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commit 619bd4a71874a8fd78eb6ccf9f272c5e98bcc7b7 upstream.
Since the change in commit:
fd7a4bed1835 ("sched, rt: Convert switched_{from, to}_rt() / prio_changed_rt() to balance callbacks")
... we don't reschedule a task under certain circumstances:
Lets say task-A, SCHED_OTHER, is running on CPU0 (and it may run only on
CPU0) and holds a PI lock. This task is removed from the CPU because it
used up its time slice and another SCHED_OTHER task is running. Task-B on
CPU1 runs at RT priority and asks for the lock owned by task-A. This
results in a priority boost for task-A. Task-B goes to sleep until the
lock has been made available. Task-A is already runnable (but not active),
so it receives no wake up.
The reality now is that task-A gets on the CPU once the scheduler decides
to remove the current task despite the fact that a high priority task is
enqueued and waiting. This may take a long time.
The desired behaviour is that CPU0 immediately reschedules after the
priority boost which made task-A the task with the lowest priority.
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: fd7a4bed1835 ("sched, rt: Convert switched_{from, to}_rt() prio_changed_rt() to balance callbacks")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170124144006.29821-1-bigeasy@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1b53cf9815bb4744958d41f3795d5d5a1d365e2d upstream.
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7195ee3120d878259e8d94a5d9f808116f34d5ea upstream.
It's not clear what behaviour is sensible when doing partial write of
NT_METAG_RPIPE, so just don't bother.
This patch assumes that userspace will never rely on a partial SETREGSET
in this case, since it's not clear what should happen anyway.
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Acked-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5fe81fe98123ce41265c65e95d34418d30d005d1 upstream.
Ensure that if userspace supplies insufficient data to PTRACE_SETREGSET
to fill TXSTATUS, a well-defined default value is used, based on the
task's current value.
Suggested-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a78ce80d2c9178351b34d78fec805140c29c193e upstream.
Ensure that if userspace supplies insufficient data to PTRACE_SETREGSET
to fill all the registers, the thread's old registers are preserved.
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Acked-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d3805c546b275c8cc7d40f759d029ae92c7175f2 upstream.
Ensure that if userspace supplies insufficient data to PTRACE_SETREGSET
to fill all the registers, the thread's old registers are preserved.
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d614fd58a2834cfe4efa472c33c8f3ce2338b09b upstream.
Ensure that if userspace supplies insufficient data to PTRACE_SETREGSET
to fill all the registers, the thread's old registers are preserved.
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 502585c7555083d4a949c08350306b9ec196779e upstream.
regs_set() and regs_get() are vulnerable to an off-by-1 buffer overrun
if CONFIG_CPU_H8S is set, since this adds an extra entry to
register_offset[] but not to user_regs_struct.
So, iterate over user_regs_struct based on its actual size, not based on
the length of register_offset[].
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fb411b837b587a32046dc4f369acb93a10b1def8 upstream.
gpr_set won't work correctly and can never have been tested, and the
correct behaviour is not clear due to the endianness-dependent task
layout.
So, just remove it. The core code will now return -EOPNOTSUPPORT when
trying to set NT_PRSTATUS on this architecture until/unless a correct
implementation is supplied.
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a6566710adaa4a7dd5e0d99820ff9c9c30ee5951 upstream.
Clearing the status bit on irq_unmask will discard any pending interrupt
that did arrive after the irq_ack, i.e. while the IRQ handler function
was executing.
Fixes: f365be092572 ("pinctrl: Add Qualcomm TLMM driver")
Cc: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org>
Reported-by: Timur Tabi <timur@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fc8653228c8588a120f6b5dad6983b7b61ff669e upstream.
When init_vqs runs, virtio_balloon.stats is either uninitialized or
contains stale values. The host updates its state with garbage data
because it has no way of knowing that this is just a marker buffer
used for signaling.
This patch updates the stats before pushing the initial buffer.
Alternative fixes:
* Push an empty buffer in init_vqs. Not easily done with the current
virtio implementation and violates the spec "Driver MUST supply the
same subset of statistics in all buffers submitted to the statsq".
* Push a buffer with invalid tags in init_vqs. Violates the same
spec clause, plus "invalid tag" is not really defined.
Note: the spec says:
When using the legacy interface, the device SHOULD ignore all values in
the first buffer in the statsq supplied by the driver after device
initialization. Note: Historically, drivers supplied an uninitialized
buffer in the first buffer.
Unfortunately QEMU does not seem to implement the recommendation
even for the legacy interface.
Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f843ee6dd019bcece3e74e76ad9df0155655d0df upstream.
Kees Cook has pointed out that xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() is subject to
wrapping issues. To ensure we are correctly ensuring that the two ESN
structures are the same size compare both the overall size as reported
by xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() and the internal length are the same.
CVE-2017-7184
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 677e806da4d916052585301785d847c3b3e6186a upstream.
When a new xfrm state is created during an XFRM_MSG_NEWSA call we
validate the user supplied replay_esn to ensure that the size is valid
and to ensure that the replay_window size is within the allocated
buffer. However later it is possible to update this replay_esn via a
XFRM_MSG_NEWAE call. There we again validate the size of the supplied
buffer matches the existing state and if so inject the contents. We do
not at this point check that the replay_window is within the allocated
memory. This leads to out-of-bounds reads and writes triggered by
netlink packets. This leads to memory corruption and the potential for
priviledge escalation.
We already attempt to validate the incoming replay information in
xfrm_new_ae() via xfrm_replay_verify_len(). This confirms that the user
is not trying to change the size of the replay state buffer which
includes the replay_esn. It however does not check the replay_window
remains within that buffer. Add validation of the contained
replay_window.
CVE-2017-7184
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c282222a45cb9503cbfbebfdb60491f06ae84b49 upstream.
Dmitry reports following splat:
INFO: trying to register non-static key.
the code is fine but needs lockdep annotation.
turning off the locking correctness validator.
CPU: 0 PID: 13059 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc7-next-20170207 #1
[..]
spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:304 [inline]
xfrm_policy_flush+0x32/0x470 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:963
xfrm_policy_fini+0xbf/0x560 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3041
xfrm_net_init+0x79f/0x9e0 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3091
ops_init+0x10a/0x530 net/core/net_namespace.c:115
setup_net+0x2ed/0x690 net/core/net_namespace.c:291
copy_net_ns+0x26c/0x530 net/core/net_namespace.c:396
create_new_namespaces+0x409/0x860 kernel/nsproxy.c:106
unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xae/0x1e0 kernel/nsproxy.c:205
SYSC_unshare kernel/fork.c:2281 [inline]
Problem is that when we get error during xfrm_net_init we will call
xfrm_policy_fini which will acquire xfrm_policy_lock before it was
initialized. Just move it around so locks get set up first.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Fixes: 283bc9f35bbbcb0e9 ("xfrm: Namespacify xfrm state/policy locks")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6207119444595d287b1e9e83a2066c17209698f3 upstream.
With this reproducer:
struct sockaddr_alg alg = {
.salg_family = 0x26,
.salg_type = "hash",
.salg_feat = 0xf,
.salg_mask = 0x5,
.salg_name = "digest_null",
};
int sock, sock2;
sock = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&alg, sizeof(alg));
sock2 = accept(sock, NULL, NULL);
setsockopt(sock, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, "\x9b\xca", 2);
accept(sock2, NULL, NULL);
==== 8< ======== 8< ======== 8< ======== 8< ====
one can immediatelly see an UBSAN warning:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in crypto/algif_hash.c:187:7
variable length array bound value 0 <= 0
CPU: 0 PID: 15949 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G E 4.4.30-0-default #1
...
Call Trace:
...
[<ffffffff81d598fd>] ? __ubsan_handle_vla_bound_not_positive+0x13d/0x188
[<ffffffff81d597c0>] ? __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x1bc/0x1bc
[<ffffffffa0e2204d>] ? hash_accept+0x5bd/0x7d0 [algif_hash]
[<ffffffffa0e2293f>] ? hash_accept_nokey+0x3f/0x51 [algif_hash]
[<ffffffffa0e206b0>] ? hash_accept_parent_nokey+0x4a0/0x4a0 [algif_hash]
[<ffffffff8235c42b>] ? SyS_accept+0x2b/0x40
It is a correct warning, as hash state is propagated to accept as zero,
but creating a zero-length variable array is not allowed in C.
Fix this as proposed by Herbert -- do "?: 1" on that site. No sizeof or
similar happens in the code there, so we just allocate one byte even
though we do not use the array.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> (maintainer:CRYPTO API)
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8aac7f34369726d1a158788ae8aff3002d5eb528 upstream.
fbcon can deal with vc_hi_font_mask (the upper 256 chars) and adjust
the vc attrs dynamically when vc_hi_font_mask is changed at
fbcon_init(). When the vc_hi_font_mask is set, it remaps the attrs in
the existing console buffer with one bit shift up (for 9 bits), while
it remaps with one bit shift down (for 8 bits) when the value is
cleared. It works fine as long as the font gets updated after fbcon
was initialized.
However, we hit a bizarre problem when the console is switched to
another fb driver (typically from vesafb or efifb to drmfb). At
switching to the new fb driver, we temporarily rebind the console to
the dummy console, then rebind to the new driver. During the
switching, we leave the modified attrs as is. Thus, the new fbcon
takes over the old buffer as if it were to contain 8 bits chars
(although the attrs are still shifted for 9 bits), and effectively
this results in the yellow color texts instead of the original white
color, as found in the bugzilla entry below.
An easy fix for this is to re-adjust the attrs before leaving the
fbcon at con_deinit callback. Since the code to adjust the attrs is
already present in the current fbcon code, in this patch, we simply
factor out the relevant code, and call it from fbcon_deinit().
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1000619
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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From: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
[ Upstream commit f209fa03fc9d131b3108c2e4936181eabab87416 ]
During a PCI error recovery, like the ones provoked by EEH in the ppc64
platform, all IO to the device must be blocked while the recovery is
completed. Current 8250_pci implementation only suspends the port
instead of detaching it, which doesn't prevent incoming accesses like
TIOCMGET and TIOCMSET calls from reaching the device. Those end up
racing with the EEH recovery, crashing it. Similar races were also
observed when opening the device and when shutting it down during
recovery.
This patch implements a more robust IO blockage for the 8250_pci
recovery by unregistering the port at the beginning of the procedure and
re-adding it afterwards. Since the port is detached from the uart
layer, we can be sure that no request will make through to the device
during recovery. This is similar to the solution used by the JSM serial
driver.
I thank Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com> for valuable input on
this one over one year ago.
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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From: Michael Pobega <mpobega@neverware.com>
[ Upstream commit 708f5dcc21ae9b35f395865fc154b0105baf4de4 ]
The Dell Latitude 3350's ethernet card attempts to use a reserved
IRQ (18), resulting in ACPI being unable to enable the ethernet.
Adding it to acpi_rev_dmi_table[] helps to work around this problem.
Signed-off-by: Michael Pobega <mpobega@neverware.com>
[ rjw: Changelog ]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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From: Alex Hung <alex.hung@canonical.com>
[ Upstream commit 9523b9bf6dceef6b0215e90b2348cd646597f796 ]
Precision 5520 and 3520 either hang at login and during suspend or reboot.
It turns out that that adding them to acpi_rev_dmi_table[] helps to work
around those issues.
Signed-off-by: Alex Hung <alex.hung@canonical.com>
[ rjw: Changelog ]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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From: Henrik Ingo <henrik.ingo@avoinelama.fi>
[ Upstream commit e950267ab802c8558f1100eafd4087fd039ad634 ]
Some devices have invalid baSourceID references, causing uvc_scan_chain()
to fail, but if we just take the entities we can find and put them
together in the most sensible chain we can think of, turns out they do
work anyway. Note: This heuristic assumes there is a single chain.
At the time of writing, devices known to have such a broken chain are
- Acer Integrated Camera (5986:055a)
- Realtek rtl157a7 (0bda:57a7)
Signed-off-by: Henrik Ingo <henrik.ingo@avoinelama.fi>
Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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From: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
[ Upstream commit b3e8652bcbfa04807e44708d4d0c8cdad39c9215 ]
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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From: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mauricfo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
[ Upstream commit 25cdb64510644f3e854d502d69c73f21c6df88a9 ]
The WRITE_SAME commands are not present in the blk_default_cmd_filter
write_ok list, and thus are failed with -EPERM when the SG_IO ioctl()
is executed without CAP_SYS_RAWIO capability (e.g., unprivileged users).
[ sg_io() -> blk_fill_sghdr_rq() > blk_verify_command() -> -EPERM ]
The problem can be reproduced with the sg_write_same command
# sg_write_same --num 1 --xferlen 512 /dev/sda
#
# capsh --drop=cap_sys_rawio -- -c \
'sg_write_same --num 1 --xferlen 512 /dev/sda'
Write same: pass through os error: Operation not permitted
#
For comparison, the WRITE_VERIFY command does not observe this problem,
since it is in that list:
# capsh --drop=cap_sys_rawio -- -c \
'sg_write_verify --num 1 --ilen 512 --lba 0 /dev/sda'
#
So, this patch adds the WRITE_SAME commands to the list, in order
for the SG_IO ioctl to finish successfully:
# capsh --drop=cap_sys_rawio -- -c \
'sg_write_same --num 1 --xferlen 512 /dev/sda'
#
That case happens to be exercised by QEMU KVM guests with 'scsi-block' devices
(qemu "-device scsi-block" [1], libvirt "<disk type='block' device='lun'>" [2]),
which employs the SG_IO ioctl() and runs as an unprivileged user (libvirt-qemu).
In that scenario, when a filesystem (e.g., ext4) performs its zero-out calls,
which are translated to write-same calls in the guest kernel, and then into
SG_IO ioctls to the host kernel, SCSI I/O errors may be observed in the guest:
[...] sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] tag#0 FAILED Result: hostbyte=DID_OK driverbyte=DRIVER_SENSE
[...] sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] tag#0 Sense Key : Aborted Command [current]
[...] sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] tag#0 Add. Sense: I/O process terminated
[...] sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] tag#0 CDB: Write Same(10) 41 00 01 04 e0 78 00 00 08 00
[...] blk_update_request: I/O error, dev sda, sector 17096824
Links:
[1] http://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=336a6915bc7089fb20fea4ba99972ad9a97c5f52
[2] https://libvirt.org/formatdomain.html#elementsDisks (see 'disk' -> 'device')
Signed-off-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mauricfo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Brahadambal Srinivasan <latha@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Manjunatha H R <manjuhr1@in.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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From: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
[ Upstream commit 39701e56f5f16ea0cf8fc9e8472e645f8de91d23 ]
The iommu_table struct manages a hardware TCE table and a vmalloc'd
table with corresponding userspace addresses. Both are allocated when
the default DMA window is created and this happens when the very first
group is attached to a container.
As we are going to allow the userspace to configure container in one
memory context and pas container fd to another, we have to postpones
such allocations till a container fd is passed to the destination
user process so we would account locked memory limit against the actual
container user constrainsts.
This postpones the it_userspace array allocation till it is used first
time for mapping. The unmapping patch already checks if the array is
allocated.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Acked-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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From: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
[ Upstream commit f40ec3c748c6912f6266c56a7f7992de61b255ed ]
Previously we enabled VFs and enable their memory space before calling
pcibios_sriov_enable(). But pcibios_sriov_enable() may update the VF BARs:
for example, on PPC PowerNV we may change them to manage the association of
VFs to PEs.
Because 64-bit BARs cannot be updated atomically, it's unsafe to update
them while they're enabled. The half-updated state may conflict with other
devices in the system.
Call pcibios_sriov_enable() before enabling the VFs so any BAR updates
happen while the VF BARs are disabled.
[bhelgaas: changelog]
Tested-by: Carol Soto <clsoto@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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From: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
[ Upstream commit 63880b230a4af502c56dde3d4588634c70c66006 ]
VF BARs are read-only zero, so updating VF BARs will not have any effect.
See the SR-IOV spec r1.1, sec 3.4.1.11.
We already ignore these updates because of 70675e0b6a1a ("PCI: Don't try to
restore VF BARs"); this merely restructures it slightly to make it easier
to split updates for standard and SR-IOV BARs.
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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From: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
[ Upstream commit 45d004f4afefdd8d79916ee6d97a9ecd94bb1ffe ]
The BAR property bits (0-3 for memory BARs, 0-1 for I/O BARs) are supposed
to be read-only, but we do save them in res->flags and include them when
updating the BAR.
Mask the I/O property bits with ~PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_IO_MASK (0x3) instead of
PCI_REGION_FLAG_MASK (0xf) to make it obvious that we can't corrupt bits
2-3 of I/O addresses.
Use PCI_ROM_ADDRESS_MASK for ROM BARs. This means we'll only check the top
21 bits (instead of the 28 bits we used to check) of a ROM BAR to see if
the update was successful.
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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From: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
[ Upstream commit 546ba9f8f22f71b0202b6ba8967be5cc6dae4e21 ]
If we update a VF BAR while it's enabled, there are two potential problems:
1) Any driver that's using the VF has a cached BAR value that is stale
after the update, and
2) We can't update 64-bit BARs atomically, so the intermediate state
(new lower dword with old upper dword) may conflict with another
device, and an access by a driver unrelated to the VF may cause a bus
error.
Warn about attempts to update VF BARs while they are enabled. This is a
programming error, so use dev_WARN() to get a backtrace.
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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From: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
[ Upstream commit 7a6d312b50e63f598f5b5914c4fd21878ac2b595 ]
Remove the assumption that IORESOURCE_ROM_ENABLE == PCI_ROM_ADDRESS_ENABLE.
PCI_ROM_ADDRESS_ENABLE is the ROM enable bit defined by the PCI spec, so if
we're reading or writing a BAR register value, that's what we should use.
IORESOURCE_ROM_ENABLE is a corresponding bit in struct resource flags.
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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From: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
[ Upstream commit 0b457dde3cf8b7c76a60f8e960f21bbd4abdc416 ]
pci_update_resource() updates a hardware BAR so its address matches the
kernel's struct resource UNLESS it's a disabled ROM BAR. We only update
those when we enable the ROM.
It's not obvious from the code why ROM BARs should be handled specially.
Apparently there are Matrox devices with defective ROM BARs that read as
zero when disabled. That means that if pci_enable_rom() reads the disabled
BAR, sets PCI_ROM_ADDRESS_ENABLE (without re-inserting the address), and
writes it back, it would enable the ROM at address zero.
Add comments and references to explain why we can't make the code look more
rational.
The code changes are from 755528c860b0 ("Ignore disabled ROM resources at
setup") and 8085ce084c0f ("[PATCH] Fix PCI ROM mapping").
Link: https://lkml.org/lkml/2005/8/30/138
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[sumits: minor fixup in rom.c for 4.4.y]
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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From: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
[ Upstream commit 286c2378aaccc7343ebf17ec6cd86567659caf70 ]
pci_std_update_resource() only deals with standard BARs, so we don't have
to worry about the complications of VF BARs in an SR-IOV capability.
Compute the BAR address inline and remove pci_resource_bar(). That makes
pci_iov_resource_bar() unused, so remove that as well.
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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From: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
[ Upstream commit 6ffa2489c51da77564a0881a73765ea2169f955d ]
Previously pci_update_resource() used the same code path for updating
standard BARs and VF BARs in SR-IOV capabilities.
Split the VF BAR update into a new pci_iov_update_resource() internal
interface, which makes it simpler to compute the BAR address (we can get
rid of pci_resource_bar() and pci_iov_resource_bar()).
This patch:
- Renames pci_update_resource() to pci_std_update_resource(),
- Adds pci_iov_update_resource(),
- Makes pci_update_resource() a wrapper that calls the appropriate one,
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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From: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
[ Upstream commit 59107e2f48831daedc46973ce4988605ab066de3 ]
There is a feature in Hyper-V ('Debug-VM --InjectNonMaskableInterrupt')
which injects NMI to the guest. We may want to crash the guest and do kdump
on this NMI by enabling unknown_nmi_panic. To make kdump succeed we need to
allow the kdump kernel to re-establish VMBus connection so it will see
VMBus devices (storage, network,..).
To properly unload VMBus making it possible to start over during kdump we
need to do the following:
- Send an 'unload' message to the hypervisor. This can be done on any CPU
so we do this the crashing CPU.
- Receive the 'unload finished' reply message. WS2012R2 delivers this
message to the CPU which was used to establish VMBus connection during
module load and this CPU may differ from the CPU sending 'unload'.
Receiving a VMBus message means the following:
- There is a per-CPU slot in memory for one message. This slot can in
theory be accessed by any CPU.
- We get an interrupt on the CPU when a message was placed into the slot.
- When we read the message we need to clear the slot and signal the fact
to the hypervisor. In case there are more messages to this CPU pending
the hypervisor will deliver the next message. The signaling is done by
writing to an MSR so this can only be done on the appropriate CPU.
To avoid doing cross-CPU work on crash we have vmbus_wait_for_unload()
function which checks message slots for all CPUs in a loop waiting for the
'unload finished' messages. However, there is an issue which arises when
these conditions are met:
- We're crashing on a CPU which is different from the one which was used
to initially contact the hypervisor.
- The CPU which was used for the initial contact is blocked with interrupts
disabled and there is a message pending in the message slot.
In this case we won't be able to read the 'unload finished' message on the
crashing CPU. This is reproducible when we receive unknown NMIs on all CPUs
simultaneously: the first CPU entering panic() will proceed to crash and
all other CPUs will stop themselves with interrupts disabled.
The suggested solution is to handle unknown NMIs for Hyper-V guests on the
first CPU which gets them only. This will allow us to rely on VMBus
interrupt handler being able to receive the 'unload finish' message in
case it is delivered to a different CPU.
The issue is not reproducible on WS2016 as Debug-VM delivers NMI to the
boot CPU only, WS2012R2 and earlier Hyper-V versions are affected.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Acked-by: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Cc: devel@linuxdriverproject.org
Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161202100720.28121-1-vkuznets@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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From: Todd Fujinaka <todd.fujinaka@intel.com>
[ Upstream commit 5bc8c230e2a993b49244f9457499f17283da9ec7 ]
i210 and i211 share the same PHY but have different PCI IDs. Don't
forget i211 for any i210 workarounds.
Signed-off-by: Todd Fujinaka <todd.fujinaka@intel.com>
Tested-by: Aaron Brown <aaron.f.brown@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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From: Chris J Arges <christopherarges@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 4e684f59d760a2c7c716bb60190783546e2d08a1 ]
Sometimes firmware may not properly initialize I347AT4_PAGE_SELECT causing
the probe of an igb i210 NIC to fail. This patch adds an addition zeroing
of this register during igb_get_phy_id to workaround this issue.
Thanks for Jochen Henneberg for the idea and original patch.
Signed-off-by: Chris J Arges <christopherarges@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Aaron Brown <aaron.f.brown@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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From: Dan Streetman <ddstreet@ieee.org>
[ Upstream commit c74fd80f2f41d05f350bb478151021f88551afe8 ]
Revert the main part of commit:
af42b8d12f8a ("xen: fix MSI setup and teardown for PV on HVM guests")
That commit introduced reading the pci device's msi message data to see
if a pirq was previously configured for the device's msi/msix, and re-use
that pirq. At the time, that was the correct behavior. However, a
later change to Qemu caused it to call into the Xen hypervisor to unmap
all pirqs for a pci device, when the pci device disables its MSI/MSIX
vectors; specifically the Qemu commit:
c976437c7dba9c7444fb41df45468968aaa326ad
("qemu-xen: free all the pirqs for msi/msix when driver unload")
Once Qemu added this pirq unmapping, it was no longer correct for the
kernel to re-use the pirq number cached in the pci device msi message
data. All Qemu releases since 2.1.0 contain the patch that unmaps the
pirqs when the pci device disables its MSI/MSIX vectors.
This bug is causing failures to initialize multiple NVMe controllers
under Xen, because the NVMe driver sets up a single MSIX vector for
each controller (concurrently), and then after using that to talk to
the controller for some configuration data, it disables the single MSIX
vector and re-configures all the MSIX vectors it needs. So the MSIX
setup code tries to re-use the cached pirq from the first vector
for each controller, but the hypervisor has already given away that
pirq to another controller, and its initialization fails.
This is discussed in more detail at:
https://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2017-01/msg00447.html
Fixes: af42b8d12f8a ("xen: fix MSI setup and teardown for PV on HVM guests")
Signed-off-by: Dan Streetman <dan.streetman@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2aa6ba7b5ad3189cc27f14540aa2f57f0ed8df4b upstream.
If we try to allocate memory pages to back an xfs_buf that we're trying
to read, it's possible that we'll be so short on memory that the page
allocation fails. For a blocking read we'll just wait, but for
readahead we simply dump all the pages we've collected so far.
Unfortunately, after dumping the pages we neglect to clear the
_XBF_PAGES state, which means that the subsequent call to xfs_buf_free
thinks that b_pages still points to pages we own. It then double-frees
the b_pages pages.
This results in screaming about negative page refcounts from the memory
manager, which xfs oughtn't be triggering. To reproduce this case,
mount a filesystem where the size of the inodes far outweighs the
availalble memory (a ~500M inode filesystem on a VM with 300MB memory
did the trick here) and run bulkstat in parallel with other memory
eating processes to put a huge load on the system. The "check summary"
phase of xfs_scrub also works for this purpose.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Cc: Ivan Kozik <ivan@ludios.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 687e0687f71ec00e0132a21fef802dee88c2f1ad upstream.
USBTMC devices are required to have a bulk-in and a bulk-out endpoint,
but the driver failed to verify this, something which could lead to the
endpoint addresses being taken from uninitialised memory.
Make sure to zero all private data as part of allocation, and add the
missing endpoint sanity check.
Note that this also addresses a more recently introduced issue, where
the interrupt-in-presence flag would also be uninitialised whenever the
optional interrupt-in endpoint is not present. This in turn could lead
to an interrupt urb being allocated, initialised and submitted based on
uninitialised values.
Fixes: dbf3e7f654c0 ("Implement an ioctl to support the USMTMC-USB488 READ_STATUS_BYTE operation.")
Fixes: 5b775f672cc9 ("USB: add USB test and measurement class driver")
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
[ johan: backport to v4.4 ]
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ea90e0dc8cecba6359b481e24d9c37160f6f524f upstream.
Sowmini pointed out Dmitry's RTNL deadlock report to me, and it turns out
to be perfectly accurate - there are various error paths that miss unlock
of the RTNL.
To fix those, change the locking a bit to not be conditional in all those
nl80211_prepare_*_dump() functions, but make those require the RTNL to
start with, and fix the buggy error paths. This also let me use sparse
(by appropriately overriding the rtnl_lock/rtnl_unlock functions) to
validate the changes.
Reported-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4dfce57db6354603641132fac3c887614e3ebe81 upstream.
There have been several reports over the years of NULL pointer
dereferences in xfs_trans_log_inode during xfs_fsr processes,
when the process is doing an fput and tearing down extents
on the temporary inode, something like:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018
PID: 29439 TASK: ffff880550584fa0 CPU: 6 COMMAND: "xfs_fsr"
[exception RIP: xfs_trans_log_inode+0x10]
#9 [ffff8800a57bbbe0] xfs_bunmapi at ffffffffa037398e [xfs]
#10 [ffff8800a57bbce8] xfs_itruncate_extents at ffffffffa0391b29 [xfs]
#11 [ffff8800a57bbd88] xfs_inactive_truncate at ffffffffa0391d0c [xfs]
#12 [ffff8800a57bbdb8] xfs_inactive at ffffffffa0392508 [xfs]
#13 [ffff8800a57bbdd8] xfs_fs_evict_inode at ffffffffa035907e [xfs]
#14 [ffff8800a57bbe00] evict at ffffffff811e1b67
#15 [ffff8800a57bbe28] iput at ffffffff811e23a5
#16 [ffff8800a57bbe58] dentry_kill at ffffffff811dcfc8
#17 [ffff8800a57bbe88] dput at ffffffff811dd06c
#18 [ffff8800a57bbea8] __fput at ffffffff811c823b
#19 [ffff8800a57bbef0] ____fput at ffffffff811c846e
#20 [ffff8800a57bbf00] task_work_run at ffffffff81093b27
#21 [ffff8800a57bbf30] do_notify_resume at ffffffff81013b0c
#22 [ffff8800a57bbf50] int_signal at ffffffff8161405d
As it turns out, this is because the i_itemp pointer, along
with the d_ops pointer, has been overwritten with zeros
when we tear down the extents during truncate. When the in-core
inode fork on the temporary inode used by xfs_fsr was originally
set up during the extent swap, we mistakenly looked at di_nextents
to determine whether all extents fit inline, but this misses extents
generated by speculative preallocation; we should be using if_bytes
instead.
This mistake corrupts the in-memory inode, and code in
xfs_iext_remove_inline eventually gets bad inputs, causing
it to memmove and memset incorrect ranges; this became apparent
because the two values in ifp->if_u2.if_inline_ext[1] contained
what should have been in d_ops and i_itemp; they were memmoved due
to incorrect array indexing and then the original locations
were zeroed with memset, again due to an array overrun.
Fix this by properly using i_df.if_bytes to determine the number
of extents, not di_nextents.
Thanks to dchinner for looking at this with me and spotting the
root cause.
[nborisov: backported to 4.4]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
--
fs/xfs/xfs_bmap_util.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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commit ef388e2054feedaeb05399ed654bdb06f385d294 upstream.
The on-disk field di_size is used to set i_size, which is a signed
integer of loff_t. If the high bit of di_size is set, we'll end up with
a negative i_size, which will cause all sorts of problems. Since the
VFS won't let us create a file with such length, we should catch them
here in the verifier too.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: Nikolay Borisov <n.borisov.lkml@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b581a5854eee4b7851dedb0f8c2ceb54fb902c06 upstream.
Since ceph.git commit 4e28f9e63644 ("osd/OSDMap: clear osd_info,
osd_xinfo on osd deletion"), weight is set to IN when OSD is deleted.
This changes the result of applying an incremental for clients, not
just OSDs. Because CRUSH computations are obviously affected,
pre-4e28f9e63644 servers disagree with post-4e28f9e63644 clients on
object placement, resulting in misdirected requests.
Mirrors ceph.git commit a6009d1039a55e2c77f431662b3d6cc5a8e8e63f.
Fixes: 930c53286977 ("libceph: apply new_state before new_up_client on incrementals")
Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/19122
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9b622e2bbcf049c82e2550d35fb54ac205965f50 upstream.
md pending write counter must be incremented after bio is split,
otherwise it gets decremented too many times in end bio callback and
becomes negative.
Signed-off-by: Tomasz Majchrzak <tomasz.majchrzak@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Artur Paszkiewicz <artur.paszkiewicz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ff010472fb75670cb5c08671e820eeea3af59c87 upstream.
On CPU online the cpufreq core restores the previous governor (or
the previous "policy" setting for ->setpolicy drivers), but it does
not restore the min/max limits at the same time, which is confusing,
inconsistent and real pain for users who set the limits and then
suspend/resume the system (using full suspend), in which case the
limits are reset on all CPUs except for the boot one.
Fix this by making cpufreq_online() restore the limits when an inactive
policy is brought online.
The commit log and patch are inspired from Rafael's earlier work.
Reported-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b1708b72a0959a032cd2eebb77fa9086ea3e0c84 upstream.
The dmas/dma-names properties are added to the UART nodes. Note that additional
properties are needed to enable them at the board level: check bindings for
details.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Ferre <nicolas.ferre@atmel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 60b89f1928af80b546b5c3fd8714a62f6f4b8844 upstream.
On some DDR controllers, compatible with the sama5d3 one,
the sequence to enter/exit/re-enter the self-refresh mode adds
more constrains than what is currently written in the at91_idle
driver. An actual access to the DDR chip is needed between exit
and re-enter of this mode which is somehow difficult to implement.
This sequence can completely hang the SoC. It is particularly
experienced on parts which embed a L2 cache if the code run
between IDLE calls fits in it...
Moreover, as the intention is to enter and exit pretty rapidly
from IDLE, the power-down mode is a good candidate.
So now we use power-down instead of self-refresh. As we can
simplify the code for sama5d3 compatible DDR controllers,
we instantiate a new sama5d3_ddr_standby() function.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Ferre <nicolas.ferre@microchip.com>
Fixes: 017b5522d5e3 ("ARM: at91: Add new binding for sama5d3-ddramc")
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5003ae1e735e6bfe4679d9bed6846274f322e77e upstream.
The function device_to_iommu() in the Intel VT-d driver
lacks a NULL-ptr check, resulting in this oops at boot on
some platforms:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000007ab
IP: [<ffffffff8132234a>] device_to_iommu+0x11a/0x1a0
PGD 0
[...]
Call Trace:
? find_or_alloc_domain.constprop.29+0x1a/0x300
? dw_dma_probe+0x561/0x580 [dw_dmac_core]
? __get_valid_domain_for_dev+0x39/0x120
? __intel_map_single+0x138/0x180
? intel_alloc_coherent+0xb6/0x120
? sst_hsw_dsp_init+0x173/0x420 [snd_soc_sst_haswell_pcm]
? mutex_lock+0x9/0x30
? kernfs_add_one+0xdb/0x130
? devres_add+0x19/0x60
? hsw_pcm_dev_probe+0x46/0xd0 [snd_soc_sst_haswell_pcm]
? platform_drv_probe+0x30/0x90
? driver_probe_device+0x1ed/0x2b0
? __driver_attach+0x8f/0xa0
? driver_probe_device+0x2b0/0x2b0
? bus_for_each_dev+0x55/0x90
? bus_add_driver+0x110/0x210
? 0xffffffffa11ea000
? driver_register+0x52/0xc0
? 0xffffffffa11ea000
? do_one_initcall+0x32/0x130
? free_vmap_area_noflush+0x37/0x70
? kmem_cache_alloc+0x88/0xd0
? do_init_module+0x51/0x1c4
? load_module+0x1ee9/0x2430
? show_taint+0x20/0x20
? kernel_read_file+0xfd/0x190
? SyS_finit_module+0xa3/0xb0
? do_syscall_64+0x4a/0xb0
? entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
Code: 78 ff ff ff 4d 85 c0 74 ee 49 8b 5a 10 0f b6 9b e0 00 00 00 41 38 98 e0 00 00 00 77 da 0f b6 eb 49 39 a8 88 00 00 00 72 ce eb 8f <41> f6 82 ab 07 00 00 04 0f 85 76 ff ff ff 0f b6 4d 08 88 0e 49
RIP [<ffffffff8132234a>] device_to_iommu+0x11a/0x1a0
RSP <ffffc90001457a78>
CR2: 00000000000007ab
---[ end trace 16f974b6d58d0aad ]---
Add the missing pointer check.
Fixes: 1c387188c60f53b338c20eee32db055dfe022a9b ("iommu/vt-d: Fix IOMMU lookup for SR-IOV Virtual Functions")
Signed-off-by: Koos Vriezen <koos.vriezen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1914f0cd203c941bba72f9452c8290324f1ef3dc upstream.
This was broken in commit cd979883b9ed ("xen/acpi-processor:
fix enabling interrupts on syscore_resume"). do_suspend (from
xen/manage.c) and thus xen_resume_notifier never get called on
the initial-domain at resume (it is if running as guest.)
The rationale for the breaking change was that upload_pm_data()
potentially does blocking work in syscore_resume(). This patch
addresses the original issue by scheduling upload_pm_data() to
execute in workqueue context.
Cc: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Based-on-patch-by: Konrad Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ankur Arora <ankur.a.arora@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e2ebfb2142acefecc2496e71360f50d25726040b upstream.
Disabling interrupts for even a millisecond can cause problems for some
devices. That can happen when sdhci changes clock frequency because it
waits for the clock to become stable under a spin lock.
The spin lock is not necessary here. Anything that is racing with changes
to the I/O state is already broken. The mmc core already provides
synchronization via "claiming" the host.
Although the spin lock probably should be removed from the code paths that
lead to this point, such a patch would touch too much code to be suitable
for stable trees. Consequently, for this patch, just drop the spin lock
while waiting.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Ludovic Desroches <ludovic.desroches@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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