t ringid)
goto error;
/* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */
- ret = key_negate_and_link(rka->target_key, timeout,
+ ret = key_reject_and_link(rka->target_key, timeout, error,
dest_keyring, instkey);
key_put(dest_keyring);
@@ -1492,6 +1604,19 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
case KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT:
return keyctl_session_to_parent();
+ case KEYCTL_REJECT:
+ return keyctl_reject_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
+ (unsigned) arg3,
+ (unsigned) arg4,
+ (key_serial_t) arg5);
+
+ case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV:
+ return keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
+ (key_serial_t) arg2,
+ (const struct iovec __user *) arg3,
+ (unsigned) arg4,
+ (key_serial_t) arg5);
+
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 5620f084dede..cdd2f3f88c88 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
goto error_2;
if (key->expiry && now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
goto error_2;
- key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+ key_ref = ERR_PTR(key->type_data.reject_error);
if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE))
goto error_2;
goto found;
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ descend:
/* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */
if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) {
- err = -ENOKEY;
+ err = key->type_data.reject_error;
continue;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index a3dc0d460def..df3c0417ee40 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -585,7 +585,7 @@ int wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr)
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags))
- return -ENOKEY;
+ return key->type_data.reject_error;
return key_validate(key);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_key_construction);
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index 83fc92e297cd..c99b9368368c 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -1076,8 +1076,7 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
char *bufp;
int i;
- p = rcu_dereference_protected(key->payload.data,
- rwsem_is_locked(&((struct key *)key)->sem));
+ p = rcu_dereference_key(key);
if (!p)
return -EINVAL;
if (!buffer || buflen <= 0)
diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c
index 02807fb16340..c6ca8662a468 100644
--- a/security/keys/user_defined.c
+++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c
@@ -184,8 +184,7 @@ long user_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
struct user_key_payload *upayload;
long ret;
- upayload = rcu_dereference_protected(
- key->payload.data, rwsem_is_locked(&((struct key *)key)->sem));
+ upayload = rcu_dereference_key(key);
ret = upayload->datalen;
/* we can return the data as is */
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index bb33ecadcf95..bab9b23c3ff4 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -181,11 +181,6 @@ int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
return ret;
}
-int security_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op)
-{
- return security_ops->sysctl(table, op);
-}
-
int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
{
return security_ops->quotactl(cmds, type, id, sb);
@@ -271,6 +266,11 @@ int security_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_copy_data);
+int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+{
+ return security_ops->sb_remount(sb, data);
+}
+
int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
{
return security_ops->sb_kern_mount(sb, flags, data);
@@ -335,11 +335,13 @@ void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
}
int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
- char **name, void **value, size_t *len)
+ const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
+ void **value, size_t *len)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- return security_ops->inode_init_security(inode, dir, name, value, len);
+ return security_ops->inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, name, value,
+ len);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security);
@@ -359,6 +361,7 @@ int security_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
return 0;
return security_ops->path_mkdir(dir, dentry, mode);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir);
int security_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
@@ -373,6 +376,7 @@ int security_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
return 0;
return security_ops->path_unlink(dir, dentry);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink);
int security_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
const char *old_name)
@@ -399,6 +403,7 @@ int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
return security_ops->path_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir,
new_dentry);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename);
int security_path_truncate(struct path *path)
{
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c8d699270687..d52a92507412 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -24,9 +24,11 @@
*/
#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kd.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/tracehook.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
@@ -36,14 +38,15 @@
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include <linux/swap.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/fdtable.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
-#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
@@ -70,7 +73,6 @@
#include <net/ipv6.h>
#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
-#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/selinux.h>
@@ -1120,39 +1122,35 @@ static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protoc
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
-static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
+static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
u16 tclass,
u32 *sid)
{
- int buflen, rc;
- char *buffer, *path, *end;
+ int rc;
+ char *buffer, *path;
buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer)
return -ENOMEM;
- buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
- end = buffer+buflen;
- *--end = '\0';
- buflen--;
- path = end-1;
- *path = '/';
- while (de && de != de->parent) {
- buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
- if (buflen < 0)
- break;
- end -= de->namelen;
- memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
- *--end = '/';
- path = end;
- de = de->parent;
+ path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
+ if (IS_ERR(path))
+ rc = PTR_ERR(path);
+ else {
+ /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
+ * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
+ * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
+ while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
+ path[1] = '/';
+ path++;
+ }
+ rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
}
- rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
return rc;
}
#else
-static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
+static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
u16 tclass,
u32 *sid)
{
@@ -1300,10 +1298,8 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
/* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
- rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
- sbsec->sid,
- isec->sclass,
- &sid);
+ rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
+ isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
if (rc)
goto out_unlock;
isec->sid = sid;
@@ -1316,10 +1312,9 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
- struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
- if (proci->pde) {
+ if (opt_dentry) {
isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
- rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
+ rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
isec->sclass,
&sid);
if (rc)
@@ -1578,7 +1573,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
return rc;
if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
- rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
+ rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, NULL, &newsid);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
@@ -1862,82 +1857,6 @@ static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
}
-static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
-{
- int buflen, rc;
- char *buffer, *path, *end;
-
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!buffer)
- goto out;
-
- buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
- end = buffer+buflen;
- *--end = '\0';
- buflen--;
- path = end-1;
- *path = '/';
- while (table) {
- const char *name = table->procname;
- size_t namelen = strlen(name);
- buflen -= namelen + 1;
- if (buflen < 0)
- goto out_free;
- end -= namelen;
- memcpy(end, name, namelen);
- *--end = '/';
- path = end;
- table = table->parent;
- }
- buflen -= 4;
- if (buflen < 0)
- goto out_free;
- end -= 4;
- memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
- path = end;
- rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
-out_free:
- free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
-out:
- return rc;
-}
-
-static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
-{
- int error = 0;
- u32 av;
- u32 tsid, sid;
- int rc;
-
- sid = current_sid();
-
- rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
- SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
- if (rc) {
- /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
- tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
- }
-
- /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
- * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
- if (op == 001) {
- error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
- SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
- } else {
- av = 0;
- if (op & 004)
- av |= FILE__READ;
- if (op & 002)
- av |= FILE__WRITE;
- if (av)
- error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
- SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
- }
-
- return error;
-}
-
static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
@@ -2060,7 +1979,8 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
} else {
/* Check for a default transition on this program. */
rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
- SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
+ &new_tsec->sid);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
@@ -2443,6 +2363,91 @@ out:
return rc;
}
+static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+{
+ int rc, i, *flags;
+ struct security_mnt_opts opts;
+ char *secdata, **mount_options;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+
+ if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!data)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
+ return 0;
+
+ security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
+ secdata = alloc_secdata();
+ if (!secdata)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_free_secdata;
+
+ rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_free_secdata;
+
+ mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
+ flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
+ u32 sid;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
+ continue;
+ len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
+ rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid);
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
+ "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
+ mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
+ goto out_free_opts;
+ }
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ switch (flags[i]) {
+ case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
+ if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
+ goto out_bad_option;
+ break;
+ case CONTEXT_MNT:
+ if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
+ goto out_bad_option;
+ break;
+ case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
+ struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
+ root_isec = sb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
+
+ if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
+ goto out_bad_option;
+ break;
+ }
+ case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
+ if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
+ goto out_bad_option;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto out_free_opts;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rc = 0;
+out_free_opts:
+ security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
+out_free_secdata:
+ free_secdata(secdata);
+ return rc;
+out_bad_option:
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
+ "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
+ sb->s_type->name);
+ goto out_free_opts;
+}
+
static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
@@ -2509,8 +2514,8 @@ static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
}
static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
- char **name, void **value,
- size_t *len)
+ const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
+ void **value, size_t *len)
{
const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
@@ -2531,7 +2536,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
- &newsid);
+ qstr, &newsid);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
"security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
@@ -2932,16 +2937,47 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- u32 av = 0;
+ int error = 0;
- if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
- av |= FILE__WRITE;
- if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
- av |= FILE__READ;
- if (!av)
- av = FILE__IOCTL;
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case FIONREAD:
+ /* fall through */
+ case FIBMAP:
+ /* fall through */
+ case FIGETBSZ:
+ /* fall through */
+ case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
+ /* fall through */
+ case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
+ error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
+ break;
+
+ case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
+ /* fall through */
+ case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
+ error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
+ break;
+
+ /* sys_ioctl() checks */
+ case FIONBIO:
+ /* fall through */
+ case FIOASYNC:
+ error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
+ break;
- return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
+ case KDSKBENT:
+ case KDSKBSENT:
+ error = task_has_capability(current, cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
+ SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ break;
+
+ /* default case assumes that the command will go
+ * to the file's ioctl() function.
+ */
+ default:
+ error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
+ }
+ return error;
}
static int default_noexec;
@@ -3644,9 +3680,16 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
/* socket security operations */
-static u32 socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec)
+static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
+ u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
{
- return tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
+ if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
+ *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
+ socksid);
}
static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
@@ -3670,12 +3713,16 @@ static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
u32 newsid;
u16 secclass;
+ int rc;
if (kern)
return 0;
- newsid = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec);
secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
+ rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
}
@@ -3687,12 +3734,16 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
int err = 0;
+ isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
+
if (kern)
isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
- else
- isec->sid = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec);
+ else {
+ err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
- isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
isec->initialized = 1;
if (sock->sk) {
@@ -4002,7 +4053,6 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
{
int err = 0;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- u32 peer_sid;
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
char *addrp;
@@ -4021,20 +4071,10 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
return err;
}
- if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
- err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
- if (err)
- return err;
- err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
- SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
- if (err)
- selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
- } else {
- err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
- if (err)
- return err;
- err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
- }
+ err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
return err;
}
@@ -4529,9 +4569,8 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
- if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
- if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
- return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+ if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
+ return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
return NF_ACCEPT;
}
@@ -4574,27 +4613,14 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
* from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
sk = skb->sk;
if (sk == NULL) {
- switch (family) {
- case PF_INET:
- if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
- secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
- else
- secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
- break;
- case PF_INET6:
- if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
- secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
- else
- secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
- break;
- default:
- return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
- }
- if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
+ if (skb->skb_iif) {
+ secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
return NF_DROP;
- } else
+ } else {
+ secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+ }
} else {
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
peer_sid = sksec->sid;
@@ -4848,7 +4874,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
* message queue this message will be stored in
*/
rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
- &msec->sid);
+ NULL, &msec->sid);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
@@ -5402,7 +5428,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
.capget = selinux_capget,
.capset = selinux_capset,
- .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
.capable = selinux_capable,
.quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
.quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
@@ -5420,6 +5445,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
.sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
.sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
+ .sb_remount = selinux_sb_remount,
.sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
.sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
.sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 7ed3663332ec..b8c53723e09b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -12,6 +12,10 @@
#define COMMON_IPC_PERMS "create", "destroy", "getattr", "setattr", "read", \
"write", "associate", "unix_read", "unix_write"
+/*
+ * Note: The name for any socket class should be suffixed by "socket",
+ * and doesn't contain more than one substr of "socket".
+ */
struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
{ "security",
{ "compute_av", "compute_create", "compute_member",
@@ -132,8 +136,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
{ "appletalk_socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "packet",
- { "send", "recv", "relabelto", "flow_in", "flow_out",
- "forward_in", "forward_out", NULL } },
+ { "send", "recv", "relabelto", "forward_in", "forward_out", NULL } },
{ "key",
{ "view", "read", "write", "search", "link", "setattr", "create",
NULL } },
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 671273eb1115..348eb00cb668 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#ifndef _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_
#define _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
#include <linux/magic.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include "flask.h"
@@ -28,13 +29,14 @@
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP 22
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE 23
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY 24
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS 25
/* Range of policy versions we understand*/
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE
#else
-#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS
#endif
/* Mask for just the mount related flags */
@@ -106,8 +108,8 @@ void security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd);
-int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
+int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid);
int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
index dff0c75345c1..63ce2f9e441d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
*
* Copyright (C) 2003 Tresys Technology, LLC
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
*
* Updated: Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
@@ -27,16 +27,16 @@ struct avtab_key {
u16 source_type; /* source type */
u16 target_type; /* target type */
u16 target_class; /* target object class */
-#define AVTAB_ALLOWED 1
-#define AVTAB_AUDITALLOW 2
-#define AVTAB_AUDITDENY 4
-#define AVTAB_AV (AVTAB_ALLOWED | AVTAB_AUDITALLOW | AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
-#define AVTAB_TRANSITION 16
-#define AVTAB_MEMBER 32
-#define AVTAB_CHANGE 64
-#define AVTAB_TYPE (AVTAB_TRANSITION | AVTAB_MEMBER | AVTAB_CHANGE)
-#define AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD 0x80000000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
-#define AVTAB_ENABLED 0x8000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
+#define AVTAB_ALLOWED 0x0001
+#define AVTAB_AUDITALLOW 0x0002
+#define AVTAB_AUDITDENY 0x0004
+#define AVTAB_AV (AVTAB_ALLOWED | AVTAB_AUDITALLOW | AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
+#define AVTAB_TRANSITION 0x0010
+#define AVTAB_MEMBER 0x0020
+#define AVTAB_CHANGE 0x0040
+#define AVTAB_TYPE (AVTAB_TRANSITION | AVTAB_MEMBER | AVTAB_CHANGE)
+#define AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD 0x80000000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
+#define AVTAB_ENABLED 0x8000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
u16 specified; /* what field is specified */
};
@@ -86,7 +86,6 @@ void avtab_cache_destroy(void);
#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS 11
#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS)
-#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_MASK (MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS-1)
#endif /* _SS_AVTAB_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
index 1f4e93c2ae86..922f8afa89dd 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ struct ebitmap {
};
#define ebitmap_length(e) ((e)->highbit)
-#define ebitmap_startbit(e) ((e)->node ? (e)->node->startbit : 0)
static inline unsigned int ebitmap_start_positive(struct ebitmap *e,
struct ebitmap_node **n)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index 1ef8e4e89880..e96174216bc9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -512,7 +512,8 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
struct context *tcontext,
u16 tclass,
u32 specified,
- struct context *newcontext)
+ struct context *newcontext,
+ bool sock)
{
struct range_trans rtr;
struct mls_range *r;
@@ -531,7 +532,7 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
return mls_range_set(newcontext, r);
/* Fallthrough */
case AVTAB_CHANGE:
- if (tclass == policydb.process_class)
+ if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true))
/* Use the process MLS attributes. */
return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, scontext);
else
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
index cd9152632e54..037bf9d82d41 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
@@ -49,7 +49,8 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
struct context *tcontext,
u16 tclass,
u32 specified,
- struct context *newcontext);
+ struct context *newcontext,
+ bool sock);
int mls_setup_user_range(struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
struct context *usercon);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 57363562f0f8..e7b850ad57ee 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -123,6 +123,11 @@ static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
},
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ },
};
static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version)
@@ -704,6 +709,7 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
int i;
struct role_allow *ra, *lra = NULL;
struct role_trans *tr, *ltr = NULL;
+ struct filename_trans *ft, *nft;
for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
cond_resched();
@@ -781,6 +787,15 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
}
flex_array_free(p->type_attr_map_array);
}
+
+ ft = p->filename_trans;
+ while (ft) {
+ nft = ft->next;
+ kfree(ft->name);
+ kfree(ft);
+ ft = nft;
+ }
+
ebitmap_destroy(&p->policycaps);
ebitmap_destroy(&p->permissive_map);
@@ -1788,6 +1803,76 @@ out:
return rc;
}
+static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ struct filename_trans *ft, *last;
+ u32 nel, len;
+ char *name;
+ __le32 buf[4];
+ int rc, i;
+
+ if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS)
+ return 0;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ printk(KERN_ERR "%s: nel=%d\n", __func__, nel);
+
+ last = p->filename_trans;
+ while (last && last->next)
+ last = last->next;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ ft = kzalloc(sizeof(*ft), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ft)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* add it to the tail of the list */
+ if (!last)
+ p->filename_trans = ft;
+ else
+ last->next = ft;
+ last = ft;
+
+ /* length of the path component string */
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!name)
+ goto out;
+
+ ft->name = name;
+
+ /* path component string */
+ rc = next_entry(name, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ name[len] = 0;
+
+ printk(KERN_ERR "%s: ft=%p ft->name=%p ft->name=%s\n", __func__, ft, ft->name, ft->name);
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 4);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ ft->stype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ ft->ttype = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ ft->tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ ft->otype = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
{
int i, j, rc;
@@ -2251,6 +2336,10 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
lra = ra;
}
+ rc = filename_trans_read(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
rc = policydb_index(p);
if (rc)
goto bad;
@@ -3025,6 +3114,43 @@ static int range_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
return 0;
}
+static int filename_trans_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ struct filename_trans *ft;
+ u32 len, nel = 0;
+ __le32 buf[4];
+ int rc;
+
+ for (ft = p->filename_trans; ft; ft = ft->next)
+ nel++;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ for (ft = p->filename_trans; ft; ft = ft->next) {
+ len = strlen(ft->name);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = put_entry(ft->name, sizeof(char), len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ buf[0] = ft->stype;
+ buf[1] = ft->ttype;
+ buf[2] = ft->tclass;
+ buf[3] = ft->otype;
+
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
/*
* Write the configuration data in a policy database
* structure to a policy database binary representation
@@ -3135,6 +3261,10 @@ int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
if (rc)
return rc;
+ rc = filename_trans_write(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
rc = ocontext_write(p, info, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index 4e3ab9d0b315..732ea4a68682 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -77,6 +77,15 @@ struct role_trans {
struct role_trans *next;
};
+struct filename_trans {
+ struct filename_trans *next;
+ u32 stype; /* current process */
+ u32 ttype; /* parent dir context */
+ u16 tclass; /* class of new object */
+ const char *name; /* last path component */
+ u32 otype; /* expected of new object */
+};
+
struct role_allow {
u32 role; /* current role */
u32 new_role; /* new role */
@@ -217,6 +226,9 @@ struct policydb {
/* role transitions */
struct role_trans *role_tr;
+ /* file transitions with the last path component */
+ struct filename_trans *filename_trans;
+
/* bools indexed by (value - 1) */
struct cond_bool_datum **bool_val_to_struct;
/* type enforcement conditional access vectors and transitions */
@@ -302,7 +314,7 @@ static inline int next_entry(void *buf, struct policy_file *fp, size_t bytes)
return 0;
}
-static inline int put_entry(void *buf, size_t bytes, int num, struct policy_file *fp)
+static inline int put_entry(const void *buf, size_t bytes, int num, struct policy_file *fp)
{
size_t len = bytes * num;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index a03cfaf0ee07..3e7544d2a07b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -201,6 +201,21 @@ static u16 unmap_class(u16 tclass)
return tclass;
}
+/*
+ * Get kernel value for class from its policy value
+ */
+static u16 map_class(u16 pol_value)
+{
+ u16 i;
+
+ for (i = 1; i < current_mapping_size; i++) {
+ if (current_mapping[i].value == pol_value)
+ return i;
+ }
+
+ return pol_value;
+}
+
static void map_decision(u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
int allow_unknown)
{
@@ -1343,10 +1358,27 @@ out:
return -EACCES;
}
+static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *p, struct context *newcontext,
+ u32 scon, u32 tcon, u16 tclass,
+ const struct qstr *qstr)
+{
+ struct filename_trans *ft;
+ for (ft = p->filename_trans; ft; ft = ft->next) {
+ if (ft->stype == scon &&
+ ft->ttype == tcon &&
+ ft->tclass == tclass &&
+ !strcmp(ft->name, qstr->name)) {
+ newcontext->type = ft->otype;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
u32 tsid,
u16 orig_tclass,
u32 specified,
+ const struct qstr *qstr,
u32 *out_sid,
bool kern)
{
@@ -1357,6 +1389,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
struct avtab_node *node;
u16 tclass;
int rc = 0;
+ bool sock;
if (!ss_initialized) {
switch (orig_tclass) {
@@ -1374,10 +1407,13 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
- if (kern)
+ if (kern) {
tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
- else
+ sock = security_is_socket_class(orig_tclass);
+ } else {
tclass = orig_tclass;
+ sock = security_is_socket_class(map_class(tclass));
+ }
scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
if (!scontext) {
@@ -1408,7 +1444,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
}
/* Set the role and type to default values. */
- if (tclass == policydb.process_class) {
+ if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) {
/* Use the current role and type of process. */
newcontext.role = scontext->role;
newcontext.type = scontext->type;
@@ -1442,6 +1478,11 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
newcontext.type = avdatum->data;
}
+ /* if we have a qstr this is a file trans check so check those rules */
+ if (qstr)
+ filename_compute_type(&policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type,
+ tcontext->type, tclass, qstr);
+
/* Check for class-specific changes. */
if (tclass == policydb.process_class) {
if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
@@ -1460,7 +1501,8 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
/* Set the MLS attributes.
This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
- rc = mls_compute_sid(scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified, &newcontext);
+ rc = mls_compute_sid(scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified,
+ &newcontext, sock);
if (rc)
goto out_unlock;
@@ -1495,22 +1537,17 @@ out:
* if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
* computed successfully.
*/
-int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid,
- u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass,
- u32 *out_sid)
+int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid)
{
return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
- out_sid, true);
+ qstr, out_sid, true);
}
-int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid,
- u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass,
- u32 *out_sid)
+int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid)
{
return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
- out_sid, false);
+ NULL, out_sid, false);
}
/**
@@ -1531,8 +1568,8 @@ int security_member_sid(u32 ssid,
u16 tclass,
u32 *out_sid)
{
- return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, out_sid,
- false);
+ return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, NULL,
+ out_sid, false);
}
/**
@@ -1553,8 +1590,8 @@ int security_change_sid(u32 ssid,
u16 tclass,
u32 *out_sid)
{
- return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, out_sid,
- false);
+ return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, NULL,
+ out_sid, false);
}
/* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index fff78d3b51a2..728c57e3d65d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
if (!uctx)
goto not_from_user;
- if (uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX)
+ if (uctx->ctx_alg != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX)
return -EINVAL;
str_len = uctx->ctx_len;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 129c4eb8ffb1..b449cfdad21c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -52,13 +52,16 @@ struct socket_smack {
struct inode_smack {
char *smk_inode; /* label of the fso */
char *smk_task; /* label of the task */
+ char *smk_mmap; /* label of the mmap domain */
struct mutex smk_lock; /* initialization lock */
int smk_flags; /* smack inode flags */
};
struct task_smack {
- char *smk_task; /* label used for access control */
- char *smk_forked; /* label when forked */
+ char *smk_task; /* label for access control */
+ char *smk_forked; /* label when forked */
+ struct list_head smk_rules; /* per task access rules */
+ struct mutex smk_rules_lock; /* lock for the rules */
};
#define SMK_INODE_INSTANT 0x01 /* inode is instantiated */
@@ -152,12 +155,6 @@ struct smack_known {
#define SMACK_MAGIC 0x43415d53 /* "SMAC" */
/*
- * A limit on the number of entries in the lists
- * makes some of the list administration easier.
- */
-#define SMACK_LIST_MAX 10000
-
-/*
* CIPSO defaults.
*/
#define SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_DEFAULT 3 /* Historical */
@@ -174,9 +171,7 @@ struct smack_known {
/*
* Just to make the common cases easier to deal with
*/
-#define MAY_ANY (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
#define MAY_ANYREAD (MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC)
-#define MAY_ANYWRITE (MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)
#define MAY_READWRITE (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE)
#define MAY_NOT 0
@@ -202,7 +197,7 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *);
/*
* These functions are in smack_access.c
*/
-int smk_access_entry(char *, char *);
+int smk_access_entry(char *, char *, struct list_head *);
int smk_access(char *, char *, int, struct smk_audit_info *);
int smk_curacc(char *, u32, struct smk_audit_info *);
int smack_to_cipso(const char *, struct smack_cipso *);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 7ba8478f599e..86453db4333d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -70,10 +70,11 @@ int log_policy = SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED;
* smk_access_entry - look up matching access rule
* @subject_label: a pointer to the subject's Smack label
* @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
+ * @rule_list: the list of rules to search
*
* This function looks up the subject/object pair in the
- * access rule list and returns pointer to the matching rule if found,
- * NULL otherwise.
+ * access rule list and returns the access mode. If no
+ * entry is found returns -ENOENT.
*
* NOTE:
* Even though Smack labels are usually shared on smack_list
@@ -85,13 +86,13 @@ int log_policy = SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED;
* will be on the list, so checking the pointers may be a worthwhile
* optimization.
*/
-int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label)
+int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label,
+ struct list_head *rule_list)
{
- u32 may = MAY_NOT;
+ int may = -ENOENT;
struct smack_rule *srp;
- rcu_read_lock();
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &smack_rule_list, list) {
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, rule_list, list) {
if (srp->smk_subject == subject_label ||
strcmp(srp->smk_subject, subject_label) == 0) {
if (srp->smk_object == object_label ||
@@ -101,7 +102,6 @@ int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label)
}
}
}
- rcu_read_unlock();
return may;
}
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label)
int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
struct smk_audit_info *a)
{
- u32 may = MAY_NOT;
+ int may = MAY_NOT;
int rc = 0;
/*
@@ -181,13 +181,14 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
* Beyond here an explicit relationship is required.
* If the requested access is contained in the available
* access (e.g. read is included in readwrite) it's
- * good.
- */
- may = smk_access_entry(subject_label, object_label);
- /*
- * This is a bit map operation.
+ * good. A negative response from smk_access_entry()
+ * indicates there is no entry for this pair.
*/
- if ((request & may) == request)
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ may = smk_access_entry(subject_label, object_label, &smack_rule_list);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ if (may > 0 && (request & may) == request)
goto out_audit;
rc = -EACCES;
@@ -212,12 +213,27 @@ out_audit:
*/
int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
{
+ struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ char *sp = smk_of_task(tsp);
+ int may;
int rc;
- char *sp = smk_of_current();
+ /*
+ * Check the global rule list
+ */
rc = smk_access(sp, obj_label, mode, NULL);
- if (rc == 0)
- goto out_audit;
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ /*
+ * If there is an entry in the task's rule list
+ * it can further restrict access.
+ */
+ may = smk_access_entry(sp, obj_label, &tsp->smk_rules);
+ if (may < 0)
+ goto out_audit;
+ if ((mode & may) == mode)
+ goto out_audit;
+ rc = -EACCES;
+ }
/*
* Return if a specific label has been designated as the
@@ -228,7 +244,7 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
goto out_audit;
if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
- return 0;
+ rc = 0;
out_audit:
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 533bf3255d7f..23c7a6d0c80c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
#include "smack.h"
#define task_security(task) (task_cred_xxx((task), security))
@@ -84,6 +85,56 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
return isp;
}
+/**
+ * new_task_smack - allocate a task security blob
+ * @smack: a pointer to the Smack label to use in the blob
+ *
+ * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
+ */
+static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(char *task, char *forked, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ struct task_smack *tsp;
+
+ tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
+ if (tsp == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ tsp->smk_task = task;
+ tsp->smk_forked = forked;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules);
+ mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock);
+
+ return tsp;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_copy_rules - copy a rule set
+ * @nhead - new rules header pointer
+ * @ohead - old rules header pointer
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
+ */
+static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
+ gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ struct smack_rule *nrp;
+ struct smack_rule *orp;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(nhead);
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(orp, ohead, list) {
+ nrp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_rule), gfp);
+ if (nrp == NULL) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ break;
+ }
+ *nrp = *orp;
+ list_add_rcu(&nrp->list, nhead);
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
/*
* LSM hooks.
* We he, that is fun!
@@ -102,23 +153,17 @@ static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
{
int rc;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
- char *sp, *tsp;
+ char *tsp;
rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
- sp = smk_of_current();
tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp));
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ctp);
- /* we won't log here, because rc can be overriden */
- rc = smk_access(sp, tsp, MAY_READWRITE, NULL);
- if (rc != 0 && capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
- rc = 0;
-
- smack_log(sp, tsp, MAY_READWRITE, rc, &ad);
+ rc = smk_curacc(tsp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
return rc;
}
@@ -134,23 +179,17 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
{
int rc;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
- char *sp, *tsp;
+ char *tsp;
rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(ptp);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
+ tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ptp));
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ptp);
- sp = smk_of_current();
- tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ptp));
- /* we won't log here, because rc can be overriden */
- rc = smk_access(tsp, sp, MAY_READWRITE, NULL);
- if (rc != 0 && has_capability(ptp, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
- rc = 0;
-
- smack_log(tsp, sp, MAY_READWRITE, rc, &ad);
+ rc = smk_curacc(tsp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
return rc;
}
@@ -463,6 +502,7 @@ static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
* smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
* @inode: the inode
* @dir: unused
+ * @qstr: unused
* @name: where to put the attribute name
* @value: where to put the attribute value
* @len: where to put the length of the attribute
@@ -470,11 +510,12 @@ static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
* Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
*/
static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
- char **name, void **value, size_t *len)
+ const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
+ void **value, size_t *len)
{
char *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
char *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
- u32 may;
+ int may;
if (name) {
*name = kstrdup(XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -483,14 +524,17 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
}
if (value) {
- may = smk_access_entry(smk_of_current(), dsp);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ may = smk_access_entry(smk_of_current(), dsp, &smack_rule_list);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
/*
* If the access rule allows transmutation and
* the directory requests transmutation then
* by all means transmute.
*/
- if (((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) && smk_inode_transmutable(dir))
+ if (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) &&
+ smk_inode_transmutable(dir))
isp = dsp;
*value = kstrdup(isp, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -716,7 +760,8 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
- strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
+ strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
rc = -EPERM;
/*
@@ -773,6 +818,12 @@ static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
isp->smk_task = nsp;
else
isp->smk_task = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
+ nsp = smk_import(value, size);
+ if (nsp != NULL)
+ isp->smk_mmap = nsp;
+ else
+ isp->smk_mmap = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
@@ -815,7 +866,8 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
- strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
+ strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP)) {
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
rc = -EPERM;
} else
@@ -829,6 +881,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
if (rc == 0) {
isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
isp->smk_task = NULL;
+ isp->smk_mmap = NULL;
}
return rc;
@@ -1060,6 +1113,126 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
}
/**
+ * smack_file_mmap :
+ * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g.
+ * if mapping anonymous memory.
+ * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
+ * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
+ * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
+ * @flags contains the operational flags.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+static int smack_file_mmap(struct file *file,
+ unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
+ unsigned long flags, unsigned long addr,
+ unsigned long addr_only)
+{
+ struct smack_rule *srp;
+ struct task_smack *tsp;
+ char *sp;
+ char *msmack;
+ char *osmack;
+ struct inode_smack *isp;
+ struct dentry *dp;
+ int may;
+ int mmay;
+ int tmay;
+ int rc;
+
+ /* do DAC check on address space usage */
+ rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
+ if (rc || addr_only)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (file == NULL || file->f_dentry == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ dp = file->f_dentry;
+
+ if (dp->d_inode == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ isp = dp->d_inode->i_security;
+ if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ msmack = isp->smk_mmap;
+
+ tsp = current_security();
+ sp = smk_of_current();
+ rc = 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ /*
+ * For each Smack rule associated with the subject
+ * label verify that the SMACK64MMAP also has access
+ * to that rule's object label.
+ *
+ * Because neither of the labels comes
+ * from the networking code it is sufficient
+ * to compare pointers.
+ */
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &smack_rule_list, list) {
+ if (srp->smk_subject != sp)
+ continue;
+
+ osmack = srp->smk_object;
+ /*
+ * Matching labels always allows access.
+ */
+ if (msmack == osmack)
+ continue;
+ /*
+ * If there is a matching local rule take
+ * that into account as well.
+ */
+ may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject, osmack,
+ &tsp->smk_rules);
+ if (may == -ENOENT)
+ may = srp->smk_access;
+ else
+ may &= srp->smk_access;
+ /*
+ * If may is zero the SMACK64MMAP subject can't
+ * possibly have less access.
+ */
+ if (may == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * Fetch the global list entry.
+ * If there isn't one a SMACK64MMAP subject
+ * can't have as much access as current.
+ */
+ mmay = smk_access_entry(msmack, osmack, &smack_rule_list);
+ if (mmay == -ENOENT) {
+ rc = -EACCES;
+ break;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If there is a local entry it modifies the
+ * potential access, too.
+ */
+ tmay = smk_access_entry(msmack, osmack, &tsp->smk_rules);
+ if (tmay != -ENOENT)
+ mmay &= tmay;
+
+ /*
+ * If there is any access available to current that is
+ * not available to a SMACK64MMAP subject
+ * deny access.
+ */
+ if ((may | mmay) != mmay) {
+ rc = -EACCES;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
* smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value
* @file: object in question
*
@@ -1095,6 +1268,7 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
*/
file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
+
/* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
@@ -1145,9 +1319,14 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
*/
static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
{
- cred->security = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
- if (cred->security == NULL)
+ struct task_smack *tsp;
+
+ tsp = new_task_smack(NULL, NULL, gfp);
+ if (tsp == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
+
+ cred->security = tsp;
+
return 0;
}
@@ -1156,13 +1335,24 @@ static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
* smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
* @cred: the credentials in question
*
- * Smack isn't using copies of blobs. Everyone
- * points to an immutable list. The blobs never go away.
- * There is no leak here.
*/
static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
- kfree(cred->security);
+ struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
+ struct smack_rule *rp;
+ struct list_head *l;
+ struct list_head *n;
+
+ if (tsp == NULL)
+ return;
+ cred->security = NULL;
+
+ list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) {
+ rp = list_entry(l, struct smack_rule, list);
+ list_del(&rp->list);
+ kfree(rp);
+ }
+ kfree(tsp);
}
/**
@@ -1178,13 +1368,16 @@ static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
{
struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
struct task_smack *new_tsp;
+ int rc;
- new_tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
+ new_tsp = new_task_smack(old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task, gfp);
if (new_tsp == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
- new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
- new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
+ rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
new->security = new_tsp;
return 0;
}
@@ -1203,6 +1396,11 @@ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
+ mutex_init(&new_tsp->smk_rules_lock);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_tsp->smk_rules);
+
+
+ /* cbs copy rule list */
}
/**
@@ -2419,6 +2617,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
}
}
isp->smk_task = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
+ isp->smk_mmap = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
dput(dp);
break;
@@ -2478,6 +2677,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
void *value, size_t size)
{
+ int rc;
struct task_smack *tsp;
struct task_smack *oldtsp;
struct cred *new;
@@ -2513,13 +2713,16 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
new = prepare_creds();
if (new == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
- tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ tsp = new_task_smack(newsmack, oldtsp->smk_forked, GFP_KERNEL);
if (tsp == NULL) {
kfree(new);
return -ENOMEM;
}
- tsp->smk_task = newsmack;
- tsp->smk_forked = oldtsp->smk_forked;
+ rc = smk_copy_rules(&tsp->smk_rules, &oldtsp->smk_rules, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
new->security = tsp;
commit_creds(new);
return size;
@@ -3221,6 +3424,7 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
.file_ioctl = smack_file_ioctl,
.file_lock = smack_file_lock,
.file_fcntl = smack_file_fcntl,
+ .file_mmap = smack_file_mmap,
.file_set_fowner = smack_file_set_fowner,
.file_send_sigiotask = smack_file_send_sigiotask,
.file_receive = smack_file_receive,
@@ -3334,23 +3538,20 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
struct cred *cred;
struct task_smack *tsp;
- tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
+ return 0;
+
+ tsp = new_task_smack(smack_known_floor.smk_known,
+ smack_known_floor.smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
if (tsp == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
- if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops)) {
- kfree(tsp);
- return 0;
- }
-
printk(KERN_INFO "Smack: Initializing.\n");
/*
* Set the security state for the initial task.
*/
cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
- tsp->smk_forked = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
- tsp->smk_task = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
cred->security = tsp;
/* initialize the smack_know_list */
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 362d5eda948b..90d1bbaaa6f3 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ enum smk_inos {
SMK_NETLBLADDR = 8, /* single label hosts */
SMK_ONLYCAP = 9, /* the only "capable" label */
SMK_LOGGING = 10, /* logging */
+ SMK_LOAD_SELF = 11, /* task specific rules */
};
/*
@@ -135,104 +136,30 @@ static void smk_netlabel_audit_set(struct netlbl_audit *nap)
#define SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN 9
#define SMK_NETLBLADDRMAX 42
-/*
- * Seq_file read operations for /smack/load
- */
-
-static void *load_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
-{
- if (*pos == SEQ_READ_FINISHED)
- return NULL;
- if (list_empty(&smack_rule_list))
- return NULL;
- return smack_rule_list.next;
-}
-
-static void *load_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
-{
- struct list_head *list = v;
-
- if (list_is_last(list, &smack_rule_list)) {
- *pos = SEQ_READ_FINISHED;
- return NULL;
- }
- return list->next;
-}
-
-static int load_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
-{
- struct list_head *list = v;
- struct smack_rule *srp =
- list_entry(list, struct smack_rule, list);
-
- seq_printf(s, "%s %s", (char *)srp->smk_subject,
- (char *)srp->smk_object);
-
- seq_putc(s, ' ');
-
- if (srp->smk_access & MAY_READ)
- seq_putc(s, 'r');
- if (srp->smk_access & MAY_WRITE)
- seq_putc(s, 'w');
- if (srp->smk_access & MAY_EXEC)
- seq_putc(s, 'x');
- if (srp->smk_access & MAY_APPEND)
- seq_putc(s, 'a');
- if (srp->smk_access & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
- seq_putc(s, 't');
- if (srp->smk_access == 0)
- seq_putc(s, '-');
-
- seq_putc(s, '\n');
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void load_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
-{
- /* No-op */
-}
-
-static const struct seq_operations load_seq_ops = {
- .start = load_seq_start,
- .next = load_seq_next,
- .show = load_seq_show,
- .stop = load_seq_stop,
-};
-
-/**
- * smk_open_load - open() for /smack/load
- * @inode: inode structure representing file
- * @file: "load" file pointer
- *
- * For reading, use load_seq_* seq_file reading operations.
- */
-static int smk_open_load(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-{
- return seq_open(file, &load_seq_ops);
-}
-
/**
* smk_set_access - add a rule to the rule list
* @srp: the new rule to add
+ * @rule_list: the list of rules
+ * @rule_lock: the rule list lock
*
* Looks through the current subject/object/access list for
* the subject/object pair and replaces the access that was
* there. If the pair isn't found add it with the specified
* access.
*
+ * Returns 1 if a rule was found to exist already, 0 if it is new
* Returns 0 if nothing goes wrong or -ENOMEM if it fails
* during the allocation of the new pair to add.
*/
-static int smk_set_access(struct smack_rule *srp)
+static int smk_set_access(struct smack_rule *srp, struct list_head *rule_list,
+ struct mutex *rule_lock)
{
struct smack_rule *sp;
- int ret = 0;
- int found;
- mutex_lock(&smack_list_lock);
+ int found = 0;
- found = 0;
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(sp, &smack_rule_list, list) {
+ mutex_lock(rule_lock);
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(sp, rule_list, list) {
if (sp->smk_subject == srp->smk_subject &&
sp->smk_object == srp->smk_object) {
found = 1;
@@ -241,19 +168,21 @@ static int smk_set_access(struct smack_rule *srp)
}
}
if (found == 0)
- list_add_rcu(&srp->list, &smack_rule_list);
+ list_add_rcu(&srp->list, rule_list);
- mutex_unlock(&smack_list_lock);
+ mutex_unlock(rule_lock);
- return ret;
+ return found;
}
/**
- * smk_write_load - write() for /smack/load
+ * smk_write_load_list - write() for any /smack/load
* @file: file pointer, not actually used
* @buf: where to get the data from
* @count: bytes sent
* @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ * @rule_list: the list of rules to write to
+ * @rule_lock: lock for the rule list
*
* Get one smack access rule from above.
* The format is exactly:
@@ -263,21 +192,19 @@ static int smk_set_access(struct smack_rule *srp)
*
* writes must be SMK_LABELLEN+SMK_LABELLEN+SMK_ACCESSLEN bytes.
*/
-static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
- size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+static ssize_t smk_write_load_list(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos,
+ struct list_head *rule_list,
+ struct mutex *rule_lock)
{
struct smack_rule *rule;
char *data;
int rc = -EINVAL;
/*
- * Must have privilege.
* No partial writes.
* Enough data must be present.
*/
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
-
if (*ppos != 0)
return -EINVAL;
/*
@@ -372,11 +299,13 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
goto out_free_rule;
}
- rc = smk_set_access(rule);
-
- if (!rc)
- rc = count;
- goto out;
+ rc = count;
+ /*
+ * smk_set_access returns true if there was already a rule
+ * for the subject/object pair, and false if it was new.
+ */
+ if (!smk_set_access(rule, rule_list, rule_lock))
+ goto out;
out_free_rule:
kfree(rule);
@@ -385,6 +314,108 @@ out:
return rc;
}
+
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/load
+ */
+
+static void *load_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ if (*pos == SEQ_READ_FINISHED)
+ return NULL;
+ if (list_empty(&smack_rule_list))
+ return NULL;
+ return smack_rule_list.next;
+}
+
+static void *load_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ struct list_head *list = v;
+
+ if (list_is_last(list, &smack_rule_list)) {
+ *pos = SEQ_READ_FINISHED;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return list->next;
+}
+
+static int load_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+ struct list_head *list = v;
+ struct smack_rule *srp =
+ list_entry(list, struct smack_rule, list);
+
+ seq_printf(s, "%s %s", (char *)srp->smk_subject,
+ (char *)srp->smk_object);
+
+ seq_putc(s, ' ');
+
+ if (srp->smk_access & MAY_READ)
+ seq_putc(s, 'r');
+ if (srp->smk_access & MAY_WRITE)
+ seq_putc(s, 'w');
+ if (srp->smk_access & MAY_EXEC)
+ seq_putc(s, 'x');
+ if (srp->smk_access & MAY_APPEND)
+ seq_putc(s, 'a');
+ if (srp->smk_access & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
+ seq_putc(s, 't');
+ if (srp->smk_access == 0)
+ seq_putc(s, '-');
+
+ seq_putc(s, '\n');
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void load_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+ /* No-op */
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations load_seq_ops = {
+ .start = load_seq_start,
+ .next = load_seq_next,
+ .show = load_seq_show,
+ .stop = load_seq_stop,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_load - open() for /smack/load
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "load" file pointer
+ *
+ * For reading, use load_seq_* seq_file reading operations.
+ */
+static int smk_open_load(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return seq_open(file, &load_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_load - write() for /smack/load
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ *
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+
+ /*
+ * Must have privilege.
+ * No partial writes.
+ * Enough data must be present.
+ */
+ if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ return smk_write_load_list(file, buf, count, ppos, &smack_rule_list,
+ &smack_list_lock);
+}
+
static const struct file_operations smk_load_ops = {
.open = smk_open_load,
.read = seq_read,
@@ -1288,6 +1319,112 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_logging_ops = {
.write = smk_write_logging,
.llseek = default_llseek,
};
+
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/load-self
+ */
+
+static void *load_self_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+
+ if (*pos == SEQ_READ_FINISHED)
+ return NULL;
+ if (list_empty(&tsp->smk_rules))
+ return NULL;
+ return tsp->smk_rules.next;
+}
+
+static void *load_self_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct list_head *list = v;
+
+ if (list_is_last(list, &tsp->smk_rules)) {
+ *pos = SEQ_READ_FINISHED;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return list->next;
+}
+
+static int load_self_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+ struct list_head *list = v;
+ struct smack_rule *srp =
+ list_entry(list, struct smack_rule, list);
+
+ seq_printf(s, "%s %s", (char *)srp->smk_subject,
+ (char *)srp->smk_object);
+
+ seq_putc(s, ' ');
+
+ if (srp->smk_access & MAY_READ)
+ seq_putc(s, 'r');
+ if (srp->smk_access & MAY_WRITE)
+ seq_putc(s, 'w');
+ if (srp->smk_access & MAY_EXEC)
+ seq_putc(s, 'x');
+ if (srp->smk_access & MAY_APPEND)
+ seq_putc(s, 'a');
+ if (srp->smk_access & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
+ seq_putc(s, 't');
+ if (srp->smk_access == 0)
+ seq_putc(s, '-');
+
+ seq_putc(s, '\n');
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void load_self_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+ /* No-op */
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations load_self_seq_ops = {
+ .start = load_self_seq_start,
+ .next = load_self_seq_next,
+ .show = load_self_seq_show,
+ .stop = load_self_seq_stop,
+};
+
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_load_self - open() for /smack/load-self
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "load" file pointer
+ *
+ * For reading, use load_seq_* seq_file reading operations.
+ */
+static int smk_open_load_self(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return seq_open(file, &load_self_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_load_self - write() for /smack/load-self
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ *
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_load_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+
+ return smk_write_load_list(file, buf, count, ppos, &tsp->smk_rules,
+ &tsp->smk_rules_lock);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_load_self_ops = {
+ .open = smk_open_load_self,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .write = smk_write_load_self,
+ .release = seq_release,
+};
/**
* smk_fill_super - fill the /smackfs superblock
* @sb: the empty superblock
@@ -1304,23 +1441,26 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
struct inode *root_inode;
static struct tree_descr smack_files[] = {
- [SMK_LOAD] =
- {"load", &smk_load_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
- [SMK_CIPSO] =
- {"cipso", &smk_cipso_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
- [SMK_DOI] =
- {"doi", &smk_doi_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
- [SMK_DIRECT] =
- {"direct", &smk_direct_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
- [SMK_AMBIENT] =
- {"ambient", &smk_ambient_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
- [SMK_NETLBLADDR] =
- {"netlabel", &smk_netlbladdr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
- [SMK_ONLYCAP] =
- {"onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
- [SMK_LOGGING] =
- {"logging", &smk_logging_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
- /* last one */ {""}
+ [SMK_LOAD] = {
+ "load", &smk_load_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SMK_CIPSO] = {
+ "cipso", &smk_cipso_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SMK_DOI] = {
+ "doi", &smk_doi_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SMK_DIRECT] = {
+ "direct", &smk_direct_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SMK_AMBIENT] = {
+ "ambient", &smk_ambient_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SMK_NETLBLADDR] = {
+ "netlabel", &smk_netlbladdr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SMK_ONLYCAP] = {
+ "onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SMK_LOGGING] = {
+ "logging", &smk_logging_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SMK_LOAD_SELF] = {
+ "load-self", &smk_load_self_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+ /* last one */
+ {""}
};
rc = simple_fill_super(sb, SMACK_MAGIC, smack_files);
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/file.c b/security/tomoyo/file.c
index 9d32f182301e..cb09f1fce910 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/file.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/file.c
@@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ int tomoyo_check_open_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
struct path *path, const int flag)
{
const u8 acc_mode = ACC_MODE(flag);
- int error = -ENOMEM;
+ int error = 0;
struct tomoyo_path_info buf;
struct tomoyo_request_info r;
int idx;
@@ -938,9 +938,6 @@ int tomoyo_check_open_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
buf.name = NULL;
r.mode = TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED;
idx = tomoyo_read_lock();
- if (!tomoyo_get_realpath(&buf, path))
- goto out;
- error = 0;
/*
* If the filename is specified by "deny_rewrite" keyword,
* we need to check "allow_rewrite" permission when the filename is not