Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|
commit 3a158a62da0673db918b53ac1440845a5b64fd90 upstream.
The metag implementation of strncpy_from_user() doesn't validate the src
pointer, which could allow reading of arbitrary kernel memory. Add a
short access_ok() check to prevent that.
Its still possible for it to read across the user/kernel boundary, but
it will invariably reach a NUL character after only 9 bytes, leaking
only a static kernel address being loaded into D0Re0 at the beginning of
__start, which is acceptable for the immediate fix.
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: linux-metag@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 8a8b56638bcac4e64cccc88bf95a0f9f4b19a2fb upstream.
The __user_bad() macro used by access_ok() has a few corner cases
noticed by Al Viro where it doesn't behave correctly:
- The kernel range check has off by 1 errors which permit access to the
first and last byte of the kernel mapped range.
- The kernel range check ends at LINCORE_BASE rather than
META_MEMORY_LIMIT, which is ineffective when the kernel is in global
space (an extremely uncommon configuration).
There are a couple of other shortcomings here too:
- Access to the whole of the other address space is permitted (i.e. the
global half of the address space when the kernel is in local space).
This isn't ideal as it could theoretically still contain privileged
mappings set up by the bootloader.
- The size argument is unused, permitting user copies which start on
valid pages at the end of the user address range and cross the
boundary into the kernel address space (e.g. addr = 0x3ffffff0, size
> 0x10).
It isn't very convenient to add size checks when disallowing certain
regions, and it seems far safer to be sure and explicit about what
userland is able to access, so invert the logic to allow certain regions
instead, and fix the off by 1 errors and missing size checks. This also
allows the get_fs() == KERNEL_DS check to be more easily optimised into
the user address range case.
We now have 3 such allowed regions:
- The user address range (incorporating the get_fs() == KERNEL_DS
check).
- NULL (some kernel code expects this to work, and we'll always catch
the fault anyway).
- The core code memory region.
Fixes: 373cd784d0fc ("metag: Memory handling")
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: linux-metag@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 563ddc1076109f2b3f88e6d355eab7b6fd4662cb upstream.
Currently we try to zero the destination for a failed read from userland
in fixup code in the usercopy.c macros. The rest of the destination
buffer is then zeroed from __copy_user_zeroing(), which is used for both
copy_from_user() and __copy_from_user().
Unfortunately we fail to zero in the fixup code as D1Ar1 is set to 0
before the fixup code entry labels, and __copy_from_user() shouldn't even
be zeroing the rest of the buffer.
Move the zeroing out into copy_from_user() and rename
__copy_user_zeroing() to raw_copy_from_user() since it no longer does
any zeroing. This also conveniently matches the name needed for
RAW_COPY_USER support in a later patch.
Fixes: 373cd784d0fc ("metag: Memory handling")
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: linux-metag@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
virtio wants to write bitwise types to userspace using put_user.
At the moment this triggers sparse errors, since the value is passed
through an integer.
For example:
__le32 __user *p;
__le32 x;
put_user(x, p);
is safe, but currently triggers a sparse warning.
Fix that up using __force.
This also fixes warnings due to writing a pointer out to
userland.
Note: this does not suppress any useful sparse checks since callers
do a cast (__typeof__(*(ptr))) (x) which in turn forces all the
necessary type checks.
Suggested-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
|
|
virtio wants to read bitwise types from userspace using get_user. At the
moment this triggers sparse errors, since the value is passed through an
integer.
Fix that up using __force.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
|
|
Meta has instructions for accessing:
- bytes - GETB (1 byte)
- words - GETW (2 bytes)
- doublewords - GETD (4 bytes)
- longwords - GETL (8 bytes)
All accesses must be aligned. Unaligned accesses can be detected and
made to fault on Meta2, however it isn't possible to fix up unaligned
writes so we don't bother fixing up reads either.
This patch adds metag memory handling code including:
- I/O memory (io.h, ioremap.c): Actually any virtual memory can be
accessed with these helpers. A part of the non-MMUable address space
is used for memory mapped I/O. The ioremap() function is implemented
one to one for non-MMUable addresses.
- User memory (uaccess.h, usercopy.c): User memory is directly
accessible from privileged code.
- Kernel memory (maccess.c): probe_kernel_write() needs to be
overwridden to use the I/O functions when doing a simple aligned
write to non-writecombined memory, otherwise the write may be split
by the generic version.
Note that due to the fact that a portion of the virtual address space is
non-MMUable, and therefore always maps directly to the physical address
space, metag specific I/O functions are made available (metag_in32,
metag_out32 etc). These cast the address argument to a pointer so that
they can be used with raw physical addresses. These accessors are only
to be used for accessing fixed core Meta architecture registers in the
non-MMU region, and not for any SoC/peripheral registers.
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
|