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This reverts upstream commit e5f15b45ddf3afa2bbbb10c7ea34fb32b6de0a0e
It caused problems in the stable tree and should not have been there.
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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powerpc: Fix default_machine_crash_shutdown #ifdef botch
Commit: c2be05481f6125254c45b78f334d4dd09c701c82 upstream
crash_kexec_wait_realmode() is defined only if CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64
and CONFIG_SMP, but is called if CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64 even if !CONFIG_SMP.
Fix the conditional compilation around the invocation.
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamalesh Babulal <kamalesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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powerpc/kexec: Add ifdef CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64 to PPC64 code
This patch introduces PPC64 specific #ifdef bits from the upstream
commit: b3df895aebe091b1657a42a8c859bd49fc96646b.
Reported-and-tested-by: dann frazier <dannf@dannf.org>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Gala <galak@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamalesh Babulal <kamalesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 84ac7cdbdd0f04df6b96153f7a79127fd6e45467 upstream.
On laptops with core i5/i7, there were reports that after resume
graphics workloads were performing poorly on a specific AP, while
the other cpu's were ok. This was observed on a 32bit kernel
specifically.
Debug showed that the PAT init was not happening on that AP
during resume and hence it contributing to the poor workload
performance on that cpu.
On this system, resume flow looked like this:
1. BP starts the resume sequence and we reinit BP's MTRR's/PAT
early on using mtrr_bp_restore()
2. Resume sequence brings all AP's online
3. Resume sequence now kicks off the MTRR reinit on all the AP's.
4. For some reason, between point 2 and 3, we moved from BP
to one of the AP's. My guess is that printk() during resume
sequence is contributing to this. We don't see similar
behavior with the 64bit kernel but there is no guarantee that
at this point the remaining resume sequence (after AP's bringup)
has to happen on BP.
5. set_mtrr() was assuming that we are still on BP and skipped the
MTRR/PAT init on that cpu (because of 1 above)
6. But we were on an AP and this led to not reprogramming PAT
on this cpu leading to bad performance.
Fix this by doing unconditional mtrr_if->set_all() in set_mtrr()
during MTRR/PAT init. This might be unnecessary if we are still
running on BP. But it is of no harm and will guarantee that after
resume, all the cpu's will be in sync with respect to the
MTRR/PAT registers.
Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
LKML-Reference: <1301438292-28370-1-git-send-email-eric@anholt.net>
Signed-off-by: Eric Anholt <eric@anholt.net>
Tested-by: Keith Packard <keithp@keithp.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit e5f15b45ddf3afa2bbbb10c7ea34fb32b6de0a0e upstream.
Now cleanup_highmap actually is in two steps: one is early in head64.c
and only clears above _end; a second one is in init_memory_mapping() and
tries to clean from _brk_end to _end.
It should check if those boundaries are PMD_SIZE aligned but currently
does not.
Also init_memory_mapping() is called several times for numa or memory
hotplug, so we really should not handle initial kernel mappings there.
This patch moves cleanup_highmap() down after _brk_end is settled so
we can do everything in one step.
Also we honor max_pfn_mapped in the implementation of cleanup_highmap.
Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
LKML-Reference: <alpine.DEB.2.00.1103171739050.3382@kaball-desktop>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 14988a4d350ce3b41ecad4f63c4f44c56f5ae34d upstream.
Do not set max_pfn_mapped to the end of the initial memory mappings,
that also contain pages that don't belong in pfn space (like the mfn
list).
Set max_pfn_mapped to the last real pfn mapped in the initial memory
mappings that is the pfn backing _end.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
LKML-Reference: <alpine.DEB.2.00.1103171739050.3382@kaball-desktop>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 371c394af27ab7d1e58a66bc19d9f1f3ac1f67b4 upstream.
The latest binutils (2.21.0.20110302/Ubuntu) breaks the build
yet another time, under CONFIG_XEN=y due to a .size directive that
refers to a slightly differently named (hence, to the now very
strict and unforgiving assembler, non-existent) symbol.
[ mingo:
This unnecessary build breakage caused by new binutils
version 2.21 gets escallated back several kernel releases spanning
several years of Linux history, affecting over 130,000 upstream
kernel commits (!), on CONFIG_XEN=y 64-bit kernels (i.e. essentially
affecting all major Linux distro kernel configs).
Git annotate tells us that this slight debug symbol code mismatch
bug has been introduced in 2008 in commit 3d75e1b8:
3d75e1b8 (Jeremy Fitzhardinge 2008-07-08 15:06:49 -0700 1231) ENTRY(xen_do_hypervisor_callback) # do_hypervisor_callback(struct *pt_regs)
The 'bug' is just a slight assymetry in ENTRY()/END()
debug-symbols sequences, with lots of assembly code between the
ENTRY() and the END():
ENTRY(xen_do_hypervisor_callback) # do_hypervisor_callback(struct *pt_regs)
...
END(do_hypervisor_callback)
Human reviewers almost never catch such small mismatches, and binutils
never even warned about it either.
This new binutils version thus breaks the Xen build on all upstream kernels
since v2.6.27, out of the blue.
This makes a straightforward Git bisection of all 64-bit Xen-enabled kernels
impossible on such binutils, for a bisection window of over hundred
thousand historic commits. (!)
This is a major fail on the side of binutils and binutils needs to turn
this show-stopper build failure into a warning ASAP. ]
Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm>
Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>
Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
LKML-Reference: <1299877178-26063-1-git-send-email-heukelum@fastmail.fm>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit bd2b64a12bf55bec0d1b949e3dca3f8863409646 upstream.
When trying to flash a machine via the update_flash command, Anton received the
following error:
Restarting system.
FLASH: kernel bug...flash list header addr above 4GB
The code in question has a comment that the flash list should be in
the kernel data and therefore under 4GB:
/* NOTE: the "first" block list is a global var with no data
* blocks in the kernel data segment. We do this because
* we want to ensure this block_list addr is under 4GB.
*/
Unfortunately the Kconfig option is marked tristate which means the variable
may not be in the kernel data and could be above 4GB.
Instead of relying on the data segment being below 4GB, use the static
data buffer allocated by the kernel for use by rtas. Since we don't
use the header struct directly anymore, convert it to a simple pointer.
Reported-By: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-Off-By: Milton Miller <miltonm@bga.com>
Tested-By: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 60adec6226bbcf061d4c2d10944fced209d1847d upstream.
When we are crashing, the crashing/primary CPU IPIs the secondaries to
turn off IRQs, go into real mode and wait in kexec_wait. While this
is happening, the primary tears down all the MMU maps. Unfortunately
the primary doesn't check to make sure the secondaries have entered
real mode before doing this.
On PHYP machines, the secondaries can take a long time shutting down
the IRQ controller as RTAS calls are need. These RTAS calls need to
be serialised which resilts in the secondaries contending in
lock_rtas() and hence taking a long time to shut down.
We've hit this on large POWER7 machines, where some secondaries are
still waiting in lock_rtas(), when the primary tears down the HPTEs.
This patch makes sure all secondaries are in real mode before the
primary tears down the MMU. It uses the new kexec_state entry in the
paca. It times out if the secondaries don't reach real mode after
10sec.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 9804c9eaeacfe78651052c5ddff31099f60ef78c upstream.
The CHECK_IRQ_PER_CPU is wrong, it should be checking
irq_to_desc(irq)->status not just irq.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 4981d01eada5354d81c8929d5b2836829ba3df7b upstream.
According to intel CPU manual, every time PGD entry is changed in i386 PAE
mode, we need do a full TLB flush. Current code follows this and there is
comment for this too in the code.
But current code misses the multi-threaded case. A changed page table
might be used by several CPUs, every such CPU should flush TLB. Usually
this isn't a problem, because we prepopulate all PGD entries at process
fork. But when the process does munmap and follows new mmap, this issue
will be triggered.
When it happens, some CPUs keep doing page faults:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=129915020508238&w=2
Reported-by: Yasunori Goto<y-goto@jp.fujitsu.com>
Tested-by: Yasunori Goto<y-goto@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li<shaohua.li@intel.com>
Cc: Mallick Asit K <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org>
LKML-Reference: <1300246649.2337.95.camel@sli10-conroe>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 0837e3242c73566fc1c0196b4ec61779c25ffc93 upstream.
Events on POWER7 can roll back if a speculative event doesn't
eventually complete. Unfortunately in some rare cases they will
raise a performance monitor exception. We need to catch this to
ensure we reset the PMC. In all cases the PMC will be 256 or less
cycles from overflow.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
LKML-Reference: <20110309143842.6c22845e@kryten>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 2d2b6901649a62977452be85df53eda2412def24 upstream.
Tony's fix (f574c843191728d9407b766a027f779dcd27b272) has a small bug,
it incorrectly uses "r3" as a scratch register in the first of the two
unlock paths ... it is also inefficient. Optimize the fast path again.
Signed-off-by: Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit f574c843191728d9407b766a027f779dcd27b272 upstream.
When ia64 converted to using ticket locks, an inline implementation
of trylock/unlock in fsys.S was missed. This was not noticed because
in most circumstances it simply resulted in using the slow path because
the siglock was apparently not available (under old spinlock rules).
Problems occur when the ticket spinlock has value 0x0 (when first
initialised, or when it wraps around). At this point the fsys.S
code acquires the lock (changing the 0x0 to 0x1. If another process
attempts to get the lock at this point, it will change the value from
0x1 to 0x2 (using new ticket lock rules). Then the fsys.S code will
free the lock using old spinlock rules by writing 0x0 to it. From
here a variety of bad things can happen.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 1d3e09a304e6c4e004ca06356578b171e8735d3c upstream.
Commit 7f74f8f28a2bd9db9404f7d364e2097a0c42cc12
(x86 quirk: Fix polarity for IRQ0 pin2 override on SB800
systems) introduced a regression. It removed some SB600 specific
code to determine the revision ID without adapting a
corresponding revision ID check for SB600.
See this mail thread:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=129980296006380&w=2
This patch adapts the corresponding check to cover all SB600
revisions.
Tested-by: Wang Lei <f3d27b@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Herrmann <andreas.herrmann3@amd.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
LKML-Reference: <20110315143137.GD29499@alberich.amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 9a6d44b9adb777ca9549e88cd55bd8f2673c52a2 upstream.
Emit warning when "mem=nopentium" is specified on any arch other
than x86_32 (the only that arch supports it).
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/553464
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
LKML-Reference: <1296783486-23033-2-git-send-email-kamal@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 77eed821accf5dd962b1f13bed0680e217e49112 upstream.
Avoid removing all of memory and panicing when "mem={invalid}"
is specified, e.g. mem=blahblah, mem=0, or mem=nopentium (on
platforms other than x86_32).
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/553464
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
LKML-Reference: <1296783486-23033-1-git-send-email-kamal@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit f86268549f424f83b9eb0963989270e14fbfc3de upstream.
mm_fault_error() should not execute oom-killer, if page fault
occurs in kernel space. E.g. in copy_from_user()/copy_to_user().
This would happen if we find ourselves in OOM on a
copy_to_user(), or a copy_from_user() which faults.
Without this patch, the kernels hangs up in copy_from_user(),
because OOM killer sends SIG_KILL to current process, but it
can't handle a signal while in syscall, then the kernel returns
to copy_from_user(), reexcute current command and provokes
page_fault again.
With this patch the kernel return -EFAULT from copy_from_user().
The code, which checks that page fault occurred in kernel space,
has been copied from do_sigbus().
This situation is handled by the same way on powerpc, xtensa,
tile, ...
Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
LKML-Reference: <201103092322.p29NMNPH001682@imap1.linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit bf3a1eb85967dcbaae42f4fcb53c2392cec32677 upstream.
When au1000_eth probes the MII bus for PHY address, if we do not set
au1000_eth platform data's phy_search_highest_address, the MII probing
logic will exit early and will assume a valid PHY is found at address 0.
For MTX-1, the PHY is at address 31, and without this patch, the link
detection/speed/duplex would not work correctly.
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <florian@openwrt.org>
To: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/2111/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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Commit: e8e5c2155b0035b6e04f29be67f6444bc914005b upstream
When CPU hotplug is used, some CPUs may be offline at the time a kexec is
performed. The subsequent kernel may expect these CPUs to be already running,
and will declare them stuck. On pseries, there's also a soft-offline (cede)
state that CPUs may be in; this can also cause problems as the kexeced kernel
may ask RTAS if they're online -- and RTAS would say they are. The CPU will
either appear stuck, or will cause a crash as we replace its cede loop beneath
it.
This patch kicks each present offline CPU awake before the kexec, so that
none are forever lost to these assumptions in the subsequent kernel.
Now, the behaviour is that all available CPUs that were offlined are now
online & usable after the kexec. This mimics the behaviour of a full reboot
(on which all CPUs will be restarted).
Signed-off-by: Matt Evans <matt@ozlabs.org>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamalesh babulal <kamalesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 426b6cb478e60352a463a0d1ec75c1c9fab30b13 upstream.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <muvarov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamalesh babulal <kamalesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit d504bed676caad29a3dba3d3727298c560628f5c upstream.
Currently for kexec the PTE tear down on 1TB segment systems normally
requires 3 hcalls for each PTE removal. On a machine with 32GB of
memory it can take around a minute to remove all the PTEs.
This optimises the path so that we only remove PTEs that are valid.
It also uses the read 4 PTEs at once HCALL. For the common case where
a PTEs is invalid in a 1TB segment, this turns the 3 HCALLs per PTE
down to 1 HCALL per 4 PTEs.
This gives an > 10x speedup in kexec times on PHYP, taking a 32GB
machine from around 1 minute down to a few seconds.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamalesh babulal <kamalesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit f90ece28c1f5b3ec13fe481406857fe92f4bc7d1 upstream.
This adds plpar_pte_read_4_raw() which can be used read 4 PTEs from
PHYP at a time, while in real mode.
It also creates a new hcall9 which can be used in real mode. It's the
same as plpar_hcall9 but minus the tracing hcall statistics which may
require variables outside the RMO.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamalesh babulal <kamalesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 5d7a87217de48b234b3c8ff8a73059947d822e07 upstream.
I saw this in a kdump kernel:
IOMMU table initialized, virtual merging enabled
Interrupt 155954 (real) is invalid, disabling it.
Interrupt 155953 (real) is invalid, disabling it.
ie we took some spurious interrupts. default_machine_crash_shutdown tries
to disable all interrupt sources but uses chip->disable which maps to
the default action of:
static void default_disable(unsigned int irq)
{
}
If we use chip->shutdown, then we actually mask the IRQ:
static void default_shutdown(unsigned int irq)
{
struct irq_desc *desc = irq_to_desc(irq);
desc->chip->mask(irq);
desc->status |= IRQ_MASKED;
}
Not sure why we don't implement a ->disable action for xics.c, or why
default_disable doesn't mask the interrupt.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamalesh babulal <kamalesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 0644079410065567e3bb31fcb8e6441f2b7685a9 upstream.
We wrap the crash_shutdown_handles[] calls with longjmp/setjmp, so if any
of them fault we can recover. The problem is we add a hook to the debugger
fault handler hook which calls longjmp unconditionally.
This first part of kdump is run before we marshall the other CPUs, so there
is a very good chance some CPU on the box is going to page fault. And when
it does it hits the longjmp code and assumes the context of the oopsing CPU.
The machine gets very confused when it has 10 CPUs all with the same stack,
all thinking they have the same CPU id. I get even more confused trying
to debug it.
The patch below adds crash_shutdown_cpu and uses it to specify which cpu is
in the protected region. Since it can only be -1 or the oopsing CPU, we don't
need to use memory barriers since it is only valid on the local CPU - no other
CPU will ever see a value that matches it's local CPU id.
Eventually we should switch the order and marshall all CPUs before doing the
crash_shutdown_handles[] calls, but that is a bigger fix.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Kamalesh babulal <kamalesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 095c7965f4dc870ed2b65143b1e2610de653416c upstream.
Author: Milton Miller <miltonm@bga.com>
On large machines we are running out of room below 256MB. In some cases we
only need to ensure the allocation is in the first segment, which may be
256MB or 1TB.
Add slb0_limit and use it to specify the upper limit for the irqstack and
emergency stacks.
On a large ppc64 box, this fixes a panic at boot when the crashkernel=
option is specified (previously we would run out of memory below 256MB).
Signed-off-by: Milton Miller <miltonm@bga.com>
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Kamalesh Babulal <kamalesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 299c56966a72b9109d47c71a6db52097098703dd upstream.
A customer of ours, complained that when setting the reset
vector back to 0, it trashed other data and hung their box.
They noticed when only 4 bytes were set to 0 instead of 8,
everything worked correctly.
Mathew pointed out:
|
| We're supposed to be resetting trampoline_phys_low and
| trampoline_phys_high here, which are two 16-bit values.
| Writing 64 bits is definitely going to overwrite space
| that we're not supposed to be touching.
|
So limit the area modified to u32.
Signed-off-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
LKML-Reference: <1297139100-424-1-git-send-email-dzickus@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 7f74f8f28a2bd9db9404f7d364e2097a0c42cc12 upstream.
On some SB800 systems polarity for IOAPIC pin2 is wrongly
specified as low active by BIOS. This caused system hangs after
resume from S3 when HPET was used in one-shot mode on such
systems because a timer interrupt was missed (HPET signal is
high active).
For more details see:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=129623757413868
Tested-by: Manoj Iyer <manoj.iyer@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Herrmann <andreas.herrmann3@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com>
LKML-Reference: <20110224145346.GD3658@alberich.amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 53399053eb505cf541b2405bd9d9bca5ecfb96fb upstream.
Ensure a predictable endian state when entering signal handlers. This
avoids programs which use SETEND to momentarily switch their endian
state from having their signal handlers entered with an unpredictable
endian state.
Acked-by: Dave Martin <dave.martin@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 261cd298a8c363d7985e3482946edb4bfedacf98 upstream.
task_show_regs used to be a debugging aid in the early bringup days
of Linux on s390. /proc/<pid>/status is a world readable file, it
is not a good idea to show the registers of a process. The only
correct fix is to remove task_show_regs.
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit e7a3481c0246c8e45e79c629efd63b168e91fcda upstream.
If the guest domain has been suspend/resumed or migrated, then the
system clock backing the pvclock clocksource may revert to a smaller
value (ie, can be non-monotonic across the migration/save-restore).
Make sure we zero last_value in that case so that the domain
continues to see clock updates.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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switching mm
commit 831d52bc153971b70e64eccfbed2b232394f22f8 upstream.
Clearing the cpu in prev's mm_cpumask early will avoid the flush tlb
IPI's while the cr3 is still pointing to the prev mm. And this window
can lead to the possibility of bogus TLB fills resulting in strange
failures. One such problematic scenario is mentioned below.
T1. CPU-1 is context switching from mm1 to mm2 context and got a NMI
etc between the point of clearing the cpu from the mm_cpumask(mm1)
and before reloading the cr3 with the new mm2.
T2. CPU-2 is tearing down a specific vma for mm1 and will proceed with
flushing the TLB for mm1. It doesn't send the flush TLB to CPU-1
as it doesn't see that cpu listed in the mm_cpumask(mm1).
T3. After the TLB flush is complete, CPU-2 goes ahead and frees the
page-table pages associated with the removed vma mapping.
T4. CPU-2 now allocates those freed page-table pages for something
else.
T5. As the CR3 and TLB caches for mm1 is still active on CPU-1, CPU-1
can potentially speculate and walk through the page-table caches
and can insert new TLB entries. As the page-table pages are
already freed and being used on CPU-2, this page walk can
potentially insert a bogus global TLB entry depending on the
(random) contents of the page that is being used on CPU-2.
T6. This bogus TLB entry being global will be active across future CR3
changes and can result in weird memory corruption etc.
To avoid this issue, for the prev mm that is handing over the cpu to
another mm, clear the cpu from the mm_cpumask(prev) after the cr3 is
changed.
Marking it for -stable, though we haven't seen any reported failure that
can be attributed to this.
Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 1f1936ff3febf38d582177ea319eaa278f32c91f upstream.
Some of those functions try to adjust the CPU features, for example
to remove NAP support on some revisions. However, they seem to use
r5 as an index into the CPU table entry, which might have been right
a long time ago but no longer is. r4 is the right register to use.
This probably caused some off behaviours on some PowerMac variants
using 750cx or 7455 processor revisions.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 57cdfdf829a850a317425ed93c6a576c9ee6329c upstream.
Spinlocks on shared processor partitions use H_YIELD to notify the
hypervisor we are waiting on another virtual CPU. Unfortunately this means
the hcall tracepoints can recurse.
The patch below adds a percpu depth and checks it on both the entry and
exit hcall tracepoints.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit f7448548a9f32db38f243ccd4271617758ddfe2c upstream.
Markus Kohn ran into a hard hang regression on an acer aspire
1310, when acpi is enabled. git bisect showed the following
commit as the bad one that introduced the boot regression.
commit d0af9eed5aa91b6b7b5049cae69e5ea956fd85c3
Author: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Date: Wed Aug 19 18:05:36 2009 -0700
x86, pat/mtrr: Rendezvous all the cpus for MTRR/PAT init
Because of the UP configuration of that platform,
native_smp_prepare_cpus() bailed out (in smp_sanity_check())
before doing the set_mtrr_aps_delayed_init()
Further down the boot path, native_smp_cpus_done() will call the
delayed MTRR initialization for the AP's (mtrr_aps_init()) with
mtrr_aps_delayed_init not set. This resulted in the boot
processor reprogramming its MTRR's to the values seen during the
start of the OS boot. While this is not needed ideally, this
shouldn't have caused any side-effects. This is because the
reprogramming of MTRR's (set_mtrr_state() that gets called via
set_mtrr()) will check if the live register contents are
different from what is being asked to write and will do the actual
write only if they are different.
BP's mtrr state is read during the start of the OS boot and
typically nothing would have changed when we ask to reprogram it
on BP again because of the above scenario on an UP platform. So
on a normal UP platform no reprogramming of BP MTRR MSR's
happens and all is well.
However, on this platform, bios seems to be modifying the fixed
mtrr range registers between the start of OS boot and when we
double check the live registers for reprogramming BP MTRR
registers. And as the live registers are modified, we end up
reprogramming the MTRR's to the state seen during the start of
the OS boot.
During ACPI initialization, something in the bios (probably smi
handler?) don't like this fact and results in a hard lockup.
We didn't see this boot hang issue on this platform before the
commit d0af9eed5aa91b6b7b5049cae69e5ea956fd85c3, because only
the AP's (if any) will program its MTRR's to the value that BP
had at the start of the OS boot.
Fix this issue by checking mtrr_aps_delayed_init before
continuing further in the mtrr_aps_init(). Now, only AP's (if
any) will program its MTRR's to the BP values during boot.
Addresses https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=623393
[ By the way, this behavior of the bios modifying MTRR's after the start
of the OS boot is not common and the kernel is not prepared to
handle this situation well. Irrespective of this issue, during
suspend/resume, linux kernel will try to reprogram the BP's MTRR values
to the values seen during the start of the OS boot. So suspend/resume might
be already broken on this platform for all linux kernel versions. ]
Reported-and-bisected-by: Markus Kohn <jabber@gmx.org>
Tested-by: Markus Kohn <jabber@gmx.org>
Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Renninger <trenn@novell.com>
Cc: Rafael Wysocki <rjw@novell.com>
Cc: Venkatesh Pallipadi <venki@google.com>
LKML-Reference: <1296694975.4418.402.camel@sbsiddha-MOBL3.sc.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 12a4dc43911785f51a596f771ae0701b18d436f1 upstream.
In fsl_rio_dbell_handler() the code currently simply acknowledges the QFI
queue full interrupt, but does nothing to resolve the queue full
condition. Instead, it jumps to the end of the isr. When a queue full
condition occurs, the isr is then re-entered immediately and continually,
forever.
The fix is to just fall through and read out current doorbell entries.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Taranowski <tom@baringforge.com>
Cc: Alexandre Bounine <alexandre.bounine@idt.com>
Cc: Kumar Gala <galak@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Matt Porter <mporter@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Li Yang <leoli@freescale.com>
Cc: Thomas Moll <thomas.moll@sysgo.com>
Cc: Micha Nelissen <micha@neli.hopto.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Grant Likely <grant.likely@secretlab.ca>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 13c6680acb3df25722858566b42759215ea5d2e0 upstream.
The glibc vdso code for s390 uses the version string 2.6.29, the
kernel uses the version string 2.6.26. No wonder the vdso code
is never used. The first kernel version to contain the vdso code
is 2.6.29 which makes this the correct version.
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: maximilian attems <max@stro.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 086e8ced65d9bcc4a8e8f1cd39b09640f2883f90 upstream.
In x2apic mode, we need to set the upper address register of the fault
handling interrupt register of the vt-d hardware. Without this
irq migration of the vt-d fault handling interrupt is broken.
Signed-off-by: Kenji Kaneshige <kaneshige.kenji@jp.fujitsu.com>
LKML-Reference: <1291225233.2648.39.camel@sbsiddha-MOBL3>
Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Tested-by: Takao Indoh <indou.takao@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 7f7fbf45c6b748074546f7f16b9488ca71de99c1 upstream.
Interrupt-remapping gets enabled very early in the boot, as it determines the
apic mode that the processor can use. And the current code enables the vt-d
fault handling before the setup_local_APIC(). And hence the APIC LDR registers
and data structure in the memory may not be initialized. So the vt-d fault
handling in logical xapic/x2apic modes were broken.
Fix this by enabling the vt-d fault handling in the end_local_APIC_setup()
A cleaner fix of enabling fault handling while enabling intr-remapping
will be addressed for v2.6.38. [ Enabling intr-remapping determines the
usage of x2apic mode and the apic mode determines the fault-handling
configuration. ]
Signed-off-by: Kenji Kaneshige <kaneshige.kenji@jp.fujitsu.com>
LKML-Reference: <20101201062244.541996375@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit de2a8cf98ecdde25231d6c5e7901e2cffaf32af9 upstream.
The vdso Makefile passes linker-style -m options not to the linker but
to gcc. This happens to work with earlier gcc, but fails with gcc
4.6. Pass gcc-style -m options, instead.
Note: all currently supported versions of gcc supports -m32, so there
is no reason to conditionalize it any more.
Reported-by: H. J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
LKML-Reference: <tip-*@git.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[The mainline kernel doesn't have this problem. Commit "(23588c3) x86,
amd: Add support for CPUID topology extension of AMD CPUs" removed the
family check. But 2.6.32.y needs to be fixed.]
This CPU family check is not required -- existence of the NodeId MSR
is indicated by a CPUID feature flag which is already checked in
amd_fixup_dcm() -- and it needlessly prevents amd_fixup_dcm() to be
called for newer AMD CPUs.
In worst case this can lead to a panic in the scheduler code for AMD
family 0x15 multi-node AMD CPUs. I just have a picture of VGA console
output so I can't copy-and-paste it herein, but the call stack of such
a panic looked like:
do_divide_error
...
find_busiest_group
run_rebalance_domains
...
apic_timer_interrupt
...
cpu_idle
The mainline kernel doesn't have this problem. Commit "(23588c3) x86,
amd: Add support for CPUID topology extension of AMD CPUs" removed the
family check. But 2.6.32.y needs to be fixed.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Herrmann <andreas.herrmann3@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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upstream ea53069231f9317062910d6e772cca4ce93de8c8
x86, hotplug: Use mwait to offline a processor, fix the legacy case
Here included also some small follow-on patches to the same code:
upstream a68e5c94f7d3dd64fef34dd5d97e365cae4bb42a
x86, hotplug: Move WBINVD back outside the play_dead loop
upstream ce5f68246bf2385d6174856708d0b746dc378f20
x86, hotplug: In the MWAIT case of play_dead, CLFLUSH the cache line
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=5471
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 398812159e328478ae49b4bd01f0d71efea96c39 upstream.
This fixes the same problem as described in the patch "nohz: fix
printk_needs_cpu() return value on offline cpus" for the arch_needs_cpu()
primitive:
arch_needs_cpu() may return 1 if called on offline cpus. When a cpu gets
offlined it schedules the idle process which, before killing its own cpu,
will call tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick().
That function in turn will call arch_needs_cpu() in order to check if the
local tick can be disabled. On offline cpus this function should naturally
return 0 since regardless if the tick gets disabled or not the cpu will be
dead short after. That is besides the fact that __cpu_disable() should already
have made sure that no interrupts on the offlined cpu will be delivered anyway.
In this case it prevents tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick() to call
select_nohz_load_balancer(). No idea if that really is a problem. However what
made me debug this is that on 2.6.32 the function get_nohz_load_balancer() is
used within __mod_timer() to select a cpu on which a timer gets enqueued.
If arch_needs_cpu() returns 1 then the nohz_load_balancer cpu doesn't get
updated when a cpu gets offlined. It may contain the cpu number of an offline
cpu. In turn timers get enqueued on an offline cpu and not very surprisingly
they never expire and cause system hangs.
This has been observed 2.6.32 kernels. On current kernels __mod_timer() uses
get_nohz_timer_target() which doesn't have that problem. However there might
be other problems because of the too early exit tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick()
in case a cpu goes offline.
This specific bug was indrocuded with 3c5d92a0 "nohz: Introduce
arch_needs_cpu".
In this case a cpu hotplug notifier is used to fix the issue in order to keep
the normal/fast path small. All we need to do is to clear the condition that
makes arch_needs_cpu() return 1 since it is just a performance improvement
which is supposed to keep the local tick running for a short period if a cpu
goes idle. Nothing special needs to be done except for clearing the condition.
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit c41d68a513c71e35a14f66d71782d27a79a81ea6 upstream.
compat_alloc_user_space() expects the caller to independently call
access_ok() to verify the returned area. A missing call could
introduce problems on some architectures.
This patch incorporates the access_ok() check into
compat_alloc_user_space() and also adds a sanity check on the length.
The existing compat_alloc_user_space() implementations are renamed
arch_compat_alloc_user_space() and are used as part of the
implementation of the new global function.
This patch assumes NULL will cause __get_user()/__put_user() to either
fail or access userspace on all architectures. This should be
followed by checking the return value of compat_access_user_space()
for NULL in the callers, at which time the access_ok() in the callers
can also be removed.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@sota.gen.nz>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Acked-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@parisc-linux.org>
Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit eefdca043e8391dcd719711716492063030b55ac upstream.
In commit d4d6715, we reopened an old hole for a 64-bit ptracer touching a
32-bit tracee in system call entry. A %rax value set via ptrace at the
entry tracing stop gets used whole as a 32-bit syscall number, while we
only check the low 32 bits for validity.
Fix it by truncating %rax back to 32 bits after syscall_trace_enter,
in addition to testing the full 64 bits as has already been added.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@sota.gen.nz>
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 36d001c70d8a0144ac1d038f6876c484849a74de upstream.
On 64 bits, we always, by necessity, jump through the system call
table via %rax. For 32-bit system calls, in theory the system call
number is stored in %eax, and the code was testing %eax for a valid
system call number. At one point we loaded the stored value back from
the stack to enforce zero-extension, but that was removed in checkin
d4d67150165df8bf1cc05e532f6efca96f907cab. An actual 32-bit process
will not be able to introduce a non-zero-extended number, but it can
happen via ptrace.
Instead of re-introducing the zero-extension, test what we are
actually going to use, i.e. %rax. This only adds a handful of REX
prefixes to the code.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@sota.gen.nz>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 0e91ec0c06d2cd15071a6021c94840a50e6671aa upstream.
The find_next_bit, find_first_bit, find_next_zero_bit
and find_first_zero_bit functions were not properly
clamping to the maxbit argument at the bit level. They
were instead only checking maxbit at the byte level.
To fix this, add a compare and a conditional move
instruction to the end of the common bit-within-the-
byte code used by all the functions and be sure not to
clobber the maxbit argument before it is used.
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Stephen Warren <swarren@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: James Jones <jajones@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 1142b71d85894dcff1466dd6c871ea3c89e0352c upstream.
Commit 8b592783 added a Thumb-2 variant of usracc which, when it is
called with \rept=2, calls usraccoff once with an offset of 0 and
secondly with a hard-coded offset of 4 in order to avoid incrementing
the pointer again. If \inc != 4 then we will store the data to the wrong
offset from \ptr. Luckily, the only caller that passes \rept=2 to this
function is __clear_user so we haven't been actively corrupting user data.
This patch fixes usracc to pass \inc instead of #4 to usraccoff
when it is called a second time.
Reported-by: Tony Thompson <tony.thompson@arm.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 6c0aca288e726405b01dacb12cac556454d34b2a upstream.
When a single step exception fires, the trap bits, used to
signal hardware breakpoints, are in a random state.
These trap bits might be set if another exception will follow,
like a breakpoint in the next instruction, or a watchpoint in the
previous one. Or there can be any junk there.
So if we handle these trap bits during the single step exception,
we are going to handle an exception twice, or we are going to
handle junk.
Just ignore them in this case.
This fixes https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=21332
Reported-by: Michael Stefaniuc <mstefani@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Cc: Maciej Rutecki <maciej.rutecki@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexandre Julliard <julliard@winehq.org>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit dab5fff14df2cd16eb1ad4c02e83915e1063fece upstream.
We didn't free per_cpu(acfreq_data, cpu)->freq_table
when acpi_freq driver is unloaded.
Resulting in the following messages in /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak:
unreferenced object 0xf6450e80 (size 64):
comm "modprobe", pid 1066, jiffies 4294677317 (age 19290.453s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 e8 a2 24 00 01 00 00 00 00 9f 24 00 ......$.......$.
02 00 00 00 00 6a 18 00 03 00 00 00 00 35 0c 00 .....j.......5..
backtrace:
[<c123ba97>] kmemleak_alloc+0x27/0x50
[<c109f96f>] __kmalloc+0xcf/0x110
[<f9da97ee>] acpi_cpufreq_cpu_init+0x1ee/0x4e4 [acpi_cpufreq]
[<c11cd8d2>] cpufreq_add_dev+0x142/0x3a0
[<c11920b7>] sysdev_driver_register+0x97/0x110
[<c11cce56>] cpufreq_register_driver+0x86/0x140
[<f9dad080>] 0xf9dad080
[<c1001130>] do_one_initcall+0x30/0x160
[<c10626e9>] sys_init_module+0x99/0x1e0
[<c1002d97>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x26
[<ffffffff>] 0xffffffff
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15807#c21
Tested-by: Toralf Forster <toralf.foerster@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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