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2014-11-23ARM: 7670/1: fix the memset fixNicolas Pitre
Commit 455bd4c430b0 ("ARM: 7668/1: fix memset-related crashes caused by recent GCC (4.7.2) optimizations") attempted to fix a compliance issue with the memset return value. However the memset itself became broken by that patch for misaligned pointers. This fixes the above by branching over the entry code from the misaligned fixup code to avoid reloading the original pointer. Also, because the function entry alignment is wrong in the Thumb mode compilation, that fixup code is moved to the end. While at it, the entry instructions are slightly reworked to help dual issue pipelines. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org> Tested-by: Alexander Holler <holler@ahsoftware.de> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 418df63adac56841ef6b0f1fcf435bc64d4ed177) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2014-11-23ARM: 7668/1: fix memset-related crashes caused by recent GCC (4.7.2) ↵Ivan Djelic
optimizations Recent GCC versions (e.g. GCC-4.7.2) perform optimizations based on assumptions about the implementation of memset and similar functions. The current ARM optimized memset code does not return the value of its first argument, as is usually expected from standard implementations. For instance in the following function: void debug_mutex_lock_common(struct mutex *lock, struct mutex_waiter *waiter) { memset(waiter, MUTEX_DEBUG_INIT, sizeof(*waiter)); waiter->magic = waiter; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&waiter->list); } compiled as: 800554d0 <debug_mutex_lock_common>: 800554d0: e92d4008 push {r3, lr} 800554d4: e1a00001 mov r0, r1 800554d8: e3a02010 mov r2, #16 ; 0x10 800554dc: e3a01011 mov r1, #17 ; 0x11 800554e0: eb04426e bl 80165ea0 <memset> 800554e4: e1a03000 mov r3, r0 800554e8: e583000c str r0, [r3, #12] 800554ec: e5830000 str r0, [r3] 800554f0: e5830004 str r0, [r3, #4] 800554f4: e8bd8008 pop {r3, pc} GCC assumes memset returns the value of pointer 'waiter' in register r0; causing register/memory corruptions. This patch fixes the return value of the assembly version of memset. It adds a 'mov' instruction and merges an additional load+store into existing load/store instructions. For ease of review, here is a breakdown of the patch into 4 simple steps: Step 1 ====== Perform the following substitutions: ip -> r8, then r0 -> ip, and insert 'mov ip, r0' as the first statement of the function. At this point, we have a memset() implementation returning the proper result, but corrupting r8 on some paths (the ones that were using ip). Step 2 ====== Make sure r8 is saved and restored when (! CALGN(1)+0) == 1: save r8: - str lr, [sp, #-4]! + stmfd sp!, {r8, lr} and restore r8 on both exit paths: - ldmeqfd sp!, {pc} @ Now <64 bytes to go. + ldmeqfd sp!, {r8, pc} @ Now <64 bytes to go. (...) tst r2, #16 stmneia ip!, {r1, r3, r8, lr} - ldr lr, [sp], #4 + ldmfd sp!, {r8, lr} Step 3 ====== Make sure r8 is saved and restored when (! CALGN(1)+0) == 0: save r8: - stmfd sp!, {r4-r7, lr} + stmfd sp!, {r4-r8, lr} and restore r8 on both exit paths: bgt 3b - ldmeqfd sp!, {r4-r7, pc} + ldmeqfd sp!, {r4-r8, pc} (...) tst r2, #16 stmneia ip!, {r4-r7} - ldmfd sp!, {r4-r7, lr} + ldmfd sp!, {r4-r8, lr} Step 4 ====== Rewrite register list "r4-r7, r8" as "r4-r8". Signed-off-by: Ivan Djelic <ivan.djelic@parrot.com> Reviewed-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Dirk Behme <dirk.behme@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> (cherry picked from commit 455bd4c430b0c0a361f38e8658a0d6cb469942b5) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2014-11-23ptrace,x86: force IRET path after a ptrace_stop()Tejun Heo
[ Upstream commit b9cd18de4db3c9ffa7e17b0dc0ca99ed5aa4d43a ] The 'sysret' fastpath does not correctly restore even all regular registers, much less any segment registers or reflags values. That is very much part of why it's faster than 'iret'. Normally that isn't a problem, because the normal ptrace() interface catches the process using the signal handler infrastructure, which always returns with an iret. However, some paths can get caught using ptrace_event() instead of the signal path, and for those we need to make sure that we aren't going to return to user space using 'sysret'. Otherwise the modifications that may have been done to the register set by the tracer wouldn't necessarily take effect. Fix it by forcing IRET path by setting TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME from arch_ptrace_stop_needed() which is invoked from ptrace_stop(). Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> [wt: fixes CVE-2014-4699] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2014-11-23MIPS: asm: thread_info: Add _TIF_SECCOMP flagMarkos Chandras
Add _TIF_SECCOMP flag to _TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY to indicate that the system call needs to be checked against a seccomp filter. Signed-off-by: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Reviewed-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/6405/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> (cherry picked from commit 137f7df8cead00688524c82360930845396b8a21) [wt: fixes CVE-2014-4157 - no _TIF_NOHZ nor _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT in 2.6.32] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2014-11-23MIPS: Cleanup flags in syscall flags handlers.Ralf Baechle
This will simplify further modifications. Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> (cherry picked from commit e7f3b48af7be9f8007a224663a5b91340626fed5) [wt: this patch is only there to ease integration of next one] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2014-11-23x86_32, entry: Clean up sysenter_badsys declarationStefan Bader
commit 554086d85e "x86_32, entry: Do syscall exit work on badsys (CVE-2014-4508)" introduced a new jump label (sysenter_badsys) but somehow the END statements seem to have gone wrong (at least it feels that way to me). This does not seem to be a fatal problem, but just for the sake of symmetry, change the second syscall_badsys to sysenter_badsys. Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1408093066-31021-1-git-send-email-stefan.bader@canonical.com Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> (cherry picked from commit fb21b84e7f809ef04b1e5aed5d463cf0d4866638) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2014-11-23x86_32, entry: Store badsys error code in %eaxSven Wegener
Commit 554086d ("x86_32, entry: Do syscall exit work on badsys (CVE-2014-4508)") introduced a regression in the x86_32 syscall entry code, resulting in syscall() not returning proper errors for undefined syscalls on CPUs supporting the sysenter feature. The following code: > int result = syscall(666); > printf("result=%d errno=%d error=%s\n", result, errno, strerror(errno)); results in: > result=666 errno=0 error=Success Obviously, the syscall return value is the called syscall number, but it should have been an ENOSYS error. When run under ptrace it behaves correctly, which makes it hard to debug in the wild: > result=-1 errno=38 error=Function not implemented The %eax register is the return value register. For debugging via ptrace the syscall entry code stores the complete register context on the stack. The badsys handlers only store the ENOSYS error code in the ptrace register set and do not set %eax like a regular syscall handler would. The old resume_userspace call chain contains code that clobbers %eax and it restores %eax from the ptrace registers afterwards. The same goes for the ptrace-enabled call chain. When ptrace is not used, the syscall return value is the passed-in syscall number from the untouched %eax register. Use %eax as the return value register in syscall_badsys and sysenter_badsys, like a real syscall handler does, and have the caller push the value onto the stack for ptrace access. Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LNX.2.11.1407221022380.31021@titan.int.lan.stealer.net Reviewed-and-tested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> (cherry picked from commit 8142b215501f8b291a108a202b3a053a265b03dd) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2014-11-23x86_32, entry: Do syscall exit work on badsys (CVE-2014-4508)Andy Lutomirski
The bad syscall nr paths are their own incomprehensible route through the entry control flow. Rearrange them to work just like syscalls that return -ENOSYS. This fixes an OOPS in the audit code when fast-path auditing is enabled and sysenter gets a bad syscall nr (CVE-2014-4508). This has probably been broken since Linux 2.6.27: af0575bba0 i386 syscall audit fast-path Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Reported-by: Toralf Förster <toralf.foerster@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e09c499eade6fc321266dd6b54da7beb28d6991c.1403558229.git.luto@amacapital.net Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> (cherry picked from commit 554086d85e71f30abe46fc014fea31929a7c6a8a) [WT: this fix is incorrect and requires the two following patches] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2014-05-19s390: fix kernel crash due to linkage stack instructionsMartin Schwidefsky
commit 8d7f6690cedb83456edd41c9bd583783f0703bf0 upstream The kernel currently crashes with a low-address-protection exception if a user space process executes an instruction that tries to use the linkage stack. Set the base-ASTE origin and the subspace-ASTE origin of the dispatchable-unit-control-table to point to a dummy ASTE. Set up control register 15 to point to an empty linkage stack with no room left. A user space process with a linkage stack instruction will still crash but with a different exception which is correctly translated to a segmentation fault instead of a kernel oops. Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> [dannf: backported to Debian's 2.6.32] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2014-05-19KVM: x86: Fix potential divide by 0 in lapic (CVE-2013-6367)Andy Honig
commit b963a22e6d1a266a67e9eecc88134713fd54775c upstream Under guest controllable circumstances apic_get_tmcct will execute a divide by zero and cause a crash. If the guest cpuid support tsc deadline timers and performs the following sequence of requests the host will crash. - Set the mode to periodic - Set the TMICT to 0 - Set the mode bits to 11 (neither periodic, nor one shot, nor tsc deadline) - Set the TMICT to non-zero. Then the lapic_timer.period will be 0, but the TMICT will not be. If the guest then reads from the TMCCT then the host will perform a divide by 0. This patch ensures that if the lapic_timer.period is 0, then the division does not occur. Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> [dannf: backported to Debian's 2.6.32] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2014-05-19uml: check length in exitcode_proc_write()Dan Carpenter
commit 201f99f170df14ba52ea4c52847779042b7a623b upstream We don't cap the size of buffer from the user so we could write past the end of the array here. Only root can write to this file. Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de> Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2014-05-19exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect testsKees Cook
commit d049f74f2dbe71354d43d393ac3a188947811348 upstream The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two places fixed in this patch. Wrong logic: if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ } or if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ } or if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ } Correct logic: if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ } or if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ } Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.) The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(), which means things like the ia64 code can see them too. CVE-2013-2929 Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> [dannf: backported to Debian's 2.6.32] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2014-05-19powernow-k6: reorder frequenciesMikulas Patocka
commit 22c73795b101597051924556dce019385a1e2fa0 upstream This patch reorders reported frequencies from the highest to the lowest, just like in other frequency drivers. Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2014-05-19powernow-k6: correctly initialize default parametersMikulas Patocka
commit d82b922a4acc1781d368aceac2f9da43b038cab2 upstream The powernow-k6 driver used to read the initial multiplier from the powernow register. However, there is a problem with this: * If there was a frequency transition before, the multiplier read from the register corresponds to the current multiplier. * If there was no frequency transition since reset, the field in the register always reads as zero, regardless of the current multiplier that is set using switches on the mainboard and that the CPU is running at. The zero value corresponds to multiplier 4.5, so as a consequence, the powernow-k6 driver always assumes multiplier 4.5. For example, if we have 550MHz CPU with bus frequency 100MHz and multiplier 5.5, the powernow-k6 driver thinks that the multiplier is 4.5 and bus frequency is 122MHz. The powernow-k6 driver then sets the multiplier to 4.5, underclocking the CPU to 450MHz, but reports the current frequency as 550MHz. There is no reliable way how to read the initial multiplier. I modified the driver so that it contains a table of known frequencies (based on parameters of existing CPUs and some common overclocking schemes) and sets the multiplier according to the frequency. If the frequency is unknown (because of unusual overclocking or underclocking), the user must supply the bus speed and maximum multiplier as module parameters. This patch should be backported to all stable kernels. If it doesn't apply cleanly, change it, or ask me to change it. Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2014-05-19powernow-k6: disable cache when changing frequencyMikulas Patocka
commit e20e1d0ac02308e2211306fc67abcd0b2668fb8b upstream I found out that a system with k6-3+ processor is unstable during network server load. The system locks up or the network card stops receiving. The reason for the instability is the CPU frequency scaling. During frequency transition the processor is in "EPM Stop Grant" state. The documentation says that the processor doesn't respond to inquiry requests in this state. Consequently, coherency of processor caches and bus master devices is not maintained, causing the system instability. This patch flushes the cache during frequency transition. It fixes the instability. Other minor changes: * u64 invalue changed to unsigned long because the variable is 32-bit * move the logic to set the multiplier to a separate function powernow_k6_set_cpu_multiplier * preserve lower 5 bits of the powernow port instead of 4 (the voltage field has 5 bits) * mask interrupts when reading the multiplier, so that the port is not open during other activity (running other kernel code with the port open shouldn't cause any misbehavior, but we should better be safe and keep the port closed) This patch should be backported to all stable kernels. If it doesn't apply cleanly, change it, or ask me to change it. Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2014-05-19powernow-k6: set transition latency value so ondemand governor can be usedKrzysztof Helt
Set the transition latency to value smaller than CPUFREQ_ETERNAL so governors other than "performance" work (like the "ondemand" one). The value is found in "AMD PowerNow! Technology Platform Design Guide for Embedded Processors" dated December 2000 (AMD doc #24267A). There is the answer to one of FAQs on page 40 which states that suggested complete transition period is 200 us. Tested on K6-2+ CPU with K6-3 core (model 13, stepping 4). Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Helt <krzysztof.h1@wp.pl> Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> (cherry picked from commit db2820dd5445a44b4726f15a2bc89b9ded2503eb) [wt: in 2.6.32, we only need this one so that next series applies cleanly] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2014-05-19x86, fpu, amd: Clear exceptions in AMD FXSAVE workaroundLinus Torvalds
Before we do an EMMS in the AMD FXSAVE information leak workaround we need to clear any pending exceptions, otherwise we trap with a floating-point exception inside this code. Reported-by: halfdog <me@halfdog.net> Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA%2B55aFxQnY_PCG_n4=0w-VG=YLXL-yr7oMxyy0WU2gCBAf3ydg@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> (cherry picked from commit 26bef1318adc1b3a530ecc807ef99346db2aa8b0) [wt: in 2.6.32, patch applies to arch/x86/include/asm/i387.h. There's no static_cpu_has() so we use boot_cpu_has() like other kernels do with gcc3. ] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2014-05-19x86, ptrace: fix build breakage with gcc 4.7 (second try)Willy Tarreau
syscall_trace_enter() and syscall_trace_leave() are only called from within asm code and do not need to be declared in the .c at all. Removing their reference fixes the build issue that was happening with gcc 4.7. Both Sven-Haegar Koch and Christoph Biedl confirmed this patch addresses their respective build issues. Cc: Sven-Haegar Koch <haegar@sdinet.de> Cc: Christoph Biedl <linux-kernel.bfrz@manchmal.in-ulm.de> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2014-05-19Revert "x86, ptrace: fix build breakage with gcc 4.7"Willy Tarreau
This reverts commit 4ed3bb08f1698c62685278051c19f474fbf961d2. As reported by Sven-Haegar Koch, this patch breaks make headers_check : CHECK include (0 files) CHECK include/asm (54 files) /home/haegar/src/2.6.32/linux/usr/include/asm/ptrace.h:5: included file 'linux/linkage.h' is not exported Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2013-06-10x86, ptrace: fix build breakage with gcc 4.7Willy Tarreau
Christoph Biedl reported that 2.6.32 does not build with gcc 4.7 on i386 : CC arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.o arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c:1472:17: error: conflicting types for 'syscall_trace_enter' In file included from /«PKGBUILDDIR»/arch/x86/include/asm/vm86.h:130:0, from /«PKGBUILDDIR»/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h:10, from /«PKGBUILDDIR»/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h:22, from include/linux/thread_info.h:56, from include/linux/preempt.h:9, from include/linux/spinlock.h:50, from include/linux/seqlock.h:29, from include/linux/time.h:8, from include/linux/timex.h:56, from include/linux/sched.h:56, from arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c:11: /«PKGBUILDDIR»/arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h:145:13: note: previous declaration of 'syscall_trace_enter' was here arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c:1517:17: error: conflicting types for 'syscall_trace_leave' In file included from /«PKGBUILDDIR»/arch/x86/include/asm/vm86.h:130:0, from /«PKGBUILDDIR»/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h:10, from /«PKGBUILDDIR»/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h:22, from include/linux/thread_info.h:56, from include/linux/preempt.h:9, from include/linux/spinlock.h:50, from include/linux/seqlock.h:29, from include/linux/time.h:8, from include/linux/timex.h:56, from include/linux/sched.h:56, from arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c:11: /«PKGBUILDDIR»/arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h:146:13: note: previous declaration of 'syscall_trace_leave' was here make[4]: *** [arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.o] Error 1 make[3]: *** [arch/x86/kernel] Error 2 make[3]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs.... He also found that this issue did not appear in more recent kernels since this asmregparm disappeared in 3.0-rc1 with commit 1b4ac2a935 that was applied after some UM changes that we don't necessarily want in 2.6.32. Thus, the cleanest fix for older kernels is to make the declaration in ptrace.h match the one in ptrace.c by specifying asmregparm on these functions. They're only called from asm which explains why it used to work despite the inconsistency in the declaration. Reported-by: Christoph Biedl <linux-kernel.bfrz@manchmal.in-ulm.de> Tested-by: Christoph Biedl <linux-kernel.bfrz@manchmal.in-ulm.de> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2013-06-10PARISC: fix user-triggerable panic on pariscAl Viro
commit 441a179dafc0f99fc8b3a8268eef66958621082e upstream. int sys32_rt_sigprocmask(int how, compat_sigset_t __user *set, compat_sigset_t __user *oset, unsigned int sigsetsize) { sigset_t old_set, new_set; int ret; if (set && get_sigset32(set, &new_set, sigsetsize)) ... static int get_sigset32(compat_sigset_t __user *up, sigset_t *set, size_t sz) { compat_sigset_t s; int r; if (sz != sizeof *set) panic("put_sigset32()"); In other words, rt_sigprocmask(69, (void *)69, 69) done by 32bit process will promptly panic the box. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2013-06-10alpha: Add irongate_io to PCI bus resourcesJay Estabrook
commit aa8b4be3ac049c8b1df2a87e4d1d902ccfc1f7a9 upstream. Fixes a NULL pointer dereference at boot on UP1500. Reviewed-and-Tested-by: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jay Estabrook <jay.estabrook@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2013-06-10MCE: Fix vm86 handling for 32bit mce handlerAndi Kleen
commit a129a7c84582629741e5fa6f40026efcd7a65bd4 upstream. When running on 32bit the mce handler could misinterpret vm86 mode as ring 0. This can affect whether it does recovery or not; it was possible to panic when recovery was actually possible. Fix this by always forcing vm86 to look like ring 3. [ Backport to 3.0 notes: Things changed there slightly: - move mce_get_rip() up. It fills up m->cs and m->ip values which are evaluated in mce_severity(). Therefore move it up right before the mce_severity call. This seem to be another bug in 3.0? - Place the backport (fix m->cs in V86 case) to where m->cs gets filled which is mce_get_rip() in 3.0 ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Renninger <trenn@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2013-06-10KVM: x86: invalid opcode oops on SET_SREGS with OSXSAVE bit set (CVE-2012-4461)Petr Matousek
commit 6d1068b3a98519247d8ba4ec85cd40ac136dbdf9 upstream. On hosts without the XSAVE support unprivileged local user can trigger oops similar to the one below by setting X86_CR4_OSXSAVE bit in guest cr4 register using KVM_SET_SREGS ioctl and later issuing KVM_RUN ioctl. invalid opcode: 0000 [#2] SMP Modules linked in: tun ip6table_filter ip6_tables ebtable_nat ebtables ... Pid: 24935, comm: zoog_kvm_monito Tainted: G D 3.2.0-3-686-pae EIP: 0060:[<f8b9550c>] EFLAGS: 00210246 CPU: 0 EIP is at kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x92a/0xd13 [kvm] EAX: 00000001 EBX: 000f387e ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00000000 ESI: 00000000 EDI: 00000000 EBP: ef5a0060 ESP: d7c63e70 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 Process zoog_kvm_monito (pid: 24935, ti=d7c62000 task=ed84a0c0 task.ti=d7c62000) Stack: 00000001 f70a1200 f8b940a9 ef5a0060 00000000 00200202 f8769009 00000000 ef5a0060 000f387e eda5c020 8722f9c8 00015bae 00000000 ed84a0c0 ed84a0c0 c12bf02d 0000ae80 ef7f8740 fffffffb f359b740 ef5a0060 f8b85dc1 0000ae80 Call Trace: [<f8b940a9>] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs+0x2fe/0x308 [kvm] ... [<c12bfb44>] ? syscall_call+0x7/0xb Code: 89 e8 e8 14 ee ff ff ba 00 00 04 00 89 e8 e8 98 48 ff ff 85 c0 74 1e 83 7d 48 00 75 18 8b 85 08 07 00 00 31 c9 8b 95 0c 07 00 00 <0f> 01 d1 c7 45 48 01 00 00 00 c7 45 1c 01 00 00 00 0f ae f0 89 EIP: [<f8b9550c>] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x92a/0xd13 [kvm] SS:ESP 0068:d7c63e70 QEMU first retrieves the supported features via KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID and then sets them later. So guest's X86_FEATURE_XSAVE should be masked out on hosts without X86_FEATURE_XSAVE, making kvm_set_cr4 with X86_CR4_OSXSAVE fail. Userspaces that allow specifying guest cpuid with X86_FEATURE_XSAVE even on hosts that do not support it, might be susceptible to this attack from inside the guest as well. Allow setting X86_CR4_OSXSAVE bit only if host has XSAVE support. Signed-off-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> [bwh: Backported to 2.6.32: XSAVE is not supported at all, so always deny setting OSXSAVE] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2013-06-10KVM: x86: relax MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME alignment checkMarcelo Tosatti
This was fixed by commit 8f964525a121f2ff2df948dac908dcc65be21b5b upstream. This alternate fix avoids the need for extensive backporting. RHEL5 i386 guests register non 32-byte aligned addresses: kvm-clock: cpu 1, msr 0:3018aa5, secondary cpu clock kvm-clock: cpu 2, msr 0:301f8e9, secondary cpu clock kvm-clock: cpu 3, msr 0:302672d, secondary cpu clock Check for an address+len that would cross page boundary instead. Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> [dannf: backported to Debian's 2.6.32] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2013-06-10KVM: x86: fix for buffer overflow in handling of MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME ↵Andy Honig
(CVE-2013-1796) commit c300aa64ddf57d9c5d9c898a64b36877345dd4a9 upstream. If the guest sets the GPA of the time_page so that the request to update the time straddles a page then KVM will write onto an incorrect page. The write is done byusing kmap atomic to get a pointer to the page for the time structure and then performing a memcpy to that page starting at an offset that the guest controls. Well behaved guests always provide a 32-byte aligned address, however a malicious guest could use this to corrupt host kernel memory. Tested: Tested against kvmclock unit test. Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2013-06-10xen/bootup: allow {read|write}_cr8 pvops call.Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
commit 1a7bbda5b1ab0e02622761305a32dc38735b90b2 upstream. We actually do not do anything about it. Just return a default value of zero and if the kernel tries to write anything but 0 we BUG_ON. This fixes the case when an user tries to suspend the machine and it blows up in save_processor_state b/c 'read_cr8' is set to NULL and we get: kernel BUG at /home/konrad/ssd/linux/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:100! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP Pid: 2687, comm: init.late Tainted: G O 3.6.0upstream-00002-gac264ac-dirty #4 Bochs Bochs RIP: e030:[<ffffffff814d5f42>] [<ffffffff814d5f42>] save_processor_state+0x212/0x270 .. snip.. Call Trace: [<ffffffff810733bf>] do_suspend_lowlevel+0xf/0xac [<ffffffff8107330c>] ? x86_acpi_suspend_lowlevel+0x10c/0x150 [<ffffffff81342ee2>] acpi_suspend_enter+0x57/0xd5 Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2013-06-10xen/bootup: allow read_tscp call for Xen PV guests.Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
commit cd0608e71e9757f4dae35bcfb4e88f4d1a03a8ab upstream. The hypervisor will trap it. However without this patch, we would crash as the .read_tscp is set to NULL. This patch fixes it and sets it to the native_read_tscp call. Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2013-06-10x86, mm, paravirt: Fix vmalloc_fault oops during lazy MMU updatesSamu Kallio
commit 1160c2779b826c6f5c08e5cc542de58fd1f667d5 upstream. In paravirtualized x86_64 kernels, vmalloc_fault may cause an oops when lazy MMU updates are enabled, because set_pgd effects are being deferred. One instance of this problem is during process mm cleanup with memory cgroups enabled. The chain of events is as follows: - zap_pte_range enables lazy MMU updates - zap_pte_range eventually calls mem_cgroup_charge_statistics, which accesses the vmalloc'd mem_cgroup per-cpu stat area - vmalloc_fault is triggered which tries to sync the corresponding PGD entry with set_pgd, but the update is deferred - vmalloc_fault oopses due to a mismatch in the PUD entries The OOPs usually looks as so: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at arch/x86/mm/fault.c:396! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP .. snip .. CPU 1 Pid: 10866, comm: httpd Not tainted 3.6.10-4.fc18.x86_64 #1 RIP: e030:[<ffffffff816271bf>] [<ffffffff816271bf>] vmalloc_fault+0x11f/0x208 .. snip .. Call Trace: [<ffffffff81627759>] do_page_fault+0x399/0x4b0 [<ffffffff81004f4c>] ? xen_mc_extend_args+0xec/0x110 [<ffffffff81624065>] page_fault+0x25/0x30 [<ffffffff81184d03>] ? mem_cgroup_charge_statistics.isra.13+0x13/0x50 [<ffffffff81186f78>] __mem_cgroup_uncharge_common+0xd8/0x350 [<ffffffff8118aac7>] mem_cgroup_uncharge_page+0x57/0x60 [<ffffffff8115fbc0>] page_remove_rmap+0xe0/0x150 [<ffffffff8115311a>] ? vm_normal_page+0x1a/0x80 [<ffffffff81153e61>] unmap_single_vma+0x531/0x870 [<ffffffff81154962>] unmap_vmas+0x52/0xa0 [<ffffffff81007442>] ? pte_mfn_to_pfn+0x72/0x100 [<ffffffff8115c8f8>] exit_mmap+0x98/0x170 [<ffffffff810050d9>] ? __raw_callee_save_xen_pmd_val+0x11/0x1e [<ffffffff81059ce3>] mmput+0x83/0xf0 [<ffffffff810624c4>] exit_mm+0x104/0x130 [<ffffffff8106264a>] do_exit+0x15a/0x8c0 [<ffffffff810630ff>] do_group_exit+0x3f/0xa0 [<ffffffff81063177>] sys_exit_group+0x17/0x20 [<ffffffff8162bae9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Calling arch_flush_lazy_mmu_mode immediately after set_pgd makes the changes visible to the consistency checks. RedHat-Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=914737 Tested-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> Reported-and-Tested-by: Krishna Raman <kraman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Samu Kallio <samu.kallio@aberdeencloud.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1364045796-10720-1-git-send-email-konrad.wilk@oracle.com Tested-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2013-06-10x86/mm: Check if PUD is large when validating a kernel addressMel Gorman
commit 0ee364eb316348ddf3e0dfcd986f5f13f528f821 upstream. A user reported the following oops when a backup process reads /proc/kcore: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffbb00ff33b000 IP: [<ffffffff8103157e>] kern_addr_valid+0xbe/0x110 [...] Call Trace: [<ffffffff811b8aaa>] read_kcore+0x17a/0x370 [<ffffffff811ad847>] proc_reg_read+0x77/0xc0 [<ffffffff81151687>] vfs_read+0xc7/0x130 [<ffffffff811517f3>] sys_read+0x53/0xa0 [<ffffffff81449692>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Investigation determined that the bug triggered when reading system RAM at the 4G mark. On this system, that was the first address using 1G pages for the virt->phys direct mapping so the PUD is pointing to a physical address, not a PMD page. The problem is that the page table walker in kern_addr_valid() is not checking pud_large() and treats the physical address as if it was a PMD. If it happens to look like pmd_none then it'll silently fail, probably returning zeros instead of real data. If the data happens to look like a present PMD though, it will be walked resulting in the oops above. This patch adds the necessary pud_large() check. Unfortunately the problem was not readily reproducible and now they are running the backup program without accessing /proc/kcore so the patch has not been validated but I think it makes sense. Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.coM> Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130211145236.GX21389@suse.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2013-06-10x86/msr: Add capabilities checkAlan Cox
commit c903f0456bc69176912dee6dd25c6a66ee1aed00 upstream At the moment the MSR driver only relies upon file system checks. This means that anything as root with any capability set can write to MSRs. Historically that wasn't very interesting but on modern processors the MSRs are such that writing to them provides several ways to execute arbitary code in kernel space. Sample code and documentation on doing this is circulating and MSR attacks are used on Windows 64bit rootkits already. In the Linux case you still need to be able to open the device file so the impact is fairly limited and reduces the security of some capability and security model based systems down towards that of a generic "root owns the box" setup. Therefore they should require CAP_SYS_RAWIO to prevent an elevation of capabilities. The impact of this is fairly minimal on most setups because they don't have heavy use of capabilities. Those using SELinux, SMACK or AppArmor rules might want to consider if their rulesets on the MSR driver could be tighter. Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Horses <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> [dannf: backported to Debian's 2.6.32] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2013-06-10x86/xen: don't assume %ds is usable in xen_iret for 32-bit PVOPS.Jan Beulich
commit 13d2b4d11d69a92574a55bfd985cfb0ca77aebdc upstream. This fixes CVE-2013-0228 / XSA-42 Drew Jones while working on CVE-2013-0190 found that that unprivileged guest user in 32bit PV guest can use to crash the > guest with the panic like this: ------------- general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP last sysfs file: /sys/devices/vbd-51712/block/xvda/dev Modules linked in: sunrpc ipt_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter ip_tables ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 xt_state nf_conntrack ip6table_filter ip6_tables ipv6 xen_netfront ext4 mbcache jbd2 xen_blkfront dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [last unloaded: scsi_wait_scan] Pid: 1250, comm: r Not tainted 2.6.32-356.el6.i686 #1 EIP: 0061:[<c0407462>] EFLAGS: 00010086 CPU: 0 EIP is at xen_iret+0x12/0x2b EAX: eb8d0000 EBX: 00000001 ECX: 08049860 EDX: 00000010 ESI: 00000000 EDI: 003d0f00 EBP: b77f8388 ESP: eb8d1fe0 DS: 0000 ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 00e0 SS: 0069 Process r (pid: 1250, ti=eb8d0000 task=c2953550 task.ti=eb8d0000) Stack: 00000000 0027f416 00000073 00000206 b77f8364 0000007b 00000000 00000000 Call Trace: Code: c3 8b 44 24 18 81 4c 24 38 00 02 00 00 8d 64 24 30 e9 03 00 00 00 8d 76 00 f7 44 24 08 00 00 02 80 75 33 50 b8 00 e0 ff ff 21 e0 <8b> 40 10 8b 04 85 a0 f6 ab c0 8b 80 0c b0 b3 c0 f6 44 24 0d 02 EIP: [<c0407462>] xen_iret+0x12/0x2b SS:ESP 0069:eb8d1fe0 general protection fault: 0000 [#2] ---[ end trace ab0d29a492dcd330 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Pid: 1250, comm: r Tainted: G D --------------- 2.6.32-356.el6.i686 #1 Call Trace: [<c08476df>] ? panic+0x6e/0x122 [<c084b63c>] ? oops_end+0xbc/0xd0 [<c084b260>] ? do_general_protection+0x0/0x210 [<c084a9b7>] ? error_code+0x73/ ------------- Petr says: " I've analysed the bug and I think that xen_iret() cannot cope with mangled DS, in this case zeroed out (null selector/descriptor) by either xen_failsafe_callback() or RESTORE_REGS because the corresponding LDT entry was invalidated by the reproducer. " Jan took a look at the preliminary patch and came up a fix that solves this problem: "This code gets called after all registers other than those handled by IRET got already restored, hence a null selector in %ds or a non-null one that got loaded from a code or read-only data descriptor would cause a kernel mode fault (with the potential of crashing the kernel as a whole, if panic_on_oops is set)." The way to fix this is to realize that the we can only relay on the registers that IRET restores. The two that are guaranteed are the %cs and %ss as they are always fixed GDT selectors. Also they are inaccessible from user mode - so they cannot be altered. This is the approach taken in this patch. Another alternative option suggested by Jan would be to relay on the subtle realization that using the %ebp or %esp relative references uses the %ss segment. In which case we could switch from using %eax to %ebp and would not need the %ss over-rides. That would also require one extra instruction to compensate for the one place where the register is used as scaled index. However Andrew pointed out that is too subtle and if further work was to be done in this code-path it could escape folks attention and lead to accidents. Reviewed-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com> Reported-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> [dannf: backported to Debian's 2.6.32] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2013-06-10x86, random: make ARCH_RANDOM prompt if EMBEDDED, not EXPERTRomain Francoise
Before v2.6.38 CONFIG_EXPERT was known as CONFIG_EMBEDDED but the Kconfig entry was not changed to match when upstream commit 628c6246d47b85f5357298601df2444d7f4dd3fd ("x86, random: Architectural inlines to get random integers with RDRAND") was backported. Signed-off-by: Romain Francoise <romain@orebokech.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2013-06-10x86: Don't use the EFI reboot method by defaultMatthew Garrett
Testing suggests that at least some Lenovos and some Intels will fail to reboot via EFI, attempting to jump to an unmapped physical address. In the long run we could handle this by providing a page table with a 1:1 mapping of physical addresses, but for now it's probably just easier to assume that ACPI or legacy methods will be present and reboot via those. [2.6.32: additional background information from Jonathan below] > > Please consider > > f70e957cda22 x86: Don't use the EFI reboot method by default, > 2011-07-06 > > for application to the 2.6.32.y and 2.6.34.y trees. The patch was > applied upstream late in the 3.0 cycle, so newer kernels don't need > it. > > In 2011, Keith Ward wrote[1]: > > > When attempting to reboot my my UEFI enabled system, the system hangs when > > calling reboot requiring me to manually reset the system via the reset switch. > > > > Screenshot: http://twitgoo.com/29bq1c > > Ben Hutchings writes[1]: > > > Version: 3.0.0-1 > > > > I also had this problem on my own system, but it is fixed now. > > I bisected the fix to: > > > > commit f70e957cda22d309c769805cbb932407a5232219 > > Author: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> > > Date: Wed Jul 6 16:52:37 2011 -0400 > > > > x86: Don't use the EFI reboot method by default > > > > which is basically equivalent to the workaround! > > > > I'll also apply this fix to squeeze as it's so simple. > > Keith Ward also wrote[1]: > > > It seems as if this has recently been reported at Ubuntu's Launchpad as well: > > https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/721576 > > There are a variety of reports of the same panic at that bug on > 2.6.32.y-, 2.6.38.y-, and 2.6.39-based kernels. Passing "reboot=a,w" > on the kernel command line avoids trouble for reporters. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1309985557-15350-1-git-send-email-mjg@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> (cherry picked from commit f70e957cda22d309c769805cbb932407a5232219) Cc: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2013-06-10x86, ioapic: initialize nr_ioapic_registers early in mp_register_ioapic()Suresh Siddha
Lin Bao reported that one of the HP platforms failed to boot 2.6.32 kernel, when the BIOS enabled interrupt-remapping and x2apic before handing over the control to the Linux kernel. During boot, Linux kernel masks all the interrupt sources (8259, IO-APIC RTE's), setup the interrupt-remapping hardware with the OS controlled table and unmasks the 8259 interrupts but not the IO-APIC RTE's (as the newly setup interrupt-remapping table and the IO-APIC RTE's are not yet programmed by the kernel). Shortly after this, IO-APIC RTE's and the interrupt-remapping table entries are programmed based on the ACPI tables etc. So the expectation is that any interrupt during this window will be dropped and not see the intermediate configuration. In the reported problematic case, BIOS has configured the IO-APIC in virtual wire-B mode. Between the window of the kernel setting up new interrupt-remapping table and the IO-APIC RTE's are properly configured, an interrupt gets routed by the IO-APIC RTE (setup by the virtual wire-B configuration) and sees the empty interrupt-remapping table entry, resulting in vt-d fault causing the platform to generate NMI. And the OS panics on this unexpected NMI. This problem doesn't happen with more recent kernels and closer look at the 2.6.32 kernel shows that the code which masks the IO-APIC RTE's is not working as expected as the nr_ioapic_registers for each IO-APIC is not yet initialized at this point. In the later kernels we initialize nr_ioapic_registers much before and everything works as expected. For 2.6.[32..34] kernels, fix this issue by initializing nr_ioapic_registers early in mp_register_ioapic() [ Relevant upstream commit info: commit 7716a5c4ff5f1f3dc5e9edcab125cbf7fceef0af Author: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Date: Tue Mar 30 01:07:12 2010 -0700 x86, ioapic: Move nr_ioapic_registers calculation to mp_register_ioapic. As the upstream commit depends on quite a few prior commits and some followup fixes in the mainline, we just picked the smallest relevant hunk for fixing the issue at hand. Problematic platform uses ACPI for IO-APIC, VT-d enumeration etc and this hunk only touches the ACPI based platforms. nr_ioapic_reigsters initialization in enable_IO_APIC() is still retained, so that other configurations like legacy MPS table based enumeration etc works with no change. ] Reported-and-tested-by: Zhang, Lin-Bao <linbao.zhang@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2013-06-10signal: Define __ARCH_HAS_SA_RESTORER so we know whether to clear sa_restorerBen Hutchings
Vaguely based on upstream commit 574c4866e33d 'consolidate kernel-side struct sigaction declarations'. flush_signal_handlers() needs to know whether sigaction::sa_restorer is defined, not whether SA_RESTORER is defined. Define the __ARCH_HAS_SA_RESTORER macro to indicate this. Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2013-06-10kbuild: Fix gcc -x syntaxJean Delvare
This is upstream commit b1e0d8b70fa31821ebca3965f2ef8619d7c5e316 backported to the 2.6.32.x stable branch. The correct syntax for gcc -x is "gcc -x assembler", not "gcc -xassembler". Even though the latter happens to work, the former is what is documented in the manual page and thus what gcc wrappers such as icecream do expect. This isn't a cosmetic change. The missing space prevents icecream from recognizing compilation tasks it can't handle, leading to silent kernel miscompilations. Besides me, credits go to Michael Matz and Dirk Mueller for investigating the miscompilation issue and tracking it down to this incorrect -x parameter syntax. Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Bernhard Walle <bernhard@bwalle.de> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2012-10-07random: remove rand_initialize_irq()Theodore Ts'o
commit c5857ccf293968348e5eb4ebedc68074de3dcda6 upstream. With the new interrupt sampling system, we are no longer using the timer_rand_state structure in the irq descriptor, so we can stop initializing it now. [ Merged in fixes from Sedat to find some last missing references to rand_initialize_irq() ] Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com> [PG: in .34 the irqdesc.h content is in irq.h instead.] Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2012-10-07x86, random: Verify RDRAND functionality and allow it to be disabledH. Peter Anvin
commit 49d859d78c5aeb998b6936fcb5f288f78d713489 upstream. If the CPU declares that RDRAND is available, go through a guranteed reseed sequence, and make sure that it is actually working (producing data.) If it does not, disable the CPU feature flag. Allow RDRAND to be disabled on the command line (as opposed to at compile time) for a user who has special requirements with regards to random numbers. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2012-10-07x86, random: Architectural inlines to get random integers with RDRANDH. Peter Anvin
commit 628c6246d47b85f5357298601df2444d7f4dd3fd upstream. Architectural inlines to get random ints and longs using the RDRAND instruction. Intel has introduced a new RDRAND instruction, a Digital Random Number Generator (DRNG), which is functionally an high bandwidth entropy source, cryptographic whitener, and integrity monitor all built into hardware. This enables RDRAND to be used directly, bypassing the kernel random number pool. For technical documentation, see: http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/download-the-latest-bull-mountain-software-implementation-guide/ In this patch, this is *only* used for the nonblocking random number pool. RDRAND is a nonblocking source, similar to our /dev/urandom, and is therefore not a direct replacement for /dev/random. The architectural hooks presented in the previous patch only feed the kernel internal users, which only use the nonblocking pool, and so this is not a problem. Since this instruction is available in userspace, there is no reason to have a /dev/hw_rng device driver for the purpose of feeding rngd. This is especially so since RDRAND is a nonblocking source, and needs additional whitening and reduction (see the above technical documentation for details) in order to be of "pure entropy source" quality. The CONFIG_EXPERT compile-time option can be used to disable this use of RDRAND. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Originally-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2012-10-07x86, cpufeature: Update CPU feature RDRND to RDRANDKees Cook
commit 7ccafc5f75c87853f3c49845d5a884f2376e03ce upstream. The Intel manual changed the name of the CPUID bit to match the instruction name. We should follow suit for sanity's sake. (See Intel SDM Volume 2, Table 3-20 "Feature Information Returned in the ECX Register".) [ hpa: we can only do this at this time because there are currently no CPUs with this feature on the market, hence this is pre-hardware enabling. However, Cc:'ing stable so that stable can present a consistent ABI. ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20110524232926.GA27728@outflux.net Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2012-10-07x86, cpu: Add CPU flags for F16C and RDRNDH. Peter Anvin
commit 24da9c26f3050aee9314ec09930a24c80fe76352 upstream. Add support for the newly documented F16C (16-bit floating point conversions) and RDRND (RDRAND instruction) CPU feature flags. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2012-10-07sparc64: Eliminate obsolete __handle_softirq() functionPaul E. McKenney
commit 3d3eeb2ef26112a200785e5fca58ec58dd33bf1e upstream. The invocation of softirq is now handled by irq_exit(), so there is no need for sparc64 to invoke it on the trap-return path. In fact, doing so is a bug because if the trap occurred in the idle loop, this invocation can result in lockdep-RCU failures. The problem is that RCU ignores idle CPUs, and the sparc64 trap-return path to the softirq handlers fails to tell RCU that the CPU must be considered non-idle while those handlers are executing. This means that RCU is ignoring any RCU read-side critical sections in those handlers, which in turn means that RCU-protected data can be yanked out from under those read-side critical sections. The shiny new lockdep-RCU ability to detect RCU read-side critical sections that RCU is ignoring located this problem. The fix is straightforward: Make sparc64 stop manually invoking the softirq handlers. Reported-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee> Suggested-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2012-10-07x86, tls: Off by one limit checkDan Carpenter
commit 8f0750f19789cf352d7e24a6cc50f2ab1b4f1372 upstream. These are used as offsets into an array of GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES members so GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES is one past the end of the array. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120324075250.GA28258@elgon.mountain Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2012-10-07x86, amd, xen: Avoid NULL pointer paravirt referencesKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk
commit 1ab46fd319bcf1fcd9fb6311727d532b580e4eba upstream. Stub out MSR methods that aren't actually needed. This fixes a crash as Xen Dom0 on AMD Trinity systems. A bigger patch should be added to remove the paravirt machinery completely for the methods which apparently have no users! Reported-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@amd.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120530222356.GA28417@andromeda.dapyr.net Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2012-10-07xen: correctly check for pending events when restoring irq flagsDavid Vrabel
commit 7eb7ce4d2e8991aff4ecb71a81949a907ca755ac upstream. In xen_restore_fl_direct(), xen_force_evtchn_callback() was being called even if no events were pending. This resulted in (depending on workload) about a 100 times as many xen_version hypercalls as necessary. Fix this by correcting the sense of the conditional jump. This seems to give a significant performance benefit for some workloads. There is some subtle tricksy "..since the check here is trying to check both pending and masked in a single cmpw, but I think this is correct. It will call check_events now only when the combined mask+pending word is 0x0001 (aka unmasked, pending)." (Ian) Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2012-10-07ia64: Add accept4() syscallÉmeric Maschino
commit 65cc21b4523e94d5640542a818748cd3be8cd6b4 upstream. While debugging udev > 170 failure on Debian Wheezy (http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=648325), it appears that the issue was in fact due to missing accept4() in ia64. This patch simply adds accept4() to ia64. Signed-off-by: Émeric Maschino <emeric.maschino@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Backported-by: Dennis Schridde <devurandom@gmx.net> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2012-10-07PARISC: Redefine ATOMIC_INIT and ATOMIC64_INIT to drop the castsMel Gorman
commit bba3d8c3b3c0f2123be5bc687d1cddc13437c923 upstream. The following build error occured during a parisc build with swap-over-NFS patches applied. net/core/sock.c:274:36: error: initializer element is not constant net/core/sock.c:274:36: error: (near initialization for 'memalloc_socks') net/core/sock.c:274:36: error: initializer element is not constant Dave Anglin says: > Here is the line in sock.i: > > struct static_key memalloc_socks = ((struct static_key) { .enabled = > ((atomic_t) { (0) }) }); The above line contains two compound literals. It also uses a designated initializer to initialize the field enabled. A compound literal is not a constant expression. The location of the above statement isn't fully clear, but if a compound literal occurs outside the body of a function, the initializer list must consist of constant expressions. Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2012-10-07powerpc: Add "memory" attribute for mfmsr()Tiejun Chen
commit b416c9a10baae6a177b4f9ee858b8d309542fbef upstream. Add "memory" attribute in inline assembly language as a compiler barrier to make sure 4.6.x GCC don't reorder mfmsr(). Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
2012-10-07powerpc/ftrace: Fix assembly trampoline register usageroger blofeld
commit fd5a42980e1cf327b7240adf5e7b51ea41c23437 upstream. Just like the module loader, ftrace needs to be updated to use r12 instead of r11 with newer gcc's. Signed-off-by: Roger Blofeld <blofeldus@yahoo.com> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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