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2019-03-28Merge tag 'v4.4.177' into toradex_vf_4.4-nextColibri-VF_LXDE-Image_2.8b6.183-20190331Marcel Ziswiler
This is the 4.4.177 stable release
2019-02-20Documentation/network: reword kernel version referenceMark Rustad
It seemed odd to say "since 4.17" in a 4.4 kernel. Consider rewording the reference to indicate where in the stable series it was introduced as well as where it originated. Signed-off-by: Mark Rustad <mrustad@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-02-08inet: frags: break the 2GB limit for frags storageEric Dumazet
commit 3e67f106f619dcfaf6f4e2039599bdb69848c714 upstream. Some users are willing to provision huge amounts of memory to be able to perform reassembly reasonnably well under pressure. Current memory tracking is using one atomic_t and integers. Switch to atomic_long_t so that 64bit arches can use more than 2GB, without any cost for 32bit arches. Note that this patch avoids an overflow error, if high_thresh was set to ~2GB, since this test in inet_frag_alloc() was never true : if (... || frag_mem_limit(nf) > nf->high_thresh) Tested: $ echo 16000000000 >/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ipfrag_high_thresh <frag DDOS> $ grep FRAG /proc/net/sockstat FRAG: inuse 14705885 memory 16000002880 $ nstat -n ; sleep 1 ; nstat | grep Reas IpReasmReqds 3317150 0.0 IpReasmFails 3317112 0.0 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-02-08inet: frags: use rhashtables for reassembly unitsEric Dumazet
commit 648700f76b03b7e8149d13cc2bdb3355035258a9 upstream. Some applications still rely on IP fragmentation, and to be fair linux reassembly unit is not working under any serious load. It uses static hash tables of 1024 buckets, and up to 128 items per bucket (!!!) A work queue is supposed to garbage collect items when host is under memory pressure, and doing a hash rebuild, changing seed used in hash computations. This work queue blocks softirqs for up to 25 ms when doing a hash rebuild, occurring every 5 seconds if host is under fire. Then there is the problem of sharing this hash table for all netns. It is time to switch to rhashtables, and allocate one of them per netns to speedup netns dismantle, since this is a critical metric these days. Lookup is now using RCU. A followup patch will even remove the refcount hold/release left from prior implementation and save a couple of atomic operations. Before this patch, 16 cpus (16 RX queue NIC) could not handle more than 1 Mpps frags DDOS. After the patch, I reach 9 Mpps without any tuning, and can use up to 2GB of storage for the fragments (exact number depends on frags being evicted after timeout) $ grep FRAG /proc/net/sockstat FRAG: inuse 1966916 memory 2140004608 A followup patch will change the limits for 64bit arches. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com> Cc: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@osg.samsung.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 4.4: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-01-26mm, proc: be more verbose about unstable VMA flags in /proc/<pid>/smapsMichal Hocko
[ Upstream commit 7550c6079846a24f30d15ac75a941c8515dbedfb ] Patch series "THP eligibility reporting via proc". This series of three patches aims at making THP eligibility reporting much more robust and long term sustainable. The trigger for the change is a regression report [2] and the long follow up discussion. In short the specific application didn't have good API to query whether a particular mapping can be backed by THP so it has used VMA flags to workaround that. These flags represent a deep internal state of VMAs and as such they should be used by userspace with a great deal of caution. A similar has happened for [3] when users complained that VM_MIXEDMAP is no longer set on DAX mappings. Again a lack of a proper API led to an abuse. The first patch in the series tries to emphasise that that the semantic of flags might change and any application consuming those should be really careful. The remaining two patches provide a more suitable interface to address [2] and provide a consistent API to query the THP status both for each VMA and process wide as well. [1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181120103515.25280-1-mhocko@kernel.org [2] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1809241054050.224429@chino.kir.corp.google.com [3] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181002100531.GC4135@quack2.suse.cz This patch (of 3): Even though vma flags exported via /proc/<pid>/smaps are explicitly documented to be not guaranteed for future compatibility the warning doesn't go far enough because it doesn't mention semantic changes to those flags. And they are important as well because these flags are a deep implementation internal to the MM code and the semantic might change at any time. Let's consider two recent examples: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181002100531.GC4135@quack2.suse.cz : commit e1fb4a086495 "dax: remove VM_MIXEDMAP for fsdax and device dax" has : removed VM_MIXEDMAP flag from DAX VMAs. Now our testing shows that in the : mean time certain customer of ours started poking into /proc/<pid>/smaps : and looks at VMA flags there and if VM_MIXEDMAP is missing among the VMA : flags, the application just fails to start complaining that DAX support is : missing in the kernel. http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1809241054050.224429@chino.kir.corp.google.com : Commit 1860033237d4 ("mm: make PR_SET_THP_DISABLE immediately active") : introduced a regression in that userspace cannot always determine the set : of vmas where thp is ineligible. : Userspace relies on the "nh" flag being emitted as part of /proc/pid/smaps : to determine if a vma is eligible to be backed by hugepages. : Previous to this commit, prctl(PR_SET_THP_DISABLE, 1) would cause thp to : be disabled and emit "nh" as a flag for the corresponding vmas as part of : /proc/pid/smaps. After the commit, thp is disabled by means of an mm : flag and "nh" is not emitted. : This causes smaps parsing libraries to assume a vma is eligible for thp : and ends up puzzling the user on why its memory is not backed by thp. In both cases userspace was relying on a semantic of a specific VMA flag. The primary reason why that happened is a lack of a proper interface. While this has been worked on and it will be fixed properly, it seems that our wording could see some refinement and be more vocal about semantic aspect of these flags as well. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181211143641.3503-2-mhocko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Paul Oppenheimer <bepvte@gmail.com> Cc: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-12-17selftests: Move networking/timestamping from DocumentationShuah Khan
commit 3d2c86e3057995270e08693231039d9d942871f0 upstream. Remove networking from Documentation Makefile to move the test to selftests. Update networking/timestamping Makefile to work under selftests. These tests will not be run as part of selftests suite and will not be included in install targets. They can be built and run separately for now. This is part of the effort to move runnable code from Documentation. Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com> [ added to 4.4.y stable to remove a build warning - gregkh] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-12-13Input: atmel_mxt_ts - add support for reset lineSebastian Reichel
Provide support for controlling reset pin. If this is not driven correctly the device will be held in reset and will not respond. Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> (cherry picked from commit f657b00df22e231da217ca0162a75db452475e8f)
2018-12-13Merge tag 'v4.4.167' into toradex_vf_4.4-nextMarcel Ziswiler
This is the 4.4.167 stable release
2018-12-01namei: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular filesSalvatore Mesoraca
commit 30aba6656f61ed44cba445a3c0d38b296fa9e8f5 upstream. Disallows open of FIFOs or regular files not owned by the user in world writable sticky directories, unless the owner is the same as that of the directory or the file is opened without the O_CREAT flag. The purpose is to make data spoofing attacks harder. This protection can be turned on and off separately for FIFOs and regular files via sysctl, just like the symlinks/hardlinks protection. This patch is based on Openwall's "HARDEN_FIFO" feature by Solar Designer. This is a brief list of old vulnerabilities that could have been prevented by this feature, some of them even allow for privilege escalation: CVE-2000-1134 CVE-2007-3852 CVE-2008-0525 CVE-2009-0416 CVE-2011-4834 CVE-2015-1838 CVE-2015-7442 CVE-2016-7489 This list is not meant to be complete. It's difficult to track down all vulnerabilities of this kind because they were often reported without any mention of this particular attack vector. In fact, before hardlinks/symlinks restrictions, fifos/regular files weren't the favorite vehicle to exploit them. [s.mesoraca16@gmail.com: fix bug reported by Dan Carpenter] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180426081456.GA7060@mwanda Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1524829819-11275-1-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com [keescook@chromium.org: drop pr_warn_ratelimited() in favor of audit changes in the future] [keescook@chromium.org: adjust commit subjet] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180416175918.GA13494@beast Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com> Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Loic <hackurx@opensec.fr> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-10-20x86/fpu: Finish excising 'eagerfpu'Andy Lutomirski
commit e63650840e8b053aa09ad934877e87e9941ed135 upstream. Now that eagerfpu= is gone, remove it from the docs and some comments. Also sync the changes to tools/. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/cf430dd4481d41280e93ac6cf0def1007a67fc8e.1476740397.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Sangorrin <daniel.sangorrin@toshiba.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-10-20ARM: dts: at91: add new compatibility string for macb on sama5d3Nicolas Ferre
[ Upstream commit 321cc359d899a8e988f3725d87c18a628e1cc624 ] We need this new compatibility string as we experienced different behavior for this 10/100Mbits/s macb interface on this particular SoC. Backward compatibility is preserved as we keep the alternative strings. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Ferre <nicolas.ferre@microchip.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-10-10hwmon: (ina2xx) fix sysfs shunt resistor read accessLothar Felten
[ Upstream commit 3ad867001c91657c46dcf6656d52eb6080286fd5 ] fix the sysfs shunt resistor read access: return the shunt resistor value, not the calibration register contents. update email address Signed-off-by: Lothar Felten <lothar.felten@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-27Merge tag 'v4.4.158' into HEADMarcel Ziswiler
This is the 4.4.158 stable release
2018-08-17kbuild: verify that $DEPMOD is installedRandy Dunlap
commit 934193a654c1f4d0643ddbf4b2529b508cae926e upstream. Verify that 'depmod' ($DEPMOD) is installed. This is a partial revert of commit 620c231c7a7f ("kbuild: do not check for ancient modutils tools"). Also update Documentation/process/changes.rst to refer to kmod instead of module-init-tools. Fixes kernel bugzilla #198965: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198965 Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi> Cc: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.de.marchi@gmail.com> Cc: Michal Marek <michal.lkml@markovi.net> Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> Cc: Chih-Wei Huang <cwhuang@linux.org.tw> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # any kernel since 2012 Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-07-25Documentation/spec_ctrl: Do some minor cleanupsBorislav Petkov
commit dd0792699c4058e63c0715d9a7c2d40226fcdddc upstream Fix some typos, improve formulations, end sentences with a fullstop. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-07-25x86/speculation: Make "seccomp" the default mode for Speculative Store BypassKees Cook
commit f21b53b20c754021935ea43364dbf53778eeba32 upstream Unless explicitly opted out of, anything running under seccomp will have SSB mitigations enabled. Choosing the "prctl" mode will disable this. [ tglx: Adjusted it to the new arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate() mechanism ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-07-25prctl: Add force disable speculationThomas Gleixner
commit 356e4bfff2c5489e016fdb925adbf12a1e3950ee upstream For certain use cases it is desired to enforce mitigations so they cannot be undone afterwards. That's important for loader stubs which want to prevent a child from disabling the mitigation again. Will also be used for seccomp(). The extra state preserving of the prctl state for SSB is a preparatory step for EBPF dymanic speculation control. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-07-25x86/speculation: Add prctl for Speculative Store Bypass mitigationThomas Gleixner
commit a73ec77ee17ec556fe7f165d00314cb7c047b1ac upstream Add prctl based control for Speculative Store Bypass mitigation and make it the default mitigation for Intel and AMD. Andi Kleen provided the following rationale (slightly redacted): There are multiple levels of impact of Speculative Store Bypass: 1) JITed sandbox. It cannot invoke system calls, but can do PRIME+PROBE and may have call interfaces to other code 2) Native code process. No protection inside the process at this level. 3) Kernel. 4) Between processes. The prctl tries to protect against case (1) doing attacks. If the untrusted code can do random system calls then control is already lost in a much worse way. So there needs to be system call protection in some way (using a JIT not allowing them or seccomp). Or rather if the process can subvert its environment somehow to do the prctl it can already execute arbitrary code, which is much worse than SSB. To put it differently, the point of the prctl is to not allow JITed code to read data it shouldn't read from its JITed sandbox. If it already has escaped its sandbox then it can already read everything it wants in its address space, and do much worse. The ability to control Speculative Store Bypass allows to enable the protection selectively without affecting overall system performance. Based on an initial patch from Tim Chen. Completely rewritten. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-07-25prctl: Add speculation control prctlsThomas Gleixner
commit b617cfc858161140d69cc0b5cc211996b557a1c7 upstream Add two new prctls to control aspects of speculation related vulnerabilites and their mitigations to provide finer grained control over performance impacting mitigations. PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bit 0-2 with the following meaning: Bit Define Description 0 PR_SPEC_PRCTL Mitigation can be controlled per task by PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL 1 PR_SPEC_ENABLE The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is disabled 2 PR_SPEC_DISABLE The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is enabled If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature. If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per task control of the mitigation is available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation misfeature will fail. PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which is selected by arg2 of prctl(2) per task. arg3 is used to hand in the control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE. The common return values are: EINVAL prctl is not implemented by the architecture or the unused prctl() arguments are not 0 ENODEV arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL has these additional return values: ERANGE arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's not either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE ENXIO prctl control of the selected speculation misfeature is disabled The first supported controlable speculation misfeature is PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS. Add the define so this can be shared between architectures. Based on an initial patch from Tim Chen and mostly rewritten. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-07-25x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigationKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk
commit 24f7fc83b9204d20f878c57cb77d261ae825e033 upstream Contemporary high performance processors use a common industry-wide optimization known as "Speculative Store Bypass" in which loads from addresses to which a recent store has occurred may (speculatively) see an older value. Intel refers to this feature as "Memory Disambiguation" which is part of their "Smart Memory Access" capability. Memory Disambiguation can expose a cache side-channel attack against such speculatively read values. An attacker can create exploit code that allows them to read memory outside of a sandbox environment (for example, malicious JavaScript in a web page), or to perform more complex attacks against code running within the same privilege level, e.g. via the stack. As a first step to mitigate against such attacks, provide two boot command line control knobs: nospec_store_bypass_disable spec_store_bypass_disable=[off,auto,on] By default affected x86 processors will power on with Speculative Store Bypass enabled. Hence the provided kernel parameters are written from the point of view of whether to enable a mitigation or not. The parameters are as follows: - auto - Kernel detects whether your CPU model contains an implementation of Speculative Store Bypass and picks the most appropriate mitigation. - on - disable Speculative Store Bypass - off - enable Speculative Store Bypass [ tglx: Reordered the checks so that the whole evaluation is not done when the CPU does not support RDS ] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-07-25x86/bugs: Expose /sys/../spec_store_bypassKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk
commit c456442cd3a59eeb1d60293c26cbe2ff2c4e42cf upstream Add the sysfs file for the new vulerability. It does not do much except show the words 'Vulnerable' for recent x86 cores. Intel cores prior to family 6 are known not to be vulnerable, and so are some Atoms and some Xeon Phi. It assumes that older Cyrix, Centaur, etc. cores are immune. Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-07-17x86/cpufeature: Carve out X86_FEATURE_*Borislav Petkov
commit cd4d09ec6f6c12a2cc3db5b7d8876a325a53545b upstream Move them to a separate header and have the following dependency: x86/cpufeatures.h <- x86/processor.h <- x86/cpufeature.h This makes it easier to use the header in asm code and not include the whole cpufeature.h and add guards for asm. Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1453842730-28463-5-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-07-09Merge tag 'v4.4.139' into toradex_vf_4.4-nextMax Krummenacher
This is the 4.4.139 stable release
2018-07-03lib/vsprintf: Remove atomic-unsafe support for %pCrGeert Uytterhoeven
commit 666902e42fd8344b923c02dc5b0f37948ff4f225 upstream. "%pCr" formats the current rate of a clock, and calls clk_get_rate(). The latter obtains a mutex, hence it must not be called from atomic context. Remove support for this rarely-used format, as vsprintf() (and e.g. printk()) must be callable from any context. Any remaining out-of-tree users will start seeing the clock's name printed instead of its rate. Reported-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com> Fixes: 900cca2944254edd ("lib/vsprintf: add %pC{,n,r} format specifiers for clocks") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1527845302-12159-5-git-send-email-geert+renesas@glider.be To: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com> To: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> To: Michael Turquette <mturquette@baylibre.com> To: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org> To: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> To: Eduardo Valentin <edubezval@gmail.com> To: Eric Anholt <eric@anholt.net> To: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com> To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-clk@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-serial@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-renesas-soc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.1+ Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-06-21Merge tag 'v4.4.138' into toradex_vf_4.4-nextMax Krummenacher
This is the 4.4.138 stable release
2018-06-13netdev-FAQ: clarify DaveM's position for stable backportsCong Wang
[ Upstream commit 75d4e704fa8d2cf33ff295e5b441317603d7f9fd ] Per discussion with David at netconf 2018, let's clarify DaveM's position of handling stable backports in netdev-FAQ. This is important for people relying on upstream -stable releases. Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-05-30dm thin: fix documentation relative to low water mark thresholdmulhern
[ Upstream commit 9b28a1102efc75d81298198166ead87d643a29ce ] Fixes: 1. The use of "exceeds" when the opposite of exceeds, falls below, was meant. 2. Properly speaking, a table can not exceed a threshold. It emphasizes the important point, which is that it is the userspace daemon's responsibility to check for low free space when a device is resumed, since it won't get a special event indicating low free space in that situation. Signed-off-by: mulhern <amulhern@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-29s390: introduce CPU alternativesVasily Gorbik
[ Upstream commit 686140a1a9c41d85a4212a1c26d671139b76404b ] Implement CPU alternatives, which allows to optionally patch newer instructions at runtime, based on CPU facilities availability. A new kernel boot parameter "noaltinstr" disables patching. Current implementation is derived from x86 alternatives. Although ideal instructions padding (when altinstr is longer then oldinstr) is added at compile time, and no oldinstr nops optimization has to be done at runtime. Also couple of compile time sanity checks are done: 1. oldinstr and altinstr must be <= 254 bytes long, 2. oldinstr and altinstr must not have an odd length. alternative(oldinstr, altinstr, facility); alternative_2(oldinstr, altinstr1, facility1, altinstr2, facility2); Both compile time and runtime padding consists of either 6/4/2 bytes nop or a jump (brcl) + 2 bytes nop filler if padding is longer then 6 bytes. .altinstructions and .altinstr_replacement sections are part of __init_begin : __init_end region and are freed after initialization. Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08Documentation: pinctrl: palmas: Add ti,palmas-powerhold-override property ↵Keerthy
definition commit 0ea66f76ba17a4b229caaadd77de694111b21769 upstream. GPIO7 is configured in POWERHOLD mode which has higher priority over DEV_ON bit and keeps the PMIC supplies on even after the DEV_ON bit is turned off. This property enables driver to over ride the POWERHOLD value to GPIO7 so as to turn off the PMIC in power off scenarios. Signed-off-by: Keerthy <j-keerthy@ti.com> Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08fs/proc: Stop trying to report thread stacksAndy Lutomirski
commit b18cb64ead400c01bf1580eeba330ace51f8087d upstream. This reverts more of: b76437579d13 ("procfs: mark thread stack correctly in proc/<pid>/maps") ... which was partially reverted by: 65376df58217 ("proc: revert /proc/<pid>/maps [stack:TID] annotation") Originally, /proc/PID/task/TID/maps was the same as /proc/TID/maps. In current kernels, /proc/PID/maps (or /proc/TID/maps even for threads) shows "[stack]" for VMAs in the mm's stack address range. In contrast, /proc/PID/task/TID/maps uses KSTK_ESP to guess the target thread's stack's VMA. This is racy, probably returns garbage and, on arches with CONFIG_TASK_INFO_IN_THREAD=y, is also crash-prone: KSTK_ESP is not safe to use on tasks that aren't known to be running ordinary process-context kernel code. This patch removes the difference and just shows "[stack]" for VMAs in the mm's stack range. This is IMO much more sensible -- the actual "stack" address really is treated specially by the VM code, and the current thread stack isn't even well-defined for programs that frequently switch stacks on their own. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/3e678474ec14e0a0ec34c611016753eea2e1b8ba.1475257877.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-03-13Merge tag 'v4.4.121' into toradex_vf_4.4-nextColibri-VF_LXDE-Image_2.8b2.97-20180331Max Krummenacher
This is the 4.4.121 stable release
2018-02-25x86/paravirt: Remove 'noreplace-paravirt' cmdline optionJosh Poimboeuf
(cherry picked from commit 12c69f1e94c89d40696e83804dd2f0965b5250cd) The 'noreplace-paravirt' option disables paravirt patching, leaving the original pv indirect calls in place. That's highly incompatible with retpolines, unless we want to uglify paravirt even further and convert the paravirt calls to retpolines. As far as I can tell, the option doesn't seem to be useful for much other than introducing surprising corner cases and making the kernel vulnerable to Spectre v2. It was probably a debug option from the early paravirt days. So just remove it. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Alok Kataria <akataria@vmware.com> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180131041333.2x6blhxirc2kclrq@treble Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> [jwang: chery pick to 4.4] Signed-off-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@profitbricks.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-25Documentation: Document array_index_nospecMark Rutland
(cherry picked from commit f84a56f73dddaeac1dba8045b007f742f61cd2da) Document the rationale and usage of the new array_index_nospec() helper. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727413645.33451.15878817161436755393.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> [jwang: cherry pick to 4.4] Signed-off-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@profitbricks.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-22ext4: correct documentation for grpid mount optionErnesto A. Fernández
commit 9f0372488cc9243018a812e8cfbf27de650b187b upstream. The grpid option is currently described as being the same as nogrpid. Signed-off-by: Ernesto A. Fernández <ernesto.mnd.fernandez@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-22arm: spear13xx: Fix dmas cellsViresh Kumar
commit cdd10409914184c7eee5ae3e11beb890c9c16c61 upstream. The "dmas" cells for the designware DMA controller need to have only 3 properties apart from the phandle: request line, src master and destination master. But the commit 6e8887f60f60 updated it incorrectly while moving from platform code to DT. Fix it. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.10+ Fixes: 6e8887f60f60 ("ARM: SPEAr13xx: Pass generic DW DMAC platform data from DT") Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-23x86/pti: Document fix wrong indexzhenwei.pi
commit 98f0fceec7f84d80bc053e49e596088573086421 upstream. In section <2. Runtime Cost>, fix wrong index. Signed-off-by: zhenwei.pi <zhenwei.pi@youruncloud.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516237492-27739-1-git-send-email-zhenwei.pi@youruncloud.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-23x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigationDavid Woodhouse
commit da285121560e769cc31797bba6422eea71d473e0 upstream. Add a spectre_v2= option to select the mitigation used for the indirect branch speculation vulnerability. Currently, the only option available is retpoline, in its various forms. This will be expanded to cover the new IBRS/IBPB microcode features. The RETPOLINE_AMD feature relies on a serializing LFENCE for speculation control. For AMD hardware, only set RETPOLINE_AMD if LFENCE is a serializing instruction, which is indicated by the LFENCE_RDTSC feature. [ tglx: Folded back the LFENCE/AMD fixes and reworked it so IBRS integration becomes simple ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-5-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-17sysfs/cpu: Fix typos in vulnerability documentationDavid Woodhouse
commit 9ecccfaa7cb5249bd31bdceb93fcf5bedb8a24d8 upstream. Fixes: 87590ce6e ("sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder") Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-17sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folderThomas Gleixner
commit 87590ce6e373d1a5401f6539f0c59ef92dd924a9 upstream. As the meltdown/spectre problem affects several CPU architectures, it makes sense to have common way to express whether a system is affected by a particular vulnerability or not. If affected the way to express the mitigation should be common as well. Create /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities folder and files for meltdown, spectre_v1 and spectre_v2. Allow architectures to override the show function. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180107214913.096657732@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-17x86/Documentation: Add PTI descriptionDave Hansen
commit 01c9b17bf673b05bb401b76ec763e9730ccf1376 upstream. Add some details about how PTI works, what some of the downsides are, and how to debug it when things go wrong. Also document the kernel parameter: 'pti/nopti'. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Moritz Lipp <moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at> Cc: Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at> Cc: Michael Schwarz <michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at> Cc: Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Andi Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180105174436.1BC6FA2B@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-05x86/kaiser: Check boottime cmdline paramsBorislav Petkov
AMD (and possibly other vendors) are not affected by the leak KAISER is protecting against. Keep the "nopti" for traditional reasons and add pti=<on|off|auto> like upstream. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-05x86/kaiser: Rename and simplify X86_FEATURE_KAISER handlingBorislav Petkov
Concentrate it in arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c and use the upstream string "nopti". Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-05kaiser: add "nokaiser" boot option, using ALTERNATIVEHugh Dickins
Added "nokaiser" boot option: an early param like "noinvpcid". Most places now check int kaiser_enabled (#defined 0 when not CONFIG_KAISER) instead of #ifdef CONFIG_KAISER; but entry_64.S and entry_64_compat.S are using the ALTERNATIVE technique, which patches in the preferred instructions at runtime. That technique is tied to x86 cpu features, so X86_FEATURE_KAISER is fabricated. Prior to "nokaiser", Kaiser #defined _PAGE_GLOBAL 0: revert that, but be careful with both _PAGE_GLOBAL and CR4.PGE: setting them when nokaiser like when !CONFIG_KAISER, but not setting either when kaiser - neither matters on its own, but it's hard to be sure that _PAGE_GLOBAL won't get set in some obscure corner, or something add PGE into CR4. By omitting _PAGE_GLOBAL from __supported_pte_mask when kaiser_enabled, all page table setup which uses pte_pfn() masks it out of the ptes. It's slightly shameful that the same declaration versus definition of kaiser_enabled appears in not one, not two, but in three header files (asm/kaiser.h, asm/pgtable.h, asm/tlbflush.h). I felt safer that way, than with #including any of those in any of the others; and did not feel it worth an asm/kaiser_enabled.h - kernel/cpu/common.c includes them all, so we shall hear about it if they get out of synch. Cleanups while in the area: removed the silly #ifdef CONFIG_KAISER from kaiser.c; removed the unused native_get_normal_pgd(); removed the spurious reg clutter from SWITCH_*_CR3 macro stubs; corrected some comments. But more interestingly, set CR4.PSE in secondary_startup_64: the manual is clear that it does not matter whether it's 0 or 1 when 4-level-pts are enabled, but I was distracted to find cr4 different on BSP and auxiliaries - BSP alone was adding PSE, in probe_page_size_mask(). Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-01-02x86/mm: Add the 'nopcid' boot option to turn off PCIDAndy Lutomirski
commit 0790c9aad84901ca1bdc14746175549c8b5da215 upstream. The parameter is only present on x86_64 systems to save a few bytes, as PCID is always disabled on x86_32. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8bbb2e65bcd249a5f18bfb8128b4689f08ac2b60.1498751203.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-25x86/mm: Add a 'noinvpcid' boot option to turn off INVPCIDAndy Lutomirski
commit d12a72b844a49d4162f24cefdab30bed3f86730e upstream. This adds a chicken bit to turn off INVPCID in case something goes wrong. It's an early_param() because we do TLB flushes before we parse __setup() parameters. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f586317ed1bc2b87aee652267e515b90051af385.1454096309.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-21Merge tag 'v4.4.107' into toradex_vf_4.4-nextMarcel Ziswiler
This is the 4.4.107 stable release
2017-11-02Revert "drm: bridge: add DT bindings for TI ths8135"Greg Kroah-Hartman
This reverts commit 11bf4a8e1d5a300b38ca4bbe1156716b0174f2da which is commit 2e644be30fcc08c736f66b60f4898d274d4873ab upstream. Ben pointed out that there is no driver or device trees referencing this device in 4.4-stable, so the patch should not be present there. Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Cc: Bartosz Golaszewski <bgolaszewski@baylibre.com> Cc: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com> Cc: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Cc: Archit Taneja <architt@codeaurora.org> Cc: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-10-08iio: adc: hx711: Add DT binding for avia,hx711Andreas Klinger
[ Upstream commit ff1293f67734da68e23fecb6ecdae7112b8c43f9 ] Add DT bindings for avia,hx711 Add vendor avia to vendor list Signed-off-by: Andreas Klinger <ak@it-klinger.de> Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-10-08drm: bridge: add DT bindings for TI ths8135Bartosz Golaszewski
[ Upstream commit 2e644be30fcc08c736f66b60f4898d274d4873ab ] THS8135 is a configurable video DAC. Add DT bindings for this chip. Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bgolaszewski@baylibre.com> Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com> Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Archit Taneja <architt@codeaurora.org> Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/1481623759-12786-3-git-send-email-bgolaszewski@baylibre.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-09-26Merge tag 'v4.4.88' into toradex_vf_4.4-nextStefan Agner
This is the 4.4.88 stable release
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.0.4) at 2024-05-31 00:02:35 +0000