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commit 57b9655d01ef057a523e810d29c37ac09b80eead upstream.
When a partition table length is corrupted to be close to 1 << 32, the
check for its length may overflow on 32-bit systems and we will think
the length is valid. Later on the kernel can crash trying to read beyond
end of buffer. Fix the check to avoid possible overflow.
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit adee11b2085bee90bd8f4f52123ffb07882d6256 upstream.
Check provided length of partition table so that (possibly maliciously)
corrupted partition table cannot cause accessing data beyond current buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
[PG: in 2.6.34 udf_err() is called udf_error()]
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 1df2ae31c724e57be9d7ac00d78db8a5dabdd050 upstream.
Add sanity checks when loading sparing table from disk to avoid accessing
unallocated memory or writing to it.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
[PG: in 2.6.34 udf_err() is called udf_error()]
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit ea51d132dbf9b00063169c1159bee253d9649224 upstream.
If the pte mapping in generic_perform_write() is unmapped between
iov_iter_fault_in_readable() and iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic(), the
"copied" parameter to ->end_write can be zero. ext4 couldn't cope with
it with delayed allocations enabled. This skips the i_disksize
enlargement logic if copied is zero and no new data was appeneded to
the inode.
gdb> bt
#0 0xffffffff811afe80 in ext4_da_should_update_i_disksize (file=0xffff88003f606a80, mapping=0xffff88001d3824e0, pos=0x1\
08000, len=0x1000, copied=0x0, page=0xffffea0000d792e8, fsdata=0x0) at fs/ext4/inode.c:2467
#1 ext4_da_write_end (file=0xffff88003f606a80, mapping=0xffff88001d3824e0, pos=0x108000, len=0x1000, copied=0x0, page=0\
xffffea0000d792e8, fsdata=0x0) at fs/ext4/inode.c:2512
#2 0xffffffff810d97f1 in generic_perform_write (iocb=<value optimized out>, iov=<value optimized out>, nr_segs=<value o\
ptimized out>, pos=0x108000, ppos=0xffff88001e26be40, count=<value optimized out>, written=0x0) at mm/filemap.c:2440
#3 generic_file_buffered_write (iocb=<value optimized out>, iov=<value optimized out>, nr_segs=<value optimized out>, p\
os=0x108000, ppos=0xffff88001e26be40, count=<value optimized out>, written=0x0) at mm/filemap.c:2482
#4 0xffffffff810db5d1 in __generic_file_aio_write (iocb=0xffff88001e26bde8, iov=0xffff88001e26bec8, nr_segs=0x1, ppos=0\
xffff88001e26be40) at mm/filemap.c:2600
#5 0xffffffff810db853 in generic_file_aio_write (iocb=0xffff88001e26bde8, iov=0xffff88001e26bec8, nr_segs=<value optimi\
zed out>, pos=<value optimized out>) at mm/filemap.c:2632
#6 0xffffffff811a71aa in ext4_file_write (iocb=0xffff88001e26bde8, iov=0xffff88001e26bec8, nr_segs=0x1, pos=0x108000) a\
t fs/ext4/file.c:136
#7 0xffffffff811375aa in do_sync_write (filp=0xffff88003f606a80, buf=<value optimized out>, len=<value optimized out>, \
ppos=0xffff88001e26bf48) at fs/read_write.c:406
#8 0xffffffff81137e56 in vfs_write (file=0xffff88003f606a80, buf=0x1ec2960 <Address 0x1ec2960 out of bounds>, count=0x4\
000, pos=0xffff88001e26bf48) at fs/read_write.c:435
#9 0xffffffff8113816c in sys_write (fd=<value optimized out>, buf=0x1ec2960 <Address 0x1ec2960 out of bounds>, count=0x\
4000) at fs/read_write.c:487
#10 <signal handler called>
#11 0x00007f120077a390 in __brk_reservation_fn_dmi_alloc__ ()
#12 0x0000000000000000 in ?? ()
gdb> print offset
$22 = 0xffffffffffffffff
gdb> print idx
$23 = 0xffffffff
gdb> print inode->i_blkbits
$24 = 0xc
gdb> up
#1 ext4_da_write_end (file=0xffff88003f606a80, mapping=0xffff88001d3824e0, pos=0x108000, len=0x1000, copied=0x0, page=0\
xffffea0000d792e8, fsdata=0x0) at fs/ext4/inode.c:2512
2512 if (ext4_da_should_update_i_disksize(page, end)) {
gdb> print start
$25 = 0x0
gdb> print end
$26 = 0xffffffffffffffff
gdb> print pos
$27 = 0x108000
gdb> print new_i_size
$28 = 0x108000
gdb> print ((struct ext4_inode_info *)((char *)inode-((int)(&((struct ext4_inode_info *)0)->vfs_inode))))->i_disksize
$29 = 0xd9000
gdb> down
2467 for (i = 0; i < idx; i++)
gdb> print i
$30 = 0xd44acbee
This is 100% reproducible with some autonuma development code tuned in
a very aggressive manner (not normal way even for knumad) which does
"exotic" changes to the ptes. It wouldn't normally trigger but I don't
see why it can't happen normally if the page is added to swap cache in
between the two faults leading to "copied" being zero (which then
hangs in ext4). So it should be fixed. Especially possible with lumpy
reclaim (albeit disabled if compaction is enabled) as that would
ignore the young bits in the ptes.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 434a964daa14b9db083ce20404a4a2add54d037a upstream.
Clement Lecigne reports a filesystem which causes a kernel oops in
hfs_find_init() trying to dereference sb->ext_tree which is NULL.
This proves to be because the filesystem has a corrupted MDB extent
record, where the extents file does not fit into the first three extents
in the file record (the first blocks).
In hfs_get_block() when looking up the blocks for the extent file
(HFS_EXT_CNID), it fails the first blocks special case, and falls
through to the extent code (which ultimately calls hfs_find_init())
which is in the process of being initialised.
Hfs avoids this scenario by always having the extents b-tree fitting
into the first blocks (the extents B-tree can't have overflow extents).
The fix is to check at mount time that the B-tree fits into first
blocks, i.e. fail if HFS_I(inode)->alloc_blocks >=
HFS_I(inode)->first_blocks
Note, the existing commit 47f365eb57573 ("hfs: fix oops on mount with
corrupted btree extent records") becomes subsumed into this as a special
case, but only for the extents B-tree (HFS_EXT_CNID), it is perfectly
acceptable for the catalog B-Tree file to grow beyond three extents,
with the remaining extent descriptors in the extents overfow.
This fixes CVE-2011-2203
Reported-by: Clement LECIGNE <clement.lecigne@netasq.com>
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <plougher@redhat.com>
Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 8762202dd0d6e46854f786bdb6fb3780a1625efe upstream.
I hit a J_ASSERT(blocknr != 0) failure in cleanup_journal_tail() when
mounting a fsfuzzed ext3 image. It turns out that the corrupted ext3
image has s_first = 0 in journal superblock, and the 0 is passed to
journal->j_head in journal_reset(), then to blocknr in
cleanup_journal_tail(), in the end the J_ASSERT failed.
So validate s_first after reading journal superblock from disk in
journal_get_superblock() to ensure s_first is valid.
The following script could reproduce it:
fstype=ext3
blocksize=1024
img=$fstype.img
offset=0
found=0
magic="c0 3b 39 98"
dd if=/dev/zero of=$img bs=1M count=8
mkfs -t $fstype -b $blocksize -F $img
filesize=`stat -c %s $img`
while [ $offset -lt $filesize ]
do
if od -j $offset -N 4 -t x1 $img | grep -i "$magic";then
echo "Found journal: $offset"
found=1
break
fi
offset=`echo "$offset+$blocksize" | bc`
done
if [ $found -ne 1 ];then
echo "Magic \"$magic\" not found"
exit 1
fi
dd if=/dev/zero of=$img seek=$(($offset+23)) conv=notrunc bs=1 count=1
mkdir -p ./mnt
mount -o loop $img ./mnt
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 0f751e641a71157aa584c2a2e22fda52b52b8a56 upstream.
From mhalcrow's original commit message:
Characters with ASCII values greater than the size of
filename_rev_map[] are valid filename characters.
ecryptfs_decode_from_filename() will access kernel memory beyond
that array, and ecryptfs_parse_tag_70_packet() will then decrypt
those characters. The attacker, using the FNEK of the crafted file,
can then re-encrypt the characters to reveal the kernel memory past
the end of the filename_rev_map[] array. I expect low security
impact since this array is statically allocated in the text area,
and the amount of memory past the array that is accessible is
limited by the largest possible ASCII filename character.
This patch solves the issue reported by mhalcrow but with an
implementation suggested by Linus to simply extend the length of
filename_rev_map[] to 256. Characters greater than 0x7A are mapped to
0x00, which is how invalid characters less than 0x7A were previously
being handled.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 093019cf1b18dd31b2c3b77acce4e000e2cbc9ce upstream.
Commit fa8b18ed didn't prevent the integer overflow and possible
memory corruption. "count" can go negative and bypass the check.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
[PG: in 2.6.34, xfs still had "linux-2.6" as a path component.]
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit fa8b18edd752a8b4e9d1ee2cd615b82c93cf8bba upstream.
This prevents in-memory corruption and possible panics if the on-disk
ACL is badly corrupted.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
[PG: in 2.6.34, xfs still had "linux-2.6" as a path component.]
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit a2ae4cc9a16e211c8a128ba10d22a85431f093ab upstream.
If inotify_init is unable to allocate a new file for the new inotify
group we leak the new group. This patch drops the reference on the
group on file allocation failure.
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 4708ad6374f07cdfb379c5d4100125e2cfd339d9 in v2.6.32.x stable
The stable release 2.6.32.32 added the upstream commit
12fed00de963433128b5366a21a55808fab2f756. However, one of the hunks of
the original patch seems missing from the stable backport which can be
found here:
http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.stable/5676
This hunk corresponds to the change in is_valid_oplock_break() at
fs/cifs/misc.c.
This patch backports the missing hunk and is against
linux-2.6.32.y stable kernel.
Cc: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: Suresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
[PG: I incorrectly dropped the same hunk in v2.6.34.9-152-g0c55f20
since the code in question was relocated/rewritten in e66673e39a ]
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit bc5b8a9003132ae44559edd63a1623b7b99dfb68 upstream.
On a corrupted file system the ->len field could be wrong leading to
a buffer overflow.
Reported-and-acked-by: Clement LECIGNE <clement.lecigne@netasq.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 1cd9f0976aa4606db8d6e3dc3edd0aca8019372a upstream.
This doesn't make much sense, and it exposes a bug in the kernel where
attempts to create a new file in an append-only directory using
O_CREAT will fail (but still leave a zero-length file). This was
discovered when xfstests #79 was generalized so it could run on all
file systems.
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 0b760113a3a155269a3fba93a409c640031dd68f upstream.
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
[PG: struct rpc_task in sched.h slightly different layout vs. v3.0]
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit a9712bc12c40c172e393f85a9b2ba8db4bf59509 upstream.
All of those are rw-r--r-- and all are broken for suid - if you open
a file before the target does suid-root exec, you'll be still able
to access it. For personality it's not a big deal, but for syscall
and stack it's a real problem.
Fix: check that task is tracable for you at the time of read().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
[PG: in .34 cred_guard_mutex is in task, not task->signal]
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit c30e92df30d7d5fe65262fbce5d1b7de675fe34e upstream.
We don't use WANT bits yet--and sending them can probably trigger a
BUG() further down.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 832023bffb4b493f230be901f681020caf3ed1f8 upstream.
Fan Yong <yong.fan@whamcloud.com> noticed setting
FMODE_32bithash wouldn't work with nfsd v4, as
nfsd4_readdir() checks for 32 bit cookies. However, according to RFC 3530
cookies have a 64 bit type and cookies are also defined as u64 in
'struct nfsd4_readdir'. So remove the test for >32-bit values.
Signed-off-by: Bernd Schubert <bernd.schubert@itwm.fraunhofer.de>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit d8805e633e054c816c47cb6e727c81f156d9253d upstream.
epoll can acquire recursively acquire ep->mtx on multiple "struct
eventpoll"s at once in the case where one epoll fd is monitoring another
epoll fd. This is perfectly OK, since we're careful about the lock
ordering, but it causes spurious lockdep warnings. Annotate the recursion
using mutex_lock_nested, and add a comment explaining the nesting rules
for good measure.
Recent versions of systemd are triggering this, and it can also be
demonstrated with the following trivial test program:
--------------------8<--------------------
int main(void) {
int e1, e2;
struct epoll_event evt = {
.events = EPOLLIN
};
e1 = epoll_create1(0);
e2 = epoll_create1(0);
epoll_ctl(e1, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, e2, &evt);
return 0;
}
--------------------8<--------------------
Reported-by: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl>
Tested-by: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl>
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@nelhage.com>
Acked-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 0ec4f431eb56d633da3a55da67d5c4b88886ccc7 upstream.
The only checks of the long argument passed to fcntl(fd,F_SETLEASE,.)
are done after converting the long to an int. Thus some illegal values
may be let through and cause problems in later code.
[ They actually *don't* cause problems in mainline, as of Dave Jones's
commit 8d657eb3b438 "Remove easily user-triggerable BUG from
generic_setlease", but we should fix this anyway. And this patch will
be necessary to fix real bugs on earlier kernels. ]
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 9b025eb3a89e041bab6698e3858706be2385d692 upstream.
Commit b52a360b forgot to call xfs_iunlock() when it detected corrupted
symplink and bailed out. Fix it by jumping to 'out' instead of doing return.
CC: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit b52a360b2aa1c59ba9970fb0f52bbb093fcc7a24 upstream.
Fixes a possible memory corruption when the link is larger than
MAXPATHLEN and XFS_DEBUG is not enabled. This also remove the
S_ISLNK assert, since the inode mode is checked previously in
xfs_readlink_by_handle() and via VFS.
Updated to address concerns raised by Ben Hutchings about the loose
attention paid to 32- vs 64-bit values, and the lack of handling a
potentially negative pathlen value:
- Changed type of "pathlen" to be xfs_fsize_t, to match that of
ip->i_d.di_size
- Added checking for a negative pathlen to the too-long pathlen
test, and generalized the message that gets reported in that case
to reflect the change
As a result, if a negative pathlen were encountered, this function
would return EFSCORRUPTED (and would fail an assertion for a debug
build)--just as would a too-long pathlen.
Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
[PG: no xfs_alert in 2.6.34; use xfs_fs_cmn_err(CE_ALERT, ...) instead]
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 6f24f892871acc47b40dd594c63606a17c714f77 upstream.
Commit ec81aecb2966 ("hfs: fix a potential buffer overflow") fixed a few
potential buffer overflows in the hfs filesystem. But as Timo Warns
pointed out, these changes also need to be made on the hfsplus
filesystem as well.
Reported-by: Timo Warns <warns@pre-sense.de>
Acked-by: WANG Cong <amwang@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@ispras.ru>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Cc: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eteo@redhat.com>
Cc: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Anderson <anderson@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 5bccda0ebc7c0331b81ac47d39e4b920b198b2cd upstream.
The cifs code will attempt to open files on lookup under certain
circumstances. What happens though if we find that the file we opened
was actually a FIFO or other special file?
Currently, the open filehandle just ends up being leaked leading to
a dentry refcount mismatch and oops on umount. Fix this by having the
code close the filehandle on the server if it turns out not to be a
regular file. While we're at it, change this spaghetti if statement
into a switch too.
Reported-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 9438fabb73eb48055b58b89fc51e0bc4db22fabd upstream.
The name_len variable in CIFSFindNext is a signed int that gets set to
the resume_name_len in the cifs_search_info. The resume_name_len however
is unsigned and for some infolevels is populated directly from a 32 bit
value sent by the server.
If the server sends a very large value for this, then that value could
look negative when converted to a signed int. That would make that
value pass the PATH_MAX check later in CIFSFindNext. The name_len would
then be used as a length value for a memcpy. It would then be treated
as unsigned again, and the memcpy scribbles over a ton of memory.
Fix this by making the name_len an unsigned value in CIFSFindNext.
Reported-by: Darren Lavender <dcl@hppine99.gbr.hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit d50f2ab6f050311dbf7b8f5501b25f0bf64a439b upstream.
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit c8e252586f8d5de906385d8cf6385fee289a825e upstream.
The regset common infrastructure assumed that regsets would always
have .get and .set methods, but not necessarily .active methods.
Unfortunately people have since written regsets without .set methods.
Rather than putting in stub functions everywhere, handle regsets with
null .get or .set methods explicitly.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 95f28604a65b1c40b6c6cd95e58439cd7ded3add upstream.
We don't have proper reference counting for this yet, so we run into
cases where the device is pulled and we OOPS on flushing the fs data.
This happens even though the dirty inodes have already been
migrated to the default_backing_dev_info.
Reported-by: Torsten Hilbrich <torsten.hilbrich@secunet.com>
Tested-by: Torsten Hilbrich <torsten.hilbrich@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jaxboe@fusionio.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit c2183d1e9b3f313dd8ba2b1b0197c8d9fb86a7ae upstream.
FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY didn't check the length of the write so the
message processing could overrun and result in a "kernel BUG at
fs/fuse/dev.c:629!"
Reported-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwenn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 1d1221f375c94ef961ba8574ac4f85c8870ddd51 upstream.
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 24e6cf92fde1f140d8eb0bf7cd24c2c78149b6b2 upstream.
It's possible for a cifsSesInfo struct to have a NULL password, so we
need to check for that prior to running strncmp on it.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit fc87a40677bbe0937e2ff0642c7e83c9a4813f3d upstream.
cifs_find_smb_ses assumes that the vol->password field is a valid
pointer, but that's only the case if a password was passed in via
the options string. It's possible that one won't be if there is
no mount helper on the box.
Reported-by: diabel <gacek-2004@wp.pl>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 4ff67b720c02c36e54d55b88c2931879b7db1cd2 upstream.
This patch replaces the earlier patch by the same name. The only
difference is that MAX_PASSWORD_SIZE has been increased to attempt to
match the limits that windows enforces.
Do a better job of matching sessions by authtype. Matching by username
for a Kerberos session is incorrect, and anonymous sessions need special
handling.
Also, in the case where we do match by username, we also need to match
by password. That ensures that someone else doesn't "borrow" an existing
session without needing to know the password.
Finally, passwords can be longer than 16 bytes. Bump MAX_PASSWORD_SIZE
to 512 to match the size that the userspace mount helper allows.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
[PG: origin vs. in 2.6.34; ses <-- pSesInfo, server <-- srvTcp ]
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit ad95c5e9bc8b5885f94dce720137cac8fa8da4c9 upstream.
Block allocation is called from two places: ext3_get_blocks_handle() and
ext3_xattr_block_set(). These two callers are not necessarily synchronized
because xattr code holds only xattr_sem and i_mutex, and
ext3_get_blocks_handle() may hold only truncate_mutex when called from
writepage() path. Block reservation code does not expect two concurrent
allocations to happen to the same inode and thus assertions can be triggered
or reservation structure corruption can occur.
Fix the problem by taking truncate_mutex in xattr code to serialize
allocations.
CC: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
Reported-by: Fyodor Ustinov <ufm@ufm.su>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit e5012d1f3861d18c7f3814e757c1c3ab3741dbcd upstream.
Attribute IDs assigned in RFC 5661 now require three bitmaps.
Fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead when getting ACLs.
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 2aa15890f3c191326678f1bd68af61ec6b8753ec upstream.
Michael Leun reported that running parallel opens on a fuse filesystem
can trigger a "kernel BUG at mm/truncate.c:475"
Gurudas Pai reported the same bug on NFS.
The reason is, unmap_mapping_range() is not prepared for more than
one concurrent invocation per inode. For example:
thread1: going through a big range, stops in the middle of a vma and
stores the restart address in vm_truncate_count.
thread2: comes in with a small (e.g. single page) unmap request on
the same vma, somewhere before restart_address, finds that the
vma was already unmapped up to the restart address and happily
returns without doing anything.
Another scenario would be two big unmap requests, both having to
restart the unmapping and each one setting vm_truncate_count to its
own value. This could go on forever without any of them being able to
finish.
Truncate and hole punching already serialize with i_mutex. Other
callers of unmap_mapping_range() do not, and it's difficult to get
i_mutex protection for all callers. In particular ->d_revalidate(),
which calls invalidate_inode_pages2_range() in fuse, may be called
with or without i_mutex.
This patch adds a new mutex to 'struct address_space' to prevent
running multiple concurrent unmap_mapping_range() on the same mapping.
[ We'll hopefully get rid of all this with the upcoming mm
preemptibility series by Peter Zijlstra, the "mm: Remove i_mmap_mutex
lockbreak" patch in particular. But that is for 2.6.39 ]
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Reported-by: Michael Leun <lkml20101129@newton.leun.net>
Reported-by: Gurudas Pai <gurudas.pai@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Gurudas Pai <gurudas.pai@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[PG: Some chunks dropped, since no ebdfed4dc5 in 34; came in at 2.6.37]
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit dac853ae89043f1b7752875300faf614de43c74b upstream.
Unconditionally changing the address limit to USER_DS and not restoring
it to its old value in the error path is wrong because it prevents us
using kernel memory on repeated calls to this function. This, in fact,
breaks the fallback of hard coded paths to the init program from being
ever successful if the first candidate fails to load.
With this patch applied switching to USER_DS is delayed until the point
of no return is reached which makes it possible to have a multi-arch
rootfs with one arch specific init binary for each of the (hard coded)
probed paths.
Since the address limit is already set to USER_DS when start_thread()
will be invoked, this redundancy can be safely removed.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 081003fff467ea0e727f66d5d435b4f473a789b3 upstream.
When marking an inode reclaimable, a per-AG counter is increased, the
inode is tagged reclaimable in its per-AG tree, and, when this is the
first reclaimable inode in the AG, the AG entry in the per-mount tree
is also tagged.
When an inode is finally reclaimed, however, it is only deleted from
the per-AG tree. Neither the counter is decreased, nor is the parent
tree's AG entry untagged properly.
Since the tags in the per-mount tree are not cleared, the inode
shrinker iterates over all AGs that have had reclaimable inodes at one
point in time.
The counters on the other hand signal an increasing amount of slab
objects to reclaim. Since "70e60ce xfs: convert inode shrinker to
per-filesystem context" this is not a real issue anymore because the
shrinker bails out after one iteration.
But the problem was observable on a machine running v2.6.34, where the
reclaimable work increased and each process going into direct reclaim
eventually got stuck on the xfs inode shrinking path, trying to scan
several million objects.
Fix this by properly unwinding the reclaimable-state tracking of an
inode when it is reclaimed.
[PG: upstream has xfs_reclaim_inode in fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_sync.c
but in 34 baseline, it is xfs_ireclaim in fs/xfs/xfs_iget.c so
drop the STATIC and add a prototype for it. ]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit fe47ae7f53e179d2ef6771024feb000cbb86640f upstream.
The lockdep warning below detects a possible A->B/B->A locking
dependency of mm->mmap_sem and dcookie_mutex. The order in
sync_buffer() is mm->mmap_sem/dcookie_mutex, while in
sys_lookup_dcookie() it is vice versa.
Fixing it in sys_lookup_dcookie() by unlocking dcookie_mutex before
copy_to_user().
oprofiled/4432 is trying to acquire lock:
(&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}, at: [<ffffffff810b444b>] might_fault+0x53/0xa3
but task is already holding lock:
(dcookie_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81124d28>] sys_lookup_dcookie+0x45/0x149
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (dcookie_mutex){+.+.+.}:
[<ffffffff8106557f>] lock_acquire+0xf8/0x11e
[<ffffffff814634f0>] mutex_lock_nested+0x63/0x309
[<ffffffff81124e5c>] get_dcookie+0x30/0x144
[<ffffffffa0000fba>] sync_buffer+0x196/0x3ec [oprofile]
[<ffffffffa0001226>] task_exit_notify+0x16/0x1a [oprofile]
[<ffffffff81467b96>] notifier_call_chain+0x37/0x63
[<ffffffff8105803d>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x50/0x67
[<ffffffff81058068>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x14/0x16
[<ffffffff8105a718>] profile_task_exit+0x1a/0x1c
[<ffffffff81039e8f>] do_exit+0x2a/0x6fc
[<ffffffff8103a5e4>] do_group_exit+0x83/0xae
[<ffffffff8103a626>] sys_exit_group+0x17/0x1b
[<ffffffff8146ad4b>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
-> #0 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}:
[<ffffffff81064dfb>] __lock_acquire+0x1085/0x1711
[<ffffffff8106557f>] lock_acquire+0xf8/0x11e
[<ffffffff810b4478>] might_fault+0x80/0xa3
[<ffffffff81124de7>] sys_lookup_dcookie+0x104/0x149
[<ffffffff8146ad4b>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
other info that might help us debug this:
1 lock held by oprofiled/4432:
#0: (dcookie_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81124d28>] sys_lookup_dcookie+0x45/0x149
stack backtrace:
Pid: 4432, comm: oprofiled Not tainted 2.6.39-00008-ge5a450d #9
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81063193>] print_circular_bug+0xae/0xbc
[<ffffffff81064dfb>] __lock_acquire+0x1085/0x1711
[<ffffffff8102ef13>] ? get_parent_ip+0x11/0x42
[<ffffffff810b444b>] ? might_fault+0x53/0xa3
[<ffffffff8106557f>] lock_acquire+0xf8/0x11e
[<ffffffff810b444b>] ? might_fault+0x53/0xa3
[<ffffffff810d7d54>] ? path_put+0x22/0x27
[<ffffffff810b4478>] might_fault+0x80/0xa3
[<ffffffff810b444b>] ? might_fault+0x53/0xa3
[<ffffffff81124de7>] sys_lookup_dcookie+0x104/0x149
[<ffffffff8146ad4b>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
References: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13809
Signed-off-by: Robert Richter <robert.richter@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 1adffbae22332bb558c2a29de19d9aca391869f6 upstream.
We are clearly missing '~' in fat_ioctl_set_attributes().
Reported-by: Dmitry Dmitriev <dimondmm@yandex.ru>
Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 812eb258311f89bcd664a34a620f249d54a2cd83 upstream.
UBIFS leaks memory on error path in 'ubifs_jnl_update()' in case of write
failure because it forgets to free the 'struct ubifs_dent_node *dent' object.
Although the object is small, the alignment can make it large - e.g., 2KiB
if the min. I/O unit is 2KiB.
Signed-off-by: Artem Bityutskiy <Artem.Bityutskiy@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit cf610bf4199770420629d3bc273494bd27ad6c1d upstream.
Sometimes VM asks the shrinker to return amount of objects it can shrink,
and we return the ubifs_clean_zn_cnt in that case. However, it is possible
that this counter is negative for a short period of time, due to the way
UBIFS TNC code updates it. And I can observe the following warnings sometimes:
shrink_slab: ubifs_shrinker+0x0/0x2b7 [ubifs] negative objects to delete nr=-8541616642706119788
This patch makes sure UBIFS never returns negative count of objects.
Signed-off-by: Artem Bityutskiy <Artem.Bityutskiy@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit eaeee242c531cd4b0a4a46e8b5dd7ef504380c42 upstream.
When re-mounting from R/O mode to R/W mode and the LEB count in the superblock
is not up-to date, because for the underlying UBI volume became larger, we
re-write the superblock. We allocate RAM for these purposes, but never free it.
So this is a memory leak, although very rare one.
Signed-off-by: Artem Bityutskiy <Artem.Bityutskiy@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 8d08dab786ad5cc2aca2bf870de370144b78c85a upstream.
The buffers allocated while encrypting and decrypting long filenames can
sometimes straddle two pages. In this situation, virt_to_scatterlist()
will return -ENOMEM, causing the operation to fail and the user will get
scary error messages in their logs:
kernel: ecryptfs_write_tag_70_packet: Internal error whilst attempting
to convert filename memory to scatterlist; expected rc = 1; got rc =
[-12]. block_aligned_filename_size = [272]
kernel: ecryptfs_encrypt_filename: Error attempting to generate tag 70
packet; rc = [-12]
kernel: ecryptfs_encrypt_and_encode_filename: Error attempting to
encrypt filename; rc = [-12]
kernel: ecryptfs_lookup: Error attempting to encrypt and encode
filename; rc = [-12]
The solution is to allow up to 2 scatterlist entries to be used.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 26626f1172fb4f3f323239a6a5cf4e082643fa46 upstream.
Add missing page_cache_release in the error path of ext4_mb_load_buddy
Signed-off-by: Yang Ruirui <ruirui.r.yang@tieto.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit d9b01934d56a96d9f4ae2d6204d4ea78a36f5f36 upstream.
If an application program does not make any changes to the indirect
blocks or extent tree, i_datasync_tid will not get updated. If there
are enough commits (i.e., 2**31) such that tid_geq()'s calculations
wrap, and there isn't a currently active transaction at the time of
the fdatasync() call, this can end up triggering a BUG_ON in
fs/jbd/commit.c:
J_ASSERT(journal->j_running_transaction != NULL);
It's pretty rare that this can happen, since it requires the use of
fdatasync() plus *very* frequent and excessive use of fsync(). But
with the right workload, it can.
We fix this by replacing the use of tid_geq() with an equality test,
since there's only one valid transaction id that is valid for us to
start: namely, the currently running transaction (if it exists).
Reported-by: Martin_Zielinski@McAfee.com
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 2842bb20eed2e25cde5114298edc62c8883a1d9a upstream.
In do_get_write_access() we wait on BH_Unshadow bit for buffer to get
from shadow state. The waking code in journal_commit_transaction() has
a bug because it does not issue a memory barrier after the buffer is moved
from the shadow state and before wake_up_bit() is called. Thus a waitqueue
check can happen before the buffer is actually moved from the shadow state
and waiting process may never be woken. Fix the problem by issuing proper
barrier.
Reported-by: Tao Ma <boyu.mt@taobao.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 86c4f6d85595cd7da635dc6985d27bfa43b1ae10 upstream.
When make_indexed_dir() fails (e.g. because of ENOSPC) after it has allocated
block for index tree root, we did not properly mark all changed buffers dirty.
This lead to only some of these buffers being written out and thus effectively
corrupting the directory.
Fix the issue by marking all changed data dirty even in the error failure case.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 338d0f0a6fbc82407864606f5b64b75aeb3c70f2 upstream.
Signed-off-by: Timo Warns <warns@pre-sense.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 3eb8e74ec72736b9b9d728bad30484ec89c91dde upstream.
The kernel automatically evaluates partition tables of storage devices.
The code for evaluating GUID partitions (in fs/partitions/efi.c) contains
a bug that causes a kernel oops on certain corrupted GUID partition
tables.
This bug has security impacts, because it allows, for example, to
prepare a storage device that crashes a kernel subsystem upon connecting
the device (e.g., a "USB Stick of (Partial) Death").
crc = efi_crc32((const unsigned char *) (*gpt), le32_to_cpu((*gpt)->header_size));
computes a CRC32 checksum over gpt covering (*gpt)->header_size bytes.
There is no validation of (*gpt)->header_size before the efi_crc32 call.
A corrupted partition table may have large values for (*gpt)->header_size.
In this case, the CRC32 computation access memory beyond the memory
allocated for gpt, which may cause a kernel heap overflow.
Validate value of GUID partition table header size.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix layout and indenting]
[PG: replace state->bdev with bdev, since 1493bf217f7f isn't in 34]
Signed-off-by: Timo Warns <warns@pre-sense.de>
Cc: Matt Domsch <Matt_Domsch@dell.com>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.sg>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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commit 221d1d797202984cb874e3ed9f1388593d34ee22 upstream.
The is_path_accessible check uses a QPathInfo call, which isn't
supported by ancient win9x era servers. Fall back to an older
SMBQueryInfo call if it fails with the magic error codes.
Reported-and-Tested-by: Sandro Bonazzola <sandro.bonazzola@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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