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-rw-r--r--Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt25
-rw-r--r--lib/vsprintf.c33
2 files changed, 48 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
index 6d78841fd416..99d8ab9d3834 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -284,13 +284,24 @@ Default value is "/sbin/hotplug".
kptr_restrict:
This toggle indicates whether restrictions are placed on
-exposing kernel addresses via /proc and other interfaces. When
-kptr_restrict is set to (0), there are no restrictions. When
-kptr_restrict is set to (1), the default, kernel pointers
-printed using the %pK format specifier will be replaced with 0's
-unless the user has CAP_SYSLOG. When kptr_restrict is set to
-(2), kernel pointers printed using %pK will be replaced with 0's
-regardless of privileges.
+exposing kernel addresses via /proc and other interfaces.
+
+When kptr_restrict is set to (0), the default, there are no restrictions.
+
+When kptr_restrict is set to (1), kernel pointers printed using the %pK
+format specifier will be replaced with 0's unless the user has CAP_SYSLOG
+and effective user and group ids are equal to the real ids. This is
+because %pK checks are done at read() time rather than open() time, so
+if permissions are elevated between the open() and the read() (e.g via
+a setuid binary) then %pK will not leak kernel pointers to unprivileged
+users. Note, this is a temporary solution only. The correct long-term
+solution is to do the permission checks at open() time. Consider removing
+world read permissions from files that use %pK, and using dmesg_restrict
+to protect against uses of %pK in dmesg(8) if leaking kernel pointer
+values to unprivileged users is a concern.
+
+When kptr_restrict is set to (2), kernel pointers printed using
+%pK will be replaced with 0's regardless of privileges.
==============================================================
diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index abbabec9720a..73e2c45acfdb 100644
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <linux/kallsyms.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/ioport.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <net/addrconf.h>
#include <asm/page.h> /* for PAGE_SIZE */
@@ -930,11 +931,37 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,
spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(void *);
return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec);
}
- if (!((kptr_restrict == 0) ||
- (kptr_restrict == 1 &&
- has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG))))
+
+ switch (kptr_restrict) {
+ case 0:
+ /* Always print %pK values */
+ break;
+ case 1: {
+ /*
+ * Only print the real pointer value if the current
+ * process has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the
+ * same credentials it started with. This is because
+ * access to files is checked at open() time, but %pK
+ * checks permission at read() time. We don't want to
+ * leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using
+ * %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it.
+ */
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+
+ if (!has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG) ||
+ (cred->euid != cred->uid) ||
+ (cred->egid != cred->gid))
+ ptr = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+ case 2:
+ default:
+ /* Always print 0's for %pK */
ptr = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
break;
+
case 'N':
switch (fmt[1]) {
case 'F':