diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/ima')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 44 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 23 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 42 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c | 56 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 286 |
7 files changed, 406 insertions, 48 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index 648a0461f8ed..1d4dbae64f8c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -108,6 +108,27 @@ config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH default "sha512" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA512 default "wp512" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_WP512 +config IMA_WRITE_POLICY + bool "Enable multiple writes to the IMA policy" + depends on IMA + default n + help + IMA policy can now be updated multiple times. The new rules get + appended to the original policy. Have in mind that the rules are + scanned in FIFO order so be careful when you design and add new ones. + + If unsure, say N. + +config IMA_READ_POLICY + bool "Enable reading back the current IMA policy" + depends on IMA + default y if IMA_WRITE_POLICY + default n if !IMA_WRITE_POLICY + help + It is often useful to be able to read back the IMA policy. It is + even more important after introducing CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY. + This option allows the root user to see the current policy rules. + config IMA_APPRAISE bool "Appraise integrity measurements" depends on IMA @@ -124,14 +145,35 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE If unsure, say N. config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING - bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed" + bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed (deprecated)" depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + select INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING default y help This option requires that all keys added to the .ima keyring be signed by a key on the system trusted keyring. + This option is deprecated in favor of INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING + +config IMA_MOK_KEYRING + bool "Create IMA machine owner keys (MOK) and blacklist keyrings" + depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING + depends on IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING + default n + help + This option creates IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings. IMA MOK is an + intermediate keyring that sits between .system and .ima keyrings, + effectively forming a simple CA hierarchy. To successfully import a + key into .ima_mok it must be signed by a key which CA is in .system + keyring. On turn any key that needs to go in .ima keyring must be + signed by CA in either .system or .ima_mok keyrings. IMA MOK is empty + at kernel boot. + + IMA blacklist keyring contains all revoked IMA keys. It is consulted + before any other keyring. If the search is successful the requested + operation is rejected and error is returned to the caller. + config IMA_LOAD_X509 bool "Load X509 certificate onto the '.ima' trusted keyring" depends on IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile index d79263d2fdbf..a8539f9e060f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile @@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \ ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o +obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_MOK_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 5b8dec715a75..660f0e1274bb 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -167,6 +167,10 @@ void ima_update_policy(void); void ima_update_policy_flag(void); ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *); void ima_delete_rules(void); +void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos); +void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos); +void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v); +int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v); /* Appraise integrity measurements */ #define IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE 0x01 @@ -251,17 +255,12 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, { return -EINVAL; } -#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */ +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING */ -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING -static inline int ima_init_keyring(const unsigned int id) -{ - return integrity_init_keyring(id); -} +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY +#define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS (S_IWUSR | S_IRUSR) #else -static inline int ima_init_keyring(const unsigned int id) -{ - return 0; -} -#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING */ -#endif +#define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS S_IWUSR +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY */ + +#endif /* __LINUX_IMA_H */ diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index 30aced99bc55..6816ef259e7e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ #include "ima.h" +static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_write_mutex); + static int valid_policy = 1; static ssize_t ima_show_htable_value(char __user *buf, size_t count, @@ -261,6 +263,11 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, { char *data = NULL; ssize_t result; + int res; + + res = mutex_lock_interruptible(&ima_write_mutex); + if (res) + return res; if (datalen >= PAGE_SIZE) datalen = PAGE_SIZE - 1; @@ -286,6 +293,8 @@ out: if (result < 0) valid_policy = 0; kfree(data); + mutex_unlock(&ima_write_mutex); + return result; } @@ -302,14 +311,31 @@ enum ima_fs_flags { static unsigned long ima_fs_flags; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY +static const struct seq_operations ima_policy_seqops = { + .start = ima_policy_start, + .next = ima_policy_next, + .stop = ima_policy_stop, + .show = ima_policy_show, +}; +#endif + /* * ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file */ static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) { - /* No point in being allowed to open it if you aren't going to write */ - if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY)) + if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY)) { +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY return -EACCES; +#else + if ((filp->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY) + return -EACCES; + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + return seq_open(filp, &ima_policy_seqops); +#endif + } if (test_and_set_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags)) return -EBUSY; return 0; @@ -326,6 +352,9 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { const char *cause = valid_policy ? "completed" : "failed"; + if ((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) + return 0; + pr_info("IMA: policy update %s\n", cause); integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL, "policy_update", cause, !valid_policy, 0); @@ -336,15 +365,21 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags); return 0; } + ima_update_policy(); +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY securityfs_remove(ima_policy); ima_policy = NULL; +#else + clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags); +#endif return 0; } static const struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = { .open = ima_open_policy, .write = ima_write_policy, + .read = seq_read, .release = ima_release_policy, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; @@ -382,8 +417,7 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void) if (IS_ERR(violations)) goto out; - ima_policy = securityfs_create_file("policy", - S_IWUSR, + ima_policy = securityfs_create_file("policy", POLICY_FILE_FLAGS, ima_dir, NULL, &ima_measure_policy_ops); if (IS_ERR(ima_policy)) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index e600cadd231c..bd79f254d204 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ int __init ima_init(void) if (!ima_used_chip) pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n"); - rc = ima_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA); + rc = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA); if (rc) return rc; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..16113f66378b --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2015 Juniper Networks, Inc. + * + * Author: + * Petko Manolov <petko.manolov@konsulko.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + * + */ + +#include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/cred.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> + + +struct key *ima_mok_keyring; +struct key *ima_blacklist_keyring; + +/* + * Allocate the IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings + */ +__init int ima_mok_init(void) +{ + pr_notice("Allocating IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings.\n"); + + ima_mok_keyring = keyring_alloc(".ima_mok", + KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(), + (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | + KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | + KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH, + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, + keyring_restrict_trusted_only, NULL); + + ima_blacklist_keyring = keyring_alloc(".ima_blacklist", + KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(), + (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | + KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | + KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH, + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, + keyring_restrict_trusted_only, NULL); + + if (IS_ERR(ima_mok_keyring) || IS_ERR(ima_blacklist_keyring)) + panic("Can't allocate IMA MOK or blacklist keyrings."); + + set_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &ima_blacklist_keyring->flags); + return 0; +} + +module_init(ima_mok_init); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 0ddc8cb6411b..f5473dbfd93d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -16,7 +16,9 @@ #include <linux/magic.h> #include <linux/parser.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/rculist.h> #include <linux/genhd.h> +#include <linux/seq_file.h> #include "ima.h" @@ -135,11 +137,11 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = { static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules); static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules); +static LIST_HEAD(ima_temp_rules); static struct list_head *ima_rules = &ima_default_rules; -static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_rules_mutex); - static int ima_policy __initdata; + static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str) { if (ima_policy) @@ -171,21 +173,18 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str) __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup); /* - * Although the IMA policy does not change, the LSM policy can be - * reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring to the old, - * stale LSM policy. - * - * Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy. - * We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if they don't. + * The LSM policy can be reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring + * to the old, stale LSM policy. Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect + * the reloaded LSM policy. We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if + * they don't. */ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void) { - struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp; + struct ima_rule_entry *entry; int result; int i; - mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex); - list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_policy_rules, list) { + list_for_each_entry(entry, &ima_policy_rules, list) { for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { if (!entry->lsm[i].rule) continue; @@ -196,7 +195,6 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void) BUG_ON(!entry->lsm[i].rule); } } - mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex); } /** @@ -319,9 +317,9 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, int func) * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type) * conditions. * - * (There is no need for locking when walking the policy list, - * as elements in the list are never deleted, nor does the list - * change.) + * Since the IMA policy may be updated multiple times we need to lock the + * list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous + * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate. */ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags) @@ -329,7 +327,8 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, struct ima_rule_entry *entry; int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1); - list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_rules, list) { + rcu_read_lock(); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) { if (!(entry->action & actmask)) continue; @@ -351,6 +350,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, if (!actmask) break; } + rcu_read_unlock(); return action; } @@ -365,7 +365,6 @@ void ima_update_policy_flag(void) { struct ima_rule_entry *entry; - ima_policy_flag = 0; list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_rules, list) { if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK) ima_policy_flag |= entry->action; @@ -418,12 +417,36 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) * ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules * * Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new - * policy. Once updated, the policy is locked, no additional rules can be - * added to the policy. + * policy. What we do here is to splice ima_policy_rules and ima_temp_rules so + * they make a queue. The policy may be updated multiple times and this is the + * RCU updater. + * + * Policy rules are never deleted so ima_policy_flag gets zeroed only once when + * we switch from the default policy to user defined. */ void ima_update_policy(void) { - ima_rules = &ima_policy_rules; + struct list_head *first, *last, *policy; + + /* append current policy with the new rules */ + first = (&ima_temp_rules)->next; + last = (&ima_temp_rules)->prev; + policy = &ima_policy_rules; + + synchronize_rcu(); + + last->next = policy; + rcu_assign_pointer(list_next_rcu(policy->prev), first); + first->prev = policy->prev; + policy->prev = last; + + /* prepare for the next policy rules addition */ + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ima_temp_rules); + + if (ima_rules != policy) { + ima_policy_flag = 0; + ima_rules = policy; + } ima_update_policy_flag(); } @@ -435,8 +458,8 @@ enum { Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type, Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type, Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, - Opt_uid, Opt_euid, Opt_fowner, - Opt_appraise_type, Opt_fsuuid, Opt_permit_directio + Opt_fsuuid, Opt_uid, Opt_euid, Opt_fowner, + Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio }; static match_table_t policy_tokens = { @@ -745,7 +768,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to ima_policy_rules * @rule - ima measurement policy rule * - * Uses a mutex to protect the policy list from multiple concurrent writers. + * Avoid locking by allowing just one writer at a time in ima_write_policy() * Returns the length of the rule parsed, an error code on failure */ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule) @@ -781,26 +804,229 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule) return result; } - mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex); - list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules); - mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex); + list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_temp_rules); return len; } -/* ima_delete_rules called to cleanup invalid policy */ +/** + * ima_delete_rules() called to cleanup invalid in-flight policy. + * We don't need locking as we operate on the temp list, which is + * different from the active one. There is also only one user of + * ima_delete_rules() at a time. + */ void ima_delete_rules(void) { struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp; int i; - mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex); - list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_policy_rules, list) { + list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_temp_rules, list) { for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p); list_del(&entry->list); kfree(entry); } - mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex); } + +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY +enum { + mask_exec = 0, mask_write, mask_read, mask_append +}; + +static char *mask_tokens[] = { + "MAY_EXEC", + "MAY_WRITE", + "MAY_READ", + "MAY_APPEND" +}; + +enum { + func_file = 0, func_mmap, func_bprm, + func_module, func_firmware, func_post +}; + +static char *func_tokens[] = { + "FILE_CHECK", + "MMAP_CHECK", + "BPRM_CHECK", + "MODULE_CHECK", + "FIRMWARE_CHECK", + "POST_SETATTR" +}; + +void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) +{ + loff_t l = *pos; + struct ima_rule_entry *entry; + + rcu_read_lock(); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) { + if (!l--) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + return entry; + } + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + return NULL; +} + +void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos) +{ + struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v; + + rcu_read_lock(); + entry = list_entry_rcu(entry->list.next, struct ima_rule_entry, list); + rcu_read_unlock(); + (*pos)++; + + return (&entry->list == ima_rules) ? NULL : entry; +} + +void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v) +{ +} + +#define pt(token) policy_tokens[token + Opt_err].pattern +#define mt(token) mask_tokens[token] +#define ft(token) func_tokens[token] + +int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) +{ + struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v; + int i = 0; + char tbuf[64] = {0,}; + + rcu_read_lock(); + + if (entry->action & MEASURE) + seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_measure)); + if (entry->action & DONT_MEASURE) + seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_measure)); + if (entry->action & APPRAISE) + seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_appraise)); + if (entry->action & DONT_APPRAISE) + seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_appraise)); + if (entry->action & AUDIT) + seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_audit)); + + seq_puts(m, " "); + + if (entry->flags & IMA_FUNC) { + switch (entry->func) { + case FILE_CHECK: + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_file)); + break; + case MMAP_CHECK: + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_mmap)); + break; + case BPRM_CHECK: + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_bprm)); + break; + case MODULE_CHECK: + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_module)); + break; + case FIRMWARE_CHECK: + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_firmware)); + break; + case POST_SETATTR: + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_post)); + break; + default: + snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->func); + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), tbuf); + break; + } + seq_puts(m, " "); + } + + if (entry->flags & IMA_MASK) { + if (entry->mask & MAY_EXEC) + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_exec)); + if (entry->mask & MAY_WRITE) + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_write)); + if (entry->mask & MAY_READ) + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_read)); + if (entry->mask & MAY_APPEND) + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_append)); + seq_puts(m, " "); + } + + if (entry->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC) { + snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "0x%lx", entry->fsmagic); + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fsmagic), tbuf); + seq_puts(m, " "); + } + + if (entry->flags & IMA_FSUUID) { + seq_puts(m, "fsuuid="); + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(entry->fsuuid); ++i) { + switch (i) { + case 4: + case 6: + case 8: + case 10: + seq_puts(m, "-"); + } + seq_printf(m, "%x", entry->fsuuid[i]); + } + seq_puts(m, " "); + } + + if (entry->flags & IMA_UID) { + snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->uid)); + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_uid), tbuf); + seq_puts(m, " "); + } + + if (entry->flags & IMA_EUID) { + snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->uid)); + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_euid), tbuf); + seq_puts(m, " "); + } + + if (entry->flags & IMA_FOWNER) { + snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", __kuid_val(entry->fowner)); + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fowner), tbuf); + seq_puts(m, " "); + } + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { + if (entry->lsm[i].rule) { + switch (i) { + case LSM_OBJ_USER: + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_user), + (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p); + break; + case LSM_OBJ_ROLE: + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_role), + (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p); + break; + case LSM_OBJ_TYPE: + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_type), + (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p); + break; + case LSM_SUBJ_USER: + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_user), + (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p); + break; + case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_role), + (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p); + break; + case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_type), + (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p); + break; + } + } + } + if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) + seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig "); + if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) + seq_puts(m, "permit_directio "); + rcu_read_unlock(); + seq_puts(m, "\n"); + return 0; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */ |