1 files changed, 38 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/asm-x86/stackprotector.h b/include/asm-x86/stackprotector.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3baf7ad89be1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/asm-x86/stackprotector.h
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+#ifndef _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H
+#define _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H 1
+
+#include <asm/tsc.h>
+
+/*
+ * Initialize the stackprotector canary value.
+ *
+ * NOTE: this must only be called from functions that never return,
+ * and it must always be inlined.
+ */
+static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void)
+{
+	u64 canary;
+	u64 tsc;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we're the non-boot CPU, nothing set the PDA stack
+	 * canary up for us - and if we are the boot CPU we have
+	 * a 0 stack canary. This is a good place for updating
+	 * it, as we wont ever return from this function (so the
+	 * invalid canaries already on the stack wont ever
+	 * trigger).
+	 *
+	 * We both use the random pool and the current TSC as a source
+	 * of randomness. The TSC only matters for very early init,
+	 * there it already has some randomness on most systems. Later
+	 * on during the bootup the random pool has true entropy too.
+	 */
+	get_random_bytes(&canary, sizeof(canary));
+	tsc = __native_read_tsc();
+	canary += tsc + (tsc << 32UL);
+
+	current->stack_canary = canary;
+	write_pda(stack_canary, canary);
+}
+
+#endif