| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
commit f87b1c49bc675da30d8e1e8f4b60b800312c7b90 upstream.
When the uaccess .fixup section was renamed to .text.fixup, one case was
missed. Under ld.bfd, the orphaned section was moved close to .text
(since they share the "ax" bits), so things would work normally on
uaccess faults. Under ld.lld, the orphaned section was placed outside
the .text section, making it unreachable.
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/282
Link: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1020633#c44
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YSQ.7.76.1912032147340.17114@knanqh.ubzr
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202002071754.F5F073F1D@keescook/
Fixes: c4a84ae39b4a5 ("ARM: 8322/1: keep .text and .fixup regions closer together")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
Commit afaf6838f4bc896a711180b702b388b8cfa638fc upstream.
Introduce C and asm helpers to sanitize user address, taking the
address range they target into account.
Use asm helper for existing sanitization in __copy_from_user().
Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
Commit a3c0f84765bb429ba0fd23de1c57b5e1591c9389 upstream.
Spectre variant 1 attacks are about this sequence of pseudo-code:
index = load(user-manipulated pointer);
access(base + index * stride);
In order for the cache side-channel to work, the access() must me made
to memory which userspace can detect whether cache lines have been
loaded. On 32-bit ARM, this must be either user accessible memory, or
a kernel mapping of that same user accessible memory.
The problem occurs when the load() speculatively loads privileged data,
and the subsequent access() is made to user accessible memory.
Any load() which makes use of a user-maniplated pointer is a potential
problem if the data it has loaded is used in a subsequent access. This
also applies for the access() if the data loaded by that access is used
by a subsequent access.
Harden the get_user() accessors against Spectre attacks by forcing out
of bounds addresses to a NULL pointer. This prevents get_user() being
used as the load() step above. As a side effect, put_user() will also
be affected even though it isn't implicated.
Also harden copy_from_user() by redoing the bounds check within the
arm_copy_from_user() code, and NULLing the pointer if out of bounds.
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
This reverts commit 4dd1837d7589f468ed109556513f476e7a7f9121.
Moving the exports for assembly code into the assembly files breaks
KSYM trimming, but also breaks modversions.
While fixing the KSYM trimming is trivial, fixing modversions brings
us to a technically worse position that we had prior to the above
change:
- We end up with the prototype definitions divorsed from everything
else, which means that adding or removing assembly level ksyms
become more fragile:
* if adding a new assembly ksyms export, a missed prototype in
asm-prototypes.h results in a successful build if no module in
the selected configuration makes use of the symbol.
* when removing a ksyms export, asm-prototypes.h will get forgotten,
with armksyms.c, you'll get a build error if you forget to touch
the file.
- We end up with the same amount of include files and prototypes,
they're just in a header file instead of a .c file with their
exports.
As for lines of code, we don't get much of a size reduction:
(original commit)
47 files changed, 131 insertions(+), 208 deletions(-)
(fix for ksyms trimming)
7 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
(two fixes for modversions)
1 file changed, 34 insertions(+)
3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
which results in a net total of only 25 lines deleted.
As there does not seem to be much benefit from this change of approach,
revert the change.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull more misc uaccess and vfs updates from Al Viro:
"The rest of the stuff from -next (more uaccess work) + assorted fixes"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
score: traps: Add missing include file to fix build error
fs/super.c: don't fool lockdep in freeze_super() and thaw_super() paths
fs/super.c: fix race between freeze_super() and thaw_super()
overlayfs: Fix setting IOP_XATTR flag
iov_iter: kernel-doc import_iovec() and rw_copy_check_uvector()
blackfin: no access_ok() for __copy_{to,from}_user()
arm64: don't zero in __copy_from_user{,_inatomic}
arm: don't zero in __copy_from_user_inatomic()/__copy_from_user()
arc: don't leak bits of kernel stack into coredump
alpha: get rid of tail-zeroing in __copy_user()
|
|
adjust copy_from_user(), obviously
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Provide uaccess_save_and_enable() and uaccess_restore() to permit
control of userspace visibility to the kernel, and hook these into
the appropriate places in the kernel where we need to access
userspace.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
|
|
The memory copy functions(memcpy, __copy_from_user, __copy_to_user)
never had unwinding annotations added. Currently, when accessing
invalid pointer by these functions occurs the backtrace shown will
stop at these functions or some completely unrelated function.
Add unwinding annotations in hopes of getting a more useful backtrace
in following cases:
1. die on accessing invalid pointer by these functions
2. kprobe trapped at any instruction within these functions
3. interrupted at any instruction within these functions
Signed-off-by: Lin Yongting <linyongting@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
|
|
/tmp/ccJ3ssZW.s: Assembler messages:
/tmp/ccJ3ssZW.s:1952: Error: can't resolve `.text' {.text section} - `.LFB1077'
This is caused because:
.section .data
.section .text
.section .text
.previous
does not return us to the .text section, but the .data section; this
makes use of .previous dangerous if the ordering of previous sections
is not known.
Fix up the other users of .previous; .pushsection and .popsection are
a safer pairing to use than .section and .previous.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
|
|
This patch adds the ARM/Thumb-2 unified support for the arch/arm/lib/*
files.
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
|
|
This declaration specifies the "function" type and size for various
assembly functions, mainly needed for generating the correct branch
instructions in Thumb-2.
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Back in the days when we had armo (26-bit) and armv (32-bit) combined,
we had an additional layer to the uaccess macros to ensure correct
typing. Since we no longer have 26-bit in this tree, we no longer
need this layer, so eliminate it.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Patch from Nicolas Pitre
This patch provides a preemption safe implementation of copy_to_user
and copy_from_user based on the copy template also used for memcpy.
It is enabled unconditionally when CONFIG_PREEMPT=y. Otherwise if the
configured architecture is not ARMv3 then it is enabled as well as it
gives better performances at least on StrongARM and XScale cores. If
ARMv3 is not too affected or if it doesn't matter too much then
uaccess.S could be removed altogether.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@cam.org>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
|
