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Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt')
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 191 |
1 files changed, 188 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt index da515c535e62..da9acfb23383 100644 --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -2035,6 +2035,36 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. Format: <first>,<last> Specifies range of consoles to be captured by the MDA. + mds= [X86,INTEL] + Control mitigation for the Micro-architectural Data + Sampling (MDS) vulnerability. + + Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an exploit against CPU + internal buffers which can forward information to a + disclosure gadget under certain conditions. + + In vulnerable processors, the speculatively + forwarded data can be used in a cache side channel + attack, to access data to which the attacker does + not have direct access. + + This parameter controls the MDS mitigation. The + options are: + + full - Enable MDS mitigation on vulnerable CPUs + off - Unconditionally disable MDS mitigation + + On TAA-affected machines, mds=off can be prevented by + an active TAA mitigation as both vulnerabilities are + mitigated with the same mechanism so in order to disable + this mitigation, you need to specify tsx_async_abort=off + too. + + Not specifying this option is equivalent to + mds=full. + + For details see: Documentation/hw-vuln/mds.rst + mem=nn[KMG] [KNL,BOOT] Force usage of a specific amount of memory Amount of memory to be used when the kernel is not able to see the whole system memory or for test. @@ -2149,6 +2179,32 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. in the "bleeding edge" mini2440 support kernel at http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git + mitigations= + [X86] Control optional mitigations for CPU + vulnerabilities. This is a set of curated, + arch-independent options, each of which is an + aggregation of existing arch-specific options. + + off + Disable all optional CPU mitigations. This + improves system performance, but it may also + expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities. + Equivalent to: nopti [X86] + nospectre_v1 [X86] + nospectre_v2 [X86] + spectre_v2_user=off [X86] + spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86] + mds=off [X86] + tsx_async_abort=off [X86] + + auto (default) + Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT + enabled, even if it's vulnerable. This is for + users who don't want to be surprised by SMT + getting disabled across kernel upgrades, or who + have other ways of avoiding SMT-based attacks. + Equivalent to: (default behavior) + mminit_loglevel= [KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this parameter allows control of the logging verbosity for @@ -2450,7 +2506,11 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. nohugeiomap [KNL,x86] Disable kernel huge I/O mappings. - nospectre_v2 [X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 + nospectre_v1 [X86,PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1 + (bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks are + possible in the system. + + nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC_FSL_BOOK3E] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 (indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent to spectre_v2=off. @@ -3362,6 +3422,13 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. Run specified binary instead of /init from the ramdisk, used for early userspace startup. See initrd. + rdrand= [X86] + force - Override the decision by the kernel to hide the + advertisement of RDRAND support (this affects + certain AMD processors because of buggy BIOS + support, specifically around the suspend/resume + path). + reboot= [KNL] Format (x86 or x86_64): [w[arm] | c[old] | h[ard] | s[oft] | g[pio]] \ @@ -3600,9 +3667,13 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. spectre_v2= [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2 (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability. + The default operation protects the kernel from + user space attacks. - on - unconditionally enable - off - unconditionally disable + on - unconditionally enable, implies + spectre_v2_user=on + off - unconditionally disable, implies + spectre_v2_user=off auto - kernel detects whether your CPU model is vulnerable @@ -3612,6 +3683,12 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the compiler with which the kernel was built. + Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation + against user space to user space task attacks. + + Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and + the user space protections. + Specific mitigations can also be selected manually: retpoline - replace indirect branches @@ -3621,6 +3698,48 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. Not specifying this option is equivalent to spectre_v2=auto. + spectre_v2_user= + [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2 + (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability between + user space tasks + + on - Unconditionally enable mitigations. Is + enforced by spectre_v2=on + + off - Unconditionally disable mitigations. Is + enforced by spectre_v2=off + + prctl - Indirect branch speculation is enabled, + but mitigation can be enabled via prctl + per thread. The mitigation control state + is inherited on fork. + + prctl,ibpb + - Like "prctl" above, but only STIBP is + controlled per thread. IBPB is issued + always when switching between different user + space processes. + + seccomp + - Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp + threads will enable the mitigation unless + they explicitly opt out. + + seccomp,ibpb + - Like "seccomp" above, but only STIBP is + controlled per thread. IBPB is issued + always when switching between different + user space processes. + + auto - Kernel selects the mitigation depending on + the available CPU features and vulnerability. + + Default mitigation: + If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y then "seccomp", otherwise "prctl" + + Not specifying this option is equivalent to + spectre_v2_user=auto. + spec_store_bypass_disable= [HW] Control Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) Disable mitigation (Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability) @@ -3940,6 +4059,72 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. platforms where RDTSC is slow and this accounting can add overhead. + tsx= [X86] Control Transactional Synchronization + Extensions (TSX) feature in Intel processors that + support TSX control. + + This parameter controls the TSX feature. The options are: + + on - Enable TSX on the system. Although there are + mitigations for all known security vulnerabilities, + TSX has been known to be an accelerator for + several previous speculation-related CVEs, and + so there may be unknown security risks associated + with leaving it enabled. + + off - Disable TSX on the system. (Note that this + option takes effect only on newer CPUs which are + not vulnerable to MDS, i.e., have + MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=1 and which get + the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR through a microcode + update. This new MSR allows for the reliable + deactivation of the TSX functionality.) + + auto - Disable TSX if X86_BUG_TAA is present, + otherwise enable TSX on the system. + + Not specifying this option is equivalent to tsx=off. + + See Documentation/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst + for more details. + + tsx_async_abort= [X86,INTEL] Control mitigation for the TSX Async + Abort (TAA) vulnerability. + + Similar to Micro-architectural Data Sampling (MDS) + certain CPUs that support Transactional + Synchronization Extensions (TSX) are vulnerable to an + exploit against CPU internal buffers which can forward + information to a disclosure gadget under certain + conditions. + + In vulnerable processors, the speculatively forwarded + data can be used in a cache side channel attack, to + access data to which the attacker does not have direct + access. + + This parameter controls the TAA mitigation. The + options are: + + full - Enable TAA mitigation on vulnerable CPUs + if TSX is enabled. + + off - Unconditionally disable TAA mitigation + + On MDS-affected machines, tsx_async_abort=off can be + prevented by an active MDS mitigation as both vulnerabilities + are mitigated with the same mechanism so in order to disable + this mitigation, you need to specify mds=off too. + + Not specifying this option is equivalent to + tsx_async_abort=full. On CPUs which are MDS affected + and deploy MDS mitigation, TAA mitigation is not + required and doesn't provide any additional + mitigation. + + For details see: + Documentation/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst + turbografx.map[2|3]= [HW,JOY] TurboGraFX parallel port interface Format: |