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authorEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>2012-04-17 16:26:54 -0400
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2012-04-22 15:31:11 -0700
commitf2c309c36d0a433c88534082cb2c3a817d6bd409 (patch)
tree4e8eb024d84de6a94c35362b55c6f9248e626564 /security
parent2d31dab4dc5754f3f0ddc40f607ba19928e4dd82 (diff)
fcaps: clear the same personality flags as suid when fcaps are used
commit d52fc5dde171f030170a6cb78034d166b13c9445 upstream. If a process increases permissions using fcaps all of the dangerous personality flags which are cleared for suid apps should also be cleared. Thus programs given priviledge with fcaps will continue to have address space randomization enabled even if the parent tried to disable it to make it easier to attack. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c5
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index ee4f8486e5f5..0aee1068170c 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -514,6 +514,11 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
}
skip:
+ /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
+ if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted))
+ bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+
+
/* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
* credentials unless they have the appropriate permit
*/